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My PhD project engages in a micro-level examination of the institutional character and 
knowledge work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), maps the 
judicialisation of climate change in terms of the evaluation and certification of climate 
science by domestic courts, and considers the role of climate litigants (e.g. 
environmental NGOs and future generations) in terms of the cross-fertilisation of 
science-driven argumentation and advocacy strategies across numerous jurisdictions. 
More specifically, by undertaking a detailed examination and analysis of salient climate 
change lawsuits which embody substantive discussions about climate science, my PhD 
thesis argues that through the production, certification and use of climate science in 
litigation, the IPCC, domestic courts and litigants are co-producing a new and emergent 
body of transnational law and jurisprudence on climate change. Since this is largely 
judge-made law, I posit that it can be thought of as a kind of co-produced ‘transnational 
climate change case law.’ I apply a Science and Technology Studies (STS) lens to frame 
my analysis of climate science as a form of applied science and trans-science and argue 
that the work of the IPCC, courts and litigants in relation to climate change can be 
regarded as a complex network of interactive relationships and hybridised knowledge 
practices, including: i) science-policy co-production; ii) science-policy-law co-
production; and iii) science-law co-production, respectively. This new body of 
transnational climate change case law is the byproduct of epistemic interactions between 
these three principal actors, which are circumventing traditional executive and 
legislative processes. This dynamic signifies a shift away from a purely statist 
conception of climate change regulation which is largely consistent with the 
transnationalisation of environmental regulation and law writ large in recent years.  
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I. Project Context 
In a pioneering speech before a US Senate Committee on 23 June 1988, and amid 
searing record-breaking temperatures, James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute 
kick-started a global conversation on climate change, which gained traction and paved 
the way for international recognition of the problem at the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio. Sounding a clarion call for climate action, 
Hansen urged that the evidence on anthropogenic global warming was now 
overwhelming and warned of the likelihood of a 2.5C temperature rise by the end of 
the 21st century.1 A leader in the climate science community, Hansen also stands out for 
his personal activism on climate change. He is a staunch proponent of placing a high 
price on carbon and pursuing ‘a wave of lawsuits’ against governments and corporations 
for causing planetary destruction and violating the rights of future generations.2 He has 
also appeared as a plaintiff and expert witness in several climate change lawsuits.  
 
To such scientific advocacy can be added the growing civil society momentum around 
climate action in recent years and the vocalisation of the intergenerational imperative to 
address the problem by emergent youth and ‘future generation’ climate movements, as 
exemplified by youth climate protests around the world in March 2019.  In April 2019, 
 
1 Phil Shabecoff, ‘Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate’ New York Times (New York, 24 
June 1988) <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells-
senate.html> accessed 10 May 2019.  
2 Jonathan Watts, 'We should be on the offensive' – James Hansen calls for wave of climate lawsuits’ The 
Guardian (17 November 2017) <https//www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/17/we-should-be-
on-the-offensive-james-hansen-calls-for-wave-of-climate-lawsuits> accessed on 10 May 2019.     
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protests in London by the organisation Extinction Rebellion – the largest act of civil 
disobedience in modern British history3 – culminated in a UK parliamentary declaration 
of a ‘climate emergency.’ In the United States, the recently tabled Congressional climate 
change bill, the Green New Deal, continues to poll favourably with 43% of the public.4  
Indeed, climate change has attained a level of mainstream prominence and a purchase 
on the public imagination such that it is likely to influence the outcome of future election 
cycles in many countries. These developments have prompted Bill McKibben and others 
to declare that we are in “a climate moment” around the globe.5 Such epistemic-political 
interventions from the scientific community and civil society actors have become part-
and-parcel of the transnational regulatory landscape on climate change and, as will be 
shown, have considerable power to shape and influence legal and policy responses to 
the issue. Litigation forms an important prong of global civil society’s climate action 
matrix. The projected exponential growth of climate change lawsuits globally over the 
next few decades also accounts for a high level of scholarly interest in the topic. 
 
Climate litigation has been recognised as, at least in part, a response to the glacial pace 
of climate change regulation at the international level and its identification as a 
polycentric problem that needs to be addressed at multiple levels of governance.6 Over 
 
3 Charlie J. Gardner & Claire F.R. Wordley, ‘Scientists must act on our own warnings to humanity’ 
(2019) 3 Nature Ecology & Evolution 1, 1271.  
4 National Green Advocacy Project Polling, ‘Green New Deal’ (5-6 March 2019) 
<https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1EZVcFhUBfZU6i6VoGJYwH9BRJ6bSSjCL2v6B8-
pR8Sw/edit#slide=id.g568bd88eea_0_0> accessed 14 May 2019.  
5 Bill McKibben, ‘We’ve run out of elections to waste – this is the last chance to make a difference on 
climate change,’ The Guardian (14 May 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/14/weve-run-out-of-elections-to-waste-this-is-
the-last-chance-to-make-a-difference-on-climate-change > accessed 14 May 2019.  
6 William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky (eds), Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and 
International Approaches (CUP 2005) 20; Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, “Climate Change 
Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia,” (2013) 
35 Law & Policy 3; Elizabeth Fisher & Eloise Scotford, “Climate Change Adjudication: The Need to 
Foster Legal Capacity: an editorial comment,” (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 3. 
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the past decade, litigation has developed into a core strategy for civil society actors in 
their efforts to bring about regulatory reform on climate change. Stalled international 
and domestic regulation has prompted actors to move away from and seek regulatory 
solutions to climate change beyond traditional treaty, executive and legislative 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the UNFCCC regime’s shift in focus towards the national 
level, as embodied by the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) architecture of 
the 2015 Paris Agreement, has provided civil society with an additional and concrete 
basis for holding governments and corporations accountable in domestic courts. Against 
this backdrop, litigation (at the national and subnational levels) has assumed a new 
regulatory significance and forms part of the growing trend towards the transnational 
regulation of climate change.7  
 
Regulation is understood here in accordance with Heyvaert’s definition of the term as 
“the deliberate exercise of influence on a target’s behaviour (designed to either stabilize 
or modify this behaviour), performed with a certain degree of authority and 
persistence.”8 Transnational environmental regulation (TER) is regulation undertaken 
by a range of actors beyond the nation-state and “characterized by the pronounced and 
substantive involvement of non-state actors.”9 One of the major catalysts for TER is the 
proliferation of global environmental risks like climate change.10 Furthermore, 
multilateral environmental agreements like the UNFCCC increasingly depend on “non-
state actors and transnational networks for the effective articulation and implementation 
 
7 W.C.G.Burns & H.Osofsky (eds), n6, 20.  
8 Veerle Heyvaert, ‘The Transnationalization of Law: Rethinking Law Through Transnational 
Environmental Regulation’ (2017) 6 Transnational Environmental Law 2, 208.  
9 Ibid, 206.  
10 Ibid, 207; J.B. Wiener, ‘Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context’ 
(1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 4. 
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of their regulatory goals.”11 Regulation is also understood here as “a sub-set of the 
broader category of governance, which comprises ‘all processes and institutions, both 
formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of the group.’”12 
More specifically, transnational climate governance occurs when “networks operating 
in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals”13 such 
as mitigation and adaptation. This is also alternatively referred to as a global climate 
regime complex and understood in terms of multi-level and multi-spatial networks (i.e. 
networked governance).14 These governance networks involve constellations of both 
state (e.g. government agencies) and non-state actors (e.g. corporations and 
environmental NGOs) performing regulatory activities both within and beyond the 
nation-state.15  
 
As a form of regulation,16 climate litigation functions as an integral and constitutive 
component of transnational climate governance. While not all climate litigation can be 
considered transnational in scope, many of the high-profile cases selected for discussion 
in this PhD project involve epistemic communities17 and transnational networks of 
climate scientists, courts and ENGO litigants and have a significant or an outsized 
transnational impact, including the ability to inspire analogous efforts across other 
 
11 V.Heyvaert, n8, 207.  
12 Ibid, 208; Douglas Kysar, ‘Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance’ (2005) 83 
Texas Law Review 7, 2145.  
13 Liliana B. Andonova, Michelle M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, ‘Transnational Climate Governance’ 
(2009) 9 Global Environmental Politics 2, 56. 
14 Timothy Cadman (ed), Climate Change and Global Policy Regimes: Towards Institutional Legitimacy 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
15 L.B.Andonova et al, n13 , 56, 59.  
16 J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6, 26. 
17 Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as a network of professionals with recognised expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue area. They share a set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-
based rationale for the social action of community members, causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a 
common policy enterprise. See Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international 
policy coordination’ (1992) 46 International Organization 1, 3. 
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jurisdictions. These comprise lawsuits that have climate justice and rights-based claims 
at their core, such as NGO-driven public interest litigation in Urgenda v The 
Netherlands18 and Juliana et al v USA.19 In addition, this PhD project largely considers 
the knowledge-based activities of scientific, judicial and litigant networks and 
understands them as actors involved in transnational climate governance due to their 
important epistemic contributions to climate science and climate litigation.     
 
While many climate change lawsuits have diverse motivations and aims, pioneers in this 
area of environmental law research, Hari Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel, opine that they 
fall into two overarching categories: i) disputes over the appropriate role of governments 
in regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and; ii) efforts to force major corporate 
emitters to reduce their emissions.20 They argue that climate litigation is both a catalyst 
for regulation and itself a new form of regulation.21 These legal scholars have been 
predominantly concerned with mapping the direct and indirect regulatory role of climate 
litigation, mainly in the United States and Australia.22  
 
Several important findings emerge from their extensive study of these two jurisdictions. 
First, they develop a useful typology of the direct and indirect regulatory impacts of 
climate change litigation. The former category involves judicial acts of interpreting and 
extending the application of environmental legislation and common law obligations to 
encompass climate harms and the regulation of GHG emissions, as exemplified by the 
 
18 Stichting Urgenda v Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396.  
19 Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (2016) Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-
TC, 4. 
20 J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6, 26. 
21 Ibid; J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6; Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Litigation: 
Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (CUP 2015). 
22 J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6.  
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landmark US Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts v EPA.23 Similarly, in the recent 
Dutch Urgenda lawsuit, the Hague District Court extended the application of tort law to 
the regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.24 Indirect regulatory influences of 
climate litigation include raising public awareness about climate change, providing an 
incentive for corporate actors to adopt climate friendly practices to avoid lawsuits, 
motivating social movements to campaign for climate action, and influencing 
governments to adopt regulation.25 Secondly, they identify an increasing focus on 
adaptation in both jurisdictions, particularly Australia.26 Finally, they argue that 
common law tort suits have a limited direct regulatory impact as compared with 
statutory suits, with judicial acts of statutory interpretation often having both direct and 
indirect policy consequences.27 They further posit that many climate change cases filed 
around the world following the adoption of the Paris Agreement have involved rights 
claims and are thereby constitutive of a ‘rights turn’ in climate litigation.28  
 
Academic literature on climate litigation is in a growth phase and remains largely 
concentrated in the hands of legal scholars.29 Conducting a systematic review of 130 
articles on climate change litigation from law and the social sciences from 2000 to 2018, 
Setzer and Vanhala identify four key themes in the literature to date: i) the relationship 
between climate change litigation and legislation; ii) the relationship between litigation, 
scales and time; iii) the relationship between climate litigation and science; and iv) the 
 
23 J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6, 154. 
24 Urgenda, n18.   
25 J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6, 157.  
26 Ibid, 171-172.  
27 Ibid, 173. 
28 Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018) 7 
Transnational Environmental Law 1.  
29 Joana Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, ‘Climate change litigation: A review of research on courts and 
litigants in climate governance’ (2019) 10 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 3.  
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relationship between climate litigation and human rights.30 Building on Peel and 
Osofsky’s work, a large cluster of legal studies exemplifies the first of these themes and 
examines the influence of climate litigation on regulation. These have tended to focus 
on: i) how litigation is reshaping climate change policymaking at multiple levels of 
governance; ii) how litigation serves to raise awareness about the plight of communities 
vulnerable to and affected by climate change and; iii) whether courts are increasingly 
assuming a de facto gap-filling regulatory role in the face of executive and legislative 
inaction.31 Of the four themes identified by Setzer and Vanhala, research examining the 
relationship between climate litigation and climate science remains among the most 
under-developed. My research seeks to bridge this significant knowledge gap by 
examining the relationship between climate science and climate law in both pre-
litigation and litigation contexts. The following section discusses my research question 
and provides a rationale for the project’s focus on the relationship between climate 
science and climate litigation. Section III outlines my central claim and the academic 
contribution my PhD project seeks to make to the literature on transnational 
environmental law and climate litigation. Section IV specifies the methods that I employ 
to answer the research question. The fifth and final section provides an overview of the 





30 Setzer et al, n29, 7-11.  
31 Brian J. Preston, ‘The Contribution of Courts in Tackling Climate Change’ (2016) 28 Journal of 
Environmental Law 1; Lisa Vanhala & Chris Hilson, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Symposium 
Introduction’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3; Lisa Vanhala, ‘The comparative politics of climate change 
litigation’ (2013) 2 Environmental Politics 3; David B. Hunter, ‘The Implications of Climate Change 
Litigation: Litigation for International Law-Making’ in W.C.G. Burns and H.M. Osofsky (eds), n5; 
David Markell & J.B.Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in the United States’ 
(2010) 40 Environmental Law Reporter 10644; Jolene Lin, ‘Climate Change and the Courts’ (2012) 32 
Legal Studies 1.  
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II. Research Question & Project Rationale 
 
The overarching research question that I have chosen to engage with in my PhD project 
is as follows: What is the role of climate science in shaping climate litigation? To 
address and unpack this question, I engage in three main tiers of analysis, looking at 
how the knowledge base on climate change is: i) produced and synthesised by the IPCC; 
ii) translated and certified by domestic courts, and; iii) mobilised and transformed by 
litigants. 
 
Why focus on the relationship between climate science and climate litigation?  
The role of climate science and expertise in shaping the dynamics of climate litigation 
is a topic that has largely been neglected by the legal literature on the subject. While 
several academic studies on climate change consider the role of climate science in 
litigation,32 work that specifically examines the role that climate science plays in 
shaping climate litigation is relatively rare. Graeme Hayes investigates how social 
movement actors mobilise expert testimonies in British and French criminal trials 
involving climate change issues.33 Elizabeth Fisher looks at academic expertise in 
climate change litigation, identifying factors behind the growth of legal academic 
interest in the issue and its implications for future scholarship.34 Sophie Marjanac and 
Lindene Patton contend that emerging ‘extreme weather event attribution science’ may 
 
32 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Issues in Climate Change Litigation’ (2011) 5 Carbon and Climate Law Review 1; 
Hari M. Osofsky, ‘The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA’ (2007) 101 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 62; Josephine van Zeben, 
‘Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the 
Tide?’ (2015) 4 Transnational Environmental Law 2; Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer & Veerle 
Heyvaert, ‘If At First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 4.  
33 Graeme Hayes, ‘Negotiating Proximity: Expert Testimony and Collective Memory in the Trials of 
Environmental Activists in France and the United Kingdom’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3, 209. 
34 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsessions, and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly 
Response to Massachusetts v. EPA’ (2013) 35 Law and Policy 3, 236.  
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become a driver of climate litigation, making it increasingly possible to satisfy legal 
causation (i.e. foreseeability) requirements and reframe governmental and corporate 
duties of care in relation to climate adaptation.35 With these notable exceptions, there is 
no legal scholarship that specifically examines how scientific and other bodies of expert 
knowledge on climate change are mobilised by actors through transnational networking 
initiatives and climate litigation. Moreover (and except for Marjanac and Patton), these 
studies do not examine the nexus and relationship between the production of climate 
science, its use in pre-litigation (i.e. within transnational judicial and litigant networks) 
and litigation (i.e. before domestic courts). By and large, they also do not consider the 
ways in which parallel developments in climate science and climate litigation influence 
one another and are mutually serving to transform existing legal and scientific 
frameworks on climate change. It is precisely this under-theorised dynamic that I seek 
to map.  
 
Climate litigation is fertile ground for examining how particular knowledge claims and 
narratives of climate change are produced, legitimated, and empowered. There is 
growing interest not only in how the technoscientific narrative of climate change is 
produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), but also how it is 
imbued with legitimacy by policymakers, courts and litigants. In short, what are the 
wider implications of a dominant technoscientific narrative for policymaking and 
devising regulatory responses to climate change? Focusing on climate litigation and the 
intersections between scientific, policy, and legal processes allows us to interrogate and 
understand how particular knowledge claims achieve legitimacy, shape and influence 
 
35 Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, ‘Extreme weather event attribution science and climate change 
litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?’ (2018) 36 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 
3.  
 17 
policies and regulatory responses, or ultimately fail. I argue that an examination of the 
relationship between the IPCC, national courts and litigants provides pertinent insights 
in this regard. Much scholarly attention has already been devoted to examining the role 
of courts with respect to climate change. Courts are being thought of as “battlefields in 
climate fights”36 and, as Osofsky notes, “have become a critical forum in which the 
future of greenhouse gas emission regulation and responsibility are debated.”37  
 
Northern industrialised states have a built-in structural preference for evidence-based 
policymaking (as driven by the informational demands of risk assessment and 
management procedures) on a host of issues including, but not limited to climate change. 
The privileging of science and technology or ‘STEM’ research as a knowledge base for 
policymaking and regulation is not new and has long been the norm within these 
societies. However, as Von Storch points out, “it is no longer being scientific that is 
important. It is the political utility of knowledge claims that carry the day. Such claims 
must also be imbued with social acceptance and social utility.”38 Litigation can be 
regarded as one important mechanism through which climate change knowledge claims 
and climate science narratives are gaining wider social utility.  
 
The deep political divisions on climate change have epistemic foundations. The battles 
being waged over climate change regulation are, at their core, epistemic ones, whereby 
competing knowledge claims are vying for supremacy. While it would prima facie 
 
36 John Schwartz, ‘Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights,’ New York Times (27 January 2010) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/energy-environment/27lawsuits.html> accessed 5 July 
2017.  
37 Hari M. Osofsky, ‘The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation’ (2010) 1 Climate Law 3.  
38 Hans Von Storch, Armin Bunde & Nico Stehr, ‘The Physical Sciences and Climate Politics’ in John S. 
Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard & David Schlosberg (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and 
Society (OUP 2011) 123.  
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appear that the general question on the anthropogenic causes of climate change has been 
settled by the IPCC’s scientific consensus,39 skepticism about the pronouncements and 
continuing role of climate science and the IPCC prevails in the United States. This 
skepticism also permeates some US climate litigation scenarios, which I characterise as 
another site of knowledge contestation within the broader climate change regime 
complex.40 My PhD thesis seeks to elucidate the ways in which key actors in climate 
litigation proceedings mobilise climate science and expertise. Much of the existing 
scholarship on the relationship between science and law in environmental litigation 
understandably focuses on the judicial treatment of scientific evidence.41 In contrast, my 
PhD project adopts a wider gaze and investigates not only how courts co-produce and 
legitimate the knowledge base on climate change, but also how other key actors in 
climate litigation proceedings harness climate science to argue their claims and lobby 
for regulatory change.  
 
Climate litigation is of interest as a new medium through which knowledge claims and 
narratives about climate change are pitted against one another and locked in a struggle 
for legitimacy. Climate science has been subject to both scholarly critiques of epistemic 
hegemony and monopolism from the left (including constructivist fields such as Science 
and Technology Studies or ‘STS’) and denialist challenges from right-wing, 
 
39 IPCC, ‘Fifth Assessment Report: The Physical Science Basis’ (2013) < 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/> accessed 12 May 2019.  
40 Climate change governance is alternatively referred to as a global climate regime complex and 
understood in terms of multi-level and multi-spatial networks (i.e. networked governance). Timothy 
Cadman (ed), Climate Change and Global Policy Regimes: Towards Institutional Legitimacy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013).  
41 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law & Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas Law Review 
1723; J.van Zeben, n32; J.Peel, n32; H.M. Osofsky, n37; Brian J. Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation (Part 
1)’ (2011) 1 Climate Change Law Review 3. 
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conservative and libertarian movements in the US.42 These actors have all levelled 
accusations against the IPCC and its collaborators (climate scientists generally from 
Northern universities or institutions) with respect to methodological deficiencies, 
concentrating their ire on imperfect data derived from Global Circulation Models 
(GCMs) and prevailing scientific uncertainties. The IPCC has also faced criticism for 
its lack of geographical diversity (particularly for under-representing developing 
country perspectives) and gender diversity and representativeness. Climate science and 
the work of the IPCC is therefore plagued by this double-bind, perpetually failing to 
satisfy critics from both the left and right sides of the political spectrum. Examining 
climate litigation allows us to get a sense of the various ways in which climate science 
narratives are being mobilised and transmitted through legal proceedings by scientists, 
courts and litigants to influence regulatory reform on climate change. 
 
I examine and unpack this undertheorised epistemic-political dimension of climate 
change litigation in order to determine the following: i) does the use of climate science 
affect legal processes such as litigation and adjudication; ii) is the judicial treatment of 
climate science and IPCC reports unique or markedly different from the judicial 
treatment of scientific evidence in other cases; and iii) might the IPCC’s scientific 
consensus and epistemic authority present opportunities for other actors such as courts 





42 See Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured 
the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (Bloomsbury Press 2011); Sheila Jasanoff, 
‘A New Climate for Society’ (2010) 27 Theory, Culture & Society 233. 
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III. Central Claims  
 
Based on a review and analysis of climate change litigation, I argue that through the 
production, certification and use of climate science in litigation, scientists, courts and 
litigants are co-producing a new and emergent transnational body of case law and 
legal practice. This is not an enacted body of law in the traditional sense, but 
comprises “convergent currents of foreign statutes, foreign constitutional provisions 
and foreign precedents [that] sometimes add up to a body of law that has its own 
claim on us as ‘law in the world.’”43 My claim is not about a universal law of climate 
change, in the sense of emerging norms of customary international law. It is therefore 
premised on the understanding that not all states have to be participants in its 
development. However, this does not negate the fact that a transnational body of 
climate change legal practice and jurisprudence is nonetheless emerging because of 
significant inter-jurisdictional borrowing and cross-fertilisation between courts and 
litigants from many different countries.   
 
I also do not claim that this body of transnational climate change case law and practice 
is absolute and leaves no scope for local differentiation. This position aligns with and 
is supported by a prominent strand of environmental legal scholarship which 
emphasises the simultaneous presence of transnationalism and localism in 
transboundary legal developments, rather than presenting such developments as 
mutually exclusive.44 Scholars of transnational environmental law like Penca espouse 
the idea of ‘transnational localism,’ which is defined as the “reinforcement of local-
 
43 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 129, 
132; Neil Duxbury, ‘The Law of the Land’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 1, 41. 
44 Jerneja Penca, ‘Transnational Localism: Empowerment through Standard Setting in Small-Scale 
Fisheries’ (2019) 8 Transnational Environmental Law 1.  
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specific approaches (reflecting local ecologies, values, and socio-economic 
specificities) within a transnational structure that provides support and recognition.”45 
Concurrently tethered to both international and domestic legal (UNFCCC/Paris 
Agreement) and epistemic frameworks (IPCC science), nationally-situated climate 
litigation aptly exemplifies this idea of transnational localism.  
 
I have overwhelmingly analysed climate litigation in states from both the Global 
North and South that are constitutional democracies,46 which makes comparisons 
between them possible. I have therefore consciously excluded discussions of climate 
litigation in authoritarian states like China because they are inapt comparators.47  This 
is because Chinese climate litigation is currently limited to “contract-based civil 
actions steered by the government’s low-carbon policies” and therefore does not 
currently resemble the forms of strategic climate litigation that exist in other 
jurisdictions.48 Rather, my claim is more focused on a transnational climate change 
case law which is being developed by and between a cluster of constitutional 
democratic states (i.e. via non-hierarchical, horizontal relationships) through climate 
 
45 J.Penca, n44, 143.  
46 ‘Constitutional democracy’ is understood here as a system of government by the people who choose 
their representatives through free and fair elections and where the exercise of public authority by 
elected representatives is organised and regulated in accordance with a constitution (whether written 
or unwritten). A constitution imposes a set of necessary constraints (e.g. checks and balances; 
separation of powers etc.) on the exercise of public authority to prevent abuses of power. It is also a 
system of government in accordance with the rule of law, which is designed to ensure the protection 
of minority rights; See Laura Burgers, ‘Should Judges Make Climate Change Law?’ (2020) 9 
Transnational Environmental Law 1; J.van Zeben, n32. 
47 For a good discussion of Chinese climate litigation, see Yue Zhao, Shuang Liu and Zhu Wang, 
‘Prospects for Climate Change Litigation in China’ (2019) 8 Transnational Environmental Law 2. 
Similarly, for a discussion of Russian climate litigation see Y. Yamineva, ‘Opportunities for Climate 
Litigation in Russia: The Impossibility of the Possible’ in M. Moise Mbengue and F. Sindico (eds.) 
Comparative Climate Change Litigation: Beyond the Usual Suspects (Springer, forthcoming). These 
scholars have all observed that courts do not play a significant role in legitimating concerns about 
climate change as their counterparts in the US, EU and Australia.  
48 Y.Zhao et al, Ibid, 349.  
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litigation, particularly by reference to IPCC assessments and the Paris Agreement 
which are universally applicable common denominators.  
 
The new and emerging body of legal practice and jurisprudence emanating from recent 
iterations of climate litigation is a hybrid byproduct of interactions between science and 
law; what Marilyn Strathern calls an epistemic transfer affecting the very knowledge 
base(s) of both.49 Experts talk to each other to solve problems which cannot be addressed 
by one approach alone. This is not just interdisciplinarity, which still implies bounded 
disciplines, but a form of ‘transdisciplinarity’ – the idea that disciplinary boundaries can 
be transcended altogether to produce hybrid outcomes in response to a problem of 
collective concern.50  
 
Constitutive elements of transnational climate change case law 
These transdisciplinary interactions are contributing to the transnationalisation of law 
on climate change. Marking a departure from traditional modes of lawmaking, this shift 
in climate change governance is consistent with Fisher, Scotford and Barritt’s claim that 
climate change is a polycentric problem which is legally disruptive. 51 Consequently, 
they argue that “climate change-related disputes do not fit easily into existing doctrinal 
paradigms” such as standing, human rights and tort law.52 I argue that one response or 
side-effect of this legal disruption has been the emergence of a new transnational body 
of legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change.  
 
 
49 Marilyn Strathern, ‘A Community of Critics? Thoughts on new knowledge’ (2006) 12 The Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute 1, 196. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford & Emily Barritt, ‘The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change’ 
(2017) 80 Modern Law Review 2, 173.  
52 Ibid, 189-190. 
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The common constitutive features of transnational climate change case law and legal 
practice include the following: i) common litigants or parties: repeat players with a 
multinational presence and personality such as fossil fuel companies and environmental 
NGOs; ii) the invocation and cross-citation of foreign precedents by certain courts and 
litigants: this is currently most apparent in constitutional contexts53; iii) universal 
membership of the Paris Agreement and its invocation in several climate change 
lawsuits post-201554 and; iv) reliance upon and application of universal climate science 
as exemplified by the fact that many of these lawsuits feature IPCC assessments, which 
have become a common denominator and evidentiary baseline. The latter involves 
“processes of doctrinal evolution”55 whereby judges are applying IPCC climate science 
to transform, update and adapt existing legal doctrines to address climate change. It is 
also characterised by litigants’ deployment of structurally convergent and recurrent 
patterns of climate science-backed legal argumentation with respect to causation, 
fundamental rights violations and the public trust doctrine.  
 
What are the regulatory implications of this emergent transnational climate change case 
law? Are judges making decisions that are regulatory in nature (i.e. policy)? One reason 
legal scholars might be concerned about this development may be the significant 
implications for state sovereignty and the separation of powers in constitutional 
 
53 Judges are increasingly paying attention to climate change developments in jurisdictions around the 
world. Cases like Juliana et al v USA have paved the way and inspired analogous constitutional lawsuits 
elsewhere. See Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (2016) Case No. 
6:15-cv-01517-TC, 4. Other examples include the Pakistani case, Ashgar Leghari v Federation of 
Pakistan (W.P. No. 25501/2015) and the Colombian lawsuit Future Generation v Ministry of the 
Environment & Others, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: Columbia Law School, ‘Climate Case 
Chart’ (2018) <http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-
others/> accessed 23 April 2019.  
54 Anna-Julia Saiger, ‘Domestic Courts and the Paris Agreement’s Climate Goals: The Need for a 
Comparative Approach’ (2020) 9 Transnational Environmental Law 1.  
55 E.Fisher et al, n51, 190. 
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democracies.56 Another is that it potentially constitutes a new form of climate change 
regulation. My research is primarily concerned with the latter. Members of the public 
are beginning to make interventions on climate change by turning to national courts and 
using litigation to drive regulatory change through science-led advocacy and 
argumentation about state and corporate responsibility for climate change. This may be 
partly due to the relatively less corruptible character of the judiciary in many countries, 
including the US where the executive and legislature remain highly susceptible to 
lobbying influence and regulatory capture by special interests.57 Against this backdrop, 
it is therefore unsurprising that courts have assumed a new kind of regulatory 
significance for private citizens and civil society actors as alternative fora through which 
to advance pro-regulatory climate (i.e. mitigation and adaptation) agendas. It is not 
entirely borne out that such judicial interventions are inherently undemocratic since 
courts are directly responding to citizens’ demands for climate action and remediation, 
particularly where legislative and executive responses have been suboptimal or 
deficient.58   
 
I argue that this is a new kind of regulatory intervention in the face of an issue as 
unprecedented and consequential as climate change. Climate litigation may be driving 
the creation of a new public sphere which currently looks exclusively technocratic, but 
also highlights the inception of a new kind of politics. Swedlow posits that when it 
comes to environmental management, we are witnessing a rise of collectivist cultures 
and a corresponding decline of individualistic cultures.59 There is some evidence for the 
 
56 See J.van Zeben, n32; Laura Burgers, ‘Should Judges Make Climate Law?’ (2020) 9 Transnational 
Environmental Law 1.  
57 J.Watts, n2.  
58 L.Burgers, n56, 2, 21. 
59 Brendan Swedlow, ‘Three Cultural Boundaries of Science, Institutions and Policy: A Cultural Theory 
of Boundary Work, Co-production and Change’ (2017) 34 Review of Policy Research 839.  
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former in terms of the proliferation of environmental groups which vigorously oppose 
industrial activity (i.e. logging, deforestation, mining, and fossil fuel exploitation). 
Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter Six, ENGOs have emerged as a powerful and 
prominent category of climate litigant, bringing enormous pressure to bear on 
governments and enterprises around the world to comply with their climate change 
obligations and provide compensation and adaptation-related redress for climatic harms.   
 
Furthermore, the triangulated dynamic of boundary work and knowledge co-production 
between climate scientists, national courts and litigants signifies a momentous shift in 
transnational climate change governance. This co-produced transnational body of 
jurisprudence and legal practice emerging out of newer waves of climate litigation is 
also resulting in the enforcement of international law in some instances (i.e. state 
obligations under the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, European Convention on Human 
Rights etc. as exemplified by the Urgenda decisions,60Plan B Earth v Secretary of State 
(Heathrow Third Runway Case)61 and Greenpeace Norway v Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy.62 I argue that this is a distinct new development and an emerging body of 
transnational legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change because of the high 
degree of structural convergence and cross-fertilisation between climate change cases 
across different jurisdictions. This specifically involves the recurrent judicial validation 
of IPCC assessments and strikingly similar patterns of argumentation employed by 
 
60 Urgenda Foundation v Netherlands (‘Urgenda I’), n19; Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation (The 
Hague Court of Appeal, 200.178.245/01, 9 October 2018) (‘Urgenda II’). For an unofficial English 
translation of the decision see, <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2018/20181009_2015-HAZA-
C0900456689_decision.pdf>; Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation (‘Urgenda III’)(The Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands, 19/00135, 20 December 2019) [unofficial English translation]; See A-J. Saiger, n54.  
61 Greenpeace Norway v Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Borgarting Court of Appeal, No. 18-
060499ASD-BORG/03, 23 January 2020). 
62 R (on application of Plan B Earth and Others) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA 
(Civ) 214. 
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litigants around salient issues like causation, fundamental rights and public trust which 
are based on identical or analogous science (i.e. IPCC or national assessments).  
 
Mapping these developments in climate litigation around the world, I also argue that the 
recurrent judicial treatment and invocation of IPCC assessments amounts to a tacit 
admission by some courts in certain high profile climate change cases that all physical 
science on climate change (which is IPCC-accredited) is potentially relevant and 
admissible. In common law jurisdictions like the US, this might significantly disrupt 
traditional legal rules of evidence and procedure which are typically geared towards 
resolving legal questions that arise in a case and are contingent on its specific factual 
scenario. In climate litigation, general and specific causal enquiries remain inextricable 
and on a continuum. More specifically, the empirical reality of climate change is 
universal, which means that many climate change cases are likely to unfold along a 
similar causal trajectory and then telescope into specific causal enquiries involving 
attribution of localised harm. Chapters Four and Five on the judicial treatment of climate 
science examine this dynamic between general and specific causation enquiries. 
Critically, in contrast to other areas of litigation, climate litigation implicates and is 
always tethered to both universal scientific (IPCC assessments) and legal frameworks 
(i.e. the UNFCCC regime and Paris Agreement). In this regard, it lends itself more easily 
to a transnational framing as a body of global case law and precedent that has wider 
resonance and application across jurisdictions despite the structural-legal differences 
between them (i.e. common law versus civil law countries). Chapters Four to Six explore 
and map these dynamics in considerable detail.  
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On a crude reading, this recent triangulation of epistemic-regulatory authority between 
the IPCC, national courts and litigants may be considered a capitulation to and victory 
for technocracy. However, what these various actors in climate litigation are doing also 
goes beyond boundary work, since there is an outward expansion of disciplinary 
boundaries into a new sphere of hybridised knowledge-making and regulation. I propose 
that these actors are in fact participating in the creation of a new conceptual space that 
is not purely technocratic. Rather, it is also a domain of collective action and a new kind 
of climate politics, because civil society litigants are harnessing and applying the 
knowledge that is produced and certified by the IPCC and courts, respectively, to drive 
regulatory change outside traditional legislative and executive processes. This is not 
inherently antithetical to democracy. Rather, it may be considered a new and innovative 
way of meaningfully responding to the demands of the demos for climate action and 
remediation. Indeed, recent scholarship on climate litigation argues that within the 
specific context of constitutional democracies, the climate litigation trend “is likely to 
influence the democratic legitimacy of judicial lawmaking on climate change, as it 
indicates an increasing realization that a sound environment constitutes a constitutional 
matter and is therefore a pre-requisite for democracy [emphasis added].”63 
 
IV. Research Methods  
 
In order to address my research question, I employ an interdisciplinary and mixed 




63 L.Burgers, n56, 2.  
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Use of an STS Framework 
First, my research establishes a theoretical framework for analysing knowledge 
production on climate change. To that end, it draws upon social science scholarship, 
mainly STS and constructivist studies of science, which have developed useful 
analytic categories and tools for understanding the knowledge work of organisations 
at the science-policy interface such as the IPCC. These include, inter alia, the 
Latourian framework of Actor Network Theory (ANT) and concepts like boundary 
organisation, boundary work, hybrid management, and co-production.64  
 
I use this STS-constructivist framework to analyse the knowledge practices of the 
IPCC, domestic courts and climate litigants both within networking contexts outside 
the courtroom and formal legal proceedings within the courtroom. I make novel use 
of this interdisciplinary framework to argue that climate science is being co-produced 
by these key actors at multiple sites. Firstly, it is being co-produced within the IPCC 
by scientific and interdisciplinary working groups that include scientists, social 
scientists, legal and policy professionals, through iterative assessment cycles. I term 
this ‘science-policy co-production.’ Secondly, climate science is also being co-
produced through various applications in legal settings such as UNFCCC COPs and, 
more significantly, within domestic courts through its integration into legal claims by 
climate litigants. I characterise this nascent development as ‘science-law co-
production.’ Finally, climate science is being evaluated and certified by courts and 
judges who are using IPCC assessments as an epistemic yardstick to recalibrate, adjust 
and ratchet up ambition with respect to national mitigation policies (i.e. emissions 
 
64 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction,” 
(2001) 26 Science, Technology, & Human Values 4, 400; Clark Miller, “Hybrid Management: Boundary 
Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental Governance in the Climate Regime,” (2001) 26 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 4, 478; S.Jasanoff, n1.  
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reduction targets). In doing so, they are engaging in ‘science-policy-law co-
production.’  
Fig 1. Trans-disciplinary Co-production of Climate Science  
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I also draw on the existing social science and legal literature on the judicial treatment of 
expert evidence in environmental litigation, a topic that has been extensively written 
about by STS scholars.65 To a lesser extent, I also draw upon the philosophical literature 
on science66 to contextualise my discussion of STS-constructivist perspectives on 
science for policymaking. This STS framework is outlined in detail in Chapter Two, 
which explains the main applications and uses of key STS concepts in my PhD project.  
 
My working definition of climate litigation  
Climate litigation is a broad church and a rapidly evolving phenomenon which 
implicates many different areas of law and “refers to lawsuits in which climate change 
 
65 Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Harvard University 
Press 1997).  
66 Here I refer to the body of work by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi.  
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and its impacts are either a contributing or key consideration in legal argumentation and 
adjudication.”67 The dynamic and expanding nature of climate litigation accounts for 
the absence of a monolithic definition of the term in the existing legal literature. Rather, 
scholars have typically put forward their own definitions. For example, Peel and 
Osofsky characterise climate litigation flexibly as encompassing “cases that take place 
in quasi-judicial contexts and that reference climate change amid a panoply of issues.”68 
While recognising that climate change does not necessarily have to constitute a central 
component of these cases, their work has largely focused on “cases at the core, which 
include climate change-specific arguments or judicial analyses referencing climate 
change.”69 Broadly aligned with this definition is the one advanced by Markell and Ruhl 
who define “climate change litigation as any piece of federal, state, tribal, or local 
administrative or judicial litigation in which the party filings or tribunal decisions 
directly or expressly raise an issue of fact or law regarding the substance or policy of 
climate change causes and impacts.”70  
 
In earlier work, I have employed the concept of ‘strategic climate litigation’ to denote 
“cases initiated to exert bottom-up pressure on governments (‘strategic public climate 
litigation’) or corporations (‘strategic private climate litigation’) to mitigate, adapt, or 
compensate for losses resulting from climate change.”71 These cases are in the minority 
and have received considerable attention from scholars, state actors and non-state 
actors.72 Some prominent examples include Massachusetts v EPA, Urgenda v The 
 
67 G.Ganguly et al, n32, 843. 
68 J.Peel & H.M.Osofsky, n6, 153.  
69 Ibid.  
70 D.Markell & J.B.Ruhl, n19, 27.  
71 G.Ganguly et al, n32, 843. 
72 Ibid.  
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Netherlands, Juliana et al v USA and Saul Luciano Lliuya v RWE.73 My above definition 
of strategic climate litigation is employed throughout this PhD project, since all these 
cases will be the focus of study and have been specifically selected because they contain 
the most robust substantive discussions on climate science, in the form of IPCC 
assessments, by courts and litigants. All of them also contain direct references to the 
terms ‘climate change’ and/or ‘greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.’  
 
Beyond this cluster of the most high-profile cases, my PhD project also considers 
lawsuits in which climate change or GHG emissions feature as a secondary or peripheral 
component. These include administrative lawsuits involving administrative or judicial 
review, pertaining to the development of new fossil fuel (e.g. coalmine) or renewable 
energy projects, of which Gloucester Resources v Minister for Planning and Taralga 
Landscape Guardians v Minister for Planning74 constitute salient examples. These cases 
have also been selected on the basis that they contain a rich discussion and judicial 
evaluation of IPCC assessments. Thus, my selection of cases for this project is largely 
guided by the criterion of whether they include a substantial discussion of climate 
science including IPCC assessments, regulatory science produced by government 
agencies such as national scientific assessments, or event attribution studies on extreme 
weather events. In line with Markell & Ruhl, my working conception of climate 
litigation also broadly and holistically encompasses ‘adjudication’ in the sense of 
administrative or quasi-judicial (i.e. tribunal) and court proceedings, which involve 
judges or tribunal members presiding over a legal dispute, reviewing evidence, legal 
claims and argumentation presented by litigants, and arriving at a formally binding 
 
73 Massachusetts v EPA 127 S. Ct. 1438; 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Urgenda, n18; Juliana, n19; Saul 
Luciano Lliuya v RWE (2017) 20171130 Case No-2-O-28515. 
74 Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning (2019) 234 LGERA 257; Taralga Landscape 
Guardians Inc. v Minister for Planning (2007) 161 LGERA 1. 
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decision or ruling. In addition, as discussed above in section III, I mainly focus on 
climate litigation in constitutional democracies. Thus, any observations or claims made 
throughout my PhD project in relation to the cases discussed may apply to other cases 
in that category, but are not generalizable to climate litigation writ large.  
 
Use of climate litigation databases 
To answer my research question, I draw heavily on primary sources such as case law 
(e.g. statements of claim, trial transcripts and judgments) and legislation. These derive 
largely from the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University and the 
LSE Grantham Institute for Climate Change and the Environment’s databases which 
comprehensively document climate litigation across the globe.75 The former is heavily 
relied upon for US cases, since it is the largest repository of US climate litigation. The 
latter is used to draw upon non-US case law, including cases from Global South 
jurisdictions, which the Grantham Institute continues to aggregate and expand upon. I 
undertake a predominantly textual and doctrinal analysis of the statements of claim, trial 
transcripts and judgments in these cases, relevant academic literature, policy papers, and 
surrounding media publications. 
 
My research seeks to identify the degree of cross-fertilisation and strategic convergence 
of ideas, adjudicative methodologies and litigants’ advocacy and argumentation 
techniques across jurisdictions, specifically in terms of their treatment and mobilisation 
of climate science. It investigates whether courts and litigants in these jurisdictions are 
beginning to develop a shared normative understanding and a common vocabulary for 
 
75 Columbia Law School: Sabin Center of Climate Change Law (SCCCL), ‘Resources’ (2016) 
<http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources> accessed 15 March 2016; SCCCL, “Litigation 
Charts” < http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/litigation-charts> accessed 25 August 
2019.  
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dealing with climate change issues. It argues that inter-jurisdictional exchanges have 
become a fixture of transnational climate change governance as best exemplified by 
transnational judicial and civil society conversations, informational exchanges and 
knowledge sharing with respect to climate change.  
 
V. Structure of the Thesis 
 
In addition to the introduction (Chapter 1) and conclusion (Chapter 7), my PhD thesis is 
organised in terms of five major chapters as follows:  
 
Chapter 2: STS-constructivism and its applications to climate science, policy and 
law 
This chapter draws upon STS-constructivist literature to carve out a theoretical 
framework for analysing knowledge production on climate change, with a focus on the 
field of climate science and the knowledge practices of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). The chapter will argue that certain constructivist tools and 
analytic categories offered by STS, such as Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) and Sheila Jasanoff’s ‘Co-production Idiom,’ allow us to better understand 
climate change knowledge production (i.e. the work of climate scientists and the IPCC) 
and certification (i.e. litigation and adjudication) as interconnected and complementary 
processes of inter-institutional epistemic engagement. Focusing on the STS concepts of 
boundary work and co-production, the chapter argues that the production of knowledge 
and a particular scientific-epistemic imaginary of climate change is concurrently taking 
place at the boundaries of science, politics, and law. The relationship between the IPCC, 
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the courts, and litigants can therefore be thought of as triangulated, complementary, and 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
Chapter 3: The IPCC’s Synthesis of Climate Science as Applied Knowledge 
This chapter uses an STS framework, combining Actor Network Theory (ANT) and the 
concepts of boundary work and co-production, to analyse knowledge production, 
specifically the emergence of climate science, its core findings and precepts and its 
transformation into a knowledge base for policymaking and norm creation through the 
work of the IPCC. The chapter begins with a discussion of the evolution of climate 
science into a field of study, its concurrent narrative power and crisis of narrativisation 
and the nature of climate science advocacy, particularly in terms of the transformation 
of the climate scientist into an advocate or activist with a recurring role in climate 
litigation and adjudication. The chapter then employs an ANT lens to unpack the IPCC’s 
knowledge practices, namely its assessment procedures, which culminate in the 
certification of climate science and the production of a scientific-political consensus. In 
sum, this chapter employs an STS-constructivist analytical framework, particularly the 
concepts of boundary work and hybrid management, to map the IPCC’s authority, assess 
its knowledge work and outputs (i.e. assessment reports), and determine its role in and 
influence on transnational climate change regulation. The chapter concludes by 
problematising the myths and fictions about the ‘pure’ nature of climate science and 
offers an alternative conceptualisation of climate science as an inherently practical body 
of knowledge. To that end, it offers a bipartite framing of climate science as applied 
science and trans-science.  
 
Chapter 4: Climate science in US federal courts  
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Through an application of the STS-constructivist analytic framework outlined in 
Chapter 2, Chapter 4 examines the role of courts in co-producing and legitimating the 
knowledge base on climate change. To gain a deeper understanding of the complex 
dynamics of climate adjudication, my analysis here focuses on the US, since that is 
where most climate litigation is occurring.76 It also seeks to determine the ways in which 
climate adjudication may differ from environmental adjudication writ large given the 
relatively watertight IPCC scientific consensus. The analysis here is premised on the 
STS postulate that the legal system generally and courts more specifically play a seminal 
role in the construction and dissemination of particular public understandings of science 
and technology and their role in addressing contemporary problems and controversies.77 
The relationship between law and science (and legal and scientific cultures) is one that 
is mutually constitutive.78  
 
The chapter analyses the judicial treatment of IPCC reports as expert evidence in climate 
litigation proceedings as a crucial mechanism for the certification of climate science and 
IPCC assessment reports. It examines the ways in which courts “redraw the lines of 
power and authority”79 in climate litigation proceedings by privileging particular expert 
accounts while excluding others, as best exemplified by Massachussetts v EPA. Federal 
courts in the US are increasingly assuming responsibility as key actors in the 
reinforcement, validation, and dissemination of the IPCC’s expert vision of and 
scientific consensus on climate change. In this regard, the chapter discusses the recent 
contribution of some US federal district (i.e. trial) courts towards the emergent 
transnationalisation of climate change jurisprudence. To that end, it engages in an in-
 
76 D.Markell & J.B.Ruhl, n31.   
77 S.Jasanoff, n65, xvi.  
78 Ibid, 8. 
79 Ibid, xv-xvi.  
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depth discussion of the largely receptive and favourable judicial treatment of climate 
science in post-Paris climate litigation in Juliana et al v USA and City of Oakland v BP, 
which are pertinent examples of this trend. It argues that while US courts have not 
deliberately sought to contribute to the transnationalisation of climate change case law, 
US case law nonetheless remains a major reference point for legal scholars, courts and 
litigants in other constitutional democracies. The transnationalisation of climate change 
case law can therefore be attributed to this wider uptake and utilisation of US climate 
change cases like Massachusetts and Juliana by these actor networks.   
 
Chapter 5: The science-law interface and the transnationalisation of climate 
adjudication 
 
This chapter examines the role of domestic courts in the transnationalisation of climate 
law, with a focus on non-US climate litigation and adjudication. It contends that judges 
in constitutional democracies are contributing to the transnationalisation of climate 
jurisprudence and law through: i) less formal networked interactions in pre-adjudicative 
settings outside the courtroom such as conferences, and; ii) direct and formal 
adjudication in courtrooms through their recurrent treatment and evaluation of climate 
science, particularly IPCC assessments or national analogues. Domestic courts are often 
acting in concert across jurisdictions, both through direct cross-citation and sometimes 
unconsciously, to produce interpretations of climate science that appear to be 
structurally convergent or largely harmonious with one another. Such judicial 
interactions and mediations are also transforming IPCC assessments into a usable body 
of knowledge for litigation and spurring the development of newer waves of climate 
science. Critically, this chapter posits that this judicial synthesis of science and law – an 
example of hybridised and transdisciplinary knowledge work – both within and outside 
the courtroom is resulting in the production of soft law frameworks and jurisprudence 
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which are constitutive components of an incipient transnational climate change case 
law. It is argued that the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and successive IPCC 
outputs (e.g. the Special Report on 1.5C warming) have served to reinforce this 
dynamic of judicial transnationalism on climate change.  
 
 
Chapter 6: Litigant networks and the transnationalisation of climate law  
This chapter examines the ways in which litigants harness and mobilise climate science 
in climate litigation. It argues that civil society, particularly environmental NGOs, have 
become a powerful category of climate litigant and are combining technoscientific, 
rights- and justice-based framings of climate change in new and innovative ways to 
advance pro-regulatory (both mitigation and adaptation) agendas through climate 
litigation. ENGOs around the world are collaborating strategically through highly 
developed and sophisticated actor networks to bring domestic lawsuits against 
governments and corporations under the rubric of the Paris Agreement (i.e. international 
law), constitutionalised human rights, public trust and intergenerational equity. 
Critically, IPCC and analogous national scientific assessments constitute the common 
epistemic foundation of their claims, which are consequently characterised by striking 
structural similarities. This is most apparent in the context of statutory lawsuits 
involving approvals for fossil fuel development projects or pushing for higher ambition 
in terms of national mitigation targets, as well as human rights and public trust claims 
filed by youth plaintiffs. More specifically, litigants’ strategic fusion of climate science 
with these existing areas of law or legal doctrines is generative of a range of boundary 
objects, which are the constitutive components of an emergent transnational common 
law of climate change. These comprise what I term ‘endangerment narratives,’ the 









In this PhD project, I argue that climate science is being generated through 
transdisciplinary co-production between the domains of science, policy and law and the 
key actors steering this process include climate scientists, domestic courts and climate 
litigants. The byproduct of these co-productive dynamics is an emergent transnational 
and common body of legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change, as illustrated 
in Chapters Five and Six. This chapter outlines the Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) framework that I apply throughout this PhD project to make and substantiate this 
argument. To that end, I specifically explain how the use of certain key STS 
methodologies, such as Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT)1 and Sheila 
Jasanoff’s ‘Co-production Idiom,’ enables us to map and understand the production and 
synthesis of climate science as transdisciplinary co-production between the domains of 
science, policy and law at multiple sites of governance, namely the IPCC, UNFCCC, 
and domestic courts. 
 
The observation that scientific knowledge cannot simply ‘reflect’ nature, but must 
necessarily translate, represent and to some degree actively construct our conceptions 
of the ‘natural world,’ is broadly accepted today.2 Assumptions about the fixity and 
 
1 As a project, ANT involves a constructivist-methodological orientation towards accounting for the 
(behind-the-scenes) sociological production of science. Unlike philosophers of science, STS and ANT 
scholars posit that a sociological study of science is entirely possible. See Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (OUP 2005) 89-93; Sheila 
Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order (Routledge 2004) 2.  
2 Construction implies that artificiality and reality march in step. The term social is used to deploy the 
associations that have rendered some state of affairs solid and durable (e.g. a scientific fact). As a project, 
ANT involves a constructivist-methodological orientation towards accounting for the (behind-the-scenes) 
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determinacy of science have been convincingly challenged and deconstructed. That 
scientific theoretical frameworks and propositions are constantly changing and being 
renegotiated through processes of evolution3 or revolution4 has also been 
acknowledged.5 However, the idea of science as objective, value-free, disconnected 
from particular social and political contexts, and therefore universal, is still subscribed 
to by lay-publics and policymakers. The persistence of scientism – the notion that there 
is in an inherent division between facts and values6 –  indicates a disjuncture between 
certain academic schools of thought7 and policymaking institutions on the nature and 
role of science in contemporary societies. Debates within both academia and the public 
sphere about the nature of science and its role in policymaking are alive and well, 
continue to be vigorously waged and remain a fixture in political life.8 Consequently, 
constructivism has not always managed to successfully bridge the gap between scholarly 
critique and the applied use of science for policymaking.  
 
 
sociological production of science. Unlike philosophers of science, STS and ANT scholars posit that a 
sociological study of science is entirely possible. Bruno Latour prefers the term ‘constructivism’ which 
he argues should not be confused with ‘social constructivism.’ He observes that ‘constructing a fact 
means that we account for the solid objective reality by mobilising various entities whose assemblage 
could fail; ‘social constructivism’ means that we replace what this reality is made of with some other 
stuff, the social in which it is ‘really’ built.’ Latour defends his brand of constructivism by pointing out 
that the artificiality of construction does not equate to a deficit in reality. See Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (OUP 2005) 89-93; Karl Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery (Harper Row 1968); Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-critical Philosophy (Routledge 1962); Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Is science socially constructed? – And can it 
still inform public policy?’ (1996) 2 Science and Engineering 1, 234. The idea of scientific facts as 
constructed and science as another interpretive framework for the study of nature is not without 
controversy. The concession by some scientists in this regard has been minor, namely that scientific 
research agendas are socially determined only to the extent that they depend on external funding and are 
circumscribed by policy pressures.  
3 K.Popper, Ibid. 
4 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1970).  
5 Tara Skodvin, ‘Science-policy interaction in the global greenhouse: Institution design and institutional 
performance in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’ (1999) CICERO Working Paper 
No.3.  
6 Daniel Lee Kleinman, Science and Technology in Society: From Biotechnology to the Internet 
(Blackwell Publishing 2005) 3. 
7 Here I refer to STS and other constructivist critiques of the natural sciences.  
8 This debate is emblematic of our current global politics on climate change. 
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Science and Technology Studies (STS) nonetheless offers valuable frameworks for 
understanding the interrelationship between science, policy, and law. In my research, I 
draw upon STS-constructivist analyses of regulatory science and the knowledge 
practices of boundary organisations (i.e. regulatory scientific institutions).9 More 
specifically, my research is predicated on the STS-constructivist idea of science as a 
socially determined and dynamic knowledge system.10 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) knowledge production on climate change has always been a 
political project rather than a purely scientific one, as indicated by its mission statement 
that it is a producer of “policy relevant [knowledge].”11 Climate science, and the IPCC’s 
framing of it, both align with the STS concept of science for policy12 or ‘trans-science,’ 
which is oriented towards addressing questions that transcend pure science and cannot 
exclusively be answered by it.13   
 
I am also sympathetic to the STS view that the social sciences ought to play a role in 
shaping our understanding of the socio-economic dimensions of climate change and 
contribute to the development of local responses to its impacts.14 However, my research 
will problematise the STS-constructivist critique that knowledge production on climate 
change ought to occur in more pluralistic and democratic settings.15 It will depart from 
 
9 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘A New Climate for Society’ (2010) 27 Theory, Culture & Society 233; Oren S. Perez, 
‘The Hybrid Legal-Scientific Dynamic of Transnational Scientific Organisations’ (2015) 26 The 
European Journal of International Law 2.  
10 B.Latour, n1; S.Jasanoff, n1, 263. 
11 IPCC, ‘Statement on IPCC Principles and Procedures’ (February 2010) < 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press/ipcc-statement-principles-procedures-02-2010.pdf > accessed 8 March 
2016.  
12 S.Jasanoff, n9.  
13 Alvin M. Weinberg, ‘Science and Trans-Science’ (1972) 10 Minerva 2, 209. 
14 S.Jasanoff, n9; Tim Forsyth, ‘Politicizing environmental science does not mean denying climate 
science nor endorsing it without question’ (2012) 12 Global Environmental Politics 2; Mike Hulme, Why 
we disagree about climate change: Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity (CUP 2009).  
15 S.Jasanoff, n9; Jeroen P van der Sluijs, Rinie van Est & Monique Riphagen, ‘Beyond consensus: 
reflections from a democratic perspective on the interaction between climate politics and science’ (2010) 
2 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 409.  
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existing STS-constructivist scholarship on the knowledge work of regulatory scientific 
institutions in two key respects. First, while subscribing to a constructivist 
understanding of science, my research will seek to highlight the problematic 
consequences of unquestioningly embracing a constructivist perspective, largely due to 
its inclination towards relativism and deconstructionism. I will therefore deliver a 
critique of certain STS-constructivist perspectives on climate science, which are not 
sufficiently nuanced to capture the complexity of knowledge work surrounding climate 
change. Second, in doing so, my research will attempt to explore how one can think 
critically about climate science and the IPCC consensus without undermining their 
legitimacy as compared with some existing STS-constructivist accounts. In the highly 
politicised context of climate change, existing STS-constructivist critiques of climate 
science occasionally appear counterproductive in the face of urgently needed regulation. 
I therefore seek to theorise the relationship of co-production between the science, 
politics, and law of climate change in a new way. To that end, my research will highlight 
both the uses and limitations of an STS-constructivist framework for understanding 
climate change knowledge production and its use in pre-litigation and litigation on 
climate change.  
 
This chapter sets out the core analytic framework that will underpin and inform my PhD 
project. To that end, it seeks to justify the use of and reliance upon insights and key 
concepts from constructivist schools of thought such as STS in relation to scientific 
knowledge production and the use of science as a primary knowledge base for public 
policy and legal processes such as climate litigation. The next part outlines the 
epistemological foundations of STS and provides a brief historical overview of the 
emergence of social constructivism as a school of thought within the social sciences. 
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Part III sketches the epistemic position of two leading STS scholars, Bruno Latour and 
Sheila Jasanoff, who have defined the field and whose work on climate change has been 
particularly influential. It delineates their working conception of science, scientific 
practice, and the use of science in regulatory domains such as climate change law and 
policy. Part IV outlines and problematises the STS critique of climate science as 
articulated by Sheila Jasanoff and others. It identifies the potential limitations and 
pitfalls of an STS mode of analysis with respect to scientific knowledge production and 
its use in legal and policy processes pertaining to climate change. In contrast, Part V 
identifies key concepts and analytic tools developed and employed by STS scholars in 
their sociological studies of scientific communities and their knowledge practices. It 
makes a case for the potential utility, application, and contribution of these concepts 
towards this PhD project. The sixth and final part offers some concluding observations.  
 
II. Epistemological Foundations of STS 
 
Science as social construction   
 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) is a multidisciplinary research program 
dedicated to studying the history, social organisation, and culture of science and 
technology and the generalised study of expertise and knowledge claims.16 STS emerged 
in the 1960s in response to the growth of science and technology in modern societies 
and their increased use in public policy.17 One of the distinguishing features of STS is 
its departure from conventional positivist accounts of science. STS scholars strongly 
advocate in favour of the conceptualisation of science as socially constructed and, in 
this crucial aspect, differ from logical positivist accounts of science as ‘objective’ or 
 
16 Sophia Roosth & Susan Silbey, ‘Science and Technology Studies: From Controversies to Post-
Humanist Social Theory,’ in Bryan S. Turner (ed), Blackwell Companion to Social Theory (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2nd edn, 2008) 1, 15.  
17 Ibid.  
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scientific enquiry as geared towards the search for ‘truths’ about nature. STS challenges 
positivist-empiricist accounts of science as rational and objective representations of the 
natural world through its alternative promulgation of a sociological understanding of 
science as a product of collective social interactions.18 STS scholars consider science to 
be constituted by socio-historical processes that are marked by perspectivism, inter-
subjective negotiation, and agonistic modes of dispute and contestation. In this regard, 
the STS conception of science is aligned with the Popperian idea of science as a series 
of unrefuted hypotheses rather than an accumulation of truths about nature, which is 
characteristic of scientific orthodoxy.19 It is even more closely aligned with the Kuhnian 
idea that science is subject to periodic massive revolutions, whereby an entire paradigm 
is dismantled and replaced by a new one.20  
 
However, STS departs from the philosophy of science in one crucial aspect, namely in 
its recognition of science as a socially determined and inter-subjectively constituted 
knowledge system. Roosth and Silbey observe that, “despite diverse theoretical, 
pragmatic, and disciplinary sources,” and arguably different epistemologies, “science 
and technology studies seemed to force an orienting consensus that science is a social 
institution.”21 Prominent STS scholars like Sheila Jasanoff have deemed social 
constructivism to be an attitude, mindset, or “belief  that the categories we think in, and 
with which we organise the world, are social achievements,” accompanied by a 
methodological orientation towards interrogating knowledge claims.22 This includes 
 
18 See Roosth & Silbey for a discussion of Mannheim’s sociological critique of Robert Merton’s empiricist-
positivist account of science and Ludwig Fleck’s critique of Viennese logical positivism through his 
theorisation of the social production of scientific facts through a “thought collective.” S.Roosth & S.Silbey, 
n16, 2-3.  
19 See K.Popper, n1, 23.  
20 See T.Kuhn, n4, 4. 
21 Ibid.  
22 S.Jasanoff, n1, 265.  
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making determinations about how universally accepted scientific propositions got to be 
that way.23 Thus, a sociological-constructivist conception of science and knowledge 
production constitutes a unifying epistemological thread that runs through most STS 
scholarship.  
 
For several decades, constructivism has been a popular epistemological framework used 
by social scientists in their studies of science and technology. The constructivist position 
that “social forces constitute not only the context, but the content of science”24 has 
sociological and anthropological roots. The preoccupation of much STS scholarship 
since the 1960s and 1970s has been with “questions of material practices that embody 
the work of doing science.”25 The constructivist epistemology was popularised by the 
third wave of STS scholarship.26 The universal positivist view of science as a purveyor 
of rational and objective truths was subsequently challenged and gave way to new 
demands for science to be better attuned to and legitimated by local interests and 
values.27  
 
Among the most compelling constructivist studies of science are those undertaken by 
STS scholars. Leading STS scholars like Bruno Latour contend that the idea of science 
and politics as discrete epistemic spheres is dated and out-of-sync with the conditions 
of postmodern societies where the dichotomies of nature/society, facts/values, and 
 
23 Ibid. 
24 S.Roosth & S.Silbey, n16, 7. 
25 Ibid, 8.  
26 Collins, H.M. and Evans, R. (2002) ‘The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and 
Experience’ (2002) 32 Social Studies of Science 2. The third wave of STS refers to the sociology of 
science, a research program largely driven by the Edinburgh and Paris Schools during the Cold War and 
decolonisation. The leading authors of Actor Network Theory (ANT), Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, 
belong to the Paris School.  
27 Steve Fuller, New Frontiers in Science and Technology Studies (Polity Press 2007) 2.  
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science/politics do not hold.28 While consensus is generally believed to be the pre-
requisite for ‘core’ or established scientific knowledge, constructivists argue that 
regulatory science or ‘science for policy’ will always constitute interpretation of a 
knowledge base, since the nature of science implies a certain degree of indeterminacy.29 
The strand of social constructivism that is prevalent in much STS scholarship was 
popularised by Latour and his colleague Woolgar in the 1980s through their dissolution 
of the distinction between nature and culture in their seminal work, Laboratory Life: 
The Construction of Scientific Facts. Latour and Woolgar posit that constructivism 
spans the divide between nature and culture and emphasise the inadequacy of social 
explanations for the agency of non-human entities which have a prominent role in 
scientific practices.30 Through these notable epistemic moves, the STS brand of 
constructivism assumed significance for its reconceptualisation of science as thoroughly 
‘encultured and politicized.’31  
 
In addition, STS scholarship emphasises the idea of scientists as social beings whose 
work comprises forms of social practice that take place within larger assemblages,32 
networks,33 or ‘epistemic communities.’34 As social beings, scientists possess a 
particular disciplinary orientation which is constituted by their training and the value-
laden selection of their objects of study and theoretical frameworks. Scientists’ 
 
28 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays into the reality of science studies (Harvard University Press 
2013) 6; Larry S. Luton, ‘Climate Scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 
Evolving Dynamics of a Belief in Political Neutrality’ (2015) 37 Administrative Theory & Praxis, 149.  
29 T.Skodvin, n5, 10.  
30 Michael Lynch, ‘Social Constructivism in Science and Technology Studies’ (2016) 39 Human Studies 
101, 107.  
31 Ibid.  
32 See Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (University 
of Minnesota Press 1987). 
33 See Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Harvard University Press 1987).  
34 See Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’ (1992) 
46 International Organization 1.  
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experience or study of natural phenomena is therefore heavily mediated by such choices. 
As STS scholar Daniel Lee Kleinman pertinently observes:  
 
Scientists’ training affects where they look, how they look at 
phenomena they study, and consequently what they see…the 
content of [their] training is thoroughly social. It is developed 
in educational systems through the interaction of certified 
scientists. It develops and varies over time and 
place…Scientists are exposed to theories during their 
training, and again, these shape where scientists look, how 
they view what they see, and what they see…The categories, 
orientations, and at some level the values on which scientists 
draw are affected by their disciplinary orientation.35 
 
 
The image of scientists that Kleinman presents is characteristic of an STS-constructivist 
understanding of science not only as a product of social interactions, but also as a field 
of social practice that possesses its own culture(s). This more textured understanding of 
science as both a social and cultural construct permeates ethnographic STS studies of 
laboratory practices, processes of scientific discovery and technological innovation. 
Borrowing traditional methodological tools from anthropology and sociology, namely 
ethnography, STS laboratory studies also developed its own hybrid methodologies by 
drawing upon critical theory, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interaction “to pay close 
attention to the cumulative consequences of micro-transactions, discursive strategies, 
and forms of representation within the production of a particular scientific fact or 
practice.”36 Some STS scholars have also made a persuasive case for recognising the 
work of scientists as “fundamentally and thoroughly political” in the sense that the 
political and social are inextricably linked.37 Kleinman contends that, in so far as 
 
35 D.L. Kleinman, n6, 6. 
36 S.Roosth & S.Silbey, n16, 10. 
37 D.L. Kleinman, n6, 10. 
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scientists make particular selections informed by value judgments, the practice of 
science and technology remains infused by power as both an enabling and constraining 
force, making possible the realisation of certain goals by some scientists (e.g. a senior 
scientist or science professor) and not others (e.g. a junior scientist or student).38 Such 
power asymmetries are visible on a discursive terrain, with dominant scientific 
discourses prescribing the criteria for legitimacy based on their superior command of 
cultural and economic resources.  
 
STS research also challenges the positivist notion of science as a uniquely bounded and 
autonomous discipline (referred to as the ‘demarcation problem’39), instead arguing that 
scientific ‘facts’ or findings cannot be divorced from the wider social context in which 
they are produced. More specifically, much contemporary scientific work takes place at 
the boundaries of ‘science’ and ‘non-science’ (e.g. policy or law). Accordingly, the 
concept of ‘boundary work’ developed by Thomas Gieryn40 is also a central 
preoccupation of STS scholarship. Such studies examine the human interactions that 
shape scientific facts and the membership of scientific communities, including those 
between scientists and non-scientists in trans-scientific knowledge production 
processes. The central preoccupation of contemporary STS scholarship is the 
examination of trans-scientific knowledge production that occurs at the boundary or 
interstices of science and policy, particularly in regulatory scientific institutions, of 
which the IPCC is a salient example.  
 
38 Ibid, 12-13.  
39 The ‘demarcation problem’ refers to the challenge for science in distinguishing itself as an autonomous 
and authoritative discipline against its rivals (non-science or pseudo-science). Increasingly it also refers 
to the challenge for science to justify its special autonomous status in light of demands for democratic 
inclusion and legitimacy or accountability by lay publics. Much STS scholarship rejects science’s 
demarcation problem. S.Fuller, n27, 4-5.  
40 Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘Boundary Work and the Demarcation of Science and Non-science: Strain and 
Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists’ (1983) 48 American Sociological Review 6.  
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Climate change is an issue which has prompted a significant revision among STS 
scholars of the goals of STS in contemporary society. It has also reoriented the field 
towards questions relating to the democratic implications of the increasing complexity 
and inaccessibility of scientific and expert knowledge and our collective survival.41 
However, constructivist analytic methods furnished by STS have proven to be double-
edged in relation to climate change. More specifically, STS scholars have expressed 
concern about the misappropriation of their constructivist tools by climate skeptics and 
denialists to attack and deconstruct mainstream climate science.42 In relation to climate 
science and the IPCC consensus, the repudiation of the demarcation problem by some 
STS accounts might prove to be a deconstructionist bridge too far. Steve Fuller argues 
that the demarcation problem merits revival today, as there is a need for a “non-
providential” account of the nature of science.43 He therefore characterises the rejection 
of the demarcation problem as “an overreaction that has thrown out the teleological baby 
with the bath water in making sense of the history of science.”44 While recognising its 
latent methodological dangers, particularly the potential for the deconstruction of 
climate science by deniers as discussed above, I adopt an STS approach on the basis that 
it offers valuable tools for the study of scientific practice and knowledge production and 
remains “integral to the normative re-orientation of science and technology that is taking 
place in our so-called postmodern times.”45 More specifically, the STS-constructivist 
postulate that science is socially constructed and scientific communities carry their own 
 
41 S.Roosth & S.Silbey, n16, 15. 
42 Ibid; See Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern’ (2004) 30 Critical Inquiry 225.  
43 S.Fuller, n27, 12. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, 4.  
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forms of cultural and political baggage, renders intelligible the knowledge practices 
within regulatory scientific institutions like the IPCC which exemplify boundary work.  
 
III. Prominent STS-Constructivist Methodologies 
 
Actor Network Theory    
This section assesses the suitability of Latourian constructivist methodology in relation 
to a study of climate change knowledge production, particularly the construction and 
framing of climate science and the IPCC consensus. To that end, the following sub-
sections examine a key component of Latour’s constructivist methodology, namely 
Actor Network Theory (ANT), in terms of its potential applications for and relevance to 
climate science and this thesis.  
 
i. Applying Actor Network Theory to Climate Science? 
As one of the most reputed STS-constructivist analytic methods for the study of science 
and technology or ‘technoscience,’46 Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law’s 
‘Actor Network Theory’ (ANT) merits serious consideration as a conceptual framework 
that can be potentially applied to examine scientific practice and knowledge production 
processes pertaining to climate change. ANT can be read as a ‘pan-constructivist 
ontology’47 of knowledge production that radically departs from metaphysical and 
logical positivist modes of epistemic enquiry, namely a genealogical search for the 
 
46 Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (Blackwell Publishing 2004) 81.  
47 M. Lynch, n30, 108. It is not clear what the ‘pan’ in ‘pan-constructivist ontology’ stands for. Michael 
Lynch might be alluding here to Latour’s discussion of the three key features of scientific networks – 
mobility, stability, and combinability – which render ‘domination at a distance’ feasible. On this point, 
Latour asserts that “the results of building, extending and keeping up these networks is to act at a 
distance, that is to do things in the centres that sometimes make it possible to dominate spatially as well 
as chronologically the periphery.” See B.Latour, n32, 223. 
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origins of scientific facts or ‘truths’ about nature. Rather, it is a relational materialist 
theory which transforms the ‘social’ to the material both inside and outside of science.48 
That is, science and technology work by translating material actions and forces from 
one to the other.49 Latour is a leading exponent of the idea that scientific practice or 
‘science in the making’ (context) and scientific content are constituted through 
networks.  
 
Eschewing purely social explanations of scientific practice,50 Latour argues that analytic 
attention should instead be directed to expanded domains of action and agency 
encompassing the human, but also extending beyond it to the non-human.51  This means 
paying attention to not only humans, but equally to non-human entities such as 
laboratories, lab equipment, collective agencies, and theoretical causes, that feature as 
subjects within an enlarged field of action and narratives about scientific discovery and 
technological innovation. All these entities, whether human or non-human, possess and 
exercise agency as actors or ‘actants.’52 ANT theorists maintain that the process of 
constructing scientific facts and transforming them into ‘black boxes’ is a collective 
process that involves cumulatively garnering support from networks made up of human 
and non-human actants interacting with one another and exercising agency. A 
knowledge claim undergoes several rounds of translation, in turn modified by each 
actant within the network that makes an interpretive contribution.  
 
 
48 Bruno Latour, n33; John Law, ‘After Ant: Complexity, Naming and Topology’ (1999) 47 The 
Sociological Review 1; S.Sismondo, n46, 82.  
49 S.Sismondo, n46, 82. 
50 Explanation here means a classically privileged form of representation dominant in Western science 
since the heyday of Newtonian mechanics, namely one that “unifies by reducing, that explains most 
phenomena by the fewest principles and…implies a radical asymmetry whereby one representative (the 
explainer) stands for as many representables (the explained).” S.Fuller, n27, 98-99.  
51 B.Latour, n33, 221. 
52 Ibid.  
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ANT constitutes part of the broader epistemological shift towards post-humanism in the 
humanities and social sciences, particularly through its promulgation of ideas about non-
human agency. Consequently, it is not without controversy and has been the target of 
extensive criticism by many sociologists and anthropologists. A common critique of 
ANT is that it is ill-attuned to differences between human and non-human agency and 
is depoliticised to the point of being complicit in the reinforcement of neoliberal 
hegemony in academia and society at large.53 In the 1990s, the Latourian brand of 
constructivism embodied by ANT came under fire from natural and social scientists 
alike – a period that became known by the moniker “science wars.” Much of the 
controversy surrounding constructivism in the 1990s was marked by misunderstandings 
about what was meant by ‘construction.’ The scientific establishment equated the 
concept with a generalised deconstructionist attitude of skepticism in relation to 
scientific findings.54 
 
However, contemporary STS scholars are equally wary of the potential for their methods 
of enquiry to be subverted and replaced by radical forms of deconstructionism, which 
may be used to advance suspect ideological agendas such as climate denialism. This 
accounts for why, in more recent work, Latour has defended his brand of constructivism 
as a pathway towards the renewal of empiricism. For example, he asserts that, “the point 
was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism, but on the 
contrary renewing it.”55  In a similar vein, STS-ANT theorists, John Law and John Urry, 
observe the following: 
 
 
53 Andrew B. Kipnis, ‘Agency between humanism and posthumanism: Latour and his opponents’ (2005) 
5 HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2, 44. 
54 M.Lynch, n30, 109.  
55 B.Latour, n33, 231.  
 52 
[Research methods] enact realities; they can help to bring into 
being what they also discover…There is little difference 
between physics and social science [in that] theories and 
methods are protocols for modes of questioning or 
interacting, which also produces realities as they interact with 
other kinds of interactions. This means we are not saying that 
reality is arbitrary. The argument is not relativist nor realist. 
Instead it is that the real is produced in thoroughly non-
arbitrary ways, in dense and extended sets of relations. It is 
produced with considerable effort, and it is much easier to 
produce some realities than others. In sum, we are saying that 




Accordingly, ANT can be read not only as an analytical framework for understanding 
knowledge production, but also as an epistemological imprimatur for the pursuit of a 
more critical mode of enquiry, namely a networked and relational understanding of 
climate science, its knowledge claims, and its controversies. Through these post hoc 
caveats, Latour and his contemporaries seek to draw an important conceptual distinction 
(and indeed create necessary conceptual distance) between ANT-style constructivist 
analyses and deconstructionism. Latour’s anxieties about the latter are particularly 
pronounced in relation to climate change, which he regards as a domain that is now 
beyond scientific contestation.57  
 
 ii. Potential applications for this thesis 
ANT enables the conceptualisation of both human and non-human entities such as inter 
alia climate scientists, the IPCC and its processes, states, climate law and policy regimes 
(i.e. the UNFCCC and its processes), courts, harmed or vulnerable individuals and 
 
56 John Law & John Urry, ‘Enacting the Social’ (2003) 33 Economy and Society 3, 3. 
57 Ava Kofman, ‘Bruno Latour, the Post-truth Philosopher, Mounts a Defense of Science’ New York 
Times (25 October 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/magazine/bruno-latour-post-truth-
philosopher-science.html> accessed 25 October 2018. 
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groups (i.e. litigants or claimants), governments and fossil fuel corporations (i.e. 
defendants), climate denialists, and the environment as key actors in the transnational 
climate change network. In other words, knowledge production processes and epistemic 
controversies surrounding climate change, whether in the IPCC or in climate litigation 
within domestic courts, can be better understood as a complex set of networked relations 
comprising all these entities. These networked relations are in turn characterised by both 
episodes of consensus formation on the one hand (e.g. IPCC processes and climate 
litigation) and agonistic dispute, controversy, resistance, and dissensus on the other (e.g. 
climate denialism and again climate litigation). Latour instructs us to turn our attention 
to such episodes and to “follow the tortuous history” of scientific statements to 
determine how established bodies of knowledge like climate science became scientific 
‘facts’.58 These sites and episodes of knowledge and consensus-making and contestation 
in transnational climate change governance constitute the core analytic focus and subject 
matter of my research.  
 
An STS mode of analysis, particularly ANT, provides one potentially useful pathway 
towards fruitful analytic engagement with the complexity of climate change knowledge 
politics and for understanding its broad ranging implications for law and policy. 
Therefore, in this PhD project, I use ANT to study not only the production of climate 
science within the IPCC, but also its treatment within transnational judicial and NGO-
litigant networks at various sites including UNFCCC COPs, judicial conferences, and 
domestic courts. My PhD project is predicated on Latour’s fluid conception of the 
network as “a metaphor of connections,” which dissolves scale related distinctions of 
 
58 B.Latour, n33, 103. 
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micro and macro or top down systems of ordering.59  The advantage of employing this 
definition of network is that it “allows us to think of a global entity – a highly connected 
one – [as] nevertheless continuously local.”60 It also dismantles the distinction between 
inside and outside, and instead privileges the idea that “a network is always a boundary 
without any inside or outside.”61  
 
More recently, Latour has reframed and updated ANT in line with German philosopher 
Peter Sloterdijk’s work on ‘spherology,’ emphasising the similarities and 
complementarities between his idea of networks and the latter’s concept of ‘spheres,’ 
which connotes hybrid realities and spaces of co-existence.62 In this regard, Latour 
observes the following:  
 
While networks are good at describing long-distance and 
unexpected connections starting from local points, 
spheres are useful for describing local, fragile, and 
complex atmospheric conditions. Networks are good at 
stressing edges and movements; spheres at highlighting 
envelopes and wombs.63 
 
 
Both Latour and Sloterdijk also reject dualisms such as nature versus culture, nature 
versus man, and subject versus object. Considered in the context of climate change, such 
dichotomies have proven to be problematic and divisive. Sloterdijk’s spherology 
complements ANT scholars’ ideas about connectedness through transnational networks. 
 
59 B.Latour, n33, 5. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Peter Sloterdijk, ‘How big is big?’ (2010) <http://www.collegium-
international.org/index.php/en/contributions/127-how-big-is-big> accessed 10 August 2017; Martin 
Skrydstrup, ‘Of spheres and squares: Can Sloterdijk help us rethink the architecture of climate science?’ 
(2016) 46 Social Studies of Science 6, 854.    
63 Bruno Latour, ‘Some experiments in art and politics’ (2011) E-flux Journal 23, 471-490. 
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For example, in a recent essay on climate change, Sloterdijk takes up Buckminster 
Fuller’s concept of ‘Spaceship Earth’ - a shared ecological space and macro-interior 
where the goal is atmospheric stabilisation.64 He further posits that meteorology (i.e. 
Earth System Science) has come to power precisely because its central project of 
atmospheric mapping spans the entire Earth as one contiguous space:  
 
[Meteorology] has become politically and scientifically 
accepted because for the moment it offers the most 
suggestive model of the global interior: it deals with the 
dynamic continuum of the terrestrial sheath of gas that 
envelopes the Earth and which since the days of the Greek 
physicists we have called the atmosphere, which meant 
"ball of vapour."65  
 
Therefore, a good way to understand ‘climate’ is through this alternative 
conceptualisation or mapping of space, whereby Earth can be thought of as a ‘supra-
sphere’ made up of networks.66 The sites of scientific knowledge production on climate 
change therefore exist and operate in this supra-sphere. More specifically, these fluid 
conceptions of network and ‘sphere’ aptly capture the hybrid and complex dynamics of 
contemporary climate change governance and regulation as well as environmental 
regulation writ large, which are being predominantly carried out at numerous sites in the 
liminal space between the global and local through dense transnational networks 
comprising a plethora of entities. These include hybrid regulatory actors like the IPCC, 
which operate at the intersection or boundaries of science, law, and policy.  
 
64 Peter Sloterdijk, n62.  
65 Ibid. 
66 In addition to space, time and scale are also integral to the conceptualisation of ‘climate.’ Another 
related mapping project by geologists (The Royal Society of Stratigraphers and its Anthropocene 
Working Group) and historians has been to conceptualise the anthropogenic carbonisation of the Earth 
and the resulting climate crisis in terms of a new geological epoch – i.e. the Anthropocene – a term 
popularised by the atmospheric chemist Paul Krutzen. See Will Steffen, Paul J. Krutzen, & John R. 
McNeill, ‘The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?’ (2007) 36 
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Furthermore, ANT enables us to understand the IPCC as a metropolitan site of climate 
change knowledge production and IPCC knowledge work as the continuous “build[ing], 
exten[ding], and keep[ing] up of scientific networks by acting at a distance” to maintain 
spatial and chronological epistemic dominance at the periphery.67 In sum, ANT and 
Latour’s fluid relational conception of network are coterminous with the idea of 
networked governance, which is already a familiar trope in transnational environmental 
law and policy.68 More importantly, constructivist modes of enquiry, such as ANT and 
ethnographic studies of science (e.g. STS lab studies), are invaluable methodological 
tools that can serve to demystify the workings of science and render them more 
intelligible to non-scientists and lay publics. Throughout this PhD project, I apply 
Latour’s fluid relational conception of the network to map all the knowledge-based 
activities undertaken by dense epistemic networks of climate scientists (i.e the IPCC in 
Chapter Three), domestic courts (Chapters Four and Five) and ENGO litigants (Chapter 
Six). 
 
Jasanoff and the ‘Co-production Idiom’ 
STS also provides pertinent analytic frameworks for the study of ‘uneven processes’ 
through which scientific and technical knowledge are produced and become entangled 
with projects of norm creation and social and political ordering.69 Jasanoff and her STS 
 
67 B.Latour, n33, 232.  
68 Daniel L. Feldman, ‘The future of environmental networks – Governance and civil society in a global 
context,’ Futures (7 July 2012) < http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2012.07.007 > accessed 29 
November 2016. Feldman contends the while knowledge networks already exist, they have the potential 
to become the primary means of global environmental governance because they can decisively act to: 
assess information and data, evaluate innovative management options, and coordinate the activities of 
key actors at local and regional levels without having to wait upon national governments and 
intergovernmental organizations to act.   
69 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order (Routledge 
2004) 2. 
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colleagues posit that in “broad areas of both past and present human activity, we gain 
explanatory power by thinking of natural and social orders as being co-produced.”70 
They accordingly conceptualise co-production as “a shorthand for the proposition that 
the ways in which we know or represent the world (both nature and society) are 
inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.”71 Finally, they also advocate 
for a more nuanced understanding of the term as an ‘idiom’ – “a way of interpreting and 
accounting for complex phenomena so as to avoid the strategic deletions and omissions 
of most other approaches in the social sciences.”72 Most STS analyses situated in this 
vein examine how knowledge production is incorporated into practices of state-making 
or governance and, conversely, how governance processes in turn influence knowledge 
production and use.73 
 
Clark Miller notes that the co-production idiom is highly valuable “[as] it enables the 
observer to become attuned to the multiple ways that knowledge and order become 
coupled in the emergence of a new phenomenon like climate change.”74 The concept is 
therefore seminal to this research project and employed throughout to make sense of the 
nexus between science and law (the various epistemic processes and interactions 
between key actors) and its formative role in new projects of transnational legal ordering 
in response to climate change. Subsequent chapters document how climate science is 
being co-produced by climate scientists, courts and climate litigants, at multiple sites 
including the IPCC and domestic courts. 
 
 
70 S.Jasanoff, n69, 2.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid, 3. 
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These processes are constitutive of a new kind of climate politics ushered in by the IPCC 
and UNFCCC regime, and subsequently carried forward by global civil society in recent 
years. Subsequent chapters also argue that this new climate politics, as embodied by 
growing waves of science-driven and evidence-based climate litigation and 
adjudication, is in turn co-producing a new transnational legal commons on climate 
change.  
 
The Science-Law Interface  
 
Science for action can be considered another major epistemic movement or school of 
enquiry within STS scholarship that is mainly concerned with the ways in which science 
is used in public policy and legal settings. Put another way, the principal object of study 
is law-science interactions and the ways in which such interactions are geared towards 
Knowledge Production & Synthesis 
Science-policy co-production
(IPCC)
Knowledge Evaluation & Certification 
Science-law co-production; Science-policy-law co-production
(UNFCCC & Domestic Courts)




informational improvement in knowledge societies, the facilitation and improvement of 
public decision-making and contributing to “the central project of governance in modern 
democracies.”75 Jasanoff emphasises that the more pertinent constructivist enquiry is 
not how ‘good’ the science is, but rather how much deference scientific expertise 
deserves in specific legal contexts.76 Therefore, science for action is concerned not with 
the processes of fact finding per se, but with its purposes or ends – something Jasanoff 
refers to as “serviceable truth.”77 This connotes a form of normative pragmatism where 
the primary demand is not for scientific objectivity or ‘truth’ for its own sake. Rather 
the important question to ask is how science can best aid and advance the purposes of 
law (e.g. to produce a fair and just outcome.)78  
 
This branch of STS scholarship also posits that the cultures of law and science are 
mutually constitutive. Both are domains of expertise which interact and collaborate to 
co-produce society at large.79  The scientific community and courts occupy central 
positions in this co-production narrative. In spheres of activity that are heavily governed 
by regulatory science such as, inter alia, bioethics, human health, and the environment, 
adjudication and litigation have become important mechanisms for vetting and 
validating science and technology. These legal processes serve to deconstruct science 
and flag ethical concerns in relation to its use in public policy.80  
 
 
75 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths: Science For Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas Law 
Review 1723, 1724.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid, 1725.  
78 Ibid, 1730.  
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‘Science for action’ enquiries can further our understanding of how the law interprets, 
implements, and legitimates science. US Supreme Court justice Stephen Breyer suggests 
one potential pathway towards effective collaboration between law and science, with an 
emphasis on how the former can facilitate the scientific enterprise:  
 
 
The practice of sound science depends on sound law – law 
that at a minimum supports science by offering the scientist 
breathing space, within which he or she may search freely 
for the truth on which all knowledge depends…we must 
search for a law that reflects an understanding of the 
relevant underlying science, not for law that frees 
companies to cause serious harm or forces them 
unnecessarily to abandon the thousands of artificial 
substances on which modern life depends.”81 
 
 
Reflecting on the role of law in terms of its responsible use and representation of science, 
Breyer further opines that it is not for the law (including courts and judges) to aim for 
scientific precision, but rather to “seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of 
scientifically sound knowledge and approximately reflect the scientific state of the 
art.”82 
 
Science for action analyses can also help us understand the processes through which 
science is translated into policy and law and to map the ways in which actors deploy 
science as ‘serviceable truth’ in legal proceedings to advance their claims.83 The use of 
science as serviceable truth or, alternatively, as an epistemic aid for legal claims is borne 
out in climate litigation contexts. For example, in the Dutch Urgenda case, the plaintiffs 
 
81 Stephen Breyer, ‘The Interdependence of Science and Law’ (1998) 280 Science 5363, 537.  
82 Ibid.  
83 S.Jasanoff, n75, 1730. 
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relied heavily on IPCC climate science to successfully argue before the Hague District 
Court that the Dutch government had breached its duty of care towards its citizens by 
failing to adopt a policy designed to reduce Dutch emissions by 25 to 40% below 1990 
levels by 2020 – the target required to prevent dangerous interference with the climate 
system (i.e. warming of less than or up to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels).84 In its own assessment of the substantive issues, the Hague District Court also 
made considerable use of IPCC assessments and arrived at a number of conclusions 
based on IPCC climate science. The Court’s key ruling stated that the Netherlands was 
obliged to reduce emissions by 25 to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% by 2050 
“in line with the IPCC’s proposed reduction target for a 450 scenario by 2050.”85 The 
Urgenda case is a prominent recent example of a climate change case in which the 
judiciary exhibited a high degree of deference towards IPCC climate science. It also 
demonstrates how courts function as key intermediaries and gatekeepers in the societal 
validation and dissemination of technoscientific knowledge – an issue explored in 
further detail in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
Jasanoff observes that a high degree of deference should be exercised where a consensus 
exists and attempts to deconstruct consensus may appear wasteful and illegitimate.86 
However, she argues that while “the existence of a strong scientific consensus may 
dilute the need to scrutinise scientific claims, it is not an invitation for the law to abdicate 
its normative responsibilities,” particularly in terms of rendering exercises of scientific-
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epistemic authority accountable.87 In so far as scientific work entails socio-political 
choices, for example, in terms of the selection of individuals or bodies to carry out work 
for particular ends, science is not apolitical, but is rather a sphere of activity subject to 
accountability requirements. These accountability considerations appear valid and 
applicable in relation to the work of boundary organisations like the IPCC which 
produce scientific knowledge for policymaking (as discussed in Chapter Three). 
Moreover, the concentration of epistemic power in the IPCC in relation to climate 
change has generated legitimate concerns about accountability. Sismondo notes that 
since STS makes no separation between epistemic and political processes, it can 
genuinely study scientific and technological societies, rather than treating science and 
technology as political externalities.88 In this regard, STS scholarship closely examines 
“political economies of knowledge: the production, distribution, and consumption of 
knowledge.”89 STS modes of analysis (such as ANT and science for action) therefore 
enable a holistic examination of the knowledge politics of climate change, which I argue 
encompasses not just the production and synthesis of climate science within the IPCC, 
but also the certification and use of climate science by domestic courts and climate 
litigants, respectively.  
 
 
IV. The STS Critique of Climate Science 
 
Building on her earlier proposition that the existence of a scientific consensus does not 
obviate the need to closely scrutinise scientific practice and engage in ongoing critical 
reflection, Jasanoff has offered a compelling critique of climate science and the 
knowledge work of the IPCC. In earlier work, she has articulated a commonly held STS-
 
87 S.Jasanoff, n75, 1742. 
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constructivist perspective on science, noting that it is always conditioned by the specific 
social and cultural contexts in which it is produced. She accordingly argues that the very 
image of science in any given society reflects the features of social organisation and 
preference that are not universal and it is in this sense that science as an institution is 
socially constructed.90 In other words, it is also always a locally inflected knowledge 
enterprise.  
 
In more recent work, she expands upon this point to argue that our collective future is 
at stake “when an impersonal, apolitical, and universal imaginary of climate change, 
projected and endorsed by science, takes over from the subjective, situated and 
normative imaginations of human actors engaging directly with nature.”91 She 
emphasises the need to connect scientific knowledge-making on climate change at the 
global level to processes of meaning-making that are more locally situated.92 In addition, 
she advocates a role for “the interpretive social sciences in fostering a more complex 
understanding of humanity’s climate predicament.”93 Jasanoff’s critique here is directed 
at climate science and the knowledge practices of the IPCC, which she perceives as 
decontextualised and delocalised, describing its scientific work as detached observation 
devoid of meaning, which can be found in the embedded experiences of local 
communities.94 This reflects her underlying concern about the inability of global 
governance institutions to better engage with and respond to the needs of local publics 
that are affected by their decisions. In short, there is an academic-constructivist anxiety 
here about the absence of participatory inclusiveness, political contestation, and 
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democratic decision-making. This position also reflects a deeper ideological 
commitment to challenging the pernicious neoliberal capitalist logics and agendas (i.e. 
the industrial and technoscientific revolutions) responsible for creating the climate 
change problem in the first place. On this view, the existing reliance on markets and 
technology as panaceas to climate change is anathema to the idea that any meaningful 
resolution demands systemic and structural upheaval, namely through the disavowal of 
neoliberal capitalism and its environmentally destructive tendencies. This has led many 
social scientists and humanists to advocate for the inclusion of alternative (i.e. non-
economic and non-scientific) epistemologies of climate change into existing decision-
making frameworks.  
 
Jasanoff’s concerns about the IPCC have also been echoed by other social scientists and 
humanities scholars. Recent STS scholarship makes the claim that the dominant 
technoscientific narrative of climate change occludes other locally specific ways of 
knowing about climate change, obstructs more just outcomes, and thereby results in 
‘slow violence.’95 Put another way, a major charge against the IPCC by STS-
constructivist scholarship is that the dominance of the physical sciences within its 
knowledge practices also erases human subjectivities and excludes potentially 
significant local bodies of knowledge (particularly from the Global South) and 
alternative framings and disciplinary narratives of climate change. Colombian 
geographer and feminist scholar Astrid Ulloa asserts that the epistemological 
perspectives of indigenous peoples in Latin America with respect to climate change are 
 
95 S.Jasanoff, n9, 235; ‘Slow violence’ is a term recently popularised by Rob Nixon to connote the latent, 
gradual, and negative externalities related to the abuse of environmental resources and ecosystems. Rob 
Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Harvard University Press, 2011); Shannon 
O’Lear, ‘Climate Science and Slow Violence: A view from political geography and STS on mobilizing 
technoscientific ontologies of climate change’ (2016) 52 Political Geography 4.  
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ignored by the existing scientific and policymaking paradigm.96 She argues that 
Northern climate change policies and programs (such as UN REDD+) naturalise 
particular gender relations and exacerbate inequalities and exclusions, “[resulting] in a 
kind of blockage of alternative ways of producing knowledge about climate change.”97 
Political geographer Shannon O’Lear similarly argues that climate science, particularly 
the IPCC’s account, is mobilised in ways that enact ‘slow violence,’ by making an 
indirect and latent contribution to human suffering.98 Directly inspired by Jasanoff’s 
work, she explicitly adopts an STS-constructivist perspective to contend that the IPCC’s 
reliance on global circulation models (GCMs) and carbon data forecloses alternative 
ways of knowing about climate change.99 At the core of these critiques is the notion that 
by purporting to act and speak on behalf of the entire world (as a purveyor of universal 
‘truths’ or facts about climate change), the IPCC embodies and enforces a form of 
epistemic hegemony or neocolonialism. In doing so, it operates in a technocratic space 
devoid of genuine deliberation and richer forms of politics. These scholars accordingly 
argue in favour of ‘repoliticising’ or developing a new kind of politics of climate 
change.100  
 
Such criticism may be partially warranted in relation to the IPCC’s scientific work as 
carried out by Working Group I (WGI). WGI’s assessment and review procedures are 
indeed dominated by a positivistic natural science paradigm (standing in as the universal 
episteme101) and, by implication, exclude alternative epistemologies as well as local and 
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indigenous bodies of knowledge. Its membership is almost exclusively made up of 
scientists who are mostly from Northern countries, meaning that it falls short of being 
geographically representative. Quantitative studies have also shown that work from 
particular scientific fields, such as the physical sciences (including the earth sciences 
such as meteorology and oceanography) dominate WGI’s peer review process.102 In 
addition, the IPCC’s outputs may not gain political acceptance and approval within all 
societies (particularly some developing countries) due to perceptions of Northern 
epistemic dominance and bias.103  
 
However, on closer inspection, the IPCC’s gaze is both global and local; a unique trait 
that actually distinguishes the institution from its global governance counterparts. It 
concurrently engages in ‘detached scientific observation’ and is also increasingly paying 
attention to local contexts and communities, as evidenced by the practices of its other 
Working Groups (i.e. WGII and WGIII) in which there is greater integration and 
hybridisation between the natural and social sciences.104 The climate science community 
has acknowledged the importance and value of incorporating local and indigenous 
perspectives into global knowledge-making processes on climate change. For example, 
a team of climate scientists from the University of British Columbia recently conducted 
a study, collecting over 90,000 observations about climate change from indigenous 
people around the world. The study established that many of these observations are 
largely consistent with the findings of global climate models.105 It also emphasised that 
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human observations and local knowledge derived from indigenous peoples’ daily 
witnessing of climate change impacts around the world can serve to fill knowledge gaps 
in relation to “poorly understood but important climate-related phenomena.”106 Another 
2011 article by a team of bio-scientists proposes a framework for “enhancing synthesis 
of indigenous narratives of observed climate change with global assessments [such as 
those of the IPCC].”107 Moreover, the study disclaims at the outset the authors’ 
awareness “that any attempt to join scientific and indigenous knowledge systems may 
reflect the history of power relationships between indigenous groups and non-
indigenous groups.”108  
 
Such studies highlight the limitations of existing STS critiques of the IPCC and also 
foreground the possibilities for more meaningful linkages between complementary 
bodies of knowledge in addressing climate change. They also show that climate 
scientists are cognizant of and well-attuned to knowledge deficit problems with respect 
to climate change that result, in part, from the exclusion of indigenous and alternative 
epistemologies and worldviews. They have acknowledged that indigenous narratives are 
minimally included in global assessments such as those of the IPCC due to the 
prioritisation of peer reviewed materials.109 They have also emphasised that indigenous 
narratives are a rich source of data “based on multigenerational knowledge, which 
promote an expanded and multidimensional picture of climate change impacts.”110  
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In particular, many of these narratives have been found to complement, corroborate and 
align with scientific observations relating to temperature change and sea ice melt.111 
Linkages between climate scientists and indigenous communities are already long-
standing and robust in the Arctic. Since the 1990s, climatologists and anthropologists 
have routinely collaborated with Arctic indigenous peoples upon whom they heavily 
rely for detailed knowledge about localised climate change impacts such as sea ice and 
permafrost melt and changes to animal populations and animal migration patterns.112 A 
pertinent example of such a collaboration is the Sea Ice Knowledge and Use (SIKU) 
Project in which climatologists and anthropologists have sought the assistance of Arctic 
indigenous people to record observations of changes to sea ice.113 The STS critique of 
climate science may therefore need to be tempered and modified due to the emergence 
and proliferation of these new and innovative modes of epistemic engagement between 




The STS critique of climate science is not without merit as it speaks to concerns within 
contemporary knowledge societies about technocracy and epistemic hegemony. It is a 
critique directed at the processes surrounding the production and framing of climate 
science, and their domination or monopolisation by the global North, rather than its 
outputs (i.e. the IPCC consensus). Jasanoff rightly argues that “to cast social 
construction as an attack on the core values of science fundamentally misses the point 
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of constructivist enquiry.”114 Her critique is very much informed by this perspective. In 
that spirit, the following analysis proceeds on the basis that the core STS-constructivist 
critique of climate science practices is sound, as it highlights defects in the knowledge 
production process that may warrant improvement and reform.  
 
However, it is not an exhaustive critique of climate science and IPCC knowledge 
practices and therefore ought to be regarded with caution for two related reasons. Firstly, 
it does not account for the potential advantages of reserving a greater or even exclusive 
role for science in initially defining the climate change problem. Secondly, it elides the 
dangers of knowledge pluralism in the already highly politicised world of climate 
change policy. Not all forms of knowledge are equal or persuasive. Admitting local and 
indigenous bodies of knowledge might not always be desirable as it would risk 
unleashing a politics of definition mired in endless relativism, which would prove 
counterproductive. The proposition that local meaning-making processes should be 
connected to global epistemic processes through which the climate change problem is 
defined and understood115 also has retrogressive implications, as it risks unnecessarily 
repoliticising the now scientifically settled question of whether climate change has 
anthropogenic roots. It was the excessive politicisation of climate change within its 
domestic public sphere that prompted the US to propose the creation of a relatively 
depoliticised independent body such as the IPCC to assume primary responsibility for 
defining the problem in the first place. 
 
 
114 S.Jasanoff, n9, 275.  
115 Ibid, 235. 
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Depoliticising the space in which climate change is defined, mapped and understood 
might be desirable for several reasons. Science continues to command significant 
persuasive power above and beyond many other disciplines. The scientific 
representation of nature, while neither objective nor ‘true,’116 is nonetheless a relatively 
persuasive one for many policymakers and many lay-publics. Philosophers of science 
such as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper have observed that the day-to-day work of a 
scientist or ‘normal science,’ “presupposes an organised structure of assumptions, or a 
theory, or a research programme, needed by the community of scientists in order to 
discuss their work rationally.”117 The authority of science as a discipline (and scientists 
as an epistemic community) has developed over decades through evolutionary and (less 
frequently) revolutionary processes, which have engendered a structure of widely 
accepted scientific doctrines.118 In addition, science’s relative persuasive power derives 
from the fact that scientific knowledge is usually generated at a remove from political 
processes119 (i.e. in relatively depoliticised environments, albeit not without scientists’ 
own political and cultural baggage).  
 
More radical constructivist and STS critiques of science also appear less convincing in 
light of scientists’ own admission that disagreement is a fundamental component of 
scientific praxis and is crucial to science’s paradigmatic evolution and self-
improvement.120 This is consistent with the Popperian view that, since antiquity, science 
 
116 K.Popper, n1; M.Polanyi, n1, 4.  
117 Karl Popper, ‘Normal science and its dangers’ in Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds), Criticism and 
the Growth of Knowledge (CUP 1965) 51; T.S.Kuhn, n4.  
118 K.Popper, n1, 51. 
119 Peter M. Haas, ‘When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process’ 
(2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 4, 575.   
120 Paul N. Edwards & Stephen H. Schneider, ‘Chapter 7: Self-governance and Peer Review in Science 
for Policy: The Case for the IPCC Second Assessment Report’ in Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards 
(eds), Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (Politics, Science, 
and the Environment (MIT Press 2001) 10.  
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has been a critical enterprise characterised by “constant and fruitful discussion between 
competing dominant theories of matter.”121 While science comes with a canon and 
particular doctrinal frameworks, these are not immutable. Noting that the ‘Myth of the 
Framework’ is the central bulwark of irrationalism in our time, Popper contends that the 
scientific enterprise is sufficiently reflexive and critical to enable such frameworks to 
be challenged, broken out of, and remade.122 He maintains that a critical comparison of 
scientific theories and frameworks is always possible.123  
 
Popper’s reflections about the nature of science as a critical and fluid enterprise are 
largely borne out in practice. For example, consensus is only the logical and idealised 
endpoint of the scientific process, which is largely constituted by iterative cycles of 
debate and disagreement among scientists. Scientific communities recognise that good 
science is that which is produced through further investigation and disagreement (i.e. 
intensive peer review), which results in the filtering out of less persuasive 
representations of natural phenomena and the expulsion of bias as far as possible.124 
These processes of disagreement, as embodied by peer review, have over time resulted 
in the creation of a core set of beliefs and principles held by a global scientific-epistemic 
community.125  
 
More specifically, the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change represents 
a breakthrough or paradigm shift whereby the competing views of scientists around a 
 
121 K.Popper, n1, 55. 
122 Ibid, 56-57. 
123 Ibid 57. 
124 P.N.Edwards & S.H.Schneider, n120, 10.  
125 Ibid; Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’ 
(1992) 46 International Organization 1, 3. 
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particular problem have been reconciled and the fundamentals agreed upon.126 Climate 
science has reached a level of maturity whereby it has come to epitomise Kuhn’s idea 
of ‘paradigm-as-exemplar.’127 The same cannot be said of all other bodies of knowledge, 
including social science disciplines. For example, even economists fundamentally 
disagree on the optimal way to respond to climate change, as aptly exemplified by the 
rift between Nicholas Stern and William Nordhaus on the carbon tax issue, particularly 
the application of discount rates.128 Jasanoff makes an important concession in this 
regard, recognising that nature is not endlessly deconstructible, has limited plasticity, 
and is capable of being meaningfully represented by a few broadly defined camps.129 
These include “epistemic communities united by common perceptions of what counts 
as natural and what should be done to protect nature [which] do form across divisive 
social and political lines.”130 Accordingly, scientific expertise may be both appropriate 
and necessary for shaping our initial understanding of climate change, particularly in 
the absence of equally viable alternatives. WGI’s dominance within and relative 
independence as an exclusively scientific arm of the IPCC may therefore be preferable. 
If WGI were to open up and democratise its membership to include non-scientists and 
other experts, it might risk becoming politicised and subject to capture by interest.  
 
Towards managerialism and technocracy 
The verification of climate change as an anthropogenic phenomenon has and continues 
to occur through a scientific paradigm with Northern roots. It is increasingly difficult to 
 
126 T.S.Kuhn, n4.  
127 Ibid.  
128 Stern and Nordhaus disagree on the appropriate discount rate to be applied when taking future climate 
change damage into consideration for the purposes of developing a carbon tax. Nordhaus is skeptical 
about future discounting. Stern supports the imposition of a higher carbon tax.  
129 S.Jasanoff, n9, 245.  
130 Ibid. 
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deny the universal validity of such a paradigm for the reasons discussed above. 
Nonetheless, the overarching constructivist and STS critique, that a scientific-epistemic 
hegemony over climate change may have certain undesirable implications, must be 
seriously considered. Science may be an important tool for the depoliticisation of some 
of the most crucial areas of contemporary global policy. However, the turn towards a 
combination of regulatory science, expertise, and managerialism, which underpins our 
‘world risk society’131 and global governance, is not without its immanent dangers.  
 
More specifically, the anxieties of STS and critical legal scholars in relation to the 
ascendance of technocracy are well founded.132 In many contemporary societies, expert-
based regulation and policymaking is increasingly standing in and being substituted for 
actual democratic politics. The attenuation of the link between policymaking and 
politics is even greater at the international and transnational levels where non-state 
actors of all stripes are engaging in regulatory activity.133 Perez rightly warns that the 
epistemic monopolies of regulatory scientific institutions like the IPCC may have a 
destabilising potential, as such institutions can exercise their normative authority to 
validate their key outputs, thereby short-circuiting the democratic process.134  
 
STS therefore serves as a useful analytic framework for the study of hybrid regulatory 
institutions like the IPCC, as it alerts us to the dangers of knowledge monopolism, 
managerialism and technocratic governance. Such anxieties were borne out by COP 21 
 
131 Ulrich Beck, ‘Living in the world risk society’ (2006) 23 Economy and Society 3.  
132 See Martii Koskenniemi for a critical analysis of managerialism and its role in the reinforcement of 
hegemonic regimes in public international law, which ties into the broader debates about pluralism and 
fragmentation in public international law. Martii Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes,’ in Margaret A. 
Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (CUP 2012). 
133 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 357, 15-16. 
134 Oren S. Perez, ‘The Hybrid Legal-Scientific Dynamic of Transnational Scientific Organisations’ 
(2015) 26 The European Journal of International Law 2, 413. 
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in Paris, which was notable for its marginalisation and exclusion of NGOs and civil 
society actors from participating in formal climate change negotiations, which occurred 
largely behind closed doors and were dominated by government officials as well as 
policymaking and corporate-industrial elites. By contrast, more hardline constructivist 
perspectives on the IPCC are of limited utility as they do not sufficiently account for the 
risks associated with liberalising or democratising its knowledge practices to enable 
input from non-scientific, local and indigenous bodies of knowledge. More specifically, 
the prescription that epistemic fragmentation and knowledge competition is a desirable 
antidote to monopolism and compatible with democratic ideals135 is also not persuasive. 
Such knowledge competition might have an even greater destabilising potential in terms 
of engendering an agonistic environment characterised by a new set of power struggles 
between multiple knowledge providers and subsequently risk the commercialisation of 
climate change knowledge. The voluntary participation of experts is one of the great 
virtues of the IPCC assessment cycle and serves to ensure that knowledge production 
on climate change remains beyond the reach of commercialisation of the kind that 
currently plagues the global development paradigm.136 Knowledge pluralism might also 
risk reversing the fruitful epistemic gains made in relation to climate change over the 
last two decades.  
 
V. Other Key STS Concepts and their Potential Applications in this Thesis 
 
In addition to employing ANT and co-production as key analytical tools, this section 
outlines some other major STS concepts that I will rely on to examine climate change 
 
135 O.S.Perez, n134, 413.  
136 For a further discussion of commercialization of expert knowledge in the development context, see 
Hans N. Weiler, ‘Whose Knowledge Matters? Development and the Politics of Knowledge’ in Theodor 
Hanf, Hans N. Weiler and Helga Dickow (eds), Entwicklung als Beruf (Nomos 2009).  
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knowledge production and its applications in legal settings. These include: i) science for 
policy (or regulatory science) and; ii) boundary work. These concepts have been selected 
as methodological tools as they are pertinent for mapping and understanding ‘behind-
the-scenes’ social processes involved in the production and dissemination of scientific 
knowledge and its incorporation into public policy and law.  
 
i. Science for policy  
Contemporary knowledge societies heavily depend on science and other forms of 
expertise in most spheres of regulatory activity, including the environment. However, 
the degree of dependence on science and expertise varies across jurisdictions. In the 
United States, the path to converting science into policy has often been circuitous and 
fraught, since science is not always automatically considered a sine qua non for 
policymaking. Within US policymaking communities there exists a tendency to 
discredit science that goes against a particular policy agenda as partisan and politically 
suspect.137 Noting that science has become increasingly politicised in the US, Haas 
argues that “the use of science is mediated and thus possibly distorted by the political 
goals of potential users.”138 These insights, which reveal the fragile nexus between 
science and policy, help to partially explain why scientific consensus does not 
automatically translate into policy in the US.  
 
However, a prominent strand of STS scholarship documents how scientific knowledge 
is increasingly transformed into a usable core through science-policy interactions that 
are occurring within international and transnational networks of knowledge-making. 
 
137 Peter M. Haas, ‘When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process’ 
(2011) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 4, 572. 
138 Ibid. 
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STS scholars have variously referred to this usable core of scientific knowledge as 
‘science for policy,’139 ‘regulatory science’140 and ‘usable knowledge.’141 These hybrid 
epistemic-regulatory networks also operate within institutional settings, (e.g. UNEP, 
UNCED, the IPCC, and MEA treaty bodies like SBSTA (UNFCCC)) as designated 
providers of policy-relevant or ‘usable’ scientific and expert knowledge that is 
intelligible to non-scientific audiences. In Chapter Three, I apply this science for policy 
lens to study the IPCC, where I extensively document its knowledge work that results 
in the production of regulatory science in the form of IPCC assessment reports.  
 
These epistemic networks or communities also collaborate with policymakers, 
government officials, NGOs, IGOs, and civil society actors. Critically, the science 
generated by these epistemic networks through their work within transnational 
regulatory institutions, owes its wide uptake and purchase to successful demarcation 
efforts by their constituent scientific and policy communities.142 Within these 
transnational regulatory institutions, including the IPCC, both communities adhere to a 
social compact whereby mutual respect is afforded to enable each to operate 
autonomously.143 Critically, this allows the scientific limb of such organisations to 
engage in processes of knowledge production and diffusion that are free of political 
interference, without compromising their own scientific and political legitimacy.144 In 
addition, scientific knowledge produced in these settings achieves greater credibility 
through an added layer of political scrutiny and vetting by governments prior to being 
 
139 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Contested Boundaries in Policy-relevant Science’ (1987) 17 Social Studies of 
Science 2, 225. 
140 T.Meyer, n97, 21.  
141 P.M.Haas, n137, 573-574. 
142 T.Meyer, n97, 17.  
143 Ibid.  
144 P.M.Haas, n137, 576. 
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incorporated into policy.145 Despite these prescriptions for producing usable and 
credible information, scientists retain sufficient latitude within regulatory organisations 
to employ demarcation strategies to preserve and reinforce the independence of their 
knowledge-making operations. These demarcation efforts are referred to as ‘boundary 
work’ within the STS literature.  
 
ii. Boundary work  
Coined in the 1980s by the sociologist Thomas Gieryn, the concept of ‘boundary work’ 
was further developed by STS scholars as a re-inscription of the ‘demarcation problem’ 
with which philosophers and sociologists of science have long grappled. The 
demarcation problem refers to questions about “how to identify unique and essential 
characteristics of science that distinguish it from other kinds of intellectual activities.”146 
Prominent philosophers of science, including Popper and Merton, have proposed 
demarcation criteria such as falsifiability and the widespread institutionalisation of 
certified knowledge (e.g. in universities), respectively. These philosophical approaches 
to science subscribe to the commonly held idea that standards or norms are the source 
of science’s success and authority as an epistemic domain.147 By contrast, more recent 
sociological studies of science have questioned the desirability of strictly demarcating 
science from non-science. Noting that demarcation is more than just an analytical or 
heuristic device, Gieryn points to the realities of scientific practice to argue that 
“demarcation is routinely accomplished in practical, everyday settings.”148  
 
 
145 T.Meyer, n97, 32. 
146 T.Gieryn, n40, 781. 
147 S.Sismondo, n46, 8.  
148 Ibid.   
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Consequently, Gieryn argues in favour of abandoning ontological-positivistic 
understandings of the characteristics of science as somehow inherently unique and 
instead examining them as the product of ideological efforts by scientists to distinguish 
scientific work from non-scientific work.149 He accordingly reframes the demarcation 
problem as ‘boundary work,’ which refers to the totality of demarcation activities, 
conceptual tools, and ideological manoeuvres that scientists use to construct and police 
the social boundaries between science and non-science, for example, the production and 
consumption of scientific knowledge.150 Critically, the discursive manoeuvres made by 
scientists engaged in the production of policy-relevant or regulatory science, which 
Gieryn refers to as ‘public science,’151 become intelligible as ‘boundary work.’ This 
typically encompasses all efforts to explain their work to non-scientists, particularly the 
legal and policy communities, to garner resources and public support for their work as 
well as rhetorical attempts to defend their professional autonomy and “[keep] science 
autonomous from government controls.”152 Scientists use demarcation tools and 
techniques to preserve the integrity of their work in the face of epistemic diversity and 
pluralism. In sum, boundary work tends towards the following three goals: i) the 
expansion of authority or expertise in particular domains (e.g. environment, public 
health etc.); ii) the monopolisation of professional authority and resources, and; iii) the 
protection of autonomy.153 These are constitutive features of the ‘professionalisation’ of 
disciplines including, but not limited to the sciences.  
 
 
149 T.Gieryn, n40, 782. 
150 Ibid, 782, 789. 
151 Ibid, 782. 
152 Ibid, 789. 
153 Ibid, 791-792. 
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For our purposes, the concept of boundary work assists in the identification of the 
material and social conditions surrounding the networked production of climate science, 
including particular points or ‘nodes’ that constitute instances of demarcation between 
science and politics. Indeed, STS scholars have opined that boundary work has useful 
policy relevant applications and is pertinent for studying the separation of political and 
scientific tasks in the advisory relationship between scientists and regulatory 
agencies.154 They have also emphasised that where boundaries between science and 
politics become ‘fuzzy’ or disappear in practice, there is a need for boundary work to 
engage in demarcation to maintain clean distinctions and social discipline within each 
sphere of activity (i.e. science and politics) and establish their authority vis-à-vis one 
another.155 Moreover, the legitimacy of each domain is contingent on actors being seen 
to act within the remit of their authority or jurisdiction.156  
 
However, boundary work also helps us understand the hybrid nature of contemporary 
regulatory activity which comprises a complex mixture of facts and values.157 It allows 
us to make sense of how science and policy can forge productive relationships with one 
another to co-produce expert knowledge and social order while concurrently 
maintaining their epistemic integrity in accordance with internal systems of 
accountability. This is made possible through a series of what Star and Griesemer have 
termed ‘boundary objects’ which are “relatively stable and reproducible things, people, 
projects, texts, maps, and ideas that facilitate articulation between different actors and 
 
154 David H. Guston, ‘Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction’ 
(2001) 26 Science, Technology & Human Values 4, 399; S.Jasanoff, n139.   
155 Clark Miller, ‘Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental 
Governance in the Climate Regime’ (2001) 26 Science, Technology & Human Values 4, 492. 
156 Ibid, 493. 
157 Ibid, 495. 
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social worlds” and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them.158 Star and 
Griesemer add that “their boundary nature is reflected by the fact that they are 
simultaneously concrete and abstract, specific and general, conventional and 
customized…and often internally heterogeneous.”159 Their creation and management is 
crucial for maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds.160 
 
While scientists engage in demarcation efforts, they also deploy boundary objects to 
garner support for their propositions from the policy community. To that end, they 
engage in processes of translation or, as Latour and Callon call it, interessement to signal 
the translation of concerns of the non-scientist into those of the scientist.161 These 
networked relations between scientific and non-scientific actors/actants are 
characterized by iterative processes of alliance formation.  Ultimately what matters is 
the “flow of objects and concepts through the network of participating allies [both 
scientists and non-scientists] and social worlds [science and policy/law].”162 These 
collaborative relationships and interactions between science, policy and law (and the 
range of actors within these domains) form the core of most contemporary regulatory 
activity.  
  
The concept of boundary work is therefore also a mechanism for examining and 
understanding climate science not as inherently authoritative and incontestable due to 
 
158 Simon Shackley & Brian Wynne, ‘Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and 
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the assumed epistemic superiority of science relative to other disciplines. Rather the use 
of this STS concept enables a more sophisticated conceptualisation of climate science 
as an authoritative field of knowledge precisely because it is a product of contestation, 
struggle, and meticulous processes of alliance formation. More specifically, the outputs 
of climate science, including the consensus and IPCC assessments, are the hard-won 
fruits of boundary work painstakingly carried out by climate scientists (with the support 
of other experts and government professionals as exemplified by the work of the IPCC) 
over several decades in the face of persistent deconstructionist challenges. The next 
chapter applies these STS concepts to craft a detailed analysis of the production and 





STS-constructivist studies of science offer several conceptual and methodological 
devices that are invaluable for studying scientific knowledge production and its uses in 
climate change governance and litigation. These include ANT, co-production, science 
for action, science for policy, and boundary work. This chapter has demonstrated that 
both ANT and science for action furnish important modes of critical enquiry that I will 
pursue in my thesis, namely an examination of the social and material conditions and 
processes surrounding the production of climate science and the uses to which climate 
science is being put by actors in legal processes such as litigation. In part, my 
investigations are motivated by the incompleteness of the STS-Jasanoffian critique of 
climate science, which does not account for the latent dangers associated with 
pluralising climate change knowledge production. It has and will be further argued that 
while STS anxieties about technocracy are well-founded, the STS critique of climate 
science is not informed by a micro-level examination of the actual knowledge practices 
 82 
of the IPCC, particularly its assessment cycle and, in that sense, is weakened by what it 
misses. This omission also appears out-of-sync with STS’ strong epistemic orientation 
towards studying science in action (i.e. as it takes place within transnational networks), 
which demands more granular analyses of the sites of production and the totality of 
processes and actors/actants involved. In Chapter Three, I accordingly seek to address 
this gap in STS scholarship by carrying out a micro-level study of the IPCC.  
 
While the more important question for STS scholars of the science-law nexus is the 
purposive uses to which science can be put in legal processes, such a question cannot be 
satisfactorily answered without first turning our attention to the science in action 
question to interrogate precisely how climate science became an authoritative field of 
study in the first place and, therefore, how its findings and propositions attained the 
status of consensus. This qualitative assessment, which seeks to understand the basis for 
the construction of sound or ‘good’ science, is highly significant in the context of climate 
change policy which cannot be credibly enacted without data initially derived from 
climate models. The science for action question then becomes relevant and important 
when investigating the uses or applications of climate science by actors in litigation. 
Both lines of enquiry are of central importance to this PhD project and are pursued in 
conjunction, as they enable me to clearly identify the ways in which these actors are 
synthesising climate science within the IPCC and strategically using it within UNFCCC 
COPs and domestic courts to co-produce a new transnational legal commons on climate 
change. The next chapter adopts an STS science-in-action (or science-in-the-making) 
framework, and applies ANT and the co-production idiom to map the IPCC’s production 
and synthesis of climate science. Chapters Four to Six subsequently examine how 
climate science is co-produced and applied in legal settings, namely by being evaluated, 
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certified and disseminated by courts and litigants in climate change lawsuits. They also 
explore the by-product of this co-production in the form of a shared body of 












In this PhD project, I argue that climate science is being generated through 
transdisciplinary co-production between the domains of science, policy and law and the 
key actors steering this process include climate scientists, domestic courts and climate 
litigants. The byproduct of these co-productive dynamics is an emergent transnational 
and shared body of legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change, as illustrated in 
Chapters Five and Six. This chapter shows that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) is the first major site for the transdisciplinary co-production of climate 
science. Actors of many different stripes including scientists, social scientists, 
policymakers and legal professionals, are involved in the IPCC’s knowledge-making 
enterprise. I argue that the IPCC’s knowledge practices evidence instances of both 
‘science-policy co-production’ and ‘science-law co-production,’ as exemplified by 
certain certification procedures like peer review, the adoption and approval of IPCC 
reports, and their integration into and application within the UNFCCC regime, 
respectively. This chapter applies an STS, science-in-action framework, comprising 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) and the co-production idiom, to document how the 
knowledge base and scientific consensus on climate change are produced and 
synthesised through scientific-epistemic networks and certified through the work of the 
IPCC and its Working Groups. It aims to identify and map the processes through which 
the IPCC’s assessment reports (i.e. its particular framing of climate science) have 
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become an authoritative body and primary source of expert knowledge for actors in 
climate litigation, as shown in Chapters Four to Six.  
 
The IPCC is the pre-eminent intergovernmental organisation for the “[assessment] of 
scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the 
scientific basis of the risk of human-induced climate change.”1 Its authority and 
influence on climate change law and policymaking are considerable. The IPCC 
continually justifies its work by reference to its United Nations mandate. According to 
its official rhetoric, it strives to preserve its legitimacy by always operating exclusively 
in the scientific domain and remaining policy-neutral.2 Examining this claim, it is clear 
however that scientific authority is only one form of authority that the IPCC currently 
exercises. The IPCC also has a policy-advisory function and its high level decision-
making procedures involve extensive governmental participation. It is therefore best 
thought of as “a science-policy boundary organisation”3 or “hybrid management body.”4 
However, according to some constructivist and STS scholars, the IPCC’s insistence on 
its scientific purity and its technoscientific construction of climate change as a 
predominantly environmental problem has precluded its concomitant framing as a social 
problem.5 This critique will be closely examined and addressed.  
 
 
1 IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Principles Governing IPCC Work’ (2015) 
IPCC.ch </http://www.ipcc.ch> accessed 27 November 2015.    
2 Ibid; Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2007).  
3 David H. Guston, ‘Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction’ 
(2001) 26 Science, Technology, & Human Values 4, 400. 
4 Clark Miller, ‘Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental 
Governance in the Climate Regime’ (2001) 26 Science, Technology, & Human Values 4, 478.  
5 Andreas Bjurström & Merritt Polk, ‘Physical and economic bias in climate change research: a 
scientometric study of the IPCC Third Assessment Report’ (2011) 108 Climatic Change 1, 1; Sheila 
Jasanoff, “A New Climate for Society,” (2010) 27 Theory, Culture & Society, 233; Clark Miller, 
‘Climate science and the making of a global political order,’ in Sheila Jasanoff (ed), States of 
Knowledge:The Co-production of Science and Social Order (Routledge 2004) pp.46-66. 
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To date, much of the research on the IPCC has been carried out by STS scholars and a 
handful of critical social scientists.6 With some important exceptions,7 the IPCC has 
received little attention from legal scholars as a subject worthy of study in its own right. 
This lacuna in the legal literature is perplexing given the prominence of the IPCC in the 
international legal regime on climate change, namely the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Conference of the Parties (COPs). The 
central preoccupation of existing legal studies on the IPCC is with the issue of 
accountability.8 Academic criticism of the IPCC’s ostensible failure to foreground 
minority or dissenting opinions in its reports9 is overstated. Studies that advocate this 
view do not pay close attention to the IPCC’s actual assessment procedures, whereby 
disagreement and differences of expert opinion are canvassed and explicitly recorded in 
its reports following intensive rounds of scientific and political scrutiny, dialogue and 
debate.10  
 
This chapter proceeds on the premise that evaluative studies seeking to measure the 
IPCC’s accountability exclusively by reference to political-legal criteria (transparency, 
participation etc.) are not entirely appropriate given its hybrid character and dual 
responsibility of maintaining both scientific credibility and political legitimacy. The 
IPCC is required to respond to the demands and live up to the expectations of both the 
 
6 Mike Hulme & Martin Mahoney, ‘Climate Change: What do we know about the IPCC?’ (2010) 14 
Progress in Physical Geography 1, 1.  
7 S.Jasanoff, n5, 233; Tara Skodvin, ‘Science-policy interaction in the global greenhouse: Institution 
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Organisations,” (2015) 26 The European Journal of International Law 2.  
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9 O.S.Perez, n7, 145.  
10 Appendix A to the Principles Governing IPCC Work, hereafter ‘Appendix A’ (15-18 April 1999) 15th 
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scientific and policy communities, which are sometimes contradictory and 
irreconcilable – a core existential tension. This chapter seeks to address this gap in the 
legal scholarship on climate change by adopting a constructivist approach11 and, to that 
end, importing relevant insights from philosophical and sociological studies of science 
and STS scholarship. It also seeks to contribute to the legal literature on climate change 
by assessing the implications of the IPCC’s epistemic authority and its particular 
framing of climate change for law and policymaking generally and legal processes such 
as litigation in particular.  
 
This chapter also contends that climate science is best thought of as ‘applied science,’ 
and ‘trans-science’ as understood by STS scholars.12 This is because it is being generated 
and shaped predominantly in response to policy demands and, occasionally, failed or 
pending climate litigation. More importantly, with climate change causation presenting 
profound challenges for adjudication, the production of event attribution science appears 
to be partly driven by the demands of legal process. This is largely consistent with the 
agenda-based character of climate science and IPCC assessments which have always 
been produced with the intent of informing public policy. 
 
The analysis is laid out according to the following schema. Part II maps the emergence 
and development of climate science as a discrete, albeit multidisciplinary, field of study. 
It also closely examines and addresses scholarly claims from STS-constructivists that 
the dominant technoscientific narrative of climate change is deficient and that climate 
 
11 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Is science socially constructed? – And can it still inform public policy?’ (1996) 2 
Science and Engineering, 263.  
12 Alvin M. Weinberg, ‘Science and Trans-science’ (1972) 10 Minerva 2; Sheila Jasanoff, 
‘Representation and Re-presentation in Litigation Science’ (2008) 116 Environmental Health 
Perspectives 1.  
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science is afflicted by a crisis of narrativisation. Parts III and IV document the 
transformation of climate science into a knowledge base for policy and law through the 
work of the IPCC. These sections will specifically map the institutional personality and 
governance role of the IPCC by paying close attention to its organisation, functions, and 
knowledge practices and develop a typology of the different forms of authority that it 
exercises. Part III determines whether the IPCC can be classified as a boundary 
organisation. Part IV examines in detail the IPCC’s assessment procedures and 
mechanisms and thereby determines whether its knowledge practices typify boundary 
work. It also examines the IPCC’s relationship to the UNFCCC regime. The UNFCCC 
is characterised as a site of science-law co-production. Part V makes a case for why 
climate science inherently lends itself to practical application and is therefore best 
thought of as a body of: i) applied science and; ii) trans-science. Through these modes 
of analysis, the chapter demonstrates that the IPCC occupies a central and indispensable 
position within the global climate change regime complex, as the principal provider of 
a broad knowledge base for policymaking, litigation and norm creation on climate 
change. More specifically, IPCC assessment reports have become an important source 
and repository of expert knowledge for actors in climate litigation and play a formative 
role in transnational judicial lawmaking on climate change. Part VI offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
II. Climate Science in Context  
 




The IPCC consensus on the anthropogenic causes of climate change13 has gained near 
universal acceptance from states as embodied by the 2015 Paris Agreement. While 
scientific uncertainties persist in relation to the manifestation of future impacts of 
climate change, the climate science community largely operates from a common set of 
well-founded assumptions and consensually established facts when advising policy 
communities about climate change matters. The battle lines over climate change tend to 
play out almost entirely in the political arena and pertain to the adoption of regulatory 
responses to the problem – a reality that courts have and continue to affirm.  
 
A shared objective of all scientific enquiry is to investigate and acquire knowledge about 
our world. However, not all scientific fields are equivalent in terms of their methods of 
knowing, predictive capabilities, and levels of certainty. Environmental sciences14 such 
as ‘ecology’15 are generally characterised by higher levels of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy.16 Predictions about the future state of an ecosystem are often framed in 
probabilistic terms and, in some areas, unpredictability reigns.17 Climate science, while 
also framed in terms of varying levels of probability, differs from other environmental 
sciences because it is heavily dominated by the physical sciences, namely Earth Systems 
 
13 IPCC, ‘Fifth Assessment Report (AR5): The Physical Science Basis’ (2013) IPCC.ch 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/> accessed 15 November 2015; The IPCC Working Group I 
concluded with 97% confidence that the current atmospheric concentration of anthropogenically emitted 
GHGs amounts to 400ppm.  
14 Ecological science or ‘ecology’ is the branch of biology that studies the relationships between 
living organisms and their environment. Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Ecology,’ (2020) < 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/59380?redirectedFrom=ecology#eid> accessed 3 February 2020. 
15 Environmental sciences involves the interdisciplinary scientific study of the environment and 
environmental problems and include scientific fields such as ecology. Oxford English Dictionary, 
‘Environmental Science’ (2020) < 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/281235?redirectedFrom=environmental+science#eid> accessed 3 
February 2020.   
16 Richard A. Carpenter, ‘Ecology in Court, and Other Disappointments of Environmental Science and 
Environmental Law’ (1983) 15 Natural Resources Law 3, 586. 
17 Ibid, 591. 
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Science18, which is a relatively high-consensus field.19 Physical sciences combine high 
levels of experimental data and probabilistic modelling, which tend to reduce the 
potential for conflict and disagreement.20 In contrast, the environmental sciences mainly 
comprise mixed, though well-founded, probabilistic science.21  
 
There are usually far more theoretical disagreements in ecology than in physics. For 
example, in relation to environmental impact statements (EIS) and environmental 
questions concerning unmanaged ecosystems, scientists in court often disagree. This is 
not the case with climate science, since over the last two decades, thousands of climate 
scientists around the world have been running the same climate models (i.e. Global 
Circulation Models or ‘GCMs’) and deriving very similar or identical results about 
atmospheric and oceanic warming and its anthropogenic causes. Climate scientists have 
also been forthright in their identification and acknowledgement of flaws within existing 
climate models,22 which they constantly strive to improve. Nevertheless, through 
iterative simulations of GCMs, climate science has developed into a mature scientific 
field that exhibits greater levels of predictive capability and reduced uncertainty. By 
contrast, ecological sciences have relatively lower levels of predictive capability, which 
has resulted in important aspects of EIS remaining inherently uncertain.23  
 
18 Earth Science or Earth Systems Science (ESS) takes the main components of planet Earth—the 
atmosphere, oceans, freshwater, rocks, soils, and biosphere—and seeks to understand major patterns 
and processes in their dynamics. It studies not only the processes that go on within each component 
(traditionally the realms of oceanography, atmospheric physics, and ecology, to name but three), but 
also interactions between these components. It is the need to study and understand these between-
component interactions that defines ESS as a discipline in its own right. See John Lawton, ‘Earth 
System Science,’ (2001) 292 Science 5524, 1965.  
19 R.A.Carpenter, n16, 591. 
20 Ibid, 588.  
21 Ibid, 589.  
22 Myles Allen, ‘The Scientific Basis for Climate Change Liability’ in Richard Lord QC, Silke Goldberg, 
Lavanya Rajamani, Jutta Brunnee (eds), Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice 
(CUP 2012) 10. 




Another crucial difference between other environmental problems and climate change 
is the absence of national or global ecological surveys in relation to the former, as 
exemplified by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regime in the US.24 
NEPA does not mandate continual assessment efforts to improve the quality and utility 
of EIS. Climate change is again uniquely situated within the highly diverse field of 
environmental and ecological issues, because the IPCC is exclusively empowered by 
states to engage in the sustained and rigorous accumulation, synthesis, and assessment 
of state-of-the-art climate science from around the world and consolidate a global 
database. As shown below, the IPCC assessment cycle is marked by high levels of 
quality control due to its sophisticated peer review system.  
 
Scientific uncertainty has long been used by regulators, politicians, and climate change 
detractors as a rationale for indefinitely deferring climate action, particularly in the US. 
However, against the backdrop of the Paris Agreement and the growth of climate 
science, any regulatory position that advocates in favour of inaction or a business as 
usual approach on climate change is arguably untenable, morally dubious, and 
politically irresponsible. Climate inaction is now both an unmitigated social ill and a 
deficient policy position. Some legal scholars rightly envisage that governments which 
pursue a business as usual approach and major carbon producers that continue their 
GHG emitting activities with the knowledge that they are contributing to dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change would be unable to rely on private law defences based on 
well-established tort principles to counter arguments likely to be made by plaintiffs in 
 
24 R.A.Carpenter, n16, 593.  
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the second half of this century.25 These include the following: i) serious damage 
occurred; ii) it was known that such damage would occur (according to IPCC 
assessments) and could have been prevented (according to the Stern Review), and; iii) 
the principal emitters chose not to act effectively, primarily in order to derive short-term 
economic benefits.26 Therefore, governments and corporations which assume such a 
position remain exposed to an array of legal challenges, which will become increasingly 
difficult for them to counter as the scientific evidence on climate change damage and 
attribution mounts.  
 
The expulsion of scientific uncertainty has become a raison d’etre and hallmark of 
climate science as both a field of study and a knowledge base for regulation and policy. 
However, uncertainty remains inherent to the problem of climate change and therefore 
poses challenges for climate science.27 GCMs are not capable of predicting and mapping 
the contours of all future impacts with a high degree of precision and accuracy due to a 
myriad of unknown variables.28 Moreover, climate scientists have occasionally 
experienced difficulties in effectively communicating uncertainty to laypersons. The 
IPCC has proved particularly adept at bridging this communication divide by providing 
accessible and intelligible explanations to lay audiences about how uncertainty is 
accounted for and indicated in the assessment reports. This is exemplified by the Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) on the Physical Science Basis in which the IPCC enumerates 
the key metrics that the Working Groups use to communicate uncertainty, namely: i) a 
 
25 Richard Lord QC, Silke Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani, Jutta Brunnee (eds), Climate Change Liability: 
Transnational Law and Practice (CUP 2012) 36.  
26 R.Lord QC et al, n25, 36.  
27 U. Cubasch, D. Wuebbles, D. Chen, M.C. Facchini, D. Frame, N. Mahowald, and J.-G. Winther, 
‘2013: Introduction,’ in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, 
T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. 
Midgley (eds.)] (CUP, 2013) 123.  
28 Ibid.  
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qualitative scale of confidence in the validity of a finding, and; ii) a quantified measure 
of uncertainty expressed probabilistically.29  
  
The issue of scientific uncertainty dominated the first wave of climate litigation cases,30 
and remains relevant where specific impacts are concerned, but will need to be rethought 
as the science of event attribution31 grows and strengthens. During the first wave of 
climate litigation, GHG emissions presented a conundrum for causal proof and the 
attribution of liability. Much of the early scholarship on climate litigation subscribes to 
this line of thought, arguing that the (then) inadequate state of scientific knowledge on 
climate change made it difficult to prove specific causation in a court of law.32 While 
this was accurate for its time, such jurisprudential and scholarly positions appear 
increasingly outmoded in light of significant advances in climate science – an issue 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Indeed, Carpenter observes that scientific 
knowledge as a base for law may change quickly and radically.33 Therefore, an account 
 
29 IPCC AR5, n13. With respect to the first metric of confidence, the following five qualifiers are used: 
very low, low, medium, high, very high. In relation to the second metric, the following terms are used to 
indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain 99-100% probability; Very 
likely 90-100%; Likely 66-100%; About as likely as not 33-66%; Unlikely 0-33%; Very unlikely 0-10%; 
Exceptionally unlikely 0-1%.   
30 Ganguly et al. characterize the first wave of climate litigation as comprising strategic public and 
private climate litigation brought against governments and fossil fuel corporations between 2005 and 
2015 and largely concentrated in the United States. Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer & Veerle 
Heyvaert, ‘If At First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 4, 846. 
31 Event attribution science or Probabilistic Event Attribution (PEA) is an emerging branch of climate 
science concerned with assessing and quantifying the extent to which extreme weather events can be 
linked to past anthropogenic GHG emissions, also known as ‘attributable risk.’ Friedereke Otto, Rachel 
James & Myles Allen, ‘The science of attributing extreme weather events and its potential contribution to 
assessing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts,’ (2018) 
<https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/application/pdf/attributingextremeeve
nts.pdf> accessed 8 April 2019; See Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, ‘Extreme weather event 
attribution science and climate change litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?’ (2018) 36 Journal 
of Energy and Natural Resources Law 3.  
32 David A. Grossman, ‘Warming Up To a Not So Radical Idea: Tort-based Climate Change Litigation’ 
(2003) 28 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 1, 6; Erica D. Kassman, ‘How Local Courts Address 
Global Problems: The Case of Climate Change’ (2012) 24 Duke Journal of International Law 201.  
33 R.A. Carpenter, n14, 578. 
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of how the current state of climate science is shaping and affecting contemporary climate 
litigation is needed and this PhD project provides one such account. 
 
The dominant technoscientific narrative of climate change  
Climate science is a branch of the atmospheric sciences and a sub-discipline within the 
Earth Sciences which includes, inter alia, climatology, meteorology, oceanography, 
physics and biogeochemistry.34 Climate scientists study the structure and dynamics of 
the Earth’s climate system to understand how global, regional, and local climates are 
maintained as well as the processes by which they are altered.35 All these scientific fields 
have contributed to our knowledge about climate change. While studies on global 
warming have existed since the late nineteenth century,36 climate change became a 
distinct subject of scientific study mainly in the United States in the 1960s and 
crystallised into a full-fledged global scientific research program only in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Disagreements between climate scientists at the time, particularly 
between James Hansen at NASA and other climatologists, also signalled the need for “a 
much more stringent approach to the assessment of all available knowledge,”37 and 
culminated in the creation of the IPCC and the initiation of its first assessment cycle in 
1988.  
 
While scientific assessments on climate change predated the establishment of the IPCC, 
and were largely carried out by US government agencies such as the National Academy 
 
34 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Climate Science’ (2018) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/climate-science/> accessed 3 February 2020.  
35 Ibid.  
36 English scientist John Tyndall developed the concept of the ‘greenhouse effect’ in 1865. Swedish 
physicist, Svante Arrhenius, built on this legacy and became the first scientist to consider the effects of 
anthropogenic carbon emissions from fossil fuel exploitation on the climate.  
37 Bert Bolin, n2, 49.  
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of Sciences (NAS), the IPCC represented the first forum in which governments sought 
to link and foster interactions between the scientific and political communities with 
respect to climate change. Moreover, the scientific consensus on the anthropogenic roots 
of climate change emerged in 2001 with the publication of the IPCC’s Third Assessment 
Report (AR3).38 Similarly, the most recent AR5 reflects an overwhelming consensus 
(97%) among the climate science community on the links between anthropogenic GHG 
emissions and climate change.39   
 
Seminal pieces of climate change research that have over time informed IPCC 
assessments and shaped the scientific consensus include James Hansen’s ‘Model Zero’ 
and Michael Mann’s ‘Hockey Stick Graph.’ Published in 1988, Model Zero was one of 
the world’s first climate models to demonstrate the link between anthropogenic carbon 
emissions and atmospheric warming.40 Michael Mann’s 1999 Hockey Stick Graph 
relied on climate proxy records to map the mean temperature of the past 500 to 2000 
years (paleoclimate reconstructions) and revealed a rapid and unprecedented warming 
pattern in the 20th century.41 Both have since proven to be accurate in their predictions. 
Indeed, GCMs now constitute the principal tools used by climate scientists to map 
atmospheric and oceanic temperature changes resulting from anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. They also continue to heavily inform IPCC assessments which constitute the 
core output of the global climate science community. Consequently, IPCC assessments 
 
38 IPCC, ‘Third Assessment Report’ (2001) IPCC.ch < https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar3/> 
accessed 25 February 2016.  
39 IPCC AR5, n13.  
40 J Hansen, I Fung, A Lacis, D Rind, S Lebedeff, ‘Global climate changes as forecast by Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies three-dimensional model’ (1988) 8 Journal of Geophysical Research 93.  
41 Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley & Michael K. Hughes, ‘Northern Hemisphere Temperatures 
During the Past Millennium: Inferences, Uncertainties, and Limitations’ (1999) 26 Geophysical Research 
Letters 6.  
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can be thought of as embodying or reflecting the dominant scientific narrative of climate 
change since the turn of the twenty-first century.  
 
The narrative power of climate science 
Climate change is different from other issues due to its unique spatial, scalar, and 
temporal dimensions. It is a polycentric and totalising phenomenon, significant enough 
to influence the classification of a new geological epoch – the ‘Anthropocene’ – to 
denote the central role of humans in shaping the Earth’s climate and the environment 
(biosphere) since the industrial revolution in the late 18th century.42 Climate change 
affects everyone, transcending geographical demarcations (i.e. the territorialised nation-
state) and dissolves distinctions between global and local.43 Of all contemporary issues, 
it is more high stakes than any other since inaction is fatal and has deleterious planetary 
consequences. As German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk argues, Buckminster Fuller’s 
‘Spaceship Earth’ metaphor has compelling applications in the climate change context.44 
Sloterdijk suggests that in this monadological conceptualisation of the Earth as a 
‘spaceship,’ regardless of whether one supports the status quo of fossil fuel exploitation 
or advocates in favour of ecological moderation, the goal of atmospheric stabilisation 
for the sake of collective survival has become an absolute imperative.45  
 
 
42 Paul J. Crutzen, ‘Geology of mankind’ (2002) 415 Nature 23; Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen & John R. 
McNeill, ‘The Anthropocene: Are Human Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?’ (2007) 36 
Ambio 8, 615. In May 2019, the Anthropocene Working Group, a constituent body of the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy, decided by a majority vote (and after extensive and vigorous debate) to 
adopt the ‘Anthropocene’ as a formal unit of geological time, understood as beginning in the 1950s with 
the onset of the nuclear age and the vast accumulation of stratigraphic content since. Nicola Davidson, 
‘The Anthropocene epoch: have we entered a new phase of planetary history?’ The Guardian  (30 May 
2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/30/anthropocene-epoch-have-we-entered-
a-new-phase-of-planetary-history> accessed 13 June 2019.  
43 Peter Sloterdijk, ‘How big is big?’ (2010) <http://www.collegium-
international.org/index.php/en/contributions/127-how-big-is-big> accessed 10 August 2017.  
44 Ibid.   
45 Ibid.  
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If this account of Earth as a spaceship is accepted, then Earth scientists occupy a unique 
position as ‘reformers,’46 acting as principal advocates of a decarbonised future. In other 
words, Sloterdijk alludes to the way in which Earth scientists are already wedded to a 
particular narrative or framing of climate change which they have actively played a part 
in globalising. In doing so, he claims that they are promoting an ethics of moderation or 
a politics of climatic socialism.47 However, Sloterdijk acknowledges that the most 
compelling account of climate is the one provided by Earth scientists.48 The scientific 
account of climate change is powerful precisely because of its unparalleled predictive 
capabilities or what Sloterdijk refers to as ‘prognostic intelligence.’49 Indeed, the 
technoscientific narrative of climate change that the IPCC assessments carry forward 
not only document existing impacts, but are also framed as prognoses or predictions of 
harm scenarios, some of which have since come to pass and others which are yet to 
materialise. In contrast, social scientific discourses and narratives on climate change do 
not possess similar prognostic capabilities. With respect to the narrative power of 
science, former scientist Michael Segal offers the following reflections:   
 
Some narratives are more powerful than others. 
Scientific narratives are some of the most powerful of 
all. They teach us more than facts, mechanisms, and 
procedures. They convey a worldview of skeptical 
empiricism and indefinite revision, and show us how to 
negotiate the boundary between our rational and 
emotional selves, teach us to suspend judgment and 
consider all the possibilities, and remind us that a belief 
in objective truth is a deep kind of optimism with 
massive dividends. Perhaps most important of all, they 
situate us in the world.50 
 
 
46 P.Sloterdijk, n43.   
47 Ibid  
48 Ibid.   
49 Ibid.  





A crisis of narrativisation?  
The core narratives of climate science, as embodied by IPCC assessments, have come 
under fire in recent years for failing to resonate with lay-publics and influence 
meaningful policy responses to climate change. Is a more compelling climate science 
‘meta-narrative’51 needed to better inform policy and garner public attention with 
respect to climate change? This section evaluates these claims, including normative 
proposals for reforming climate science narratives and the role of climate scientists with 
respect to policymaking. It argues that climate scientists are sufficiently attuned to the 
narrative deficiencies of their knowledge outputs. Indeed many prominent climate 
scientists are already playing non-traditional roles and have spearheaded high profile 
climate advocacy efforts in recent years in their capacity as both expert witnesses in 
litigation and activists.  
 
The scientific account of climate change has not always succeeded in garnering 
widespread public support or influencing the development of policy responses to the 
problem. Certain scholars partly attribute this to the absence of compelling narratives 
around uncontested scientific facts. The facts produced by climate scientists are 
insufficient on their own to inspire climate action. In this regard, Segal suggests that 
better scientific storytelling is required to bridge the gap between science and culture.52 
Climate scientists are also aware of this problem, with James Hansen famously referring 
 
51 Ibid; Chris Rapley, Kris de Meyer & Sarah Chaytor, ‘Time for Change? Climate Science 
Reconsidered,’ (June 2014) Report of the UCL Policy Commission on Communicating Climate Science 
< https://www.ucl.ac.uk/public-policy/sites/public-policy/files/migrated-
files/Communication_of_Climate_Science_policy_briefing_FINAL.pdf> accessed 15 February 2018; 
Roger A. Pielke Jr, The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics (CUP 2007).  
52 M.Segal, n50, 124. 
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to the ‘timid language of scientific probabilities’ as scientific reticence.53 Several 
commentators have accordingly called for the development of a more powerful ‘meta-
narrative’ of climate science.54  
 
According to Rapley, such a narrative must be fundamentally premised on the rejection 
of the linear ‘technocratic model’ that currently dominates the science-policy paradigm 
towards a ‘co-production’ model.55 Rapley further argues that climate scientists and 
policymakers must work collaboratively with one another as well as other experts and 
members of the public to develop a more holistic ‘co-production’ approach to the 
issue.56 This would also ensure that climate science achieves greater credibility in the 
eyes of lay-publics.57 Pielke and Rapley also suggest that climate scientists ought to take 
on new roles and responsibilities with respect to policymaking and public engagement. 
Notable recommendations include the roles of i) a ‘science communicator’ who engages 
with society to convey their results and offer interpretations of those results; ii) an ‘the 
honest broker of policy alternatives’ who contributes scientific expertise to climate-
related decision-making and, along with other stakeholders, fully evaluates all available 
options, thereby engaging in a process of co-production and; iii) an ‘issue advocate’ who 
engages with decision-makers and the public to promote a particular course of action, 
justified on the basis of their expert knowledge and understanding.58 
 
 
53 See James Hansen as quoted in a New York magazine article by David Wallace-Wells, ‘The 
Uninhabitable Earth’ New York Magazine (July 2017) < 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html> accessed 9 
July 2017.  
54 C.Rapley et al, n51; R.A. Pielke Jr, n51; M.Segal, n50, 122. 
55 C.Rapley et al, Ibid, 25. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Chris Rapley & Kris de Meyer, ‘Climate science reconsidered’ (2014) 4 Nature Climate Change, 746; 
R.A.Pielke Jr, n51.  
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The stakes involved in recasting scientific narratives  
The contention that scientific facts need to be made more palatable for public 
consumption does not on its own adequately explain political inaction on climate 
change. A crucial question missed by those demanding better narratives from climate 
science, as exemplified by the STS perspectives of Jasanoff and others discussed in 
Chapter Two, is what is at stake if constructivist or ‘deconstructionist’ approaches enter 
into knowledge-making processes pertaining to climate change? In short, as discussed 
in Chapter Two, this perspective does not adequately account for the pernicious 
influence of climate denial on public opinion through its organised assault on climate 
science. While in contemporary societies, technoscientific propositions and innovations 
are increasingly subject to processes of public scrutiny and validation, the constituent 
elements of what Ulrich Beck terms ‘reflexive modernization,’59 deconstructionist 
approaches and methodologies pose unique problems in relation to climate change. As 
Demeritt rightly observes, “the controversy over climate change suggests that public 
exposure of scientific uncertainty is not always the politically progressive or reflexive 
liberation of politics, law and the public sphere from their patronization by 
technocracy.”60 Furthermore, STS-constructivism does not enable us to call out climate 
denial as a lie; rather it becomes a 'point of view.'61 Climate deniers have long been 
invested in a campaign to systematically discredit IPCC assessments and have already 
tried to deconstruct (albeit unsuccessfully) the Hockey Stick Graph.62 With the backing 
of the fossil fuel industry, climate deniers have managed to use deconstructionist 
 
59 Ulrich Beck, ‘From industrial society to the risk society: questions of 
survival, social structure, and ecological enlightenment’ (1992) 9 Theory, Culture & Society 97 123; 
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage Publications 1992).  
60 David Demeritt, ‘Science studies, climate change, and the prospects for constructivist critique’ (2006) 
35 Economy and Society 3, 460-461. 
61 Ibid, 460. 
62 D.Demeritt, n60, 462. Climate skeptics cherry-picked paleo-climatic data to countenance Michael 
Mann’s hockey stick graph and its conclusion that recent (i.e. 20th century) warming is unprecedented. 
Such denialist views were subsequently amplified by right-wing think tanks and media outlets.  
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approaches to successfully sow doubt and sustain a campaign of organised public 
skepticism about climate science, particularly in the US.   
 
In short, what is perhaps most at stake here is knowledge itself, specifically knowledge 
production and the IPCC’s control over the climate change narrative. Litigation on 
climate change is proliferating precisely because there is a desire among various actors 
to control the narrative, since such control elicits or translates into particular regulatory 
outcomes. Law acts as a powerful certification mechanism in this context. More 
specifically, scientific narratives require social justification63 and litigation is one 
mechanism through which this might occur. The present vulnerability of the 
technoscientific narrative of climate change cannot be ignored given that climate deniers 
are once again in power in the US. The IPCC narrative, although dominant, is again 
being threatened by systematic assaults on climate science and vicious attacks against 
climate scientists by deniers. Therefore, careful consideration and caution are required 
when advocating in favour of modifying the climate change narrative through 
constructivist approaches in order to accommodate alternative epistemological 
perspectives.  
 
The attack on expertise and science, as evidenced by the Trump Administration’s efforts 
to defund and muzzle government scientific agencies, means that scientists (particularly 
those employed by US government agencies like NAS, NASA and NOAA) may lose 
control of the climate change narrative altogether, which would prove profoundly 
counterproductive to collective action on the issue. In light of these sobering political 
realities, reflexive modernisation with respect to climate change requires us, at a 
 
63 M.Segal, n50, 124. 
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minimum, to vigorously defend ‘good’ science and unequivocally disavow ‘bad’ 
science and climate denial.64 More specifically, the core propositions of climate science 
(particularly as reflected in the physical science volume of IPCC assessments) might 
need to be placed beyond deconstructionist scrutiny and dissection of the kind that is 
liable to misappropriation by climate deniers. The key implication here is that the core 
set of scientific propositions about climate change constitutes an epistemic baseline 
from which to regulate the problem.   
  
Climate science advocacy: “Litigate-to-Mitigate”65  
The assaults on IPCC climate science have prompted some prominent climate scientists 
to defend their work by engaging in climate activism and advocacy to promote climate 
science narratives through public interviews and lectures, documentary films, literature 
and, increasingly, litigation. In recent years, high profile climate science advocacy 
efforts have largely been carried out by public figures and celebrities. Salient examples 
of such advocacy through narrative include documentary films by Al Gore and Leonardo 
DiCaprio.66 Climate-themed fiction or ‘cli-fi’ is also a rapidly growing sub-genre of 
science fiction literature, rendered compelling by the authors’ direct reliance on climate 
science projections for the construction of plausible post-climate futures.67 These works 
touch on a range of important climate-related subjects such as water scarcity, forced 
 
64 D.Demeritt, n60, 474. 
65 Jonathan Watts, ‘We should be on the offensive” – James Hansen calls for wave of climate lawsuits,’ 
The Guardian (17 November 2017) < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/17/we-
should-be-on-the-offensive-james-hansen-calls-for-wave-of-climate-lawsuits> accessed 17 November 
2017. 
66 Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (2006) and ‘An Inconvenient Sequel: Truth to Power’ (2017); 
Leonardo Dicaprio’s ‘Before the Flood’(2016).  
67 Livia Albeck-Ripka, ‘Is Climate-Themed Fiction All Too Real? We Asked the Experts’ New York 
Times (26 September 2017) < https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/26/climate/climate-books-
fiction-scifi-novels.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news> accessed 26 
September 2017; The recent Pulitzer prize winning book ‘The Overstory’ by Richard Powers is a salient 
example of a climate change novel. See Richard Powers, The Overstory (Penguin Randomhouse 2018).  
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human displacement, species extinction and sea-level rise. Climate scientists are 
increasingly participating in climate advocacy as reflected by their occasional 
collaboration with filmmakers and novelists on the issue.68 Moreover, the election of 
Donald Trump has spurred the American scientific community into strongly voicing its 
concerns about renewed attacks on science and expertise and threats to evidence-based 
policymaking. The March for Science in May 2017 marks the largest assembly of 
scientists participating in organised protest against the US government in recent 
history.69  
 
While such political mobilisation and advocacy by scientists is on the rise, many 
prominent climate scientists have led similar efforts in the past decade. Perhaps the most 
high profile example of climate science advocacy includes that undertaken by former 
NASA climatologist James Hansen who is often referred to as the ‘father of global 
warming.’70 Hansen’s Model Zero predicted much of what has now come to pass 
regarding climate change and many climate impacts have also surpassed his initial 
projections. According to Hansen, dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate 
system would constitute atmospheric CO2 levels of 350 parts per million (ppm).71 In 
September 2016, this threshold was significantly exceeded with CO2 levels crossing 400 
ppm. Hansen regularly attends protests (e.g. Keystone XL Pipeline) and has been 
arrested numerous times for his activism. He is also one of the plaintiffs and key expert 
 
68 L.Albeck-Ripka, n67; For example, Barbara Kingsolver, author of ‘Flight Behaviour,’ consulted 
biologist Lincoln Bower, an expert on monarch butterflies and their population decline as a consequence 
of environmental degradation, including climate change.  
69 Nicholas St Fleur, ‘Scientists, feeling under siege, march against Trump policies’ New York Times (22 
April 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/science/march-for-science.html > accessed 22 April 
2017.  
70 Elizabeth Kolbert ‘The Catastrophist: NASA’s climate expert delivers the news no one wants to hear’ 
The New Yorker (26 June 2009) < https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/29/the-catastrophist> 
accessed 20 August 2017. 
71 E.Kolbert, n70. 
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witnesses in the recent landmark Oregon District Court case, Juliana et al v USA72 
(popularly referred to as the Our Children’s Trust case), a lawsuit brought on behalf of 
his granddaughter and future generations against the US government for its failure to 
adequately regulate the GHG emissions of the fossil fuel industry. Hansen has also 
provided expert testimony in another major US climate change lawsuit Green Mountain 
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v Crombie.73 In view of such impassioned climate 
science advocacy, the charge against climate scientists for being predominantly 
technocratic and clinical in their production and circulation of climate science is not 
borne out or, at the very least, shows that there are exceptions to the rule. Hansen’s 
advocacy is a marked example of a sincere and considered effort to mobilise scientific 
data derived from climate models to create a climate change narrative that clearly seeks 
to drive societal change.  
 
Hansen has also been candid and forthcoming about his advocacy efforts.74 For example, 
in a 2009 protest in Washington D.C., in an interview with the New Yorker, he stated 
the following: “I’m trying to make clear what the connection is between the science and 
the policy…somebody has to do it.”75 His colleague, climatologist Michael 
Oppenheimer notes, “[Hansen’s] made up his mind that you have to pull out all the stops 
at this point, and that all his scientific efforts would come to naught if he didn’t also 
involve himself in political action.”76 From 2007, Hansen began writing to world 
leaders, including Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain, and Yasuo Fukuda, then 
 
72 Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (2016) Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-
TC. 
73 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth v Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).  
74 See Hansen’s TED Talk from 2012. James Hansen, ‘Why I must speak out about climate change’ TED 
(2012) < https://www.ted.com/talks/james_hansen_why_i_must_speak_out_about_climate_change> 
accessed 3 October 2017.  




the Prime Minister of Japan. In December 2008 he composed a personal appeal to 
Barack and Michelle Obama. Science historian Naomi Oreskes notes that Hansen’s 
advocacy is striking for its moral language: “Hansen talks in stronger terms. He’s using 
adjectives. He has started to speak in moral terms, and that always makes scientists 
uncomfortable.”77 Hansen also delivers PowerPoint presentations with the disclaimer 
that any statements relating to policy are his personal opinion.  
 
 In 2017 Hansen and his team authored a scientific paper titled ‘Young People’s Burden’ 
with the public trust climate change lawsuit Juliana v USA78 (discussed in Chapters Four 
and Six) directly in mind.  The study’s four key findings include the following: i) global 
warming in the past 50 years has raised the global temperature well above the prior range 
of the Holocene to the level of the Eemian period when sea level was 6-9 metres higher 
than today; ii) global warming can be held below 1.5C (the aspirational goal of the 
Paris Agreement) if rapid reductions of global CO2 emissions (at least 3% a year) begin 
by 2021 and there is no net growth of other climate forcings. However, 1.5C exceeds 
estimated Eemian temperature and is not an appropriate goal; iii) the growth rate of 
greenhouse gas climate forcing has accelerated markedly in the past several years, and; 
iv) an appropriate goal is to return the global temperature range to the Holocene range 
within a century. To realise this ‘negative CO2 emissions’ scenario, an immediate and 
drastic reduction in GHG emissions is required coupled with improved agricultural and 
forestry practices including reforestation and technological extraction of CO2 from the 
air.79 
 
77 See Naomi Oreskes as quoted in E.Kolbert, n79.  
78 Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (Our Children’s Trust Case) 
(2016) Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 4. 
79 James Hansen et al, ‘Young people’s burden: requirement of negative CO2 emissions’ (2017) 8 Earth 




Other prominent climatologists with notable public-facing climate advocacy roles 
include Will Steffen and Michael Mann. Will Steffen is a chemist and an expert on Earth 
System Science and the former Inaugural Director of the Climate Change Institute at the 
Australian National University from 2008 to 2012, where he is now an emeritus 
professor. He has delivered a series of public lectures on climate science over the last 
decade, including TED talks, in which he has repeatedly urged the Australian 
government to pursue more meaningful action on climate change.80 Steffen also recently 
appeared as an expert witness in the landmark Australian (New South Wales) case 
pertaining to a development proposal for an open cut coalmine, Gloucester Resources v 
Minister for Planning.81 His testimony was pivotal to the assessment of climate change 
impacts of the proposed Rocky Hill coalmine in this case and is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Similarly, Michael Mann has also publicly advocated in favour of science-based policy 
interventions on climate change. He is a climatologist and geophysicist and the current 
director of the Earth System Science Center at Pennsylvania State University. He is also 
a member of the board of ‘The Climate Mobilization,’ a US grassroots advocacy group 
calling for national economic mobilization against climate change, geared towards 
reaching net zero emissions by 2025.82 Upon directly experiencing the impacts of the 
2019 to 2020 Australian bushfires, Mann penned an op-ed for the Guardian on 1 January 
 
80 Will Steffen, ‘Climate Change 2018: The Nature of the Challenge’ (2018) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-jk5vJowtA> accessed 4 February 2020; Will Steffen, ‘ 
TedXCanberra: The Anthropocene’ (2010) < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABZjlfhN0EQ> 
accessed 4 February 2020.  
81 Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning (2019) 234 LGERA 257.  
82 Michael Mann, ‘Time to Mobilize: Michael Mann for Climate Mobilization’ (27 December 2018) < 
https://www.theclimatemobilization.org/blog/a-message-from-michael-mann-time-to-mobilize> 
accessed 4 February 2020.  
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2020 in which he declared “I am a scientist on holiday in the Blue Mountains, watching 
climate change in action”83 and ardently pleaded with Australians to “vote out fossil-
fuelled politicians who have chosen to be part of the problem.”84  
 
In Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Conway astutely document the ways in which 
prominent climate scientists have been persecuted by the fossil fuel industry and climate 
deniers over the last three decades.85 Other scholarly accounts have attributed the 
persecution of climate scientists to ‘ideological thinking’ and ‘conspiratorial ideation.’86 
This involves an approach to social or scientific phenomena as a matter of individual 
‘belief,’ the rejection of scientific propositions, including the fundamentals of climate 
science, and the tendency to “explain significant political or social events as a secret 
plot by powerful individuals or organisations.”87 In the US, the muzzling of government 
climate scientists even has its own moniker –  being “Hansenized.”88 In a manner 
analogous to the former Bush Administration, the Trump Administration regards 
climate scientists in particular as a threat to the dominance of special interests and the 
fossil fuel status quo which it actively supports and sustains. Its scientific skepticism 
and efforts to undermine government scientists attests to the latter’s (perhaps relatively 
newfound) power and influence as a political force to be reckoned with, particularly 
with respect to climate change. The exponential rise in lawsuits against climate scientists 
 
83 Michael Mann, ‘Australia your country is burning – dangerous climate change is here with you 
now’ (1 January 2020) < https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/02/australia-your-
country-is-burning-dangerous-climate-change-is-here-with-you-now> accessed 1 January 2020.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the 
Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (Bloomsbury Press 2010).  
86 Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Klaus Oberauer, Scott Brophy, Elisabeth A. Lloyd and Michael 
Marriott, ‘Recurrent Fury: Conspiratorial Discourse in the Blogosphere Triggered By Research on the 
Role of Conspiracist Ideation in Climate Denial,’ (2015) 3 Journal of Social & Political Psychology 
1, 143. 
87 Ibid.  
88 N.Oreskes et al., n85.  
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by denialist groups (many of them funded by the fossil fuel industry) since the 2016 US 
election89 is symptomatic of the anti-science sentiment that is now endemic within the 
White House and other branches of the US government.  
 
Climate litigation is another platform for climate science advocacy, where concerted 
efforts are being made by climate scientists and litigants to legitimate, protect and 
defend the technoscientific narrative of climate change and the core findings of climate 
science (i.e. IPCC assessments) from assault by industry, government and denialist 
groups. In the context of climate litigation, I argue that climate science advocacy takes 
the form of recurrent appearances by climate scientists as expert witnesses and amicus 
curiae, and litigants’ use of climate science to craft compelling rights and climate 
justice-based narratives. Therefore, climate litigation remains an important front-line 
strategy among the climate science community and civil society for the promotion and 
dissemination of the IPCC’s technoscientific narrative of climate change. Such efforts 
are also demonstrative of science-law co-production since scientists and litigants are 
often collaborating to use litigation to co-produce and elevate the IPCC’s 
technoscientific narrative of climate change.  These dynamics are mapped and unpacked 





89 The civil society advocacy group, Climate Science Legal Defense Fund (CSLDF), which represents 
climate scientists in lawsuits, recently reported that frivolous lawsuits against climate scientists by 
climate denialist think tanks and front groups have risen significantly since the 2016 election. In general, 
many of these climate denialist groups have been emboldened by the Trump administration. Lauren 
Kurtz, ‘Climate scientists are under attack from frivolous lawsuits’ The Guardian (7 July 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/jul/07/climate-
scientists-are-under-attack-from-frivolous-lawsuits> accessed 20 August 2017.  
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III. The IPCC’s Institutional Personality 
 
Although it does not conduct research itself, the IPCC is responsible for reviewing and 
framing the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change.90 This section will 
attempt to map the contours of the IPCC’s institutional personality and specifically 
determine whether it merits the title of a ‘boundary organisation.’ The IPCC is a 
transnational network or ‘epistemic community’91 comprising experts (both scientific 
and otherwise) and government representatives from around the world. While its 
membership is diverse and multinational, all members subscribe to and engage in the 
shared epistemic enterprise of producing policy relevant knowledge on climate change. 
Its United Nations mandate prescribes that its primary role is to review and assess the 
current state of scientific and technical knowledge on the anthropogenic basis of climate 
change and prepare policy-neutral and policy-relevant reports.92 Its organisational 
principles also prescribe a support role for the IPCC within UNFCCC processes (e.g. 
COPs), which are the main sites of international regulatory activity on climate change.93  
 
The IPCC’s procedures and outputs indirectly influence norm creation and 
policymaking. It was designed to have considerable influence on international 
regulatory processes as an upstream producer of knowledge and policy advice. The 
IPCC’s dominance in relation to scientific knowledge production is a consequence of 
 
90 IPCC, ‘Organization’ (2016) < http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml> accessed 18 
January 2016. 
91 Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as a network of professionals with recognised expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue area. They share a set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-
based rationale for the social action of community members, causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a 
common policy enterprise. See Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international 
policy coordination’ (1992) 46 International Organization 1, 3. 
92 IPCC Principles, n11, Principles 2 & 3. 
93 Ibid, Principle 1.  
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states’ (particularly the US’) conscious efforts to depoliticise the climate change issue 
within their national jurisdictions by centralising and concentrating epistemic authority 
in one principal institution at the international level.94 Through its epistemic dominance 
and consensus, the IPCC continues to inform international (UNFCCC), supranational 
(EU) and national law- and policymaking on climate change from a position of relative 
independence. Such institutional design choices also evince the underlying intention of 
states and other UN bodies95 to vest the IPCC with significant epistemic authority and 
influence in relation to international standard setting processes under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC. For example, at COP 3, member states (i.e. Annex I parties) translated the 
IPCC’s consensus on the anthropogenic basis of climate change into a legally binding 
agreement, the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Some legal commentators have also characterised the IPCC as a ‘regulatory scientific 
institution’ – a particular breed of transnational organisation innovated in “response to 
the demand in modern societies for scientific certainty and to the scarcity of normative 
resources in the international domain.”96 The IPCC merits the label of a regulatory 
scientific institution because it seeks to apply scientific and technical knowledge to a 
specific problem area in transnational governance and advises legal institutions such as 
the UNFCCC about the current state of scientific knowledge on the issue.97 It also 
engages in internal standard-setting and self-regulation, having adopted sophisticated 
rules of procedure that govern the admissibility, treatment, and formal acceptance and 
 
94 Shadur Agrawala, ‘Context and early origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ 
(1998) 39 Climatic Change 605, 617. 
95 Along with the US, UNEP and WMO co-founded the IPCC.   
96 O.S.Perez, n7, 392.  
97 Timothy Meyer, ‘Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic Cooperation in International Environmental 
Governance’ (2013) 2 Transnational Environmental Law 1, 17.  
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approval of scientific and technical reports on climate change.98 Its peer review 
procedures are particularly comprehensive and rigorous, even more so than those for 
most academic journals, with no direct analogue in transnational governance.99 Since its 
inception in 1988, the IPCC has also periodically strengthened and expanded its peer 
review procedures in response to criticism and to expel potential bias. Its work has 
considerable influence on transnational regulatory processes pertaining to climate 
change. Through over two decades of inter-institutional engagement and practice, its 
knowledge work has arguably become the sine qua non of law and policymaking on 
climate change.  
 
At the intersection of science and politics: A Janus-faced entity? 
The IPCC’s claims to scientific purity are consistent with what Latour describes as the 
modern drive towards the purification of hybrids into science or politics and facts or 
values.100 Despite such claims, the IPCC can be appropriately characterised as a science-
policy ‘boundary organisation’101 or ‘hybrid management body.’102 Boundary 
organisations are those situated between two social worlds such as science and politics, 
and can be used by individuals within each for specific purposes without losing their 
own identity.103 They consist of social arrangements, networks and institutions that 
mediate between the institutions of science and politics.104 The IPCC is a paradigmatic 
example of a global governance institution engaged in boundary work, which comprises 
the production of “regulatory science [through] advisory processes loaded with value 
 
98 Appendix A, n10, Rule 4.  
99 Shadur Agrawala, ‘Structural and process history of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ 
(1998) 39 Climatic Change 623-624.  
100 Bruno Latour, We have never been modern (Harvard University Press 1993).  
101 D.Guston, n3, 399.  
102 C.Miller, n4, 486.  
103 D.Guston, n3, 400 ; C.Miller, n4.  
104 C.Miller, n4, 482.  
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judgments.”105 Therefore, it is a site of what STS scholars like Latour and Jasanoff have 
termed ‘co-production,’ which involves the simultaneous production of knowledge and 
social order.106   
 
Legal scholars like Oren Perez agree with the STS characterisation of regulatory 
scientific institutions (RSIs) as exercising hybrid epistemic-scientific and political-legal 
authority.107 However, he goes slightly further, arguing that the STS terminology (i.e. 
boundary organisation, boundary work and co-production) does not sufficiently capture 
the unique hybrid dynamic and institutional complexity within RSIs.108 More 
specifically, these metaphors are not adequately attuned to the institutional tensions 
within RSIs produced by the juxtaposition of the discourses of science, law and 
politics.109 Accordingly, he posits that RSIs like the IPCC have a ‘triple-hybrid 
structure’ comprising three complementary pairs -  science-law, law-non-law, and 
science-pseudo science.110 The hybrid structure of RSIs produces existential tensions by 
virtue of the fact that they are subject to parallel and competing systems of scientific and 
legal-political accountability, which may come into conflict. RSIs are therefore torn 
between the conventions of science (with its focus on intellectual merit and objectivity) 
on the one hand and law-politics (with its emphasis on voice, participation, and 
transparency) on the other.111  
 
 
105 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Watching the watchers: lessons from the science of science advice’ The Guardian (8 
April 2013) < http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2013/apr/08/lessons-science-
advice> accessed 20 January 2016.  
106 D.Guston, n3, 401; Bruno Latour, Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through 
society (Harvard University Press 1987); Sheila Jasanoff, n11, 396.  
107 O.S.Perez, n7, 392.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid, 403.  
110 Ibid, 412.  
111 Ibid, 404.   
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Perez’s contribution here is important as it moves away from a binary characterisation 
of RSIs as simply scientific-political organisations, to provide a more nuanced account 
of hybridity within this particular new breed of transnational institutions. However, his 
characterisation of RSIs as ‘triple-hybrid organisations’ does not constitute a radical 
departure from the STS literature on boundary organisations, but rather builds on the 
legacy of such scholarship to expand upon the concept of boundary work. In this regard, 
it is closely aligned with Clark Miller’s work which reformulates and updates the 
concept of boundary organisations into the notion of ‘hybrid management,’ which more 
pertinently captures the contemporary dynamics of global governance. Miller defines 
‘hybrid management’ as the processes by which boundary organisations secure internal 
cohesion and maintain productive relationships between domains by “putting scientific 
and political elements together [hybridisation], taking them apart [deconstruction], 
establishing and maintaining boundaries between different forms of life [boundary 
work], and coordinating activities taking place in multiple domains [cross-domain 
orchestration].”112 A common denominator of all these conceptual-theoretical 
frameworks is the concept of hybridity, which is sufficiently flexible to apply to a range 
of institutions engaging in regulatory activity beyond the state. The present study will 
therefore rely on this more flexible concept of hybridity to map the authority of the 
IPCC.  
 
Between facts and values: The IPCC as the archetypal hybrid institution 
The IPCC exhibits the classical traits of a boundary organisation or hybrid management 
body as theorised by Miller.113 It is a site of co-production in the sense that it 
 




simultaneously serves as a forum for scientific knowledge-making and the development 
of policy responses to climate change – a form of socio-political ordering. Although 
scientific assessments constitute a major component of its mandate, its work is not 
purely scientific. Rather, its institutional structure reflects its hybrid existence or “dual 
agency”114 as both a scientific and legal-political organisation. On the one hand, the 
scientific limb of the IPCC’s mandate is carried out by WGI, which is responsible for 
reviewing and assessing the current state of scientific knowledge on climate change.115 
On the other hand, WGII and WGIII are respectively tasked with assessing climate 
change impacts and developing responses,116 and thereby routinely engage in non-
scientific knowledge work, which has obvious socio-political dimensions and 
implications.  
 
The work of both WGII and WGIII involves extensive appraisal of climate equity issues 
such as vulnerability and socio-economic impacts – subject matter which by its very 
nature invites value judgments. In addition, the IPCC’s review work involves the 
extensive participation of, and liaison and collaboration between scientists, other experts 
(i.e. economists and legal professionals) and government representatives. While the first 
stage of peer review is reserved exclusively for independent experts, participation in the 
second stage is open to experts, authors of the draft reports, and all WMO and UN 
member states.117 Similarly, experts and government representatives are joint 
participants in the Working Group Panels where they collectively approve and accept 
the final draft reports.118  
 
114 D.Guston, n3, 401.   
115 IPCC, ‘Working Groups/Taskforce’ (2016)  < 
http://www.ipcc.ch/working_groups/working_groups.shtml> accessed 19 January 2016.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Appendix A, n10, Rules 4.1 & 4.2.  




These joint interactions represent the coalescence of science and politics, which is aptly 
exemplified by one of the IPCC’s key outputs, the Summaries for Policymakers (SPMs), 
which contain scientific content, but are also politically negotiated products.119 
Processes leading to the adoption of the SPMs attest to the Janus-faced character of the 
IPCC, as they are pertinent examples of boundary work or hybrid management practices 
that combine scientific and political input. The SPMs are authored by scientists and 
subsequently adopted by consensus at the Plenary sessions of each Working Group after 
undergoing a rigorous and comprehensive review process by governments and 
independent experts, involving line-by-line approval.120 Given such extensive 
governmental and political participation in its processes, some commentators have 
observed that the IPCC’s maintenance of its image as scientific is slightly 
paradoxical.121 The following section will identify the ways in which the IPCC’s 
organisational structure and procedures attempt to harmonise and balance the dual 
imperatives of scientific independence and political inclusivity. 
 
IV. The IPCC’s Key Procedures and Functions 
 
The foregoing analysis establishes the IPCC’s status as a transnational environmental 
regulator and a boundary-hybrid management organisation. It also demonstrates that the 
IPCC is not a monolith. The label ‘scientific organisation’ is a misnomer, as it fails to 
adequately capture its institutional complexity. Rather, the IPCC comprises a plethora 
of actors (numerous categories of experts and governmental representatives) that 
 
119 Larry S. Luton, ‘Climate Scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Evolving 
Dynamics of a Belief in Political Neutrality’ (2015) 37 Administrative Theory & Praxis 152.  
120 Appendix A, n10, 4.3.  
121 T.Skodvin, n5, 29; L.S.Luton, n119, 145.  
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participate in variegated and dynamic processes of knowledge-making and definitional 
work, as evidenced by the existence of three discrete working groups. This section 
closely examines the practices of the Working Groups (WGs), clarifies the status of the 
IPCC’s principles and rules of procedure, and also provides a comprehensive account 
of its assessment reporting structure and functions including: i) preparation of reports; 
ii) peer review, and; iii) acceptance, approval and adoption of reports. It also provides 
concrete examples of the IPCC’s hybrid management activities or boundary work, 
which evidence its exercise of both scientific and legal-political authority.  
 
Status of IPCC principles and rules of procedure 
The IPCC was established in 1988 by UNEP and the WMO under the auspices of the 
UN through General Assembly (GA) Resolution 43/53.122 Although GA resolutions are 
generally thought to be non-binding and recommendatory in international law,123 the 
ICJ has held them to be authoritative and, in limited cases, binding.124 GA resolutions 
are generally binding in relation to organisational matters within the UN legal order 
(rationae materiae) and on their valid addressees (rationae personae), which can 
include member states and other UN bodies.125 The GA’s authority rationae materiae 
arguably extends to the establishment of other UN bodies such as the IPCC.  
 
WMO Council Resolution 4 also prescribes the IPCC’s initial mandate and terms of 
reference, which assigns it responsibility for assessing scientific information on 
 
122 UNGA Res 43/53 (6 December 1988).  
123 South West Africa (Ethiopia v S Africa; Liberia v S Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 6  
at 50–51, para. 98.  
124 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations [1950] ICJ 
Rep 4, at 8.  




greenhouse gases to enable evaluation of the consequences of climate change, 
formulating response strategies, and reporting on its activities to UNEP and WMO.126 
These resolutions form the basis of the Principles Governing IPCC Work, which were 
adopted in 1998 in Vienna and have been periodically amended and updated,127 as well 
as its appendices, which enumerate the rules of procedure.128 Principle 1 is expressed in 
mandatory language and prescribes that, “the IPCC shall concentrate its activities on 
tasks allotted by the relevant WMO and UNEP Governing Council resolutions and 
decisions…”129 Thus, even if not legally binding, the IPCC principles and rules of 
procedure derive from a combination of GA Resolution 43/53 and UNEP and WMO 
Governing Council Resolutions and therefore have at least a quasi-legal character.  
 
The IPCC Assessment Cycle 
IPCC assessments are the most salient examples of boundary work, as they embody the 
tension between the IPCC’s role as scientific knowledge producer and policy advisor. 
This tension is produced by the IPCC’s status as a boundary organisation, which is 
concurrently subject to scientific and political systems of accountability that inevitably 
pull in different directions. Nomenclature aside, the IPCC’s assessment work is situated 
between the scientific and political realms, which means that it must mediate between 
the respective imperatives of remaining committed to notions of scientific truth and 
credibility on the one hand and the claims of interest, power, and legitimacy on the 
other.130 The IPCC attempts to strike a balance between these competing imperatives 
 
126 WMO Executive Council Res 4 EC-XLII (22 June 1990).  
127 IPCC Principles, n11. 
128 Appendix A, n10.   
129 IPCC Principles, n11, Principle 1.  
130 Bernd Siebenhuner, ‘The changing role of nation-states in international environmental assessments – 
the case of the IPCC’ (2003) 13 Global Environmental Change, 113; Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch 
(Harvard University Press 1990). 
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through its sophisticated and hybrid institutional organisation and procedures, which 
enable instances of both scientific-technical independence (deconstruction and 
boundary demarcation) and science-policy integration (hybridisation and cross-domain 
orchestration).131 Prominent examples of the former include the initial assessment of 
relevant and up-to-date research, the compilation of reports, and the first stage of peer 
review. All three are the exclusive province of scientists and other experts. Examples of 
the latter include the later stages of peer review and acceptance, approval and adoption 
of reports, which involves extensive participation by and collaboration between 
scientists, other experts and governmental representatives. A more detailed examination 
of these procedures follows in turn.   
 
i. Preparation of reports 
The IPCC divides its work of collating and assessing the credibility of relevant 
scientific, technical, and socio-economic research, and preparing reports among three 
principal WGs and a Taskforce on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. WGI is tasked 
with assessing the science of climate change, WGII’s mandate extends to assessing the 
socio-economic impacts of climate change and WGIII is responsible for developing 
response strategies relating to mitigation and adaptation.132 The Taskforce is responsible 
for developing a methodology for calculating and reporting national greenhouse gas 
emissions and removals.133  
 
The general structure of the initial assessments and drafting of reports is uniform across 
the three WGs and Taskforce. First, the WG and Taskforce Bureaux select Coordinating 
 
131 C.Miller, n4, 487.  
132 IPCC, ‘IPCC Structure’ (2016) < http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_structure.shtml> 




Lead Authors (CLAs), Lead Authors (LAs), and Contributing Authors (CAs) based on 
recommendations from governments, NGOs, the IPCC Secretariat, and participating 
organisations (e.g. UNEP and WMO) that identify and provide a list of appropriate 
experts.134 Second, the WG and Taskforce Bureaux select authors from the lists provided 
with the aim of ensuring diversity and geographical representation in membership 
(including authors from developing countries) and scientific, technical, and socio-
economic views and backgrounds.135  
 
Third, CLAs and LAs are tasked with preparing the first draft of all assessment reports. 
In doing so, they are required to assess peer reviewed and internationally available 
literature, which includes unpublished manuscripts and selected non-peer-reviewed or 
‘grey’ literature (e.g. industry journals, working papers, internal organisational 
publications etc.).136 Authors must typically prioritise peer-reviewed sources, but can 
justify their use of non-peer reviewed literature in accordance with Annex 2 of the rules 
of procedure.137 This provides guidance on how to treat non-peer-reviewed literature, 
which has to be: i) critically assessed for quality and validity; ii) listed in the reference 
sections of IPCC reports and; iii) submitted to the WG/Taskforce Bureau Co-Chairs who 
coordinate the Report in order to ensure procedural transparency.138  
 
Finally, LAs are obliged to record any disagreement by “clearly [identifying] disparate 
views for which there is significant scientific or technical support.”139 In addition, they 
 
134 Appendix A, n10, Rule 4.2.1.  
135 Ibid, Rule 4.2.2. 
136 Ibid, Rule 4.2.3.  
137 Ibid, Rule 4.2.3. 
138 IPCC, ‘General Guidance on the Use of Literature in IPCC Reports’ (hereafter Annex 2) (2015) 
<https://nofrakkingconsensus.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/ipcc_greyliterature-gn.pdf> accessed 15 
February 2016.  
139 Ibid.  
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generally work in small groups and are assigned to a designated section of the report. 
LAs also have primary responsibility for synthesising available literature and 
developing text that is scientifically, technically, and socio-economically sound and 
faithfully represents a wide range of expert views as far as possible. CLAs also share 
these responsibilities, but have the additional tasks of: i) coordinating various 
components of the report and ensuring their completion to a high standard; ii) identifying 
cross-cutting scientific and technical issues within the report and ensuring that they are 
addressed in a coherent manner and; iii) overseeing the timely delivery of the report to 
the WG/Taskforce Bureaux. There are also hundreds of CAs in the assessment cycle, 
who assume a support function of preparing technical information in the form of text, 
graphs, or data for assimilation by the LAs. The hundreds of expert authors who 
participate in the assessment and report drafting processes are drawn from many of the 
193 UN member states and work in a voluntary capacity. The most recent AR5 involved 
the contribution of 831 experts from around the world across the three WGs.140 In 
aggregate, the IPCC assesses and reviews a vast body of literature numbering in the 
thousands over the course of each reporting cycle. In AR5, WGI’s report contained over 
9200 references to scientific publications, WGII’s report contained 12,000, and WGIII’s 
report cited close to 10,000 references.141  
 
In WGII and WGIII, the initial assessment of scientific-technical research and the 
drafting of reports are carried out by expert teams comprising both scientists and social 
scientists. Both the natural and social sciences have collective input in the assessment 
of scientific and technical data and drafting of reports, which exemplify interdisciplinary 
 
140 IPCC, ‘IPCC Factsheet: How does the IPCC select its authors?’ (2015) < 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/FS_select_authors.pdf> accessed 15 February 2016.  
141 IPCC, ‘Fifth Assessment Report: WG Factsheets’ (2016) < http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/> 
accessed 10 February 2016.  
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and cross-domain integration. WGII and WGIII also conduct regional assessments and 
reflect on socio-economic conditions within particular societies and communities most 
vulnerable to climate change. Accordingly, they operate somewhere in the realm 
between science and pseudo-science.142 For example, in the Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4) and AR5, WGII and WGIII identify certain populations as particularly vulnerable 
to climate change and emphasise both the urgency and moral imperative of assisting 
those populations through North-to-South transfers of climate finance and 
technology.143 In AR5, WGII uses targeted case studies that draw upon social science 
literature to highlight the vulnerability of particular regions and countries. Since the 
Second Assessment Report (SAR), a separate chapter has also been devoted to a 
discussion of Small Island States.  
 
Scientometric studies of the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR) have revealed that 
WGII is the most integrated of the three working groups, as its draws on literature from 
both the natural and social sciences, albeit with the balance tipped in favour of the 
former which retain a dominant influence.144 By contrast, the social sciences 
(particularly economics) dominate the work of WGIII.145 To a lesser extent, the WGs 
also draw upon legal, political science, sociological, and anthropological research. The 
STS critique about the absence of interpretive social sciences in knowledge-making 
processes pertaining to climate change is therefore not entirely borne out in practice.  
 
142 O.S.Perez, n7, 404.  
143 IPCC, ‘Fourth Assessment Report: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ (2007) < 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/wg2/> accessed 15 January 2016; IPCC, ‘Fifth Assessment Report: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ (2014) < https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> accessed 15 
January 2016.  
144 Scientometric studies is a research field that measures, analyses and evaluates science, mainly from 
statistics based on scientific texts indexed in databases. Andreas Bjurström & Merritt Polk, ‘Physical and 
economic bias in climate change research: a scientometric study of the IPCC Third Assessment Report’ 





WGI differs from its counterparts, as its membership and work constitute marked 
examples of boundary demarcation. Its mandate is limited to determining the physical 
science basis of climate change. It is therefore not surprising that scientists dominate its 
membership and retain exclusive prerogative to assess scientific and technical data and 
author its assessment reports. Its authorial team is made up of a range of scientists, 
including climatologists, oceanographers and meteorologists. WGI also heavily 
prioritises literature from a particular sub-field of the physical sciences, namely the 
Earth Sciences (geosciences, oceanography, and meteorology).146 Journal content 
analyses of the TAR have revealed that three-quarters of the total literature referenced 
was from the Earth Sciences, with environmental sciences and biology making up the 
remainder.147   
 
ii. Peer review 
Peer review is the cornerstone of the IPCC assessment cycle, designed to ensure that 
expert knowledge is credible, accurate, and unbiased as far as possible. It is a well-
established certification mechanism that is widely used in both the natural sciences and 
other academic disciplines. Peer review is a highly distributive and iterative process, 
typically involving extensive back-and-forth between authors, referees, and review 
editors, several rounds of revision, and eventually an outcome agreeable to all parties.148 
In the natural sciences, it is often a blind or double-blind process whereby the anonymity 
of the author and referees is maintained throughout. Peer review is not without 
 
146 A. Bjurström et al, n144, 10. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Paul N. Edwards & Stephen H. Schneider, ‘Chapter 7: Self-governance and Peer Review in Science 
for Policy: The Case for the IPCC Second Assessment Report’ in Clark Miller & Paul N. Edwards (eds) 
(MIT Press 2001) 10, 8. 
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controversy and its reliability as an indicator of research quality has been questioned 
and challenged. Common criticisms include those of confirmation bias and taint due to 
particular funding agendas.149 However, Edwards and Schneider observe that such 
criticism is often underpinned by a lofty and idealised view of peer review as a ‘truth 
machine.’150 They rightly argue that peer review is a human process, vital to building 
any coherent knowledge community, and its fundamental purpose is not to derive 
‘truth,’ but rather to improve the quality of research by subjecting it to criticism and 
evaluation by those best qualified to do so.151 Other significant objectives of peer review 
include the minimisation rather than resolution of academic disagreement and 
establishment of the credibility of expert knowledge.152   
 
The IPCC procedural rules for peer review appear to embody the purposive goal of 
informational improvement through disagreement, constructive debate, and critique 
rather than truth creation. They outline the aim of gathering the best possible scientific 
and technical advice for inclusion in the reports to ensure that they reflect the latest 
scientific, technical, and socio-economic findings as comprehensively as possible.153 
The IPCC further elaborates the aim of achieving “scientific excellence, balance, and 
clarity” through multiple stages of review, which are an essential part of its review 
process to ensure “comprehensive, objective, and transparent assessment of the current 
state of knowledge of the science related to climate change.”154 
 
 
149 P.N.Edwards et al, n148, 9. 
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As with authors, Review Editors (REs) and Expert Reviewers (ERs) are similarly 
selected from lists provided by governments, NGOs, the IPCC Secretariat and 
participating organisations. The selection process also aims for geographical 
representativeness and a wide range of views and expertise.155 While two REs are 
assigned to each chapter of the reports, hundreds of ERs participate in the review process 
as a whole. REs are responsible for assisting the WG/Taskforce Bureaux in the selection 
of ERs, ensuring that all research is appropriately considered, advising authors on how 
to manage controversial issues, and ensuring that controversies and differences of 
opinion are included in the text of the reports, particularly if they are relevant to policy 
debate.156 ERs perform peer review functions akin to those found in established 
scientific and other academic journals, primarily commenting on the accuracy and 
completeness of the scientific, technical, and socio-economic content in the IPCC draft 
assessment reports.157  
 
The first stage of peer review involves a process of scientific-academic certification of 
the IPCC assessment reports and represents an instance of boundary demarcation. It is 
similar to peer review processes found in academic journals, albeit on a much grander 
scale. Participation is exclusively reserved for experts.158 The First Order Drafts are 
widely circulated to ERs for evaluation. While performing their evaluation, ERs are also 
entitled to request any material referenced in the document under review.159 They 
subsequently provide their comments to the LAs through the relevant WG/Taskforce 
Bureau.160 A process of consultation between ERs, WG/Taskforce Bureau Co-Chairs, 
 
155 Appendix A, n10, Rule 4.2.4.  
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CLAs, and the IPCC Secretariat may be held to specifically address particular points of 
assessment or major areas of difference.161 Based on the review comments, author teams 
prepare Second Order Drafts and a first draft of the SPMs. The second and final stages 
of review involve both experts and governments162 who provide comments to facilitate 
the preparation of the Final Draft Reports and SPMs by the author teams for Plenary 
acceptance, approval, and adoption. These later stages of review are apt examples of 
integration and cross-domain orchestration, as they culminate in the political 
certification of the IPCC assessment reports and SPMs.  
 
iii. Acceptance, approval, and adoption of reports  
The IPCC procedures for acceptance, approval, and adoption of reports constitute 
prominent examples of collaboration and integration between the scientific and political 
communities. Following the second stage of review and redrafting, the assessment 
reports and SPMs are submitted to the plenary of each WG for acceptance and approval, 
respectively.163 These plenaries mainly comprise national delegations that include 
government officials and policymakers, and also involve the participation of LAs (i.e. 
experts). In WGI plenary sessions, LAs retain a special status and considerable 
influence, as any proposed changes to the text of the report cannot be made without their 
consent. It is also at the plenary sessions that controversial issues or disagreements are 
addressed through a series of side meetings to enable arrival at a consensus. These side 
meetings consist of an intensive science-policy dialogue, allowing government officials 
and experts to reopen and settle disputes over certain sections of the reports or SPMs, 
generally by developing revised text. However, the finally approved product seldom 
 
161 Appendix A, n10.  
162 Ibid, Rule 4.2.4.2.  
163 Assessment reports are accepted, SPMs are approved, and Synthesis Reports are adopted; IPCC 
Principles, n1, Principle 2.   
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tends to differ substantially from the draft text, due to a pattern of political deference 
towards expertise in WG plenary sessions. While consensus approval of assessment 
reports occurs in a highly polarised and politicised environment, government 
representatives generally tend to defer to the scientific authority of experts.164 
 
These plenary discussions are critical as “they represent the first step towards acquiring 
political acceptance of the knowledge base [on climate change] and its conclusions.”165 
Having undergone an intensive process of scientific-political scrutiny, the assessment 
reports and SPMs emerge as robust and scientifically credible documents that are 
approved by WG plenary consensus. Therefore, as Skodvin astutely observes, the 
substantive conclusions that arise out of these plenary discussions are not easily 
deconstructed.166 More specifically, once accepted by the WG plenaries, the full panel 
plenary of the IPCC cannot subsequently amend a report. This is an important 
institutional safeguard established through a revision of the IPCC rules of procedure in 
1993 and designed to ensure consistency between the assessment reports and SPMs.167 
The main task of the panel plenary is to review the reports, record any substantial 
disagreements, and formally accept them.168 SPMs undergo a separate process of 
approval by government delegates, who are the main actors in that process. LAs do not 
directly participate in this process, but retain an advisory role. SPMs are subjected to 
intensive political scrutiny, namely line-by-line discussion among government delegates 
who approve them by consensus. The procedural safeguard discussed above also ensures 
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that controversial issues addressed and settled at the WG plenary sessions cannot be 
reopened during the SPM approval process. The panel plenary is also responsible for 
the section-by-section review and adoption of the Synthesis Report (of which SPMs are 
a subset), which synthesises and integrates materials contained in the assessment reports 
in a non-technical style accessible to policymakers.169  
 
Institutional reform 
The IPCC is an innovative beast, whose hybridity and high level of procedural flexibility 
allow it to concurrently operate as both a scientific and policy advisory body, without 
the bureaucratic encumbrances typical of other regulatory institutions. Its assessment 
procedures exemplify both boundary work and co-production par excellence. As 
Rached observes, “there is hardly an international body, with a similar institutional task, 
that has attained this level of procedural meticulousness.”170 While each assessment 
cycle may involve a credibility crisis or trial,171 the IPCC nonetheless manages to 
perform its multifaceted role with a certain degree of success and with its credibility and 
authority largely intact.  
 
This is attributable to its rather sophisticated procedural architecture, which it has 
developed and fine-tuned over time through institutional learning in response to outside 
criticism, to preserve its authority and credibility in the eyes of its main audiences (i.e. 
scientists and governments). Most notably, following a series of crises in 2009,172 the 
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172 In 2009, the World Wildlife Fund identified errors in the data in AR4 on Himalayan glaciers. In the 
same year, Contributing Authors from the University of East Anglia were also discovered to have 
manipulated data to exaggerate the urgency of a particular climate change scenario - a crisis that became 
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IPCC commissioned the InterAcademy Council (IAC), a multinational organisation of 
science academies, to audit its procedures in order to strengthen its capacity to respond 
to future challenges and improve the quality of its reports.173 The IPCC’s sophisticated 
assessment procedures can therefore be ascribed to its uptake and enforcement of IAC 
recommendations (2010), particularly in relation to the treatment of uncertainty, and the 
fortification of its review process to minimise the possibility of future errors.  
 
The IPCC’s relationship to the UNFCCC 
This section examines the extent to which the IPCC and its knowledge outputs are 
integrated into the UNFCCC and Conference of the Parties (COPs). It is argued that the 
final stage of certification or authentication of IPCC assessments is legal and occurs: i) 
at the UNFCCC level, and; ii) through climate change litigation. Moreover, both are key 
sites of science-policy-law co-production. The judicial treatment of IPCC reports as 
expert evidence in climate change litigation is an extensive topic, which merits separate 
treatment and will therefore be addressed in the following two chapters.  
 
The relationship between the IPCC and the UNFCCC is one of path dependence,174 
reciprocal legitimation, and science-policy-law co-production. The early work of the 
IPCC played an instrumental role in facilitating negotiations for a climate convention.175 
The First Assessment Report (FAR), which was published in 1992, furnished a scientific 
basis for the adoption of the UNFCCC. The then Chairman of the IPCC, Bert Bolin, 
notes that the IPCC and the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), the body 
tasked with preparing the draft text of the UNFCCC, had an extremely close working 
 
173 IAC, ‘Evaluation of IPCC’s assessment process’ (2016) < 
http://www.interacademycouncil.net/File.aspx?id=27675> accessed 22 February 2016.  
174 T.Meyer, n97, 35.  
175 S.Agrawala, n99, 625.  
 
 129 
relationship.176 The work of the INC was heavily based on the IPCC assessments and 
the IPCC Chairman also participated in the INC sessions.177 The IPCC also lobbied 
governments and other intergovernmental organisations such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to enter into negotiations for a 
climate convention.178 Through its extensive engagement with the INC and these other 
stakeholders, the IPCC played a crucial role in drumming up multilateral support for the 
UNFCCC.  
 
Bolin further observes that during negotiations for a climate convention at the 1992 UN 
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, scientific 
arguments were no longer the focus of discussion, meaning that the FAR (i.e. the 
scientific basis of climate change) had already been embraced by the political 
community and was serving its purpose.179 However, marked differences remained 
between states on key issues such as mitigation targets and what constituted dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Moreover, the long-term 
implications of climate change had not been comprehensively understood by 1992. 
These prevailing knowledge gaps provided the IPCC with a continuing raison d’être, 
namely an advisory role within the UNFCCC regime even after its inception – a function 
that it performs to this day.  
 
The IPCC occupies an indispensable position within the UNFCCC regime. As the sole 
provider of expert knowledge on climate change, it is the epistemic lifeline of the 
international legal regime on climate change. To the extent that its assessments inform 
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the content of the UNFCCC’s outputs (i.e. by providing sound scientific bases for 
regulation), the IPCC is also arguably a key source of its authority and legitimacy. 
Similarly, by way of reciprocal legitimation, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris 
Agreement also provide legal bases for the IPCC’s authority. More specifically, the 
following provisions can be construed as additional legal sources of the IPCC’s 
authority.  
 
Article 21.2 of the UNFCCC prescribes that “the head of the interim secretariat of the 
Convention will cooperate with the IPCC to ensure that the latter can respond to the 
need for objective scientific and technical advice.”180 Article 5 of the Kyoto Protocol 
states that methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions and global warming 
potentials used to calculate carbon dioxide equivalence of anthropogenic emissions shall 
be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon 
by the Conference of the Parties at its third session.181 The Paris Agreement also 
reaffirms the UNFCCC’s reliance on the IPCC, inviting the latter to “provide a special 
report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 
and related global greenhouse gas pathways.”182 The IPCC also closely collaborates 
with the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the main 
UNFCCC treaty body tasked with incorporating scientific and technical data into the 
climate change regime. The SBSTA and UNFCCC COPs have endorsed a series of 
IPCC methodological guidelines for the calculation of GHG inventories and treatment 
 
180 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 
21 March 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, Article 21.2.  
181 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ‘KP’ (adopted 11 
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5.3.  
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of uncertainties in emissions estimations.183 The SBSTA also periodically makes 
requests to the IPCC for scientific reports and technical papers.184 The foregoing factors 
indicate a relatively high level of integration between the IPCC and UNFCCC. This 
science-law integration has important implications for climate litigation, as it provides 
a direct pathway for litigants to invoke and harness IPCC assessments as persuasive 
epistemic tools that support and substantiate their claims, because they have already 
been subject to legal scrutiny and certification by the UNFCCC regime.  
 
V. IPCC Climate Science in Litigation: Two Framings  
 
To understand the distinctive character of climate science, this chapter has thus far 
analysed the IPCC’s institutional character and knowledge practices and demonstrated 
that climate science is co-produced knowledge emerging out of the following dynamics: 
i) science-policy co-production between climate scientists, other experts, government 
officials and policy-makers and; ii) science-policy-law co-production through the 
interactions between the IPCC and the UNFCCC regime. This section further seeks to 
problematise the nature of IPCC climate science by making a case for moving away 
from a positivist account towards a more STS-constructivist ‘science in action’ 
understanding of it as a continually evolving, internally varied and hybridised 
knowledge system that is predominantly being generated and shaped by public policy, 
litigation and adjudication. I argue that there are two principal framings or productive 
ways in which IPCC climate science can be best understood: i) as an applied science 
and; ii) as trans-science. This bipartite framing in turn enables a micro-level analysis of 
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the various applications of climate science in legal and policy settings, including 
litigation and adjudication, by multiple transnational actors to achieve pro-regulatory 
outcomes as discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
i. An applied science  
IPCC climate science bears many of the hallmarks of what scientists and philosophers 
of science have called applied science, which is science that has practical applications 
in the context of technological and policy design and development.185 The IPCC has 
played a seminal role in the maturation of climate science into an applied science 
through its heavy use of GCMs, which are the main methodological tools used in the 
‘detection, attribution and prediction of global climate change.’186 According to the 
IPCC, GCMs are ‘the most advanced tools currently available for simulating the 
response of the global climate system to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations.’187 
They are designed and simulated to not only understand the phenomenon of climate 
change for its own sake, but equally to shape, direct and drive policy responses and 
regulatory interventions on climate change globally. In this regard, IPCC climate 
science (and GCM-derived data) can be considered a body of applied science because 
from its very inception it has been geared towards the development and design of climate 
change policies. Therefore, the value and utility of GCMs is predicated on their 
 
185 The term ‘applied science’ was coined by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 1817, but concepts such as 
‘practical science’ (Angewandte Wissenschaft) were also developed in parallel at approximately the same 
time by German scientists of a Kantian bent. By the 1850s, the term ‘applied science’ had become dominant 
and widely used in Europe. See Robert Bud, ‘“Applied Science”: A Phrase in Search of a Meaning’ (2012) 
103 Isis 3, 537-538; 543-544.  
186 Note that General Circulation Models are also known as Global Climate Models. The terms are used 
interchangeably and acronymised as GCMs. William M. Goodwin, ‘Global Climate Modeling as Applied 
Science’ (2015) 46 Journal for General Philosophy of Science 2, 339.  
187 IPCC, ‘What is a GCM?’ (2018) < http://www.ipcc-data.org/guidelines/pages/gcm_guide.html> 
accessed 17 July 2018. 
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predictive accuracy and quantitative reliability primarily as a basis for policymaking and 
regulation.  
 
Whether a climate change policy, including mitigation, is appropriate largely depends 
on what is causing the climate to change – an assessment of attribution which rests on 
the quantitative adequacy of GCMs.188 Attribution studies involve comparative analysis 
of the outputs from GCMs which are operated using only natural forcings with outputs 
from GCMs that are run using anthropogenic forcings. If observations cannot be 
reproduced by GCMs using only natural forcings, but can be reproduced by those that 
use anthropogenic factors, then it serves as evidence that anthropogenic factors are the 
cause of the detected climate change.189 GCMs are run by multiple research groups 
around the world and outputs from their simulations are aggregated and averaged to 
produce a best probabilistic estimate of how the climate will respond under a particular 
emissions scenario.190 For all these reasons GCMs are generally considered the 
‘epistemic core of the climate science/policy community.’191 The quantitative reliability 
of GCMs has often been called into question by climate skeptics who posit that results 
produced by climate models are unreliable because they cannot be reproduced through 
standard scientific experimentation. Climate skeptic attacks on GCMs are based on a 
fundamental misapprehension about the nature and purposive role(s) of climate science 
as a practical knowledge enterprise or knowledge that is specifically designed for 
policymaking and regulation. This brand of climate skepticism, which is politically 
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motivated and aimed at thwarting climate change policies differs from ‘methodological 
convergence skepticism’ – a scientific school of thought which argues that GCMs and 
their data outputs can never be improved to the point of producing deterministic climatic 
prognoses.192 
 
Offering an alternative perspective on climate science as an applied science, 
philosophers of science such as Goodwin have opined that:  
 
the appropriate analogy for understanding what makes 
simulation results reliable in global climate modeling is 
not with scientific experimentation or measurement, but 
– at least in the case of the use of global climate models 
for policy development – with the applications of 




Goodwin observes that positive support for the reliability of GCMs can be provided by 
a ‘relative strategy’ which examines and argues for ‘epistemological parallels between 
traditional experimentation and computer simulations.’194 One way to do this is to treat 
computer simulations as experiments whereby the experimental system is a computer 
coded with a GCM.195 However, the analogy between experimentation and computer 
simulation models is strained by the fact that GCMs are used to map and make future 
projections of the world under a changed climate. Other scholars have suggested that 
the outputs of climate modelling can be defended against skeptic attacks on the basis 
that it is a body of knowledge that is fortified, continually renewed and fine-tuned by 
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research pluralism. Leuschner observes that scientific plurality in climate research 
generates ‘diverse results [that] are used to construct, evaluate and improve climate 
models and, consequently, help to produce a robust range of climate prognoses.’196 
 
The sheer complexity of climate modelling has led science philosophers to more 
recently argue in favour of assessing the efficacy and reliability of GCMs by reference 
to their applications in policy design and development contexts.197 On this constructivist 
reading of GCMs as primarily a policy design tool, the more productive enquiry (and 
ultimately the case for their continuing relevance and reliability) then becomes whether 
GCM outputs are helping to productively inform and enable policy design and 
regulatory interventions on climate change. Conceptualising climate science as an 
applied science makes it easier to comprehend as a body of knowledge that is fluid and 
subject to renewal and modification precisely because it is constantly responding to and 
being adapted in accordance with the vicissitudes of an ever-changing climate. It is 
therefore entirely conceivable that the applications of climate science are many and 
varied as well as constantly subject to revision in policymaking and litigation contexts 
as they continue to wrestle with a plethora of climatic scenarios and impacts.  
 
ii. Trans-scientific characteristics   
IPCC climate science is also a paradigmatic example of ‘trans-science’ as theorised by 
scientists and STS-constructivist scholars because it has been generated at the interface 
of science and other disciplines by the IPCC, which is a boundary or hybrid management 
organisation, as illustrated above in section III. The term was coined in 1972 by the 
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American nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg to denote those ‘questions [of fact] which 
can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science...they transcend 
science.’198 Questions of public policy, including those pertaining to climate change 
where issues of science and politics converge, are therefore ‘trans-scientific questions’ 
to which scientists can only ever give trans-scientific answers. Key bodies of climate 
science can plausibly be characterised as trans-science. More specifically, the science 
emerging in response to recent climate litigation, namely event attribution science, can 
be labelled trans-science. This body of climate science is being partly generated to help 
with establishing climate causation199 – a question that is neither exclusively scientific 
nor legal but both, hence trans-scientific – in the courtroom, but cannot do so in a 
deterministic manner as evidenced by the probabilistic articulation of climate modelling 
data.  
 
As Majone observes, in standard setting contexts ‘regulatory judgment is as important 
as engineering [or scientific] judgment and as equally dependent on experience, insight 
and other trans-scientific elements.’200 Thus, seen in this light, the involvement of 
domestic courts and other actors (litigants) in trans-scientific determinations makes 
sense. Litigation provides a space for transdisciplinary engagement between these actors 
which are all part of a trans-scientific enterprise in which they are called upon to make 
their own epistemic contributions. Trans-scientific debates such as those pertaining to 
climate change generally imply oscillation between these different disciplinary (i.e. 
 
198 Alvin M. Weinberg, “Science and Trans-Science” (1972) 10 Minerva 2, 209, 218.  
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science and law) boundaries. Science is inadequate on its own for dealing with climate 
change issues which are inherently trans-scientific in that they involve value judgments 
about how identified risks ought to be managed and what is worthy of regulation and 
legal redress – i.e. climatic harm/injuries, rights protection and the welfare of future 
generations (intergenerational equity) etc. In this regard, legal-adversarial processes 
such as litigation have assumed significance as a mechanism to address these 
intrinsically trans-scientific questions and sort ‘good’ (soundly constructed) from ‘bad’ 
(poorly constructed) climate science which is subsequently brought to bear on these 
issues.  
 
Weinberg himself endorsed ‘the adversary procedure as the best alternative’ to address 
and resolve trans-scientific questions.201 While acknowledging that legal procedure 
cannot establish scientific 'truths' since the outcome is always trans-scientific, Weinberg 
believed that it could nonetheless serve to establish where science ends and trans-science 
begins.202 In short, adversarial processes such as litigation provide the preconditions for 
boundary work by enabling scientists to be more forthcoming about the contours and 
limits of their epistemic jurisdiction (i.e. engage in demarcation), which Weinberg 
suggests is the ‘role and responsibility of the scientist in trans-scientific debate.’203 
However, STS and legal scholars have challenged the idea that legal-adversarial 
processes are any more conducive and appropriate than scientific processes for the 
resolution of trans-scientific questions. For example, Majone observes that new 
scientific understandings often increase rather than reduce the cognitive complexity of 
regulatory problems.204 Thus, despite rapid advancements in climate science, it will 
 
201 A.Weinberg, n198, 216. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid, 220. 
204 G.Majone, n200, 19.  
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always be difficult for courts and judges to address climate change questions due to their 
innately trans-scientific and indeterminate character. Nevertheless, a workable core of 
climate science now exists to assist courts as triers of fact – an issue discussed in 




The IPCC’s knowledge practices typify boundary work and are geared towards the 
production of regulatory science. Its knowledge work is heterogeneous and variegated, 
comprising expert contributions from scientists and social scientists. Its assessment 
cycle is designed to concurrently secure the dual imperatives of preserving the 
credibility of climate science on the one hand and promoting wider political acceptance 
of the knowledge base on climate change on the other. The IPCC manages to navigate 
this core existential tension with a high level of success, particularly as evidenced by 
the later stages of peer review and the approval of reports, which typically culminate in 
consensus formation between the scientific and political communities. The production 
of consensus is all the more remarkable given that the political certification of IPCC 
reports occurs in a highly polarised environment.  
 
The IPCC is also at the apex of transnational climate change governance. While it does 
not generate climate change policies or norms, its knowledge work is a significant 
catalyst for their creation. The work of WGII and WGIII serves as a guide to regulatory 
action, namely mitigation and adaptation. Closer examination of the IPCC’s knowledge 
practices, particularly those of the more integrated WGII and WGIII, also reveal an 
increased contribution in recent assessment cycles from the interpretive social sciences. 
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This revelation contradicts some STS-constructivist accounts of the IPCC, which charge 
the institution with propagating a deficient conception of climate change through a 
predominantly technoscientific narrative. Such critiques of the IPCC’s knowledge 
monopoly are partly understandable as they derive from legitimate concerns about 
epistemic hegemony and amplified technocratic power.  
     
However, it has been argued here that while such critiques may be forceful, they ought 
to be regarded with caution. Although the IPCC’s work is imperfect and not immune to 
criticism, such critiques are misguided, as they do not look closely at its actual 
knowledge practices. Few would deny that regulatory action on climate change must be 
based on sound science, which (in our collective interest) ought to retain the initial 
prerogative to preliminarily define and map the problem. To the extent that climate 
change is also a socio-economic problem, the interpretive social sciences and alternative 
epistemological perspectives (e.g. indigenous and local bodies of knowledge) have 
assumed a supporting role in the IPCC’s work to address knowledge gaps in relation to 
vulnerability, impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. The IPCC functions remarkably well 
given its institutional complexity and mammoth task. Its knowledge monopoly and 
scientific consensus on climate change did not materialise overnight, but were hard-won 
through nearly three decades of intensive science-policy dialogue, debate and, 
institutional learning in the face of credibility crises. Its knowledge work remains an 
indispensable resource for transnational climate change governance.   
 
This chapter has also sought to problematise the many misconceptions and myths about 
the pure nature or ‘essence’ of climate science. To that end, it has argued that climate 
science is a dynamic body of knowledge that is distinctive both for the nature of its 
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production (as per IPCC processes) and its evolution as a practical body of specialised 
knowledge that is directly tailored towards the demands and contingencies of legal 
processes and policymaking. IPCC climate science therefore merits the labels of applied 
science and trans-science. Indeed, current climate litigation trends as well as the 
emergence of the category of the ‘scientist advocate’ – activist climate scientists who 
appear as expert witnesses and repeat players in litigation – lend some credence to this 
characterisation. They are also emblematic of the increased blurring of disciplinary 
boundaries in the sphere of transnational climate governance. Chapters Four to Six 
document climate science in action, namely by focusing on its practical applications 
within climate governance networks and climate litigation. These chapters specifically 
consider how climate science is being translated and certified by domestic courts (i.e. 
Chapters Four and Five) and mobilised by ENGO litigants in support of their climate 







Climate Science in US Federal Courts  
 
 
Facts. Evidence. Reason. Logic. An understanding of science. These are good things. 
These are qualities you want in people making policy. These are qualities you want to 
continue to cultivate in yourselves as citizens. 
 




I. Introduction  
 
 
In this PhD project, I argue that climate science is being generated through 
transdisciplinary co-production between the domains of science, policy and law and the 
key actors steering this process include climate scientists, domestic courts and climate 
litigants. The byproduct of these co-productive dynamics is an emergent transnational 
and shared body of legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change, as illustrated in 
Chapters Five and Six. This chapter specifically examines the treatment of climate 
science by certain federal courts in climate change lawsuits in the United States - a 
subject that remains under-researched in the climate litigation literature.1 US federal 
courts merit separate and specialised treatment by way of an entire chapter not only due 
to the high concentration of climate litigation in the US, but also because some of the 
earliest and most substantial judicial discussions of climate science feature in US cases. 
These cases are relatively high-profile because they have a pioneering transnational 
influence; they were among the first to feature IPCC assessments and have therefore 
reverberated globally and markedly influenced the judicial consideration of climate 
science in other jurisdictions, as discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
1 There are only two short articles on the topic. See Michael Gerrard, ‘Court Rulings Accept Climate 
Science’ (2013) 250 New York Law Journal 52; Sabrina McCormick et al., ‘Science in litigation, the 




I argue that certain US federal courts constitute prominent sites for the transdisciplinary 
co-production of climate science, with judges sometimes directly interacting with 
climate scientists and repeatedly evaluating and certifying IPCC assessments in climate 
change lawsuits over the last two decades. This is largely emblematic of a science-law 
co-production model. While most cases exemplify this model of co-production, 
occasionally there have been landmark cases like Massachusetts v EPA, which have had 
had a more resonant and influential impact on public policy with respect to climate 
change. Such cases, though rare, are reflective of science-policy-law co-production. 
Both kinds are discussed in this chapter. Although US courts are not consciously 
engaging in a transnational project of legal ordering through the development of climate 
jurisprudence, this chapter will argue that their appraisal of climate science is 
nonetheless taken seriously by courts and communities of legal practice in other 
jurisdictions. Thus, US climate litigation can be considered a key contributor to the 
transnationalisation of scientifically-inflected climate change jurisprudence.  
 
The US is where most public and private climate litigation is taking place, with lawsuits 
growing exponentially.2 As a metropolitan site of knowledge production, the US is also 
where many of the world’s leading climate scientists and contributors to the IPCC 
assessment cycle are based. Many of them have participated in high profile US climate 
change lawsuits as defendants, plaintiffs, and court-appointed experts.3 Similarly, many 
 
2 Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner 
Energy (CUP 2015); Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (Columbia Law School), ‘Climate Change 
Litigation Databases: U.S. Climate Change Litigation’ (2017) <http://climatecasechart.com/us-climate-
change-litigation/> accessed 20 October 2017.  
3 For example, Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth v Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) and 
Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (2016) Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-
TC, 4.  
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of the world’s largest fossil fuel corporations, which are typically defendants in climate 
change lawsuits and increasingly referred to as Carbon Major Entities (CMEs),4 are also 
headquartered or have operations in the US. To date, climate advocates have used 
litigation to challenge government inaction on climate change and as an alternative 
regulatory pathway to compel corporate emitters to reduce their GHG emissions.5 
Climate change litigation has therefore become both a catalyst for regulation and itself 
a new form of regulation.6  
 
The dismantling of US environmental and climate change regulations under the Trump 
Administration is likely to spur even more climate litigation.7 Against this backdrop, the 
acceptance and endorsement of climate science, particularly IPCC assessments, by 
certain US courts, including the Supreme Court, is highly noteworthy and merits close 
attention. The judiciary has already played a major role in influencing and compelling 
US government agencies to adopt climate-friendly regulations in the past.8 Based on an 
analysis of case law, I argue that some US courts have been largely deferential towards 
climate scientists and accepted and affirmed the underlying climate science in many 
major climate change cases in the last two decades.  
 
 
4 Richard Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and 
Cement Producers, 1854–2010,’ (2014) 122 Climatic Change 1, 229.  
5 H.M.Osofsky & J.Peel, n2  
6 Jacqueline Peel & Hari M.Osofsky , ‘Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A 
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia,’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3; H.M. Osofsky & J. 
Peel, n2.  
7 Coral Davenport, ‘Trump lays plans to reverse Obama’s climate change legacy’ New York Times (21 
March 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/climate/trump-climate-change.html> accessed 21 
March 2017; Martin Pengelly, ‘Trump to sign executive order undoing Obama’s clean power plan’ The 
Guardian (26 March 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/26/trump-executive-
order-clean-power-plan-coal-plants> accessed 26 March 2017; David Smith, ‘Trump begins tearing up 
Obama’s years of progress on tackling climate change’ The Guardian (28 March 2017) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/28/trump-begins-tearing-up-obamas-years-of-progress-
on-tackling-climate-change> accessed 28 March 2017.  
8 See Massachusetts v EPA 127 S. Ct. 1438; 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth v 
Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).  
 
 144 
Furthermore, the IPCC indirectly features as an actor in any climate litigation scenario 
in which causation is an issue, due to its position as the pre-eminent synthesizer and 
supplier of climate science. Its global monopoly on the certification of climate science 
has led to its assumption of (an as yet unacknowledged) de facto specialist jurisdiction 
or an adjudicatory fact-finding role in climate change cases. This also sets climate 
science and climate change litigation and adjudication apart from other types of 
environmental litigation involving scientific evidence. Critically, the IPCC’s expanded 
pre-adjudicatory role partly accounts for the reluctance of some US courts to engage in 
judicial fact-finding in climate change cases, the outcomes of which are heavily 
contingent on scientific determinations on causation. Courts have already begun to 
acknowledge the IPCC’s dominance in this area and have generally limited their role to: 
i) traditional judicial review of the lawfulness of the conduct of government agencies 
(strategic public litigation); and, ii) deferring to government agencies to regulate the 
industrial activities of carbon producers and their GHG emissions (strategic private 
litigation).9  
 
However, in this chapter I also contend that the IPCC’s dominance as a fact-finder on 
climate change does not entirely obviate the need for judicial fact-finding in climate 
litigation. It is argued that through their repeated affirmation and acceptance of general 
scientific-causal evidence on climate change, national courts have become principal 
actors in the legal certification of IPCC climate science and important interlocutors in 
transnational climate change governance. Furthermore, in recent climate litigation 
(albeit predominantly public litigation), courts have not always shied away from 
 
9 See People of the State of California v General Motors Corp, No. C06-05755, (N.D. Cal., 09/17/2007); 
American Electrical Power Co. (AEP) v Connecticut 564 U.S. 410 (2011); Kivalina v ExxonMobil 
Corporation et al. 696 F.3d 849, 2012 WL 4215921 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v Murphy Oil USA Inc., 607 
F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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independent fact-finding and have actively participated in constructing the factual 
record of a case through an initial review and appraisal of expert testimonies submitted 
by climate scientists in relation to extreme climatic events which are characterised by 
greater scientific-causal uncertainty. In sum, the fact-finding role of courts has been 
modified and narrowed rather than completely dispensed with in climate change cases 
and continues to be exercised with respect to proximate or specific causation issues. 
More recent climate litigation foregrounds the existence of this co-productive 
relationship between courts and climate scientists.  
 
The next part of this chapter looks at the approach specifically taken by some US federal 
courts with respect to climate science as expert testimony in litigation, with a focus on 
the Supreme Court’s seminal jurisprudence in Massachusetts v EPA. It outlines the 
traditional fact-finding role of US federal courts and documents how climate 
adjudication marks a slight departure from this role, since courts are actively 
transforming scientific facts on climate change into justiciable facts. Part III examines 
judicial attempts to wrestle with the complexity of climate change causation and outlines 
judicial approaches to general and specific causation. Part IV examines two recent high 
profile judgments the City of Oakland v BP p.l.c. and Juliana et al v USA, to demonstrate 
that the legacy of Massachusetts v EPA remains alive and well in post-Paris US climate 
litigation, with certain district courts exhibiting even higher levels of receptiveness 
towards IPCC assessments and climate science. These cases have also been specifically 
chosen for their formative significance in relation to an emergent transnational climate 






II.  The Climate Jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court   
 
Climate litigation and adjudication have emerged and grown in response to institutional 
failures to effectively regulate climate change. A major strand of legal scholarship on 
climate change litigation therefore examines the role of litigation as an alternative 
regulatory pathway in light of institutional failures by international and national 
bodies.10 More recent legal scholarship considers how “litigation [serves] as a forum for 
co-producing a physical and social understanding of climate change,” and the ways in 
which adjudication authorises and legitimates conduct in relation to climate change.11 
Jasanoff describes litigation as a site of co-production comprising both “fact-finding and 
meaning-making.”12  
 
The discussion here is situated in line with this latter scholarly oeuvre. An STS-inflected 
lens is employed to understand and analyse the relationship between courts and the IPCC 
as one of co-production of climate change as a concurrently socio-political, legal, and 
scientific reality.  In order to contextualise the role that courts are playing in the co-
production of facts about climate change, this section will first outline the traditional 
fact-finding role of American federal courts in cases marked by scientific complexity. 
The discussion will then specifically concentrate on the important role that courts play 
in constructing and legitimating a particular scientific-epistemic and socio-legal 
worldview of climate change, namely that of the IPCC. The US’ unique position as a 
 
10 See H.Osofsky & J.Peel, n2; Joana Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, ‘Climate change litigation: A review of 
research on courts and litigants in climate governance’ (2019) 10 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Climate Change 3.  
11 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsession, and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly 
Response to Massachusetts v EPA’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3, 237. 
12 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘A New Climate for Society’ (2010) 27 Theory, Culture & Society 233, 248. 
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metropolitan site of knowledge production (including in the field of climate science), 
and its status as one of the most significant contributors to climate change both in terms 
of size and per capita emissions, accounts for the conscious choice here of the US as the 
primary jurisdiction and object of study in this chapter. Given the high volume of US 
climate litigation, the discussion will be limited to climate change cases adjudicated by 
federal courts, which best reflect the current state of the common law and statutory 




Judicial fact-finding and evaluation of scientific evidence  
 
In the US, District Courts are federal trial courts which are designed for fact-finding and 
the construction of a case’s factual record based on scientific and expert evidence 
presented by the parties.13 Federal appellate courts are empowered to amend errors in 
the factual record created at trial and establish standards of proof.14 In administrative 
law cases, federal courts are also empowered to review ‘jurisdictional facts’ which 
comprise a statutorily prescribed set of facts or circumstances that must exist before a 
government official or agency can legitimately exercise authority.15 The Supreme Court 
has also extended this doctrine beyond the administrative context.16 In general, 
American courts abide by the principle of deference with respect to legislative fact-
finding.17 Both commentators and courts have argued that legislatures possess superior 
 
13 Noel Leon, ‘Judicial Fact-Finding Isn’t Just Legitimate, It’s Crucial’ Rewire (5 August 2016) < 
https://rewire.news/article/2016/08/05/judicial-fact-finding-legitimate-its-crucial/> accessed 6 April 
2017.  
14 Joseph T. Walsh, ‘The Evolving Standards of Admissibility of Scientific Evidence’ (1998) 2 Best of 
ABA Sections 1, 3.  
15 George C. Christie, ‘Judicial Review of Findings of Fact’ (1992) 87 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1, 20; See Crowell v Benson 285 U.S. 22 (1932) where Hughes CJ ruled that courts determine not 
only questions of law, but also certain ‘fundamental or jurisdictional’ facts.  
16 Ibid; See Bose Corp. v Consumers Union of the United States 466 U.S. 485 (1984).  
17 Caitlin E. Borgmann, ‘Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding’ (2009) 84 Indiana 
Law Journal 1, 6.  
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competence with respect to fact-finding as compared with courts due to greater 
resources at their disposal and the capacity to aggregate expert knowledge from multiple 
sources to create a comprehensive factual record on an issue.18  
 
However, Borgmann argues that existing case law largely demonstrates that the 
‘doctrine of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding’ is in disarray.19 For example, 
the US Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the role that facts should play in its 
constitutional decisions.20 Borgmann further questions the wisdom of applying judicial 
deference to legislative fact-finding in a blanket manner, since legislatures can also be 
poor fact-finders when compared to federal trial courts, especially when dealing with 
legislation that infringes constitutional or minority rights.21 Some constitutional rights 
cases on abortion, gay parenting and child protection from internet indecency have 
revealed that legislatures did not undertake comprehensive fact-finding, but based their 
policy decisions on assumptions and hearsay.22 For example, Congressional hearings on 
abortion have often been far more protracted than trials on the same issue and involved 
inflammatory, non-medical testimony and invective from lay witnesses. Some legal 
commentators have accordingly emphasised the importance of courts exercising 
independent judgment on factual questions in each case before them and, where 
necessary, striking down findings of fact that appear unreasonable.23  
 
Furthermore, with respect to scenarios involving scientific complexity, the legislature 
does not necessarily possess superior fact-finding competence relative to federal trial 
 
18 C.E.Borgmann, n17, 18. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid, 21.  
22 For an extended discussion on this topic see C.E.Borgmann, n17.  
23 Ibid; G.Christie, n15, 26. 
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courts. When legislative findings of fact go against the overwhelming weight of 
scientific or expert evidence on an issue, trial judges are duty-bound to act as 
gatekeepers and independent evaluators of that evidence and scrutinise scientific-expert 
testimony for credibility and legitimacy. This was the test set out by the Supreme Court 
majority with respect to the evaluation and admissibility of scientific evidence by federal 
courts in the landmark 1993 case of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc. In 
Daubert, the Supreme Court ruled that in dealing with scientific evidence, a trial judge 
must serve as a “gatekeeper [to] ensure that the expert testimony both rests on a reliable 
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”24 In performing this duty, the trial judge 
has recourse to multiple sources including expert testimonies. The court also concluded 
that trial judges retain considerable discretion with respect to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence, namely whether such evidence passes the test of reliability. 
However, in exercising such discretion to determine the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, the Supreme Court established criteria pertaining to scientific method that a 
trial judge must consider in every instance. These include the following: i) whether the 
theory or technique can be tested; ii) whether the submitted evidence or expert testimony 
has been subject to peer review; iii) whether the margins of error are acceptable, and; 
iv) whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance within the scientific 
community to which the expert belongs.25  
 
In essence, the Daubert ruling provides a mechanism for federal judges to exclude vast 
bodies of junk science by determining what is admissible as relevant and reliable expert 
evidence or ‘good science.’ The decision was widely interpreted as requiring judges to 
 




adopt a scientific frame of mind and bring the legal assessment of science into closer 
alignment with scientific assessment methods.26 This move has not been without 
controversy or criticism. Delivering a persuasive critique of the Daubert decision, 
Jasanoff has argued that the attempt to make judicial practice more scientific is 
consistent with the neoliberal impetus within economics and law and constitutes “part 
of a tectonic shift in US legal and political thought which aims to “modernize” legal 
decision-making by making it more standardized, efficient, and predictable.”27 The 
scientisation of legal admissibility criteria for scientific evidence does not necessarily 
guarantee the delivery of justice and, in many cases, impedes it.28 Notably, Daubert has 
been routinely invoked to exclude plaintiffs’ testimony and created a more favourable 
legal environment for defendants.29 Jasanoff further argues that mechanical judicial 
applications of Daubert criteria in practice, underlined by a preoccupation with good 
science, have sometimes oriented law away from its foundational imperative of doing 
justice.30 By privileging a rational basis for making normative judgements, Jasanoff 
asserts that Daubert “detached science from its human and social context and drove a 
wedge between reason and justice.”31 
 
Such STS scholarly concerns about the scientisation of legal admissibility criteria 
pertaining to scientific evidence are not necessarily valid in all cases where federal 
courts have considered scientific evidence. Rather, more recent judicial practice 
indicates that courts have not always lost sight of ethical and justice imperatives when 
 
26 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings’ (2005) 95 American Journal 
of Public Health 1, 50. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  




engaging in fact-finding and evaluating scientific evidence. More specifically, federal 
courts play an important supplementary fact-finding role in situations where legislative 
fact-finding is found to be deficient or lacking. This is best illustrated by recent abortion 
cases, which evidence that the judicial assessment of science is, on this particular issue, 
firmly wedded to its relevant human and social context of safeguarding women’s health 
and reproductive rights.32  While American courts do not have an exclusive remit to 
evaluate scientific evidence, they nonetheless retain a review function to ensure that the 
factual record in a case is sound, credible, and based on actual peer-reviewed scientific 
evidence rather than junk science. Federal abortion cases exemplify a judicial directive 
to lawmakers that scientifically unsubstantiated laws that infringe on constitutional 
rights are at high risk of being overturned.33  
 
Scientific and legal paradigms also differ with respect to their conception of a ‘fact’ or 
‘truth.’ Legal proceedings are often characterised by tensions and divergences between 
“formal legal truth and substantive truth in judicial fact-finding processes.”34 Both 
lawyers and judges are cognisant of the reality that litigation and adjudication, while 
generally truth-oriented, do not always produce a factual record that perfectly 
corresponds to empirical, scientific, or social facts.35 As legal scholars like Summers 
assert, “it is simply not so that the exclusive business of a trial court in all disputed cases 
is to find the actual truth.”36 The particular circumstances and factors of a case that may 
 
32 See Justice Breyer’s judgment in Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt 579 U.S. No.15-274 (2016). 
33 Noel Leon, ‘Judicial Fact-Finding Isn’t Just Legitimate, It’s Crucial,’ Rewire (5 August 2016) < 
https://rewire.news/article/2016/08/05/judicial-fact-finding-legitimate-its-crucial/> accessed 6 April 
2017. This is of course subject to the important caveat that under the current Trump Administration, the 
composition of the Supreme Court may change. This leaves open the possibility for Roe v Wade to be 
overturned under a more conservative bench.  
34 Robert S. Summers, ‘Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding – Their 
Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases’ (1998) 18 Law & Philosophy 1, 497. 
35 Ibid, 497. 
36 Ibid, 500.  
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produce this discrepancy include inter alia the unavailability of evidence, unequal legal 
representation of parties before the court, inequality in resources for trial preparation 
between the parties, prejudice or bias on the part of fact-finders, and the incompetence 
of fact-finders in understanding and weighing evidence.37  
 
In addition, legal rules of procedure and evidence are geared towards the production of 
formal findings of fact which may depart from substantive truth.38 Similarly, lawyer-
client privilege also limits the admissibility of evidence that may reflect substantive truth 
such as a defendant’s confession about committing a crime. Consequently, the factual 
record created at trial and the substantive truth or reality of a case rarely align. While 
these procedural and evidentiary rules are not consciously truth-defeating, they are 
designed to serve other policy imperatives such as protecting the client-lawyer 
relationship and the representative role of lawyers in general, render trials more time-
efficient, and facilitate the final resolution of legal disputes. Thus, legal rules of evidence 
and procedure structurally privilege legal truth (i.e. formal legal findings of fact) over 
substantive social truth. In short, “there are limits to the law and the fact-finding efficacy 
of law’s machinery.”39  
 
Finally, legal processes of factual enquiry and the creation of a factual record at trial are 
heavily circumscribed by legal standards of proof.40 In a civil trial, factual enquiries 
need only be pursued up to the point where the balance of probabilities (i.e. a much 
lower threshold than the criminal law standard of beyond reasonable doubt) can be 
satisfied. For example, rules of evidence typically dictate that only those facts which are 
 
37 R.S.Summers, n34, 499. 
38 Ibid, 500. 
39 Ibid, 505. 
40 Ibid, 506. 
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relevant to and potentially probative of a cause of action are admissible. This can lead 
to the exclusion of a plethora of substantive (albeit less relevant) facts that might 
nonetheless provide a more complete picture or reveal the ‘actual’ truth of the case. 
Formal findings of fact are therefore the culmination of processes of factual enquiry that 
are artificially tailored and curtailed to meet legal rather than scientific or social-
scientific standards of proof.  
 
In sum, legal processes of fact-finding generally and judicial fact-finding specifically 
are not predicated on a scientific understanding of facts, despite the recent scientisation 
of admissibility criteria for scientific evidence in litigation following Daubert. Rather, 
they are deeply inscribed with non-scientific imperatives, namely concerns about the 
ethics, responsibility, justice, and temporal efficacy of a particular case. Thus, 
adjudication is not a search for substantive truth, but rather a process geared towards a 
number of objectives including righting past wrongs, achieving a final resolution on a 
case and thereby producing definitive winners and losers. While formal legal facts and 
the substantive truth in a particular case may sometimes coalesce, in many cases they 
also diverge. The pursuit of substantive truth is therefore only one among many 
competing values and imperatives of litigation and adjudication in the American legal 
system.  
 
Applying these observations to the climate change context, I argue that judicial fact-
finding in climate change cases extends beyond the simple acceptance and certification 
of climate science in accordance with the Daubert principles, which purportedly reflect 
core precepts of the scientific method. Rather, it is conceivable that judicial fact-finding 
in climate change cases is and will always continue to be motivated and driven by extra-
 
 154 
scientific considerations, including legal-procedural efficacy, the provision of stability 
and certainty in judicial decision-making, and a final resolution. Courts are therefore not 
only making findings of fact, but concurrently transforming those facts into what Latour 
has termed “matters of fact.”41 Consequently, the gatekeeping role of US federal courts 
with respect to scientific evidence is also indispensable in climate change cases. In 
collaboration with other actors in climate litigation, courts are playing a crucial role in 
transforming scientifically documented factual scenarios of climatic harm into 
actionable wrongs that merit legal resolution and the production of a just outcome – an 
issue that is explored in greater detail in the following section.  
 
The certification of climate science in Massachusetts v EPA 
Massachusetts v EPA is the first landmark environmental case in the US where the 
Supreme Court directly addressed climate change as well as the science of the problem. 
The case earned this reputation as a watershed in climate litigation, as it marked the first 
time an American court ruled that GHGs “unambiguously may be regulated as an ‘air 
pollutant’” by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under section 202 of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA).42 Hailed by legal scholars as the most “significant environmental 
decision of our time,” the case has unsurprisingly been the subject of extensive scholarly 
interest and analysis.43 A comprehensive engagement with the legal literature on 
Massachusetts v EPA is beyond the scope of this examination, which focuses 
specifically on the American federal judiciary’s treatment of climate science. This 
 
41 See Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern’ 
(2004) 30 Critical Inquiry 225. Latour makes a call to renew empiricism by cultivating a ‘stubbornly 
realist attitude.’ 
42 Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency 127 S. Ct. 1438; 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 529. 
43 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly 
Response to Massachusetts v EPA’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3, 244; David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, ‘An 
Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?’ 
(2012) 64 Florida Law Review 15, 76. 
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section will however draw on this literature to provide a brief overview of the 
surrounding socio-political context that informed and led to the decision, particularly as 
it relates to the state of climate science at the time.  
 
Massachusetts v EPA is also salient for being the first climate change lawsuit in which 
the Supreme Court declared American municipal courts as appropriate fora for the 
adjudication of climate change matters and, by implication, for the review of climate 
science underlying litigants’ claims. Remarking on the peculiar difficulties of climate 
change adjudication, Osofsky observes that “the complexities of scale and scientific 
uncertainties in relation to subnational contributions to climate change place judges in a 
difficult decision-making position.”44 She argues that such uncertainties around scale 
and science create additional judicial discretion and opportunities for litigants to 
manipulate the outcome.45 Judicial commentary on the issue of standing in 
Massachusetts v EPA elucidates the ways in which American federal courts are 
grappling with scalar and scientific complexities surrounding climate change. This 
section will argue that Massachusetts v EPA also has special epistemic significance due 
to the Supreme Court’s overwhelming acceptance and endorsement of IPCC climate 
science. While the certification of IPCC assessments is not primarily contingent on 
national and subnational litigation and adjudication (as shown in Chapter Two), such 
legal processes have nonetheless imbued the IPCC assessments with an added layer of 
legitimacy. They have also served to augment the IPCC’s epistemic authority overall as 
well as its position as a pivotal actor in global climate change governance.  
 
 
44 Hari M. Osofsky, ‘The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA,’ (2007) 101 




i. The case in its wider socio-political context  
Massachusetts v EPA was the culmination of decades-long epistemic struggle on climate 
change – one that had been decisively settled by the global climate science community 
before the case’s resolution in April 2007.46 The Bush Administration was still in power 
in the US with a palpably anti-climate agenda, which it operationalised through the 
passage of numerous executive orders that adversely impacted upon the work of expert 
agencies like the EPA and government climate scientists. One of the most notorious 
examples is Executive Order 1342247 which the Congressional Research Service 
interpreted as “a clear expansion of presidential authority over rulemaking agencies.”48 
Legal scholars and commentators also opined that it amounted to an executive power 
grab that enabled White House staff to override agency scientists and experts.49 These 
statements reflect the prevailing political mood at the time which was one of intense 
concern about the politicisation of expertise with respect to the environment, health and 
safety. Thus, as Freeman and Vermeule plausibly assert: 
 
Even if the Supreme Court Justices were unaware of the 
particulars of President Bush’s executive orders, by the time 
Massachusetts v EPA reached the court, the general picture 
of which they are a part, including allegations of political 
interference with climate-related science, had clearly taken 
shape and concerns about politicization were widely 
known.50 
 
46 The IPCC published its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007. The Summary for Policymakers was 
published in February 2007, meaning that AR4’s key findings were already widely known before the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Massachusetts v EPA two months later in April 2007.  
47 Exec Order 13422, 72 Fed Reg 2703 (2007) - "Each agency shall identify in writing the specific 
market failure (such as externalities, market power, lack of information) or other specific problem that it 
intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of public institutions) that warrant new 
agency action, as well as assess the significance of that problem, to enable assessment of whether any 
new regulation is warranted." 
48 Curtis W. Copeland, ‘Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order 
13422 14’ (Congressional Research Service, February 2007) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/RL3 3862.pdf.> accessed 15 April 2017; Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, ‘Massachusetts v 
EPA: From Politics to Expertise’ (2007) Supreme Court Review 51, 59-60;  
49 J.Freeman et al, Ibid, 60.  
50 J.Freeman et al, Ibid; See Robert Pear, ‘Bush Directive Increases Sway on Regulation,’ New York 






Moreover, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court Justices were also apprised of the 
fact that the scientific consensus on climate change had been consolidated by this time 
and the climate crisis had captured and achieved a stranglehold on the public 
imagination. Two further developments also definitively shaped this broader socio-
political context, namely the IPCC’s publication of its Fourth Assessment Report in 
early 2007 and the release of former Vice President Al Gore’s documentary film, an 
Inconvenient Truth. In addition, not only climate scientists, but the scientific community 
at large had become fiercely vocal in its demands for regulating the problem. These 
factors made up the wider “[socio-political], legal, and cultural context in which the 
Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v EPA.”51 Regardless of their personal views or 
politics, Supreme Court Justices were likely aware of the growing scientific consensus 
on climate change and the mounting accusations that the Bush Administration was 
engaging in a sustained campaign of manipulation and suppression of agency science.52 
These circumstances provided the impetus for public climate litigation in the US and 
were arguably the key drivers of a new wave of climate change lawsuits against 
regulatory agencies, of which Massachusetts v EPA is the first (and probably the most 








26C045DD7EE8B364C919B0D2E5&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL> accessed 28 October 2017.  
51 J.Freeman et al, n48, 61. 
52 Ibid.  
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Massachusetts v EPA revolved around the EPA’s denial in 2003 of a rule-making 
petition filed in 1999 by 20 private organisations requesting the EPA to regulate GHGs 
from new motor-vehicles under section 202 of the CAA. The EPA concluded that it did 
not have the authority to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change, 
since, despite being aware of the climate crisis, Congress had declined to adopt an 
amendment to the CAA prescribing binding emissions reductions.53 In sum, until 
Congress unequivocally and specifically declared that the EPA should regulate climate 
change pursuant to the CAA, the EPA concluded that it was not authorised to address 
the issue and, consequently, that GHGs did not constitute ‘air pollutants’ within the 
meaning of the CAA.54  
 
The EPA’s denial of the rule-making petition was challenged by twelve states (led by 
Massachusetts), three cities, a US territory and thirteen NGOs.55 The respondents 
comprised the EPA, ten other states, and nineteen industry and utility groups which 
organised themselves into three major coalitions, namely the Vehicle Intervenor 
Coalition, the CO2 Litigation Group, and the Utility Air Regulatory Group.56 Neither 
the petitioners nor respondents challenged the existence of anthropogenic climate 
change. The EPA agreed with the petitioners that GHGs had increased as a result of 
human activities and acknowledged that there had been a rise in global temperatures. 
However, it argued that a causal link between the former and the latter could not be 
unequivocally established.  
 
 
53 Massachusetts v EPA 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); At 52926. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid. 
56 H.M.Osofsky, n44, 581. The question of statutory construction was whether GHG emissions from 




In the majority opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court observed with 
respect to its own jurisdiction that the issue of a non-justiciable political question did 
not arise in this case, since the question before it was one of statutory construction and 
therefore suitable for review.57 The court also rejected the EPA’s arguments that 
standing presented an insurmountable obstacle to review. It ruled that it was perfectly 
within the petitioners’ procedural rights to challenge agency action that is injurious to 
it.58 Massachusetts was found to have special standing as a sovereign state and 
entitlements to protection from the federal government. The court accordingly held that 
it was entitled to ‘special solicitude.’59 It further ruled that the EPA’s omission to 
regulate GHG emissions presented both an actual and imminent risk of harm to 
Massachusetts and any grant of judicial relief would require the EPA to reduce that 
risk.60 
The majority then turned to the first standing requirement for the petitioners to show 
that they had suffered an injury and considered climate science at some length, 
particularly with respect to sea-level rise. It reviewed evidence of sea-level rise 
presented by Massachusetts in support of its claim that it was beginning to lose coastal 
land – the particularised injury alleged in this instance. With respect to Massachusetts’ 
alleged injuries, the court relied upon and emphasised relevant parts of an affidavit 
provided by climate scientist Michael McCracken and noted the following:  
That these climate change risks are widely shared does not 
minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this 
litigation…According to the petitioners’ unchallenged 
affidavits, global sea-level rose somewhere between 10 and 
20 centimeters over the 20th century (McCracken Decl. 5(c) 
Stdg. App. 208). These rising seas have already begun to 
 
57 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 13. 
58 Ibid, 15-16. 
59 Ibid, 17. 
60 Ibid, 18. 
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swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land…[Massachusetts] has 
alleged a particularized injury as a landowner. The severity 
of that injury will only increase over the course of the next 
century.61  
 
With respect to the second standing requirement of causation, the EPA did not dispute 
the existence of a causal link between human activities and climate change, but held that 
its decision to not regulate GHG emissions from new motor-vehicles could not be 
causally linked to the petitioners’ particular injuries.62 The court rejected the EPA’s 
contention that reducing motor-vehicle emissions would be a tentative or incremental 
step on the basis of its review and acceptance of McCracken’s expert testimony stating 
that US motor-vehicle emissions account for 6% of global carbon-dioxide emissions.63 
The court accordingly held that US motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful 
contribution to global GHG emissions and global warming.64  
Finally, for the third standing requirement of redressability, the court held that a 
reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions, regardless of 
what happens elsewhere.65 It afforded significant weight to the agreement between the 
EPA and the President to address the issue of global climate change. In relation to 
climate science, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ affidavits providing evidence of sea-
level rise as uncontested, and therefore, constitutive of the case’s factual record as well 
as sufficiently probative of the petitioners’ risk of harm.66 The court observed the 
following:  
 
61 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 18-19. 
62 Ibid, 20.  
63 Ibid, 21. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, 22. 
66 Ibid, 23. 
 
 161 
In sum – at least according to the petitioners’ uncontested 
affidavits – the rise in sea levels associated with global 
warming has already harmed and will continue to harm 
Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, though 
remote, is nevertheless real.67  
 
The court concluded that this risk could be reduced by the EPA’s regulatory actions (i.e. 
if Massachusetts were granted the relief it sought) and that the petitioners therefore had 
standing.68 Ultimately, the nature of climate change as a global problem was held not to 
be a barrier to such adjudication, since even if the problem is shared, Massachusetts and 
the other co-petitioners had a legitimate stake or interest worth protecting.  
On the merits, the case mainly revolved around questions of statutory construction, 
namely whether section 202(a)(1) of the CAA authorises the EPA to regulate GHG 
emissions from motor-vehicles in the event that they contribute to climate change.69 The 
court concluded that the EPA did have such power. More specifically, the language of 
the statute was unambiguous and permitted a reading or classification of GHG emissions 
as an ‘air pollutant,’ the definition of which is capacious.70 Evincing its affirmation of 
the state of climate science at the time, the court held that prevailing scientific 
uncertainty was not an adequate basis that precluded the EPA from issuing an 
endangerment finding on GHGs and regulating climate change.71 The court therefore 
held that the EPA had acted “arbitrarily, capriciously… and unlawfully” by failing to 
offer a reasoned explanation for its refusal to regulate GHG emissions from new motor-
vehicles under the CAA.72 By implication, the court arguably chastised the EPA for not 
 
67 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 23. 
68 Ibid, 23.  
69 Ibid, 25. 
70 Ibid, 26. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid, 32. 
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anchoring its decision to refrain from making an endangerment finding on GHGs based 
on a genuine and reasonable consideration of available, state-of-the-art scientific 
evidence, (including IPCC assessment reports)73 which revealed clear causal links 
between GHG emissions from motor-vehicles and climate change. Jasanoff observes 
that by ruling in this manner, the Supreme Court was, in effect, overriding climate-
skeptic efforts to obstruct the regulation of GHGs by declaring that the EPA’s defiance 
of the international scientific consensus on climate change without explanation was 
irrational.74 
Although the court did not explicitly mention climate science in its discussion on the 
merits, in an earlier part of its judgment, the majority considered the socio-political 
context surrounding the development of American climate change research since the 
1970s and the history of climate change regulation in the US.75 It also acknowledged 
the IPCC’s crucial role in advancing the scientific understanding of climate change in 
the early 1990s and the international community’s subsequent adoption of the 
UNFCCC. The majority’s discussion of these issues reveals a more sophisticated 
understanding and awareness of climate change as a multiscalar issue and a subject of 
regulatory concern for domestic, supranational, and international institutions. In 
recognising the relationship between unabated domestic GHG emissions and climate 
change as a global problem, the US Supreme Court also implicitly acknowledged its 
own role as a transnational actor called upon to adjudicate matters that touch on foreign 
affairs or have transboundary dimensions.  
 
73 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 5-6.  
74 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Cosmopolitan Knowledge: Climate Science and Global Civic Epistemology’ in John 
S.Dryzek, Richard B.Norgaard & David Schlosberg (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and 
Society (OUP 2011) 135.  
75 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 5-6.  
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The court’s discussion, which makes several references to advances in climate science 
and the corresponding development and consolidation of the international legal regime 
on climate change (i.e. the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol), also arguably signals its 
general dissatisfaction with the procrastination of the American executive and 
legislature on climate change at the time. For example, the court’s frustration in this 
regard is clearly evidenced by its discussion of the back-and-forth dynamic and impasse 
between the EPA and Congress on the issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 
US Senate’s subsequent decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol due to the absence of 
major developing country emitters like India and China, all against the backdrop of a 
growing IPCC scientific consensus.76 In addition, by directly juxtaposing the historical 
and socio-political context of US climate change regulation on the one hand and global 
developments in climate science by the IPCC on the other, the court appears to be 
assigning to climate science a narrative of progress. In contrast, the court narrates the 
existing state of US climate change regulation as relatively backward and out-of-sync 
with global regulatory trends. The court’s following commentary is particularly 
revealing in this regard:  
Congress directed EPA to propose a “coordinated national 
policy on global climate change”…and that necessary 
actions must be identified and implemented in time to 
protect the climate. Meanwhile the scientific understanding 
of climate change progressed. In 1990, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a 
multinational scientific body organized under the auspices 
of the United Nations, published its first comprehensive 
report on the topic (emphasis mine).77  
 
 
76 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 4-5.  
77 Ibid, 5.  
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Furthermore, the EPA’s contentions which the court ultimately rejected were based on 
a 2001 scientific report by the National Research Council (NRC) which stated that that 
the science of climate change was too uncertain to permit regulation of GHGs. While 
the court did not explicitly discuss the EPA’s use of the NRC report, its rejection of the 
EPA’s contentions on causation in particular indicate its implicit disapproval of the 
latter’s reliance on out-of-date, cherry-picked scientific evidence. Climate science had 
made significant strides by the time the case was decided in 2007. Therefore, in the six 
years after the NRC published its report, climate science had developed to demonstrate 
clear causal links between anthropogenic GHG emissions and climate change. The IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report reflected the most up-to-date account of climate science at 
the time and Working Group I’s report on the physical science basis of climate change 
was released in February 2007 and therefore before the court handed down its decision 
in April 2007.  
Taken together, these examples as well as the court’s repeated invocation and 
affirmation of evidence provided by climate scientists on sea-level rise, strongly suggest 
that at the core of the US Supreme Court’s expanding awareness and understanding of 
climate change is the idea that the decisions of regulatory agencies must be accompanied 
by a reasonable consideration of the best available and state-of-the-art scientific 
evidence on the issue. Some legal scholars have described this process of challenging 
the EPA’s regulatory paralysis on climate change as ‘expertise-forcing.’78 It also reveals 
underlying judicial anxieties about the politicisation of scientific assessment procedures 
within American administrative agencies as discussed above. As Freeman and Vermeule 
 
78 J.Freeman et al, n48, 64. 
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note, “the majority’s worry in MA v EPA was that politics had disabled the EPA’s expert 
judgment about crucial regulatory questions.”79  
iv. The science-policy-law co-production of climate change facts 
Massachusetts v EPA aptly illustrates how national courts serve as key sites of ‘co-
production’ between the judiciary and other actors, including regulatory scientific 
institutions like the IPCC and climate scientists. This is emblematic of a science-policy-
law co-production model. It also exemplifies how litigation and adjudication constitute 
“deeply institutionalized modes of achieving pragmatic closures on epistemic claims 
and controversies that science alone could not have settled.”80 Some commentators have 
noted that traditional separation of powers arguments may not apply in such cases, since 
climate change is an exceptional problem. While traditional doctrinal scholarship 
envisages that the legislature, executive, and judiciary roughly correspond to the spheres 
of politics, science/expertise, and law, respectively,81 some legal scholars have 
questioned this view in recent times in light of new challenges like climate change. 
Fisher contends that climate change does not easily fit into a scientific, legal, or political 
box, which renders its operation or treatment in a separation of powers context unclear.82 
As with most administrative law cases, the Supreme Court did not directly make 
findings of fact83 and therefore remained within the remit of its jurisdiction sensu stricto. 
However, legal scholars and courts in other common law jurisdictions have read the case 
as an authoritative judicial statement on the scientific-factual reality of climate change.84 
 
79 J.Freeman et al, n48, 64.  
80 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science’ in Charles Camic, Neil Gross & 
Michel Lamont (eds), Social Knowledge in the Making (University of Chicago Press 2011) 135.  
81 E.Fisher, n43, 247.  
82 Ibid, 247.  
83 Ibid, 250. 
84 Ibid; See Brian J. Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation (Part 2)’ (2011) 5 Carbon & Climate Law 
Review 2.  
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It is therefore worth briefly considering the role that the US Supreme Court played in 
co-producing not only the case’s factual record, but also ultimately the dominant 
scientific-epistemic imaginary of climate change disseminated by the IPCC.  
 
Notably, the Supreme Court majority made a conscious choice to privilege IPCC 
assessments and the IPCC scientific consensus over alternative accounts of climate 
science, namely National Research Council (NRC) reports relied upon by the EPA 
which were out-of-date.85 The case is also an illustration of how federal judges are 
directly integrating IPCC statements into their own factual-legal matrix. Through both 
these measures, the Supreme Court augmented the epistemic authority of the IPCC. For 
example, in his discussion of the facts and procedural issues such as standing, Justice 
Stevens directly subsumed the factual determinations of the IPCC and climate scientists 
like Michael MacCracken.86 Similarly, Justice Breyer who aligned himself with the 
majority, typically assumes a deferential stance in cases involving scientific complexity. 
As Jasanoff observes, “for Breyer, it is nature’s text that takes precedence, and his 
reasoning repeatedly draws affirmation from expert accounts of reality.”87 Although 
Breyer did not file a separate opinion in this case, his statements during the oral 
arguments reveal a clear preference for “conceptualizing risk in quantitative terms”88 
and deferring to scientists’ probabilistic methods of calculating risk. 
 
At a glance, the co-productive labours of the court with respect to fact-finding in 
Massachusetts v EPA appear to be limited to the legitimation of a dominant natural 
 
85 Massachusetts v EPA, n53, 5-6, 10, 18. 
86 Ibid, 18-19. 
87 Sheila Jasanoff, “The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science,” in Charles Camic, Neil Gross, 
and Michel Lamont (eds), Social Knowledge in the Making (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011) 
329.  
88 Ibid, 329.  
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scientific understanding of climate change. On closer inspection however the court’s 
role extends beyond the certification of IPCC climate science. Rather, Massachusetts v 
EPA and other climate change cases show that American courts are also playing a vital 
role in transforming scientific facts produced by other actors like the IPCC and climate 
scientists into what Latour calls “matters of fact” 89 or justiciable facts. More 
importantly, the judicial confirmation that GHG emissions qualify as air pollutants 
under the CAA, constitutes strong evidence of science-policy-law co-production, as it 
is the quintessential example of a co-produced ‘fact’ about climate change.  
 
The role of courts in climate change cases is therefore complex, significant, and one that 
complements the IPCC's role as a knowledge producer and certifier. Courts are co-
producing climate change not only as a scientific reality, but also reinscribing it into a 
socio-legal reality that urgently merits regulatory interventions and responses. In 
conjunction with the IPCC, they are creating actionable facts that generate demand for 
urgent regulation. More specifically, they are stipulating that climate change is not just 
a scientific reality, but a social problem or ill because it is detrimental to human health 
and the environment. For example, in Massachusetts v EPA, the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on climate science demonstrating the causal links between GHGs and harmful 
health and environmental impacts heavily informed its characterisation of GHGs as ‘air 
pollutants’ under the CAA. Judicial exercises in identifying climate-related harms, in 
turn, serve to reinforce and enhance the IPCC’s epistemic authority. Massachusetts v 
EPA is the prime example in this regard, because it is a direct judicial imprimatur for 
regulators to act on the best available scientific data showing evidence of harm to human 
 
89 Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern’ 
(2004) 30 Critical Inquiry 2, 236. 
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health and the environment from anthropogenic GHGs. This eventually led to the EPA's 
endangerment finding with respect to GHGs in 2009. In sum, the judgment represents 
an instance of science-policy-law co-production precisely because the Supreme Court 
majority’s interpretation and reading in of GHG emissions as ‘air pollutants’ under the 
CAA by reference to IPCC assessments, prompted a change in federal climate change 
policy in the form of the EPA’s endangerment finding in relation to GHG emissions and 
compelled their subsequent regulation.  
 
Despite judicial claims to scientific and legal forms of objectivity,90 it is not possible 
even for courts to disaggregate the complex mix of social-scientific-legal factors in the 
context of climate change, since they are inextricably intertwined.91 A survey of US case 
law reveals that for courts a ‘fact’ about climate change is not purely made up of 
scientific propositions, but is additionally inflected with socio-legal factors and 
considerations. The factual account of climate change produced, legitimated, and 
disseminated by courts is therefore a framing of the problem as both a scientific reality 
and a social ill, namely as a series of harms to human health and the environment. This 
account is concurrently undergirded by IPCC climate science and a legal-juridical 
understanding of climate change as a social harm, subsequently translatable and 
actionable as various categories of legal harm (e.g. statutory violations or tortious 
conduct) that give rise to remedial or damage entitlements for adversely affected actors. 
This dynamic is further illustrated by other US climate litigation scenarios which are 
discussed below.  
 
 
90 See Jasanoff for a comparative analysis of jurisprudential approaches taken by Justices Scalia and 
Breyer in cases of scientific complexity. In particular, she notes that Breyer takes up ideas of scientific 
objectivity, generally deferring to expert accounts of nature, while Scalia holds steadfastly to legal texts 
which he regards as ‘the unambiguous baseline on which reason is based.’ S.Jasanoff, n87, 329-330. 
91 E.Fisher, n81, 247.  
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III. The Causation Conundrum  
 
 
To date, American federal courts have mainly considered climate change causation and 
any relevant climate science at the procedural stage of litigation, namely when dealing 
with the question of standing. The standing doctrine, deriving from Article III of the US 
Constitution, prescribes that the jurisdiction of federal courts will be limited to cases in 
which: i) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact; (ii) that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the 
defendant’s misconduct (causation); and (iii) is capable of being redressed by the 
court.92 Furthermore, courts generally need to be convinced of two main aspects of 
causation: i) that GHG emissions cause anthropogenic climate change (i.e. the general 
causation enquiry); ii) that a defendant’s GHG emissions are the cause of the particular 
climatic event that resulted in harm or injury to the plaintiff (i.e. the specific or proximate 
causation enquiry).93  
 
With respect to the first limb of general causation, this section draws on relevant case 
law examples to argue that American federal courts have widely embraced the scientific 
consensus on climate change and are near-unanimous in their affirmation of the IPCC 
and the global climate science community’s general proposition that anthropogenically 
emitted GHGs are the dominant cause of climate change. The latter enquiry pertaining 
to specific causation goes to the issue of attribution of liability to individual corporate 
defendants (e.g. fossil fuel producers) for particular climatic events that resulted in 
plaintiffs’ injuries. Nearly all causation claims in toxic tort cases (of which asbestos, 
tobacco, and climate change cases constitute prominent categories) stand or fall on 
 
92 U.S. Constitution, Art III. 
93 James Thornton & Howard Covington, ‘Climate change before the court’ (2016) 9 Nature Geoscience 
3, 5.  
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expert testimony.94 Private climate litigation, particularly first generation tort cases, 
show that courts have thus far refrained from definitively ruling on this second limb of 
the causation enquiry, citing insufficiency of scientific evidence or scientific uncertainty 
as major reasons. However, the failure of private climate litigation in the US can also 
be attributed to non-scientific factors. In all first-generation climate change tort cases 
courts also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of: i) the political question doctrine, 
which stipulates that federal courts cannot adjudicate on certain controversies that are 
more appropriate for resolution by the elected branches of government95 or; ii) the 
displacement doctrine, which prescribes that federal statute, namely the EPA’s authority 
to regulate GHGs under the CAA, displaces the federal common law of tort with respect 
to climate change matters.96   
 
i. Judicial convergence on general causation  
 
Despite the persistence and pervasiveness of climate skepticism and denialism in the 
American political establishment, several American courts have accepted the IPCC 
scientific consensus which has translated into their acceptance of the general causation 
threshold that anthropogenic GHG emissions are directly contributing to climate 
change. Indeed, since Massachusetts v EPA, the IPCC and climate scientists’ key 
propositions regarding the causal links between GHG emissions and climate change 
have generally not been questioned by courts. This is aptly illustrated by AEP v 
Connecticut in which the plaintiffs (Connecticut and several other states) filed a public 
nuisance lawsuit against five electric power companies, which it alleged were the largest 
 
94 Thomas O. McGarity, ‘Daubert and the Proper Role for the Courts in Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Regulation’ (2005) 95 American Journal of Public Health 1, 93. 
95 People of the State of California v General Motors Corp, No. C06-05755, (N.D. Cal., 09/17/2007); 
Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corporation et al. 696 F.3d 849, 2012 WL 4215921 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v 
Murphy Oil USA Inc., 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
96 American Electric Power Co. et al. v Connecticut (No. 10-174) 582 F. 3d 309 (2011).  
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emitters of carbon-dioxide in the US.97 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals (COA) 
reversed the District Court’s initial dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that 
they raised a non-justiciable political question. In doing so, the COA effectively ruled 
that federal courts are not automatically precluded from reviewing climate change 
matters – a finding that was also upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the scientific basis of the EPA’s endangerment finding in 2009, which 
integrated statements of fact provided by climate scientists both within the agency and 
beyond:  
Responding to our decision in Massachusetts, EPA 
undertook greenhouse gas regulation…EPA concluded that 
“compelling evidence” supported the “attribution of 
observed climate change to anthropogenic” emissions of 
greenhouse gases. Consequent dangers of greenhouse gas 
emissions, EPA determined, included increases in heat-
related deaths; coastal inundation and erosion caused by 
melting icecaps and rising sea levels; more frequent and 
intense hurricanes, floods, and other “extreme weather 
events” that cause death and destroy infrastructure; drought 
due to reductions in mountain snowpack and shifting 
precipitation patterns; destruction of ecosystems supporting 
animals and plants; and potentially “significant disruptions” 
of food production.98 
 
The COA and Supreme Court also accepted causation-related claims that the 
defendants/petitioners’ conduct constituted “substantial and unreasonable interference” 
with the public’s rights in violation of the common law of nuisance.99 In support of their 
claims, the plaintiffs submitted evidence showing that the defendants contributed to 25% 
of all emissions from the electric power sector, 10% of all human activities, and 2% of 
all global emissions.100 Notably, the Supreme Court dismissed the case on the merits not 
 
97 AEP v Connecticut, n96. 
98 AEP v Connecticut, 564 U.S. 3 (2011).  
99 Ibid, 9. 
100 AEP v Connecticut, n98, 9.  
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because of insufficient scientific evidence on causation, but rather on the basis of the 
displacement doctrine. The court ruled that the CAA and the EPA’s exclusive statutory 
authority to regulate GHG emissions displaced the plaintiffs’ claims under the federal 
common law of nuisance.101  
Even in exceptional cases in which litigants have challenged climate science and the 
IPCC consensus, federal courts have not accepted their climate-skeptic claims. For 
example, in Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, where the 
plaintiffs (motor-vehicle manufacturers) challenged climate science, the federal District 
Court of Vermont ultimately accepted the testimony of three climate scientists and 
upheld the Vermont regulation targeting GHG emissions from motor-vehicles.102 The 
plaintiffs challenged these state regulations on GHGs on the basis that they pre-
emptively adopted Californian emissions standards in violation of the federal statutory 
regime on climate change, namely the CAA, the Environmental Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) and the EPA’s exclusive authority to regulate GHG emissions 
from new motor-vehicles. The plaintiffs also sought to have the expert testimonies of 
climate scientists Dr James Hansen, Dr Barrett Rock, and Mr K.G.Duleep struck out 
under the Daubert admissibility criteria. The court applied the Daubert criteria to assess 
the reliability of expert evidence presented by these climate scientists and considered 
their testimonies at length. With respect to James Hansen’s testimony, the court 
concluded the following:  
 
Hansen’s testimony is based on sufficient facts and data and 
reliable methods, applied reliably to the facts. Hansen cited 
abundant data in support of his theories regarding climate 
change, including historical data gathered from a number of 
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sources including measured temperatures, ice cores and 
ocean cores, as well as modeling results. He also cited 
substantial data regarding the likelihood of ice sheet 
disintegration, including satellite imagery and the GRACE 
satellite’s gravitational field data showing recent losses of 
mass in Greenland and Antarctica, increases in ice quakes in 
Greenland, recent accelerations in ice streams flowing off 
Greenland, and historical data on sea level rise at other warm 




Furthermore, with respect to the peer review criterion, the court noted that “there is 
widespread acceptance of the basic premises that underlie Hansen’s testimony” and that 
the  plaintiffs’ own expert, Dr Christy, “agrees with the IPCC’s assessment that in the 
light of new evidence and taking into account remaining uncertainties, most of the 
observed warming over the last fifty years is likely to have been due to the increase in 
GHG concentrations.”104 The court accordingly determined that Hansen’s testimony 
was reliable for the purposes of admissibility, and “[provided] the Court with important 
information on the nature and risks of global warming.”105 Critically, the court noted 
that Hansen’s testimony “provided valuable context for the Court’s consideration of the 
plaintiffs’ contentions [and] assists the Court, as the trier of fact in this case.”106 These 
statements by the Vermont District Court attest to the centrality and indispensable 
character of IPCC assessments and the expert testimonies of climate scientists (as lead 
authors of IPCC reports) in judicial fact-finding in climate change cases. The case also 
highlights the subtle shift in the US federal judiciary’s role vis-à-vis scientific evidence 
on climate change in the past decade. More specifically, it shows that IPCC reports have 
become well-insulated and progressively consolidated through further federal court 
 
103 Green Mountain Chrysler, n3, 44.  
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid, 47. 
106 Ibid, 47-48. 
 
 174 
rulings. Rather, what is sometimes still contested is the appropriateness and reliability 
of the witnesses chosen to represent and explain this evidence. 
 
Similarly, in Coalition for Responsible Regulation Inc. v EPA, a group of industries and 
states challenged the EPA’s endangerment finding on GHGs and a spate of EPA-issued 
climate change regulations in the wake of Massachusetts v EPA, arguing that these were 
based on faulty science.107 With respect to its endangerment finding, the claimants 
accused the EPA of “improperly delegating its judgment” by consulting external 
scientific organisations and relying on secondary studies.108 In making its endangerment 
finding, the EPA had heavily relied upon scientific assessments issued by the IPCC, 
NRC, and the U.S. Global Climate Research Program (USGCRS).   
 
The D.C. Circuit Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and found that the EPA had acted 
lawfully by compiling a substantial record of scientific evidence on the anthropogenic 
causes of climate change and considering the scientific evidence in a rational manner.109 
Interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v EPA, the Circuit Court 
determined that the statutory questions that the EPA was required to answer in making 
its endangerment finding were: i) “whether GHGs may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare” and; ii) “whether motor-vehicle emissions cause or 
contribute to that endangerment.”110 More importantly, the court emphasised that “these 
questions require a scientific judgment about the potential risks greenhouse gas 
emissions pose to public health or welfare – not policy considerations.”111 With respect 
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June 26, 2012). 
108 Ibid, 32. 
109 Ibid.    
110 Ibid, 23. 
111 Ibid, 23-24. 
 
 175 
to the EPA’s reliance on assessments from external scientific organisations like the 
IPCC, NRC, and USGCRS, the court observed the following:  
 
EPA simply did here what it and other decision-makers must 
often do to make a science-based judgment: it sought out and 
reviewed existing scientific evidence to determine whether a 
particular finding was warranted. It makes no difference that 
much of the scientific evidence in large part consisted of 
“syntheses” of individual studies and research.112  
 
 
The Circuit Court’s ruling in this case is therefore far-reaching since it is not only an 
example of Chevron deference to government agencies,113 but also, by extension, an 
example of judicial deference towards the fact-finding authority and expertise of 
scientific organisations like the IPCC due to their status as key purveyors of climate 
science. The court’s decision actively encourages and normalises the use and integration 
of assessments from external scientific organisations within fact-finding processes of 
administrative agencies like the EPA. Consequently, it ascribes to climate science and 
syntheses of climate science (such as IPCC assessments) a pivotal role and special status 
in public climate litigation in the US, which contributes to the distinctiveness of this 
body of litigation. Following the Supreme Court majority in Massachusetts v EPA, the 
Circuit Court majority in this case also accepted the underlying climate science and its 
ruling can arguably be read as a more accurate reflection of the US federal judiciary’s 
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ii. Evidentiary difficulties around specific causation  
 
  
To date, the inability of plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements of specific or proximate 
causation, namely by demonstrating that their climate-related injuries are fairly 
traceable to a defendant’s GHG emissions, has been a profound obstacle to their success 
in private climate litigation. The global and multiscalar nature of climate change and the 
cumulative, diffuse, and transboundary character of GHG emissions, renders it difficult 
to prove particularised forms of injury in a court of law.114 In the first generation of 
climate change cases, federal courts consistently ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish a sufficient causal link between the emitting activities of defendants and their 
climate related injuries and therefore lacked Article III standing to litigate their tort (i.e. 
public nuisance) claims.115 At the time that these cases were decided, event attribution 
science was still in its infancy, which made it impossible to establish a definitive causal 
connection between single extreme weather events and the GHG emissions of 
defendants.  
In one of the best-known examples of climate tort litigation, Native Village of Kivalina 
v ExxonMobil Corp et al., the plaintiffs, the Inupiat Eskimo peoples of Kivalina Alaska, 
brought a public nuisance claim against 24 oil, energy, and utility companies. They 
alleged that the defendants’ emitting activities caused climate change related harms to 
Kivalina (erosion of coastal land, sea-ice and permafrost melt, increased frequency and 
severity of coastal storms resulting in damage to infrastructure etc.) which threatened 
 
114 Erica D. Kassman, ‘How Local Courts Address Global Problems: The Case of Climate Change’ 
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their way of life, induced displacement, and compelled the village’s relocation. 116 In 
support of their claims, the plaintiffs provided a detailed account of the impact of climate 
change on Kivalina. They specifically alleged that the sea ice, which acts as a protective 
barrier to coastal storms, was melting earlier, leaving the village exposed to coastal 
storms and surges.117 The resulting erosion had therefore reached a point that rendered 
Kivalina uninhabitable.118 Consequently, they sought damages and relocation costs 
estimated to be between $90 and $400 million by the US Army Corps of Engineers.119 
At the outset, the court accepted these documented climate change impacts on Kivalina 
as part of the case’s factual record.   
The court also did not question the existence of a general causal link between GHG 
emissions and anthropogenic climate change or the underlying scientific consensus, but 
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the causal link between the emissions 
of particular corporate defendants and the plaintiffs’ injuries. More specifically, the 
plaintiffs’ claims failed due to their inability to prove specific or proximate causation 
under the standing doctrine. The plaintiffs drew on causation theories from water 
pollution cases, arguing that a “contribution approach” could be applied here to show 
that the defendants’ emitting conduct constituted the “seed of their injury.” 120 Given 
that these claims were brought under the common law of nuisance, the District Court 
however exhibited reluctance to embrace and extend theories of causation typically 
applied in statutory contexts with respect to air and water pollution. The court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ causation arguments by emphasising the distinction between statutory 
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claims and common law nuisance claims. The court pointed to the fact that the Clean 
Water Act, which governs water pollution, establishes an important statutory 
presumption that discharge exceeding congressionally mandated limits gives rise to a 
substantial likelihood that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s harm, regardless of 
whether other parties made similar discharges.121 No analogous federal standard existed 
with respect to GHG emissions.122  
Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiffs were unable to show that their injuries 
were fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct, since GHG emissions are diffuse, 
undifferentiated and cannot be traced to any particular source.123 Accordingly, it noted 
that:  
It is not possible to state which emissions – emitted by whom 
and at what time in the last several centuries and at what 
place in the world – “caused” plaintiffs’ alleged global 
warming related injuries. Thus, the plaintiffs have not and 
cannot show that defendants’ conduct is the seed of their 
injury.124 
 
The court ultimately ruled that the plaintiffs’ nuisance claim failed for lack of Article 
III standing and was also barred by the political question doctrine because the issue of 
climate change required an initial policy determination by the Executive.125 On appeal, 
the 9th Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment and further ruled that the 
CAA displaces the federal common law of nuisance in relation to the regulation of GHG 
emissions.126   
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In a similar lawsuit, Comer v Murphy, a group of plaintiffs from Louisiana brought a 
class action suit against several oil and coal companies in the common law of tort 
(nuisance, negligence, civil conspiracy, trespass, fraudulent misrepresentation and 
concealment) alleging that the latter’s emissions contributed to rising sea levels and the 
intensity of Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in damage to their properties.127 The 
plaintiffs sought monetary damages for their injuries. In August 2007, the District Court 
conducted a hearing concerning the coal companies’ motion to dismiss, which it 
granted.128 Like the court in Kivalina, it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing as they 
were unable to demonstrate that their injuries were ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendants’ 
conduct and their claims were non-justiciable under the political question doctrine.129 
These earlier examples of climate tort litigation are also notable for what they miss, as 
illustrated by the failure of federal trial courts in many cases to undertake independent 
fact-finding and meaningfully consider any available and relevant event attribution 
science in accordance with the Daubert criteria for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence. In Kivalina, the District Court clearly envisaged a very limited judicial role 
on climate change matters, which it considered to be the subject of policy determinations 
by the elected branches of government. Thus, it failed to embrace even its 
jurisdictionally-sanctioned role as gatekeeper. Both cases were dismissed for lack of 
standing and raising non-justiciable political questions. Notably, preliminary causation 
assessments (i.e. as a subset of the procedural standing requirement130) were undertaken 
without any judicial consideration of climate science. In Comer, the District Court 
merely took judicial notice of IPCC assessments submitted by the plaintiffs, which had 
no direct bearing on its decision-making. Ultimately, both courts adopted a position of 
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extreme deference towards the elected branches of government based on the political 
question doctrine and without engaging in independent fact-finding or in-depth 
consideration of scientific evidence on climate change causation. Despite these early 
examples of unsuccessful US climate tort litigation, in which plaintiffs failed to clear 
causation hurdles, there are positive signs indicating that courts have stepped up their 
engagement with climate science in post-Paris climate litigation.  
 
IV. Climate Science in Post-Paris US Climate Litigation  
 
Active judicial engagement and an emergent transnational outlook 
Despite significant setbacks in earlier generations of US climate litigation, there are 
some encouraging signs for claimants from some US judges who have demonstrated an 
increased willingness to wrestle with the scientific complexity of climate change claims. 
Judge William Alsup’s judgment in the California climate change lawsuit, City of 
Oakland v BP p.l.c., appears to herald a new direction in US climate litigation from 
previously passive to more active judicial engagement with climate science. The case 
did not involve any contestation around climate science by the parties, with Justice 
Alsup explicitly declaring that the ‘issue is not over science.’131 His decision to 
nevertheless educate himself on climate science in a scientifically uncontentious case is 
therefore remarkable and fascinating. Prior to the final hearing, he held a special tutorial 
to familiarise himself with climate science132 – a move that is unprecedented in US 
climate adjudication.  
 
131 City of Oakland v BP p.l.c , <http://climatecasechart.com/case/people-state-california-v-bp-plc-
oakland/?cn-reloaded=1> accessed 30 October 2018, 6.  
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Sciencemag.org < http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/03/san-francisco-court-room-climate-science-
gets-its-day-docket> accessed 2 July 2018. On 27 February 2018, the Federal District Court of Northern 
California issued a notice requesting the counsel to the parties to hold a two-part science tutorial on 




In stark contrast to the District Court judges in Kivalina and Comer, Judge Alsup 
devoted considerable time and effort towards understanding climate science. This 
heralds a shift from passive judicial acceptance to more active judicial engagement with 
climate science. For example, he provided the parties with a list of eight questions for 
the tutorial including “what is the mechanism by which infrared radiation trapped by 
CO2 in the atmosphere is turned into heat and finds its way back to sea-level?” and 
“what are the main sources of CO2 that account for the incremental buildup of CO2 in 
the atmosphere?”133 The District Court of Northern California also provided the parties 
with an hour to ‘trace the history of scientific study of climate change’ and an hour to 
‘set forth the best science now available on global warming, glacier melt, sea rise, and 
coastal flooding.’134 Over the course of the five-hour tutorial on 21 March 2018, Judge 
Alsup canvassed and heard opinions from several climate scientists on topics of central 
importance to the case such as atmospheric warming, sea-level rise and coastal flooding. 
He acknowledged that IPCC assessments ‘make a persuasive case for anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system,’ having significantly improved our understanding 
of the problem over time and with the Fifth Assessment Report making the reality of 
global warming ‘abundantly clear.’135 He further recognised that the defendants were 
among the top ten largest carbon producers and GHG emitters worldwide.136 
Accordingly, he opined that ‘this order fully accepts the vast scientific consensus that 
the combustion of fossil fuels has materially increased atmospheric carbon-dioxide 
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levels, which in turn has increased the median temperature of the planet and accelerated 
sea-level rise.’137  
 
The questions posed by Judge Alsup to the parties and climate scientists in the tutorial 
were geared towards the creation of a more accurate factual record for the case138 
through the mapping of climatic scenarios and impacts relevant to the plaintiff’s claims 
regarding California sea-level rise and the resulting destruction of residential property 
and forced human displacement. According to one of the expert witnesses in the case, 
Daniel Kanneman, a professor of energy at the University of California, Berkeley, Judge 
Alsup’s questions were ‘very solid ground questions [trying] to establish a baseline for 
dialogue.’139 Thus, the evidence submitted by the parties and scientists during the 
tutorial in response to Judge Alsup’s questions and the conclusions subsequently drawn 
by him amounted to science-law co-production of the case’s factual record. The fact that 
such hybridised knowledge emerged out of co-production during the discovery process 
makes it a fitting example of trans-science.  
 
Judge Alsup concluded that ‘this order accepts the science behind global warming’ but 
ultimately dismissed the case on the basis that the problem of climate change requires a 
‘global political solution’ which cannot be delivered by American federal courts.140 The 
case has therefore understandably been interpreted by environmental advocates and 
climate litigants as a significant blow to their efforts to hold fossil fuel companies 
 
137 City of Oakland v BP p.l.c, n131, 12. 
138 The holding of a science tutorial in such cases is unusual, but not unprecedented for Judge Alsup who 
‘likes to establish a common set of facts before the case moves forward.’  Umair Irfan, ‘The judge in a 
federal climate change lawsuit wants a science tutorial,’ Vox (20 March 2018) 
<https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/3/20/17129354/climate-change-lawsuit-tutorial-
alsup> accessed 31 October 2018.  
139 Ibid.  
140 City of Oakland v BP p.l.c., n131, 15. 
 
 183 
accountable for climate change. However, Oakland v BP should not be read too 
narrowly or reductively in terms of its unsuccessful outcome. While the case conforms 
to a pattern of failed climate tort suits in the US, it is more far-reaching than either of its 
predecessors Kivalina and Comer in several important aspects. First, the decision 
amounts to a resounding confirmation from the American federal judiciary that the 
science of climate change is no longer in dispute and therefore attempts by defendants 
to smear and discredit climate science are likely to be treated as vexatious and ultimately 
fail in a court of law.  
 
Second, as with Massachusetts v EPA, the case constitutes another prominent example 
of judicial signalling to the political branches of government to operate from a minimum 
baseline acceptance of climate science and thereby pursue evidence-based regulation 
and policymaking on climate change. Apparent in Judge Alsup’s decision is an appeal 
to the American Executive and regulatory agencies like the EPA to address questions of 
how to ‘appropriately balance’ and ‘allocate the pluses and minuses’ of climate change 
‘among the nations of the world,’ since it is a problem that deserves a solution on a more 
vast scale than a district judge…can supply.’141 In finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
justiciable, Judge Alsup implicitly accepted that climate change claims are capable of 
being framed as localised grievances (in this case California sea-level rise caused by the 
defendant fossil fuel companies’ GHG emissions), but that it is simply beyond the 
capacity and remit of one court or individual judge to provide pertinent redress. Rather, 
this role is reserved for the political branches of government. Ultimately his dismissal 
of the case does not diminish his overarching characterisation of climate change as a 
pressing and dangerous problem substantiated by climate science, which merits a 
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worldwide political solution. Judge Alsup thus acknowledged the international and 
transnational dimensions of the problem. Despite its outcome, the case can plausibly be 
interpreted as an emphatic judicial nudge to the executive and legislature that inaction 
on climate change is untenable from an evidentiary standpoint. This means that political 
objections to regulatory rulemaking on scientific-evidentiary grounds (i.e. the kind 
raised by the EPA in Massachusetts) and systematic political assaults on climate science 
are highly unlikely to stand up in court.  
 
 
A constitutional turn  
 
The role of the American judiciary in the transnationalisation of climate adjudication 
cannot be understated. Although earlier climate tort litigation has limited potential for 
replication outside the US, American courts nevertheless remain a major supplier of 
legal ideas in climate adjudication around the world. This is evidenced by public trust 
cases such as Juliana et al v USA (The Our Children’s Trust Case),142 which stands out 
as an anomaly in the current US climate adjudication and litigation landscape and has 
had a considerable influence and impact on non-US climate litigation.143 Outside the 
 
142 Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (Our Children’s Trust Case) 
(2016) Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 4. Over the course of 2018, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has repeatedly denied various applications by the Trump Administration seeking to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ case. On 30 July 2018, the US Supreme Court unanimously denied the Trump 
Administration’s application for staying the case and ruled in favour of the youth plaintiffs, allowing the 
case to proceed to trial in the District Court of Oregon.  
143  US case law constitutes a significant reference point for transnational and comparative law 
scholars as well as some courts and judges in other jurisdictions, as evidenced by the following: 
Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A 
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia” (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3. K.M. 
Murchison, ‘Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Overview,’ 
(1995) 22 B.C. Environmental Affairs Law Review 503; Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Obsession and Expertise: 
Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v EPA’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3; Lisa 
Vanhala & Chris Hilson, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Symposium Introduction’ (2013) 35 Law & 
Policy 3; Lisa Vanhala, ‘The comparative politics of courts and climate change’ (2013) 22 
Environmental Politics 3; Joana Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, ‘Climate change litigation: A review of 
research on courts and litigants in climate governance’ (2019) 10 WIRES Climate Change; Brian  
Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Part 1’ (2011) 5 Carbon and Climate Law Review 1; Brian  
Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Part 2’ (2011) 5 Carbon and Climate Law Review 2.  
 
 185 
US, some national courts rely on foreign precedents in their interpretation and 
application of domestic laws,144 including in the fields of environmental protection and 
climate change.  
   
Juliana et al v USA is a pending class action suit filed in the District Court of Oregon in 
2015 by the civil society group Our Children’s Trust on behalf of twenty-one young 
American citizens against the US government (including the President and multiple 
administrative agencies such as the EPA) and several fossil fuel corporations. The case 
is also notable for the Oregon District Court judge, Judge Ann Aiken’s serious active 
engagement with climate science in her judgment of 10 November 2016. The court and 
the parties did not dispute the existence of climate change nor its anthropogenic roots, 
which were taken as facts.145 The plaintiffs’ claims were supported by declarations from 
climate scientist James Hansen who also featured as a co-plaintiff on behalf of his 
granddaughter and future generations. At the outset, Judge Aiken ruled that the case did 
not raise a non-justiciable political question, since “the question at the heart of this 
lawsuit was whether the defendants had violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights – a 
question that is entirely appropriate for adjudication.”146 Therefore, even though they 
touched on political issues, the plaintiffs’ claims were held not to be barred by the 
political question doctrine.147  
With respect to Article III standing, Judge Aiken applied the requirements of the 
doctrine more flexibly as compared with the District Courts in Kivalina and Comer. She 
concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded their injuries in fact, as 
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particularised rather than generalised grievances and therefore had standing.148 For 
example, plaintiff Kelsey Juliana successfully alleged that algae blooms affected the 
water she drinks and low water levels caused by drought killed the salmon the she eats. 
Plaintiff Roske-Martinez also successfully alleged that increased wildfires and extreme 
flooding in his place of residence jeopardised his safety. Judge Aiken stated that these 
plaintiffs had managed to show that these climate related harms affected them in a 
concrete and personal way even if they were also harms experienced by other people.149   
With respect to the causation limb of Article III standing, the plaintiffs presented two 
main arguments. First, they contended that American GHG emissions make up a lion’s 
share of all global emissions, that the defendants had the power to reduce or increase 
those emissions, and that the defendants exercise that power to promote activities 
resulting in higher levels of fossil fuel combustion.150 Secondly, they argued that the 
defendants failed to use their regulatory power to reduce emissions. More specifically, 
the Department of Transportation and the EPA, which are respectively tasked with 
regulating the transportation and power plant sectors –producers of two-thirds (64%) of 
all US emissions – failed to exercise their power to set robust emissions reduction 
standards for these sectors.151 Consequently, their emissions caused climate change that 
resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries.  
 
Judge Aiken accepted the plaintiffs’ causation arguments and remarked on the state of 
climate science. She acknowledged that “climate science is constantly evolving,” citing 
journal articles in support of her decision.152 For example, she cited with approval the 
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work of Kirsten Engel and Jonathan Overpeck stating that “although climate impacts at 
the regional and local levels are subject, among other things, to the uncertainties of 
downscaling techniques…our knowledge of the climate is developing at a breakneck 
pace.”153 Thus, in stark contrast to the District Court in Kivalina, Justice Aiken engaged 
in independent research on climate change within the remit of her judicial fact-finding 
authority. However, she also acknowledged the limits of her fact-finding role with 
respect to climate change causation by affirming the Second Circuit Court’s dicta in 
Connecticut v AEP that this inquiry is ‘best left to the rigors of evidentiary proof at a 
future stage of the proceedings rather than dispensed with as a threshold question of 
constitutional standing.’154 Judge Aiken qualified this by stating that the difficulty in 
proving this chain of causation (i.e. later at the merits stage) did not inform the 
justiciability determination in the early stage of the proceedings.155 She therefore 
accepted that at this early stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded 
the existence of a causal link between the defendants’ conduct and their injuries and 
ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to sue.”156  
While notable for its consideration of climate science, Juliana et al v USA is also a 
remarkable and perhaps anomalous example of judicial activism on climate change. The 
judgment is also far-reaching due to Judge Aiken’s interpretation and recognition of a 
new ‘fundamental right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life’ under the 
US constitution.157 She held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged the infringement 
of a fundamental right and accepted their argument that the defendants played “a unique 
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and central role in creating the current climate crisis,” acted with full knowledge of the 
consequences of their actions, and failed to adequately correct or mitigate the harms they 
helped create in deliberate indifference to the injuries caused by climate change.158 She 
also ruled that the defendants were subject to the federal public trust doctrine and the 
plaintiffs’ claims alleging that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties as trustees to 
protect the environment and climate system for the benefit of future generations was 
justiciable in a federal court.159 The defendants’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit was 
accordingly denied. In addition, the US Supreme Court also denied the Trump 
administration’s application for staying the case, allowing it to proceed to trial in October 
2018.160 Our Children’s Trust has also filed analogous lawsuits in other states across the 
US including Massachusetts. 
Another striking feature is Judge Aiken’s use of scientific knowledge to explicitly frame 
climate change as a deeply moral issue and as a series of wrongs or injustices. This was 
particularly apparent from her discussion of the climate harms experienced by youth 
plaintiffs and the concepts of public trust and intergenerational equity. It was also 
apparent in her overall characterisation of this lawsuit as, “action [of a] different order 
than the typical environmental case” in that “it alleges that the defendants’ actions or 
inactions – whether or not they violate any statutory duty – have so profoundly damaged 
our home planet that they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life 
and liberty.”161 Marking perhaps the boldest judicial declaration yet on the appropriate 
role of federal courts with respect to climate change, Judge Aiken concluded her 
judgment by noting that: 
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Federal courts have too often been cautious and overly 
deferential to [the elected branches of government] in the 
arena of environmental law, and the world has suffered for 
it…Even when a case implicates hotly contested political 
issues, the judiciary must not shrink from its role as a 
coequal branch of government.162 
 
 
The gravity of the climate change threat also represents a potential opportunity for courts 
to redefine their roles and, where necessary, to check and hold to account the executive 
and legislature for their abdication of regulatory responsibilities with respect to climate 
change. Juliana et al v USA also attests to the significance of American courts as 
exporters of legal ideas, as it is beginning to have a discernible transnational impact. 
The case is also a pertinent example of the way in which litigants are beginning to use 
technical bodies of knowledge, including science and law, to promote and realise 
pressing ethical imperatives relating to climate change, namely the protection and 
preservation of the planet for future generations. It has inspired analogous constitutional 
climate change lawsuits in the Global South with youth plaintiffs in Colombia, India 
and Pakistan suing their governments for violating their rights to life and health through 
the failure to adequately regulate climate change.163 This topic is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Six. 
 
162 Juliana et al v USA, n142, 52-54. 
163 See Pandey v Union of India, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: Columbia Law School, ‘Climate 
Case Chart’ (2018) < http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2017/20170325_Original-Application-No.-___-of-
2017_petition-1.pdf> accessed 23 April 2019; Rabab Ali v Federation of Pakistan, Our Children’s Trust, 
‘Global Legal Actions: Pakistan’ (2019) < https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/pakistan> accessed 8 July 
2018; Future Generation v Ministry of the Environment & Others, Sabin Center for Climate Change 
Law: Columbia Law School, ‘Climate Case Chart’ (2018) <http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-




The cluster of climate change lawsuits examined here show that certain US federal 
courts have become important intermediaries in the interactions between the IPCC and 
domestic policymakers in transnational climate change governance. The above 
examples of climate litigation show that judges have tended to be deferential towards 
both scientists and policymakers. Their critical contribution has been in terms of 
ensuring that administrative conduct and regulation on climate change remains firmly 
anchored in sound and up-to-date climate science, with IPCC assessments constituting 
an epistemic baseline. These courts have encouraged greater integration of climate 
science into domestic climate change regulation. For example, the EPA’s rigorous 
scientific review procedures mandate regulatory decision-makers to rely upon the 
expertise of hundreds of scientists from both government agencies (e.g. EPA, NASA, 
NOAA) and external scientific organisations (e.g. IPCC and NRC).164 More 
importantly, through their evaluation of IPCC climate science, US federal courts like 
the Supreme Court have played a pivotal role in co-producing facts on climate change, 
as attested by its classification of GHG emissions as ‘air pollutants’ under the CAA in 
Massachusetts v EPA. These interpretive judicial exercises constitute a form of 
boundary work at the intersection of climate science, policy and law, and are therefore 
emblematic of science-policy-law co-production, as they have concretely translated to 
policy reform on climate change.  
 
The US climate change cases discussed here also attest to the triangular and 
complementary nature of the relationship between courts, government agencies and 
policymakers, and the scientific community. Through this three-way partnership and 
 
164 T.O.McGarity, n94, 93.  
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boundary work, courts and legal professionals, regulators and policymakers, and 
scientists continually work to satisfy the requirements of science, policy and law. More 
specifically, in collaboration with advocates and litigants, courts are routinely 
translating scientific statements of fact into categories of climatic harm and legally 
actionable wrongs (i.e. justiciable matters of fact) that can be adjudicated upon and 
resolved through the application of relevant legal doctrines and principles – a dynamic 
further explored in Chapters Five and Six. In this regard, they are concerned not only 
with uncovering the substantive ‘truth’ about a climate change-related event and the 
resulting injury to plaintiffs, but ensuring that an appropriate final outcome is achieved 
in light of the particular circumstances of a case.  
 
Another crucial contribution and effect of major judicial interventions on climate change 
in the US has been the reinforcement and augmentation of the epistemic authority of the 
IPCC. A survey of these major American climate change cases reveals that courts have 
repeatedly affirmed and reinforced the status of IPCC assessments as an epistemic 
framework that is indispensable to US climate change policymaking and regulation. The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v EPA unequivocally privileged the IPCC’s 
scientific worldview on climate change and thereby granted the organisation, its 
knowledge work, and its scientific assessments an added layer of legitimacy. While this 
limited survey of prominent American climate change cases prevents the development 
of observations that are generalizable to US climate litigation and adjudication writ 
large, the Supreme Court’s stance on climate science is pivotal. The progressive position 
of the apex court in relation to IPCC assessments, in conjunction with the doctrine of 
stare decisis, is likely to have considerable sway over other superior courts of record 
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and lower federal trial courts, and compel them to adopt a similar position in future 
climate litigation.  
 
Finally, the existing trajectory of US climate litigation in which climate science has 
featured prominently, shows that certain courts and judges will not accept the wholesale 
dismantling of federal climate change regulations, particularly in light of Massachusetts 
v EPA.165 Despite the advent of ‘fake news’ and a ‘post-truth’ era following the election 
of Donald Trump, which has enabled climate denial narratives to flourish in the United 
States, at least some American federal courts and judges, such as those discussed here, 
are likely to uphold the IPCC’s scientific-factual account of climate change. Indeed, the 
American federal judiciary’s position on climate change has remained intact since 2007 
and has not altered with the ebb and flow of American election cycles and changes in 
government. At a minimum, the jurisprudence of American federal courts to date is 
arguably a reliable barometer of the fact that climate-skeptic laws and policies are 
illegitimate and have no place in the American climate change governance. Moreover, 
procedural doctrines like Article III standing may be more flexibly interpreted and 
relaxed by courts as the science of event attribution mounts and renders it easier for 
plaintiffs to establish causation – a topic that is explored in Chapter Six.  
 
 
165 However, this remains subject to the important caveat that the composition of the US Supreme 
Court and the federal judiciary is not irrevocably altered under the Trump Administration. According 
to some legal commentators, such court packing is already occurring. Furthermore, if Donald Trump 
is re-elected in 2020, there remains a strong likelihood of further court packing, which may result in 
the appointment of climate denialist judges. See Jason Zengerie (New York Times Magazine), ‘How 
the Trump Administration is Remaking the Courts’ (22 August 2018) < 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html> accessed 23 
January 2020; Nathan R. Hardy & Richard L. Jolly (Los Angeles Times), ‘Opinion. Trump has 
packed the court with right-wing ideologues. Democrats, what’s your plan?’ (18 December 2019) < 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-12-18/donald-trump-judges-federal-courts-
conservatives> accessed 23 January 2019.  
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Post-2015 US climate litigation reflects a shift from previously passive to more active 
judicial engagement with IPCC climate science among some federal courts, which have 
become influential as exporters of ideas in this area. Even if US courts have not 
consciously engineered the transnationalisation of climate change jurisprudence, some 
high-profile instances of US climate litigation and adjudication have nonetheless served 
to inspire and drive similar efforts around the world, with Juliana et al v USA serving 
as a major catalyst for a new growing category of public trust and rights-based climate 
litigation. Moreover, the treatment of IPCC assessments by some American federal 
courts, including the US Supreme Court, has been replicated by courts around the world, 
including the Global South. This has resulted in IPCC assessments being transformed 
into a judicially-accredited evidentiary pillar for climate litigation both in the US and 
other jurisdictions around the world. These co-productive adjudicative dynamics are 






CHAPTER FIVE  
 
 





In this PhD project, I argue that climate science is being generated through 
transdisciplinary co-production between the domains of science, policy and law and the 
key actors steering this process include climate scientists, domestic courts and climate 
litigants. The byproduct of these co-productive dynamics is an emergent transnational 
and shared body of legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change, as illustrated in 
this chapter and Chapter Six. Climate change has been a major catalyst for transnational 
environmental governance1 and given rise to new and innovative modes of engagement, 
coordination and cooperation between state and non-state actors. This chapter examines 
the role of domestic courts in the co-production and transnationalisation of 
scientifically-informed climate change jurisprudence. Chapter Four illustrates this 
dynamic by reference to certain US federal courts, including the Supreme Court. This 
chapter sits alongside and complements Chapter Four in that it carries forward the same 
argument by reference to the transnational epistemic-networking activities and climate 
jurisprudence of judges and domestic courts in other jurisdictions.  It specifically argues 
that through their involvement in a range of judicial networks and fora and their 
treatment of climate science in litigation, several domestic courts around the world are 
co-producing a new body of transnational judicial practice and jurisprudence on climate 
change. Moreover, the science being used in most climate litigation and adjudication is 
common and, at a minimum, comprises IPCC assessments. This new body of 
 
1 Harriet Bulkeley et al., Transnational Climate Change Governance (CUP 2014); Veerle Heyvaert, ‘The 
Transnationalization of Law: Rethinking Law Through Transnational Environmental Regulation’ (2017) 
6 Transnational Environmental Law 2. 
 
 195 
transnational judicial practice and jurisprudence can be alternatively conceptualised as 
‘transnational legal commons on climate change.’2 
 
Alongside public policy, I argue that litigation and adjudication (as defined in Chapter 
One) have become significant drivers of scientific knowledge production on climate 
change. Moreover, through interactions in the courtroom and beyond, scientists, judges 
and litigants are beginning to see themselves as part of a common epistemic-regulatory 
community or ‘transnational community of practice.’3 While climate science constitutes 
the primary source of knowledge and evidence in climate litigation, I argue that 
transdisciplinary mediations by courts are serving to transform climate science into a 
usable body of knowledge for litigation and law reform.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Part II reiterates the working definition of 
networked transnational climate change governance (originally introduced in Chapter 
One) on which the remaining analysis of this chapter is based. Part III then examines 
the ways in which national courts function as transnational institutions. In this regard, it 
considers how transnational judicial networks have emerged and rapidly grown in 
response to the plethora of transboundary problems engendered by globalisation 
including environmental challenges like climate change. It is argued that a host of 
judicial initiatives are strongly suggestive of the emergence of a transnational judicial 
dialogue on climate change. Information exchange and knowledge sharing on climate 
 
2 This is a variation on the concept of ‘The Common Law of the Environment’ developed by UK 
Supreme Court judge, Lord Carnwath, to refer to a set of environmental law norms and principles that 
have been disseminated and universalised through regulation, litigation and adjudication. Lord Carnwath, 
‘Judges and the Common Laws of the Environment – at Home and Abroad’ (2014) 26 Journal of 
Environmental Law 177, 187. 
3 Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’ (1992) 46 
International Organization 1, 3; Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic 
Foundations of International Relations (Routledge 2015) 13. Adler employs the terminology of 
‘transnational communities of practice.’ 
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science and evidentiary challenges around causation are core constitutive features of 
these transnational judicial conversations and interactions. Part IV then considers the 
idea of a ‘legal commons’ and how some national courts and judges are engaging in the 
cross-citation of foreign judgments on climate change and co-producing a shared body 
of climate jurisprudence through the recurrent application and convergent or analogous 
interpretations of IPCC assessments. This has in turn led to the transnational judicial 
certification of IPCC assessments. These processes are all strongly indicative of the 
emergence, growth and consolidation of a distinctive, co-produced and 
epistemologically hybridised transnational judicial practice and jurisprudence on 
climate change. Part V offers some concluding observations.  
 
II. The Transnationalisation of Climate Change Adjudication 
 
Transnational climate change governance and the predominance of networks  
Climate litigation and adjudication have proliferated globally over the last two decades 
and are playing a vital role in driving regulation both within and beyond the state.4 These 
legal processes have therefore become an important and influential subset of 
transnational environmental governance. Although there are numerous definitions of 
transnationalism, for the purposes of this analysis transnationalism or ‘transnational 
relations’ are understood as ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at 
least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental actor.’5 This definition aptly captures the dynamic 
and relationship between the principal actors in climate litigation, namely 
 
4 Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Climate change litigation’s regulatory pathways: A comparative 
analysis of the United States and Australia’ (2013) 35 Law & Policy 3.  
5 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In Non-state Actors, Domestic 
Structures & International Institutions (CUP 1995) 3; H.Bulkeley et al, n1, 6. 
 
 197 
intergovernmental organisations like the IPCC, state or public actors like courts and 
non-state actors like NGOs which constitute the largest category of plaintiffs.6 The 
analysis in this chapter is situated in line with legal and international relations 
scholarship which understands transnationalism as a phenomenon in which the state 
itself acts transnationally through its institutions.7 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter One, ‘transnational governance’ occurs ‘when 
networks operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards 
public goals.’8 These definitions of transnationalism in IR scholarship also align with 
recent legal scholarship on ‘transnational regulation,’ which is ‘a subset of transnational 
governance,’9 and defined as:  
 
 
The deliberate exercise of influence on a target’s behaviour 
(designed either to stabilize or modify this behaviour), 
performed with a certain degree of authority and 
persistence…in the pursuit of public interest goals 
[including] environmental protection goals.10 
 
 
Common to all these definitions is the recognition that transnationalism comprises the 
exercise of multiple and varying forms of authority beyond the state or within the state 
but with transboundary implications by actors of all different stripes including inter alia 
private, public and non-state actors. Moreover, these exercises of authority are oriented 
 
6 Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, ‘The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review’ 
(UNEP, 2017) <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CC-
Litigation.pdf> accessed 29 June 2018. 
7 H.Bulkeley et al, n1, 7. 
8 Liliana B. Andonova, Michelle M.Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, ‘Transnational Climate Governance’ 
(2009) 9 Global Environmental Politics 2, 56. 
9 Veerle Heyvaert, ‘The Transnationalization of Law: Rethinking Law Through Transnational 




towards the realisation of public interest goals. This chapter as well as the following one 
focuses on hybrid transnational governance networks on climate change which are the 
product of collaborations between private and public transnational actors11 including the 
epistemic community of climate scientists (i.e. the IPCC), domestic courts and litigants 
(i.e. climate affected communities and NGOs).12 Key functions of these networks 
include knowledge production (as discussed in Chapter Two), information diffusion and 
‘the establishment of a set of norms, rules or standards outside of the intergovernmental 
arena...’ that are geared towards ‘steering constituents’ and achieving regulatory 
objectives.13 The remainder of this chapter considers information diffusion (or 
knowledge-sharing) and the co-production of scientifically-informed climate 
jurisprudence by national courts and judges.  
 
National courts as transnational institutions  
Many legal scholars have declared that a process of ‘judicial globalisation’ is underway 
and refers to the ‘phenomenon of high courts (whether international, regional, or 
national) entering into a global conversation by referring to and borrowing from each 
other.’14  However, the term ‘transnational’ is preferred here over ‘international’ or 
‘global’ as it is broader and more pertinent for describing the range of interactions that 
take place between courts and judges both: i) within the courtroom through cross-
citation of foreign judgments, and; ii) beyond the courtroom, including information 
exchanges, knowledge sharing, technical training and capacity building at conferences 
 
11 L.B.Andonova et al, n8, 62. 
12 P.M.Haas, n3; E.Adler, n3, 13.  
13 L.B.Andonova et al, n8, 63-64. 
14 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) Harvard International Law Journal 
41; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Courting the World’ (2004) 141 Foreign Policy 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 4; Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Judicial 
Globalization: New Development or Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law 
Journal 505; Martin S. Flaherty, ‘Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government’ (2006) 20 
Ethics & International Affairs 4.  
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and networking events. Legal scholars have used the terms ‘transnational judicial 
dialogue’ and ‘transnational judicial communities’ to describe these types of 
interactions.15 Related to this is the idea of ‘judicial comity’ which connotes deference 
to foreign courts.16 According to Slaughter, this is a doctrine that encompasses four 
strands, namely: i) respect for foreign courts as courts rather than as agents of a foreign 
government; ii) a recognition that foreign courts are also entitled to their fair share of 
disputes as co-equals in adjudication with the prerogative to decide local controversies; 
iii) a distinctive emphasis on individual rights and the judicial role in protecting them, 
and; iv) recognition that a kind of legal globalisation is both a cause and consequence 
of economic globalisation, which requires judges to play a role in making ‘the world’s 
legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross-purposes.’17 
 
The proliferation of transnational problems has engendered greater communication and 
interaction between national courts, particularly superior and constitutional courts. 
Several national courts now see themselves as major actors in global governance and 
function as transnational institutions on the basis that they routinely address matters of 
global concern such as human rights, humanitarian, public health and environmental 
problems. These courts are also sometimes called upon to interpret states’ domestic 
obligations in accordance with their commitments and obligations under international 
law. This is aptly illustrated in the arena of environmental law where courts often deal 
with subject matter that involves international and transboundary dimensions such as air 
and water pollution, biodiversity loss and climate change.  
 
15 Olga Frishman, ‘Transnational Judicial Dialogue as an Organisational Field’ (2013) 19 European Law 
Journal 6, 741; Monica Claes & Maartje de Visser, ‘Are you networked yet? On dialogues in European 
judicial networks’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review 2, 100.  
16 A-M.Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization,’ n14, 1112.  
17 A-M.Slaughter, Ibid, 1112-1113; See Justice Stephen Breyer in Howe v. Goldcorp Investments Ltd., 




III. Judicial Climate Networks  
 
Legal scholarship on courts has traditionally focused on the use of foreign precedents 
by judges in the courtroom.18 This section broadens the field of enquiry and instead 
employs an STS actor-network lens to pay close attention to the role of judges with 
respect to climate change beyond courtroom settings and as part of social associations 
and assemblages.19 This is undertaken to develop a richer understanding of how judges 
are involved in the authoring and diffusion of environmental and climate change norms 
in varied, less formal ways and in different capacities, including as environmental 
advocates and climate activists. Through their involvement in transnational governance 
networks, domestic courts and judges are increasingly acting in concert and cooperating 
with their peers in other jurisdictions on matters of collective concern.20 The analytic 
focus here is on judicial associations, namely transnational judicial networks and their 
interventions on climate change, particularly in terms of their transdisciplinary merging 
of science and law to craft a new body of climate change soft law and jurisprudence and 
‘authoritative steering’ of regulatory bodies towards realising the public interest goals 
of climate change mitigation and adaptation.21 It is argued that networked judicial 
interventions have become a critically important subset and constitutive component of 




18 A-M.Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization,’ n14; Neil Duxbury, ‘The Law of the Land’ (2015) 78 Modern 
Law Review 1. 
19 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (OUP, Oxford 
2007) 5,7.  
20 H.Bulkeley et al, n1, 7; A-M. Slaughter, ‘Courting the World,’ n14.  
21 L.B.Andonova et al, n8, 55-56. 
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Social interactions beyond the courtroom 
Beyond the courtroom, judicial conferences and networking events also offer evidence 
and are constitutive elements of the transnationalisation of climate adjudication. Judicial 
networks comprise ‘fora for the exchange of ideas about legal jurisprudence [and the 
development] of practical mechanisms for court management.’22 These interactions are 
largely horizontal as they involve ‘a set of relatively stable non-hierarchical and 
interdependent relationships in which the participants share a common interest and 
exchange resources and ideas to achieve common goals.’23 Furthermore, networked 
judicial interactions indicate that judges see themselves as part of a ‘common 
enterprise’24 as evidenced by the formation of judicial coalitions and cooperative 
institutions that often cohere around particular problems or issues. Prime examples 
include the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment (GJIE), the European Union 
Forum of Judges for the Environment (EUFJE) Network and the ASEAN Chief Justices’ 
Roundtable on the Environment. Common goals for these judicial networks typically 
involve strengthening the environmental rule of law and developing jurisprudence.25  
 
Certain judges are ardent proponents of judicial networking in the arena of 
environmental law given its relatively recent crystallisation into a legal field. For 
example, Chief Judge Brian Preston of the Land and Environment Court of New South 
Wales (NSW) in Australia has written and spoken extensively at conferences about the 
 
22 Hon Justice Rachel Pepper, ‘The Role of Judicial Networking and Information Sharing in Promoting 
and Implementing Environmental Law,’ (12 November 2016) 
<http://www.lec.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Speeches%20and%20Papers/PepperJ/PepperJ%20Judici
al%20Networking%20in%20Promoting%20Mutual%20Assistance.pdf> accessed 3 July 2018, 1.  
23 Tania Börzel, ‘Organizing Babylon – On the Different Concepts of Policy Networks’ (1998) 76 Public 
Administration 253, 254 cited in M.Claes & M. de Visser, n15, 101; R.Pepper, Ibid, 2.  
24 A-M.Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization,’ n14, 1104. 
25 R.Pepper, n22, Ibid. 
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important contribution of judges to climate litigation.26 Justice Preston has also recently 
been involved in several notable extrajudicial initiatives, being both a founding member 
of the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment27 (discussed below) and a co-author 
of the ‘Climate Principles for Enterprises’ - a soft law instrument prescribing legal 
obligations for private enterprises in relation to climate change.28 Similarly, his 
colleague Justice Rachel Pepper has also outlined the advantages of judicial networks 
on environmental law in the following emphatic terms:  
  
The utility of judicial networks resonates loudly in the field 
of environmental law. This is because environmental law 
remains a relatively new discipline compared to other more 
established legal fields, and because it is reactive to scientific 
and technological advancements (for example, the need to 
eliminate greenhouse gas emissions) and social and 
economic developments. These characteristics require 
environmental law to be dynamic and responsive, something 
which judicial and legal networks facilitate and encourage.29 
 
 
This aligns with Slaughter’s observation that “judges who participate in these networks 
are rarely motivated by a missionary zeal to build a global system. Rather, they are 
driven by more prosaic concerns such as judicial politics, the demands of a heavy 
caseload, and the impact of new international rules on national litigations.”30 These 
networks are also important to consider as transformative sites out of which important 
environmental jurisprudence and soft law frameworks on environmental protection 
 
26  Brian J. Preston, ‘The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change’ (2016) 28 Journal of 
Environmental Law 1, 11-17.  
27 IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law, ‘Global Judicial Institute on the Environment’ 
(2016) IUCN.org <https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-environmental-law/our-
work/global-judicial-institute-environment> accessed 31 July 2018. 
28 ‘Climate Principles for Enterprises’ (2018) <https://climateprinciplesforenterprises.org/> accessed 20 
July 2018.  
29 Ibid.    
30 A-M.Slaughter, ‘Courting the World,’ n14, 79. 
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might emerge. In this sense, global normative change may sometimes be an unconscious 
side-effect of networked judicial interactions. Consequently, they merit analytical 
scrutiny on par with formal courtroom adjudication and resulting jurisprudence.  
 
Judicial conferences and networking events are not new, but well-established traditions 
in legal systems around the world. Classic domestic examples include conferences and 
meetings held by bar associations, law societies and law commissions. Prominent 
international legal conferences on the environment in which judges typically participate 
include (but are not limited to) those convened by the IUCN such as the World 
Conservation Congress, UNEP and various university law schools. Perhaps the best 
known recent examples of such international conferences include the 2012 UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio (Rio+20) and the UNFCCC conference 
of the parties (COPs). These events are held periodically in locations around the world 
and bring together a range of actors - lawyers, judges, policymakers, government 
officials, law students, academics, NGOs and civil society activists – from many 
different countries to exchange knowledge and ideas about environmental protection as 
well as influence regulatory and normative change.  
 
Judicially-generated soft law frameworks  
Perhaps most importantly, transnational judicial interactions and dialogues at the World 
Environmental Law Congress and the GJIE have recently culminated in the production 
of soft law instruments including the GJIE Charter, the IUCN World Declaration on the 
Environmental Rule of Law and the Global Pact for the Environment.31 Article II of the 
 
31 Ecolex, ‘World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law’ (2016) < 
https://www.ecolex.org/details/literature/world-declaration-on-the-environmental-rule-of-law-mon-




GJIE Charter outlines the GJIE’s mission ‘to support the role of courts and tribunals in 
applying and enforcing environmental laws and promoting the environmental rule of 
law.’32 Furthermore, the Charter envisages that this mission will be carried out through 
programs on capacity building, mutual exchange and knowledge-sharing, establishment 
of a database on environmental cases and judgments, technical assistance, and 
convening of conferences and symposia.33 Similarly, the IUCN World Declaration 
enshrines several important environmental principles, duties and rights including inter 
alia, ‘the obligation to protect nature, right to nature and rights of nature, right to 
environment, ecological sustainability and resilience, in dubio pro natura, 
intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity.’34  
 
These principles are not new and derive from earlier instruments such as the 1992 Rio 
Declaration. However, the recently launched 2017 Global Pact on the Environment 
seeks to succinctly summarise these key environmental law principles as the basis for a 
new binding international treaty to complement and sit alongside the Paris Agreement.35 
The other key output of the GJIE, the Brasilia Declaration of Judges on Water Justice, 
also similarly enshrines several fundamental environmental law principles for the 
promotion of water justice including the precautionary principle, in dubio pro aqua and 
the polluter pays principle.36  Eminent jurists like Lord Justice Carnwath of the UK 
 
environment.pdf> accessed 1 August 2018; IUCN, ‘Brasilia Declaration of Judges on Water Justice’ 
(2018) 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/brasilia_declaration_of_judges_on_water_justic
e_21_march_2018_final_as_approved.pdf> accessed 15 October 2018. 
32 IUCN World Environmental Congress, ‘Charter of the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment’ 
(2016) IUCN.org < https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/charter-of-the-global-
judicial-institute-rio-de-janeiro-29-april-2016-_0.pdf > accessed 31 July 2018, Art II. 
33 Ibid, Art III.  
34 Ecolex, n31, Principles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8.  
35 Global Pact for the Environment, n40; Lord Carnwath, ‘Climate Justice and the Global Pact: Judicial 
Colloquium on Climate Change and Law in Lahore, Pakistan’ (26 February 2018)  
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-180226.pdf> accessed 15 February 2019, 5. 
36 Brasilia Declaration, n31, Principles 5, 6, 7.  
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Supreme Court have opined that the Global Pact constitutes an up-to-date enumeration 
of universal principles of environmental law agreed at the highest level – ‘like a Global 
Common Law of the Environment.’37  
 
Moreover, it is highly likely that these types of soft law instruments will guide and 
inform judicial thinking, interpretation and jurisprudence in some climate change cases 
in the foreseeable future. Environmental law principles enshrined in these judicial soft 
law frameworks may be applied by judges in climate litigation, albeit in accordance with 
particular national circumstances and contexts. For example, the principles of 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD), such as the precautionary principle, may 
be invoked by litigants in an administrative climate change lawsuit. In this context, an 
environmental impact assessment might require consideration of both direct and indirect 
(i.e. Scope 3) GHG emissions of a particular development project such as a new 
coalmine or power plant. Questions regarding the climate change impacts of such 
development projects will typically require judicial consideration of relevant IPCC 
climate science. This scenario is discussed in detail by reference to relevant case law 
and the judicial application of the IPCC’s carbon budget framework in Part IV below. 
As products of transnational judicial dialogues, such soft law instruments already carry 
considerable weight in certain national courts and serve as adjudication manuals.38  
 
The GJIE outputs demonstrate that some contemporary environmental law, including 
climate change law, is being generated through transnational networked judicial 
interactions. At a minimum, these incipient environmental law frameworks can be 
 
37 Brasilia Declaration, Ibid; L.Carnwath, n2, 187. 
38 L.Carnwath, n35, 5.  
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considered an embodiment of opinio juris and assume a soft law format. They also have 
the potential to crystallise into hard law through recurrent judicial application and 
interpretation in domestic environmental litigation contexts over time.39  
 
Transnational judicial dialogues on climate change and IPCC assessments 
The establishment of the GJIE in 2016 at the first IUCN World Environmental Law 
Congress in Rio provides a strong indication of the existence of an emergent, albeit 
robust transnational judicial dialogue on climate change. The GJIE is also a fitting 
example of a transnational judicial network specialising in environmental law. It is an 
initiative supported by courts and judges from around the world, with countries like 
India, Brazil, Australia and China serving as leading proponents and key partners.40 To 
a lesser degree, American courts are also involved in the work of the GJIE. For example, 
the participation of Hawai’ian Supreme Court judges is explicable on the basis that 
Hawai’i is a state in which climate litigation is ascendant given its heightened 
vulnerability to climatic impacts such as sea-level rise.41 
 
Certain judicial statements and declarations emanating from the GJIE meetings provide 
a plausible basis for recognising an emergent transnational judicial dialogue and 
jurisprudence on climate change. First, the Chair of the IUCN World Commission on 
Environmental Law and one of the founding members of the GJIE, Justice Antonio 
 
39 L.Carnwath, n35, 5. 
40 IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law, ‘Global Judicial Institute on the Environment’ 
(2016)  <https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-environmental-law/our-work/global-
judicial-institute-environment> accessed 31 July 2018.  
41 Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe ( eds), ‘Climate Change Impacts in the 
United States: The Third National Climate Assessment’ (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 841 pp. 
doi:10.7930/J0Z31WJ2., 2014) 
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/high/NCA3_Climate_Change_Impacts_in_the_United%20States_Hi
ghRes.pdf> accessed 1 August 2018; Charles H. Fletcher et al, ‘National Assessment of Shoreline 
Change: Historical Shoreline Change in the Hawaiian Islands’ (2012) 
<https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/1051/pdf/ofr2011-1051_report_508.pdf> accessed 1 August 2018.  
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Benjamin of the Brazilian Supreme Court, has declared climate change as ‘the single 
most important legal issue facing judges globally.’42 Justice Benjamin has stated that a 
key objective of the GJIE is to educate judges on how to deal with climate change issues 
as well as build judicial capacity in this regard.43  
 
Second, at an annual meeting of the GJIE in May 2017, Hawai’ian Supreme Court 
Justice Michael Wilson spoke about climate change in particularly emphatic terms as 
‘the defining issue’ for the judicial community.44 Focusing on its deleterious impacts on 
Hawai’i, in his presentation to the GJIE he cited climate science at length including the 
US Third National Climate Assessment Report as well as peer reviewed scientific 
studies on sea-level rise.45 In a corresponding paper he also highlighted the ‘formidable 
consensus of the world scientific community’ and extensively cited the IPCC’s Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5), which he argued ‘warrants close consideration.’46 He 
ultimately concluded that ‘IPCC assessments are unqualified, they have been formally 
accepted by the world’s national governments, and thus they can be considered both 
scientifically and politically, as “known facts.” They cannot be ignored if one is 
committed to an evidence-based approach to public policy and the environmental rule 
of law.’47 Relying on these key pieces of climate science, Justice Wilson unequivocally 
declared climate change to be ‘unlike any other social issue’ and observed the following:  
 
 
42 Justice Antonio Benjamin as quoted in Justice Michael Wilson, ‘Global Judicial Institute for the 
Environment: Judicial Response to a Planet Under Siege’ IUCN (2017) 
‘<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/2017/wcel_mike_wilson_pres_judicial_respon
se_to_a_planet_under_siege.pdf.> accessed 31 July 2018.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.   
45 US Global Change Research Program, ‘Third National Climate Assessment Report’ (2014) < 
https://www.globalchange.gov/nca3-downloads-materials > accessed 1 August 2018. 
46 Justice Michael Wilson, ‘Climate Change: The Role of Judges’ (2017) 
<https://www.eufje.org/images/docConf/ox2017/wilson.pdf7.> accessed 1 August 2018, 6. 
47 Ibid, 7. 
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The dimension of this social issue is without parallel. It has 
no equivalent. Its gravity deepens with time due to its 
impending consequences. Carbon emissions must be 
reduced before the earth hits another degree Celsius. We 
have a margin of safety of approximately 50 years. This is 
what is facing the world’s judiciary. A solution issue unlike 
any other that has a solution horizon. The solution must 
occur before the earth warms another one degree Celsius.48 
 
 
Justice Wilson’s comments are noteworthy for their recognition of climate change not 
only as a legal issue confronting the transnational judicial community, but also as a 
social issue. Taken together, these statements can therefore arguably be read as an 
implicit judicial acknowledgement of climate change issues as inherently trans-
scientific in nature. From such declarations and statements, it is also possible to glean 
judicial intent which might better enable climate litigants to predict which judges, courts 
and jurisdictions are likely to be more favourable and receptive to climate change 
claims.  
 
Judicial dialogues on climate change in the Global South 
Some of the most well developed judicial conversations on environmental protection 
and climate change are taking place in Asia and Latin America. Despite their regionally-
specific loci, specialist judicial fora on the environment are essentially transnational in 
character as judges from other regions also participate.49 Moreover, the existence of 
constitutionalised environmental rights and specialist environmental courts in many 
Asian and Latin American states has also arguably contributed to the proliferation of 
judicial conferences on the environment in the Global South. These provide judges with 
 
48 M.Wilson, n46.  
49 For example, Latin American and Australian judges regularly participate in Asian judicial conferences 
such as the ASEAN Chief Justices’ Roundtable on the Environment. See R.Pepper, n22, 2, 7.  
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the opportunity to directly learn from one another and collectively develop pathways 
and strategies for addressing identical or analogous environmental and climate change 
claims.  
 
One of the best known judicial environmental conferences in the Global South is the 
ASEAN Chief Justices Roundtable on the Environment (CJRE). In its most recent sixth 
conference proceedings, the CJRE acknowledged climate change as an emerging 
judicial challenge which, out of all environmental problems, is the most global in 
scope.50 The CJRE also took notice of high profile climate litigation from around the 
world, including the Urgenda case and The Hague District Court’s acceptance of IPCC 
assessments. Notably, the CJRE’s invitation to an Australian judge, Justice Rachel 
Pepper of the NSW Land and Environment Court, to provide a survey of climate 
litigation around the world, indicates the existence of high level transnational 
engagement and dialogue on climate change between judges in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Justice Pepper encouraged the ASEAN judiciaries to reverse the burden of proof, relax 
standing requirements and apply the principle of non-regression in the context of 
domestic climate litigation.51 The CJRE report further highlights the possibility of an 
increase in disputes and litigation around evidenced-based climate change policies 
before ASEAN courts. It also emphasises the role of judicial networks in promoting 
mutual assistance through, for example, the establishment of comprehensive and 
accessible databases for judgments with a view to developing an ASEAN environmental 
law jurisprudence.52  
 
50 Sixth ASEAN Chief Justices Roundtable on the Environment, ‘Forging the Sustainable Future of the 
Environment: The Proceedings’ (February 2018) 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/398416/6th-asean-chief-justices-roundtable-
proceedings.pdf> accessed 2 August 2018, 28. 
51 Ibid, 31. 




Transnational judicial dialogues on climate change are also gaining traction in Latin 
America. This can be attributed to two major factors. First, the constitutionalisation of 
environmental rights in several Latin American states (e.g. Brazil, Ecuador and 
Colombia)53 and the existence of robust climate change legislation have more easily 
enabled rights-based environmental and climate litigation, particularly by NGOs and 
citizen groups. Second, specialist environmental courts and tribunals have proliferated 
since the year 2000, with over 1200 worldwide. 54 Many of these are situated in the 
Global South including Latin America. While there is enormous diversity in 
constitutional adjudication across Latin America,55 environmental constitutionalism has 
led to greater jurisprudential cross-fertilisation in environmental cases among Latin 
American courts. For example, the principle of in dubio pro natura (or pro-nature 
principle) discussed above is often applied by Latin American courts to the 
interpretation of statutory and constitutional provisions in environmental cases.56 
Therefore, this principle arguably reflects a transnational judicial consensus on the 
enforcement of the environmental rule of law in Latin America.  
 
States like Brazil have often taken on a de facto leadership role in developing such 
environmental law principles57 and, in general, promoting transnational judicial 
 
53 Roderic O’Gorman, ‘Environmental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study’ (2017) 6 Transnational 
Environmental Law 3, 435-436, 454.  
54 UNEP, ‘Environmental Courts and Tribunals: A Guide for Policymakers,’ (2016) 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10001/environmental-courts-
tribunals.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 2 August 2018, IV. 
55 Patricia Navia & Julio Rios-Figueroa, ‘The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America’ 
(2005) 38 Comparative Political Studies 2, 213. 
56 Nicholas Bryner, ‘4.1 Applying the Principle In Dubio Pro Natura For Enforcement of Environmental 
Law,’ in Organization of American States, ‘Inter-American Congress on the Environmental Rule of Law: 
Selected Essays,’ (2015) < 
http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/dsd/environmentalruleoflaw_selectedessay_english.pdf> accessed 2 August 
2018, 166. 
57 Ibid, 170. 
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dialogues on environmental and climate change issues.  Brazil has played host to many 
major environmental law conferences dating back to the Rio World Summit in 1992. 
The Brazilian Association of Judges is also one of the major organisers of the IUCN 
World Environmental Law Congress, the first session of which Brazil also hosted. 
Finally, the GJIE was co-founded and is currently chaired by the Chief Justice of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court, Antonio Benjamin. Taken together, these various interactions 
between judges outside the courtroom show that the impetus towards judicial 
transnationalisation is intensifying due to widely held concerns about how courts ought 
to confront and address climate change and make use of IPCC assessments to do so.  
 
IV. Climate Change in the Courtroom: Crafting a New Legal Commons? 
 
The idea of the ‘commons’ has long been in circulation in environmental law and policy. 
The concept ‘common heritage of mankind’ envisages vital natural resources such as 
air, the atmosphere, water bodies such as lakes, rivers and oceans, and forests and their 
protection for the sustainable use and enjoyment of all mankind across generations. It 
forms an integral part of international environmental law and is referenced in many 
major environmental treaties and soft law instruments. In contrast, the idea of a 
corresponding legal commons on the environment (one that goes beyond international 
law) is less familiar and undertheorised. To date, only Lord Justice Carnwath of the UK 
Supreme Court has put forward an account of emerging legal principles that constitute 
the foundation for a ‘common law of the environment.’58 I will similarly argue here that 
an emergent set of transnational legal practices and principles is identifiable with respect 
to climate change and forms the basis of an incipient transnational legal commons on 
 
58 L.Carnwath, n2.  
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climate change. For example, the ‘public trust’ doctrine is already inextricably wedded 
to the idea of ‘common heritage of mankind,’ as it has historically been applied to cases 
involving the regulation of air and water (e.g. pollution cases).59 More specifically, the 
extension and growing application of the public trust doctrine to the regulation of the 
climate (i.e. our global atmospheric commons), as exemplified by recent climate 
litigation such as Juliana et al v USA, lends credence to the idea that a legal commons 
constituted by a shared body of climate change case law or jurisprudence is indeed 
emerging – a point that is further developed in Chapter Six.  
 
Among the most compelling accounts of a ‘legal commons’ and theories of foreign law 
citation, upon which I also draw to make my case, are those offered by Jeremy Waldron. 
Moving away from the narrower international law idea of ius gentium, Waldron invokes 
the term in its historically broader sense as ‘a common law of mankind.’60 He 
conceptualises ius gentium as law that is not enacted or written in the books, but which 
nonetheless has its own positivity because it is comprised of convergent currents of 
foreign statutes, constitutional provisions and precedents.61 These sometimes add up to 
a body of law that has its own claim on us as ‘law in the world.’62  
 
 In general, context sensitivity, a need to pay attention to local conditions and legal 
doctrines like stare decisis, compel litigants and judges to prioritise and predominantly 
apply domestic precedents to resolve legal questions, particularly in jurisdictions like 
the United States. Waldron contends that ius gentium nevertheless retains critical 
 
59 Anne Richardson Oakes, ‘Judicial Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine: A Powerful Tool of 
Environmental Protection?’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 3, 6-10.  
60 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 129, 
132. 
61 Ibid, 132-133. 
62 Ibid, 133; Neil Duxbury, ‘The Law of the Land,’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 1, 41.  
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purchase as a vital resource for interpreting and applying domestic laws because it is “a 
source of normative insight grounded in positive law of various countries and [may] be 
relevant to the resolution of a legal question in this country.”63 As a repository of 
accumulated legal wisdom and experience of mankind, it offers useful guidance for the 
resolution of legal questions and may play an important gap filling role.64 Holistically 
addressing a legal question, particularly where the protection of human rights or 
transboundary environmental problems are concerned, calls for the application of a 
comparative and transnational law lens that takes into account any existing ‘foreign law 
consensus.’65  
 
Waldron draws a helpful analogy with accumulated global scientific practice and 
problem solving. Using the example of public health, he observes that the exercise of 
containing epidemics (inherently transboundary in nature) often requires countries to 
cooperate and have recourse to public health and scientific best practice in other 
countries and internationally prescribed standards by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO).66 Thus, it stands to reason that legal issues with transboundary dimensions also 
ought to be dealt with in kind, namely by adopting a scientific disposition and having 
recourse to an established transnational body of legal practice and precedents.67 
Duxbury adds that while courts have no duty to apply foreign precedents, they may feel 
pressured to do so because of convergent legal and adjudicative practices with respect 
to an identical or analogous factual scenario.68 Fairness is achieved where cases with 
 
63 J.Waldron, n60, 143.  
64 Ibid, 132-133. 
65 Ibid, 140.  
66 Ibid, 143.  
67 Ibid.  
68 N.Duxbury, n62, 45.  
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materially identical facts are being treated alike irrespective of where the facts arise.69 
In this thesis, I adopt and apply this enlarged conception of transnational adjudication 
as both cross-citation of foreign judgments (another salient form of transnational judicial 
dialogue70) and structural similarities or convergence in the judicial evaluation of 
climate science. Consequently, as highlighted in Chapter One, ‘legal commons’ is 
understood throughout this thesis to mean a shared body of transnational climate change 
case law or jurisprudence rather than a uniform body of climate change law made up of 
equivalent norms or principles. 
 
Adjudication and the development of climate change law  
Over the past decade, climate change has become a permanent fixture in the sphere of 
environmental adjudication. In addressing climate change, courts are not overstepping 
their authority as believed by certain industrial and political elites. Rather, as Fisher and 
Scotford argue, “in most jurisdictions courts have a duty to adjudicate legal disputes 
brought before them” and it is through the adjudication of climate change disputes that 
a complex problem like climate change is subsumed into the legal order.71 Courts are 
key institutional actors and architects in the transformation and evolution of legal 
systems and doctrines in response to transboundary problems like climate change. More 
specifically, this is occurring through processes of judicial decision-making and the 
establishment of legal precedents which are constitutive of a common case law of the 
environment.72 Some pioneering judges in the field of environment law have 
unequivocally acknowledged that “adjudication inherently involves judicial law 
 
69 N.Duxbury, n62, 42; Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 6.   
70 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 American Journal of 
International Law 1, 99-101; C.Baudenbacher, n14, N.Duxbury, n62.  
71 Elizabeth Fisher & Eloise Scotford, ‘Climate Change Adjudication: The Need to Foster Legal 
Capacity: An Editorial Comment’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 4.  
72 See Lord Carnwath, n2. 
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making.”73 Other legal scholars have argued that this lawmaking component of 
adjudication is a fundamental pre-requisite for the proper functioning of constitutional 
democracies, particularly when minority rights are endangered by majoritarian 
institutions.74 
 
The linchpin of this process is the judicial interpretation of legislation and consideration 
of administrative decision-making (e.g. consent for land use and development projects), 
which is largely the focus of my discussion here. As noted by Justice Preston of the 
NSW LEC, judicial interpretive processes are vital in relation to environmental 
legislation “which is drawn as a framework of rules expressed at a high level of 
generality. A court can, by interpretation of the legislation, flesh out the skeletal 
framework both in meaning and in application to the facts of the dispute before the 
court.”75 In accordance with this framing, I argue that judges have integrated and 
routinised the use of IPCC outputs as interpretive aids in climate adjudication. In sum, 
the principal processes through which judges are contributing to legal-doctrinal 
evolution and the development of a shared transnational body of case law or 
jurisprudence on climate change include: i) the accreditation of IPCC assessments (i.e. 
a shared evidence base) and; ii) shared interpretation and reasoning of the evidence base 
as attested by the application of the IPCC’s ‘carbon budget’ framework in post-Paris 
climate adjudication, which highlights similar judicial approaches to grappling with the 
multi-scalar nature of climate change and with claims that the contribution of individual 
actors/states to climate change is negligible or a ‘drop in the ocean.’  
 
73 Brian J. Preston, ‘The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change’ (2016) 28 Journal of 
Environmental Law 1, 15; See also Laura Burgers, ‘Should Judges Make Climate Change Law?’ (2020) 
Transnational Environmental Law (forthcoming), 2, 6, 21.  
74 L.Burgers, Ibid, 21. 




i. The transnational judicial accreditation of IPCC Assessments: A shared 
evidence base 
 
Chapter Four examined the judicial treatment of climate science in high profile climate 
change lawsuits in the United States. This section provides a complementary analysis of 
the treatment of climate science by courts, with a spotlight on non-US climate litigation. 
Several climate change lawsuits provide a clear indication of a transnational judicial 
consensus on the status of IPCC Assessments as a valid epistemic-evidentiary 
foundation for climate litigation. In sum, transnational climate change adjudication has 
resulted in the elevation of IPCC assessments as a judicially-accredited body of science 
and a Global Knowledge Commons for evidence-based policymaking and regulation.  
 
A shared epistemic-evidentiary foundation in the form of IPCC assessments is a 
common thread that runs through many climate change lawsuits. Scientifically-informed 
climate adjudication is, in turn, putting pressure on governments around the world to 
consider and integrate up-to-date climate science (at a minimum IPCC assessments) into 
governmental decision-making frameworks. Urgenda v The Netherlands (Urgenda I) is 
at the forefront of this growing trend. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) 
served as the primary evidentiary basis of the plaintiffs’ claims against the Dutch 
government. The Hague District Court accepted that a “causal link can be assumed 
between Dutch greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and the effects (now and in 
the future) on the Dutch living climate.”76 Finding in favour of Urgenda and accepting 
 
76 Stichting Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) 
(Urgenda I), ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, Hague 
District Court Verdict, at [4.90].  
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the state of climate science as established by IPCC assessments as fact, the court ordered 
the Dutch government to reduce the Netherlands’ GHG emissions by 25% below 1990 
levels by 2020.77 While an Urgenda-style lawsuit may be difficult to transpose to 
jurisdictions outside the Netherlands due to differentiated understandings and 
implementation of the separation of powers,78 the case has wider resonance and is 
potentially exportable with respect to the court’s treatment and validation of climate 
science and IPCC assessments as a basis for interpreting a state’s obligations on climate 
change mitigation under the Paris Agreement.  
 
Following Urgenda I, a transnational judicial conversation on the central importance of 
IPCC assessments in climate litigation and adjudication is flourishing within the EU and 
beyond. Indeed, in the near-identical Klimaatzaak case, the Belgian Court of First 
Instance adopted similar reasoning to its Dutch counterpart in Urgenda to issue a 
declaration in 2016 stating that the federal and regional governments in Belgium have 
failed to adopt mitigation targets in accordance with the law, namely 40% below 1990 
levels by 2020 and 87.5% below 1990 levels by 2050.79  
 
IPCC assessments also constitute the evidentiary core of the plaintiffs’ claims in Saul 
Luciano Lliuya v RWE, a lawsuit filed in Germany by a Peruvian farmer against the 
German power company RWE. On 13 November 2017, the plaintiff was successful in 
 
77 Urgenda, n76, at [5.1].  
78  Ibid. I refer here to the United States where the political question and displacement doctrines operate to 
exclude the power of the judiciary to consider federal common law public nuisance claims. More 
specifically, in contrast to civil law jurisdictions like the Netherlands, the separation of powers (of which 
the political question and displacement doctrines are constituent elements) has been frequently invoked 
and employed as a boundary policing mechanism by the American federal judiciary to exclude climate 
change matters brought under the common law of tort as discussed above.  
79 Both Urgenda and Klimaatzaak are currently pending on appeal. See VFW Klimaatzaak v Kingdom of 
Belgium et al (Court of First Instance, Brussels, 2015) < 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/vzw-klimaatzaak-v-kingdom-of-belgium-et-al-court-
of-first-instance-brussels-2015/> accessed 27 August 2018.  
 
 218 
his appeal at the Higher Regional Court in Hamm, setting a new landmark precedent for 
private climate litigation against large corporate emitters and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of analogous cases being filed across Europe and beyond. At the oral hearing, 
the court held the plaintiff’s appeal admissible and opined that his claims had merit and 
that the case is likely to proceed to the evidentiary stage.80 The court accepted the 
underlying climate science which comprised a combination of IPCC assessments and 
event attribution studies documenting substantial glacial melt and flood risk in the 
Andes. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether the court will be receptive 
to the plaintiff’s line of argumentation on causation at the evidence hearing. However, 
the signs are positive since the court has already declared that ‘while RWE’s emissions 
are not wholly responsible for the flood risk to Huaraz, it is enough that its emissions 
are partially responsible for the actual, present risk.’81 Accordingly, the Court held that 
there is no legal basis to rule out the existence of partial causation in this case.82 
Notably, the Court also considered climate models (i.e. GCMs) to be an appropriate 
source of evidence in this case and concluded that the question of whether RWE’s 
emissions are partially contributing to the endangerment of the plaintiff’s hometown of 
Huaraz is a scientific determination.83  
 
 
In a more proactive vein, the Hamm regional court also went beyond IPCC assessments, 
requesting the claimant to provide further scientific evidence on attribution at the 
evidence hearing. This suggests that IPCC assessments are only the baseline of scientific 
 
80 Agence France-Press, “Peruvian farmer sues German energy company for contributing to climate 
change” The Guardian (14 November 2017) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/peruvian-farmer-sues-german-energy-giant-rwe-
climate-change> accessed 14 November 2017.  
81 Germanwatch, ‘General ruling of the civil high court in Hamm’ (14 November 2017) < 
https://germanwatch.org/en/huaraz> accessed 14 November 2017. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid.  
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evidence required in climate litigation. When specific questions about loss, damage and 
liability arise, a court is likely to request further scientific evidence on attribution. The 
relationship between IPCC assessments and event attribution science can accordingly 
be characterised as follows: as first tier (general causation) and second tier (specific 
causation) bodies of evidence, respectively, that serve to complement one another at 
different stages of climate litigation.  
 
One possible interpretation is that courts have tended to rely on IPCC assessments to get 
around procedural or jurisdictional hurdles (e.g. the US Article III standing or political 
question doctrines) to adjudicate climate change matters as questions of law and are 
likely to demand further tailored attribution science on single extreme events at the 
merits stage. This is difficult to establish with certainty since, to date, most climate 
litigation has not progressed to the merits stage. However, Lliuya v RWE illustrates a 
new trajectory in climate litigation and adjudication with attribution science gaining 
traction and occupying a central role at the merits stage in relation to questions of loss, 
damage and liability. In sum, both IPCC assessments and climate attribution studies are 
bodies of trans-science that are serving as adjudicatory aids for addressing climate 
causation enquiries. The latter is a prime example of what STS scholars describe as 
science that does not pre-exist the controversy, but is ‘contingently constructed’ to 
resolve questions arising out of a specific legal case.84 
 
Courts in Australia and New Zealand have also made pronouncements on IPCC 
assessments, indicating that they constitute sound scientific evidence for climate 
 
84 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Representation and Re-presentation in Litigation Science’ (2008) 116 Environmental 
Health Perspectives 1, 124.  
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litigation and adjudication. In the New Zealand case of Thomson v Minister for Climate 
Change (NZ), the High Court considered IPCC AR5 at length, noting that it ‘is the most 
comprehensive assessment of knowledge of climate change since its predecessor’ and 
the ‘best available synthesis of the literature and forms a sound body of evidence.’85 It 
concluded that the Minister for Climate Change ought to have reviewed AR5 when 
determining New Zealand’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris 
Agreement and its national emissions mitigation target, but made no reviewable error.86  
 
The Court stressed that ‘IPCC Reports provide a factual basis on which [regulatory] 
decisions can be made.’87 It also heard and accepted expert evidence from several 
climatologists including James Hansen, David Frame (a lead author on IPCC Working 
Group I) and James Renwick (a lead author of AR5 and AR4) which was submitted in 
support of the plaintiff’s claims. In their testimonies, these climate scientists offered 
extended explanations of the conclusions drawn in IPCC AR5 pertaining to increased 
atmospheric warming, sea-ice melt and sea-level rise.88 Engaging in a transnationalist 
exercise of cross-citation, the court also drew upon several foreign climate change 
lawsuits ranging from Massachusetts v EPA,89 Juliana et al v USA,90 Friends of the 
Earth v Canada,91 ClientEarth v Secretary of State92 and Urgenda,93 to conclude that 
climate change questions are generally likely to be justiciable and that ‘it may be 
 
85 Sarah Thomson v Minister for Climate Change [2017] NZHC 733, at [9]-[18].  
86 Ibid, at [179].  
87 Ibid, at [79]. 
88 Ibid, at [12]-[18].  
89 Massachusetts v EPA 127 S. Ct. 1438, 529. 
90 Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (Juliana et al v USA) (2016) 
Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC. 
91 Friends of the Earth v Governor in Council et al. 2009 FCA 297. 
92 ClientEarth v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2016] EWHC 2740. 
93 Urgenda, n76. 
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appropriate for domestic courts to play a role in government decision making about 
climate change policy.’94 
 
Some Australian courts have also been more outward-looking and receptive in their 
treatment of IPCC assessments and climate science. They have largely presided over 
administrative law claims involving judicial review or merits review.95 In Australia, 
such climate litigation is a subset of litigation geared towards the enforcement of 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) principles.96 As a specialist 
environmental court made up of judges that possess a strong internationalist outlook, 
the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (LEC) has been a leader in climate 
adjudication in Australia and beyond. The LEC is a highly-informed domestic court 
which consciously develops its jurisprudence by drawing on a range of international and 
foreign legal material as well as other expert material.  
 
In the 2007 Taralga case  –  and arguably one of the earliest Australian climate change 
lawsuits in which the Taralga community challenged a government proposal for a 
windfarm  – Chief Judge Brian Preston delivered a judgment in which he extensively 
cited the then current IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4).97 He unequivocally 
 
94 Thomson, n85, at [101]-[133].  
95 Under Australian federal law, as well as New South Wales state law, merits review is a type of 
administrative review in which ‘a person or body other than the original decision-maker reconsiders 
the facts, law and policy aspects of the original decision and determines what is the correct and 
preferable decision.’ This is often described as ‘stepping into the shoes’ of the original decision-
maker. Merits review can be undertaken by an administrative decision-maker, tribunal or judge 
depending on the requirements of the particular jurisdiction. Australian Review Council: Australian 
Government, ‘What is merits review?’ (2020) 
<https://www.meritprotectioncommission.gov.au/information-about-administrative-review/what-
merits-review> accessed 6 February 2020.  
96 Justice Peter Biscoe, ‘Climate Change Litigation’ (11-14 November 2010) < 
http://www.lec.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/biscoe_climatechangelitigation.pdf> accessed 27 June 
2019.  
97 Taralga Landscape Guardians Inc. v Minister for Planning (2007) 161 LGERA 1.  
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opined that ‘IPCC assessments make clear that it is impossible to ignore the effects of 
human behaviour on climate change,’  namely through the combustion and use of fossil 
fuels, which have increased the vulnerability of natural and human systems, ‘threatening 
to compound the desperate situation in Australia’s rural and drought-affected areas.’98 
IPCC AR4 significantly influenced his decision to rule in favour of the government’s 
proposal for a wind farm, as indicated by his statement that the public benefits to be 
derived from the renewable energy scheme – GHG emissions mitigation in the long-
term – far outweighed the short-term private costs to the Taralga community and 
landowners from the loss of polluting, emissions-intensive energy sources like coal 
power plants.99  
 
As discussed in part III, the LEC and its judges are pioneers in judicial networking and 
have also had a significant transnational influence on environmental and climate 
adjudication, notably in the Asia-Pacific.100 Furthermore, the LEC’s procedures for 
dealing with scientific evidence in environmental cases are rigorous. Under NSW law, 
in order to be admissible, expert evidence must be: i) relevant in that it could directly or 
indirectly affect the probability of the existence of a fact in issue; ii) involve specialised 
knowledge within a field of knowledge the law recognises; iii) submitted by a witness 
who is qualified as an expert in the recognised field of specialised knowledge; and iv) 
 
98 Taralga, n97, 10-11 at [67]-[71]. 
99 Ibid, 41, at [352]. 
100 For example, the NSW LEC has a partnership with the Supreme Court of Thailand. Thai judges have 
participated in capacity building and training workshops at the LEC and have drafted a legal framework 
on environmental adjudication and new draft rules on expert witnesses akin to those of the LEC. Brian J. 
Preston & Charlotte Hanson, ‘The Globalisation and Harmonisation of Environmental Law: An 
Australian Perspective’ (2013) 16 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 1, 29. 
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the expert opinion must be wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge 
within the field.101  
 
In an attempt to ensure that adjudication is based on the most reliable and up-to-date 
scientific evidence, the LEC convenes a concurrent evidence procedure known as the 
‘Joint Conference of Experts,’ whereby environmental or climate scientists sit side by 
side, air their expert opinions including any disagreements and produce a joint report 
that is submitted to the court as evidence at trial.102 An additional layer of scientific peer 
review and vetting is built into this pre-trial fact-finding process, with the intent that any 
junk science is filtered out and the scientific report that is produced is watertight and 
rarely rejected by the court.103 This report is also arguably the quintessential 
embodiment of trans-science, as it is science that is tailor-made for resolving legal 
questions that arise in a given case. These LEC procedures therefore aptly illustrate the 
high level of science-law co-production that takes place between scientists and judges 
on environmental protection and climate change matters. It is also a prime example of a 
hybridised knowledge practice (i.e. one at the intersection of science and law) with 
norm-generative implications. The following sub-section also considers the LEC’s 
evaluation and application of the IPCC’s carbon budget framework.  
 
ii. Post-Paris adjudication and the IPCC’s ‘carbon budget’ framework: 
Shared interpretation of evidence and reasoning 
 
 
101 NSW Land and Environment Court, ‘Experts and expert evidence’ (2018) 
<http://www.lec.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/coming_to_the_court/expert_witnesses.aspx#Admissibility_of
_exp> accessed 27 July 2018. 
102 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 79; See also Brian J. Preston, ‘Science and the law’ (2003) 23 Australian 
Bar Review 1, 3.  
103 B.J.Preston, Ibid. 
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The adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the IPCC’s publication of its Special 
Report (SR15) 104 on global warming of 1.5C in October 2018 are parallel legal and 
scientific developments in the climate change regime which have arguably ushered in a 
new, more science-responsive and science-oriented form of climate adjudication. The 
Paris Agreement’s architecture of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
envisages national institutions as the locus of climate change governance. Indeed, 
domestic courts have clearly emerged as the primary sites for the adjudication of legal 
disputes in which claimants have sought to challenge national governments for failing 
to meet agreed mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement, oriented towards the 
collective 1.5-2C temperature stabilisation goal for warming above pre-industrial 
levels.105 In several cases, courts have treated the Paris Agreement as a kind of 
grundnorm which provides vital interpretive context for the adjudication of domestic 
climate change disputes.106 This wider interpretive context also encompasses IPCC 
assessments including AR5 and SR15. I have argued here that AR5 is the main climate 
science output that recurs throughout much post-Paris climate litigation. In addition, 
there are early signs that the closely connected SR15 is also gaining currency and 
judicial attention and is likely to be much more influential in future generations of 
climate litigation. 
 
SR15 was produced to give concrete expression and content to the Paris Agreement’s 
stipulated goal of “holding the increase in average global temperatures to well below 
 
104 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’ (SR15) (22 December 2018) < 
https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf> accessed 27 June 2019.  
105 Urgenda, n76; Klimaatzaak, n79; Plan B Earth and Others v Secretary of State for Transport [2019] 
EWHC 1070; Thomson, n85; EarthLife Africa Johannesburg v Minister for Environmental Affairs and 
Others (Thabametsi Case) Case No. 65662/16 (2016) <http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/4463/> 
accessed 27 June 2019.  
106 Anna-Julia Saiger, ‘Domestic Courts and the Paris Agreement’s Climate Goals: The Need for a 
Comparative Approach’ (2020) 9 Transnational Environmental Law 1.  
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2C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5C above pre-industrial levels.”107 The IPCC has expressed with a high level of 
confidence that “global warming is likely to reach 1.5C between 2030 and 2052 if 
[GHG emissions] continue to increase at the current rate.”108 As the Paris Agreement 
does not specify the content of this temperature goal, the IPCC sought to do so through 
SR15 by expanding upon the concept of a global ‘carbon budget’  which was first 
outlined in AR5. In SR15, the IPCC outlines a carbon budget for both 50% and 66% 
scenarios for the avoidance of 1.5C. By relying on global surface air temperature 
(SATs), the IPCC calculates that in relation to the 66% avoidance scenario, the global 
carbon budget is reduced from 570GtCO2 to 420GtCO2.109  
 
It is crucial to note that these budgets are, at best, estimates based on currently available 
model datasets on observational temperature records from the UK Met Office’s 
HadCrut4, NASA’s Gistemp, NOAA’s GlobalTemp, Cowtan and Way and Berkeley 
Earth. Therefore, as per the IPCC’s own disclaimer, there are substantial uncertainties 
in the size of these estimated remaining carbon budgets.110 The IPCC puts the 
uncertainty range at ±250GtCO2 based on the different estimates of historical 
temperatures.111 For example, it is not yet known the extent to which these carbon 
budgets would be affected (i.e. reduced) by the release of non-CO2 GHGs and additional 
CO2 and methane from permafrost melt and wetlands over the course of this century.112 
Importantly, the IPCC concludes that to remain within and not overshoot these allotted 
 
107 SR15, n104, 9.  
108 Ibid, 6.  
109 Ibid, 14. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.  
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carbon budgets and thereby avoid a 1.5C temperature rise by mid-century requires 
states to pursue deep and dramatic global emissions reductions and a “rapid and far-
reaching” restructure of our economies and industrial systems.113  
 
In the Gloucester Resources case, the NSW Land and Environment Court was among 
the first to wrestle with and apply the carbon budget approach in the context of climate 
adjudication. The case involved a matter concerning a development application for a 
new open cut coalmine in the Gloucester Valley (NSW). Under section 4.15(1) of the 
NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment (‘EPA’) Act, the Independent Planning 
Commission (IPC) of NSW, on delegation from the NSW Minister for Planning, was 
required to consider the public interest when reviewing a development application.114 
The court upheld the Minister’s refusal to grant authorisation to the applicant, a mining 
company known as Gloucester Resources Limited (GRL), for the development of an 
open-cut coalmine (the ‘Rocky Hill’ coalmine) in Gloucester Valley, NSW. This refusal 
of authorisation was partly based on the IPC’s rational consideration of existing and 
future climate change impacts as an integral part of Ecologically Sustainable 
Development (ESD) principles. Other considerations which influenced the Minister’s 
decision included the detrimental socio-economic and visual-aesthetic impacts the 
coalmine would likely have in relation to the Gloucester valley.  
 
In an act of unequivocal deference to climate science, the Court emphasised the 
centrality and relevance of IPCC assessments and national assessments outlining current 
and future climate impacts applicable to Australia. These include inter alia increased 
 
113 SR15, n104, 17. 
114 See Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW).  
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average air surface temperature, increased heatwaves, harsher fire weather and increased 
bushfire events, ocean warming and acidification, an increase in the intensity and 
frequency of tropical cyclones and a decline in rainfall.115 The Court also relied 
extensively and emphatically upon expert evidence provided by Earth Scientist Will 
Steffen to decipher the implications of opening new coalmines for Australia’s NDC 
under the Paris Agreement (26-28% below 2005 levels by 2030) and its emissions 
allowances in light of the global carbon budget.  
 
In his judgment, Justice Brian Preston adopted key parts of Steffen’s report explaining 
how the carbon budget approach could be applied to the 2C temperature target. 
Applying the IPCC’s calculations for a greater than 66% avoidance scenario outlined 
above, Steffen stipulated that “the cumulative human emissions since 1870 must be less 
than 1000 Gt C (emitted as CO2)” which he terms the ‘base budget’ based on the IPCC’s 
AR4.116 Furthermore, Steffen concluded that subtracting non-CO2 GHGs (-210 Gt C) 
and historical emissions through to 2017 (-575 Gt C) leaves the remaining carbon budget 
to net zero emissions at 215 Gt C.117 This means “the world has approximately 21-22 
years at current emissions rates before the global economy must reach zero 
emissions.”118 Steffen put the year at which emissions must peak before declining at 
2020.119   
 
The crucial take away from this carbon budget calculus according to Steffen is that fossil 
fuel combustion must be phased out in the coming years, which necessitates that 
 
115 Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning (2019) 234 LGERA 257, at [436]-[438].  
116 Ibid, at [441]-[443]. 
117 Ibid, at [443]. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, at [444]. 
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“existing oil and gas reserves remain in the ground, unburned if the Paris accord climate 
targets are to be met.”120 Applying this approach to Australia specifically, Steffen 
concluded that: i) most of Australia’s fossil fuel reserves, and all of its coal reserves, 
must remain in the ground; ii) the development of new fossil fuel reserves is 
incompatible with any carbon budget premised on a more than  50% avoidance scenario 
and with Australia’s NDC under the Paris Agreement; and iii) the approval and 
development of the Rocky Hill coalmine would therefore be “inconsistent with the 
carbon budget approach towards climate stabilisation.”121 
 
Justice Preston’s judgment shows that the carbon budget approach and its synthesis by 
Steffen were particularly persuasive and compelling evidentiary drivers in this case, as 
they constituted major factors (along with adverse socio-economic, visual and aesthetic 
impacts of the proposed mine) that led the court to ultimately reject the applicant, 
GRL’s, claim that the Rocky Hill coalmine should be one of the fossil fuel reserves 
exceptionally allowed to remain open to exploitation and combustion.122 Particularly 
interesting is his conscious juxtaposition of the science-based carbon budget approach 
on the one hand and the scientifically-lacking or unsubstantiated claims on market 
substitution and carbon leakage presented by the defendants on the other, as 
determinative of the core issues. Justice Preston took specific notice of Steffen’s 
statements on how any new fossil fuel developments would exceed the carbon budget, 
which he endorsed and applied to his own reasoning:  
 
From a scientific perspective, it matters not which fossil 
reserves are burned or not burned, only that, in total, most of 
the fossil fuel reserves are not burned. Professor Steffen 
 
120 Gloucester Resources, n115, at [446]. 
121 Ibid, at [449].  
122 Ibid, at [528]-[529].  
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explained, however, that existing and already approved but 
not yet operational mines/wells will more than account for 
the fossil fuel reserves that can be exploited and burned and 
still remain within the carbon budget. This is the reason he 




Crucially, Justice Preston remained unconvinced by the defendant’s argument that the 
coalmine would ‘not necessarily cause the carbon budget to be exceeded’ and deemed 
it to be ‘speculative and hypothetical’ and not evidence-based.124 He opined that there 
was no evidence before the court of any “specific and certain action to ‘net out’ the GHG 
emissions of the project” and therefore no authority could rationally give development 
consent in such a case.125 This again clearly reflects the court’s unequivocal 
prioritisation of and preference for claims which are built on a solid and rigorously tested 
scientific foundation and which accordingly provide a tangible and quantifiable basis 
for mitigation efforts.  
 
The IPCC carbon budget was also applied by the The Hague Court of Appeal (COA) in 
The Netherlands v Urgenda (Urgenda II).126 The COA held that the Dutch state had 
done too little to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change, which is imminent 
and requires the adoption of more ambitious mitigation targets for 2020 and beyond as 
well as more immediate intervention.127 The COA observed that: 
 
the later actions are taken to reduce [emissions], the quicker the 
available carbon budget will diminish, which in turn would require 
 
123 Gloucester Resources, n115, at [527].  
124 Ibid, at [530].  
125 Ibid.  
126 The Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation (Urgenda II) (The Hague Court of Appeal, 
200.178.245/01, 9 October 2018) at [71].  
127 Ibid.  
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taking considerably more ambitious measures at a later stage, as is 
acknowledged by the State…to eventually achieve the desired level of 
95% by 2020.128  
  
Consideration of both IPCC AR5 and the carbon budget led the COA to uphold the 
Hague District Court’s ruling that the Dutch State was required to adopt a minimum 25% 
emissions reduction target for 2020.129 The COA also concluded that by failing to adopt 
such a target, The Netherlands had violated its duty of care to its citizens arising out of 
Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).130 The COA 
also rejected the Dutch State’s contention that in absolute terms its emissions are 
minimal (i.e. a drop in the ocean) compared with global emissions.131 In this regard, it 
held that the fact that climate change is a global problem does not exempt The 
Netherlands from “obligations to take measures within its own territory, within its 
capabilities, which in concert with the efforts of other states provide protection from the 
hazards of dangerous climate change.”132  
 
Similarly, in The Netherlands v Urgenda (Urgenda III), the Supreme Court of The 
Netherlands also applied the carbon budget to interpret the Dutch government’s 
obligations under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR and held that there is limited space available 
in the carbon budget.133 The Supreme Court acknowledged the IPCC scientific 
consensus that any delay in reducing emissions now would exhaust the available carbon 
budget and significantly increase the cost of pursuing emissions reductions later.134  In 
 
128 Urgenda II, n126, at [71].  
129 Ibid, at [72].  
130 Ibid, at [72]-[73].  
131 Ibid, at [61]-[62]. 
132 Ibid, at [62].  
133 The Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation (Urgenda III)(The Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 
19/00135, 20 December 2019) at [4.6], [7.43]. 
134 Ibid.  
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light of this, the Court held that the Dutch government had failed to show that its 
emissions reductions were sufficiently ambitious and capable of achieving the 2030 and 
2050 targets as required by its obligations under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.135 It accordingly 
concluded that the COA had rightly ordered the Dutch State to increase its 2020 
emissions reduction targets.136   
 
The carbon budget was also applied by the Borgarting Court of Appeal in Greenpeace 
Norway v Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. At the outset, the Court acknowledged the 
IPCC’s scientific consensus on the general causal link between anthropogenic GHG 
emissions and climate change.137 In relation to the carbon budget, it established that there 
is only room for another fifteen years of emissions before the world needs to transition 
to net zero emissions.138 Based on this carbon budget calculation, the Court found that 
Norwegian emissions per inhabitant are approximately 10 tonnes per year, which 
exceeds the global average of 5 tonnes per year as well as the EU average.139 It also held 
that Norwegian emissions from oil and gas combustion amount to 1% of all global 
emissions, which is not insignificant.140 The Court accordingly found that since drastic 
emissions reductions are required, Norway’s reported NDC was insufficient for 
achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. Thus, it held that the Norwegian 
government is required to progressively ratchet up its emissions reductions and its 
exploitation of new oil and gas reserves is directly anathema to these commitments.141   
 
 
135 Urgenda III, n133, at [7.4.6]. 
136 Ibid, at [8.34]-[8.35]. 
137 Greenpeace Norway v Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Borgarting Court of Appeal, No. 18-
060499ASD-BORG/03, 23 January 2020) 24. 
138 Ibid, 23, at [3.1]. 
139 Ibid, 24-25. 
140 Ibid, 25. 
141 Ibid, 27. 
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The co-productive merger of scientific facts and judicial statements in these cases is 
emblematic of the science-policy-law co-production and epistemic hybridity that now 
permeates climate litigation and adjudication. These cases aptly illustrate how cutting-
edge climate science is increasingly being infused into judicial reasoning in climate 
change cases. While the global carbon budget approach is still in its infancy and not yet 
an integral part of standard adjudicatory practice, it is likely to gain significant traction 
through recurrent use by plaintiffs in new waves of post-Paris climate litigation and 
adjudication and compel courts around the world to engage with this scientific 
framework. Early signs of this trend include recent climate litigation against the UK 
government in which the ENGO, Plan B Earth, explicitly referred to the carbon budget 
approach in its judicial review application.142 Plan B Earth pressed the Secretary of State 
to consider revising the UK’s 2050 carbon budget following the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, its revised temperature goal of 1.5C and the publication of the IPCC’s 
special report, arguing they were statutorily obliged to do so.143 
 
Similarly, the claimants in the ‘People’s Climate Case’ (Carvalho v The European 
Parliament and the Council) have relied heavily on the IPCC carbon budget, thereby 
providing another opening for a major regional court, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), to directly consider IPCC climate science. The case has been brought by ten 
families and the Swedish Saami Youth Association to compel the European Union (EU) 
to adopt more ambitious emissions reduction targets in line with the Paris Agreement. 
Applying the IPCC’s carbon budget framework, the claimants have calculated the EU’s 
 
142 Plan B Earth and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2018] 
EWHC 1892 (Points of Claim), at [30].  
143 Ibid, 3-4.   
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remaining carbon budget and argue that it has already been exceeded.144 It remains to be 
seen whether these claims will be accepted by the ECJ on appeal. This case is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Six in the context of litigants’ application of the IPCC carbon 
budget framework.  
 
 
Locally situated, globally connected: Climate adjudication as scalar challenge 
 
The sum of these networked and structurally analogous adjudicative exercises is an 
incipient body of shared climate change case law and precedent, which reflects a largely 
convergent and cohesive transnational judicial outlook on the role and status of climate 
science in climate litigation. At the heart of this is the judicial recognition of climate 
change as a concurrently global, regional, national and local (i.e. multi-scalar) problem 
that demands a multi-level and transnational governance response.145 One side-effect of 
locally-situated, albeit globally-attuned adjudication of the kind discussed in this chapter 
is arguably that IPCC assessments are always admissible in climate change cases. The 
cases explored here reveal a tacit admission by judges around the world that all peer 
reviewed and up-to-date physical science on climate – both individual studies and their 
synthesis in the form of IPCC assessments – is potentially relevant and admissible in 
relation to evidentiary enquiries (including causation) in any given climate change case.   
 
In short, through such judicial interventions and mediations, IPCC assessments are 
being integrated into the factual record of many domestic climate change cases. This 
development radically challenges and disrupts traditional rules of evidence and 
 
144 Armando Carvalho and Others v EU (European General Court, T-330/18, complaint filed 24 May 
2018) < https://peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/application-delivered-to-
european-general-court.pdf> accessed 13 August 2020, at [268]-[274]. 
145 Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Is Climate Change ‘International’? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role’ (2009) 
49 Virginia Journal of International Law 3, 587. 
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procedure oriented towards factual specificity (particularly causation enquiries) of the 
kind explored in Chapter Four on US courts. It is also consistent with Fisher, Scotford 
and Barritt’s broader observation that “climate change may be thought of as legally 
disruptive in that it requires a ‘break’ in the continuity of existing legal practices and 
doctrinal ‘business and usual.’”146 This disruption is also characterised by courts 
showing an increased willingness to adjudicate localised climate change disputes or 
claims routinely by reference to global bodies of science such as IPCC reports and new 
scientific developments in the IPCC, such as the expanded ‘carbon budget’ approach 
articulated in SR15, as exemplified by Gloucester Resources, the Urgenda appeal cases 
and Greenpeace Norway. This science-driven approach arguably goes beyond the 
conventions and boundaries of traditional environmental adjudication into a new 
conceptual space marked by science-law co-production, transdisciplinarity and 
hybridised epistemic activity.  
 
In this crucial aspect, there appears to be a kind of structural isonomy between scientific 
and legal evidentiary procedures pertaining to climate change. Like the IPCC, courts are 
always grappling with multiple scales whenever they preside over a climate change 
claim. What is unique in the context of climate litigation and adjudication is that the 
‘global’ is always simultaneously implicated in local disputes, since climate change is 
inherently a multi-scalar problem. Judges of the NSW LEC have repeatedly 
acknowledged the interrelationship between the global and local in the context of 
climate change, with Justice Pain noting the following with respect to the proposed 
Anvil Hill coalmine development in Gray v Minister for Planning:  
 
146 Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford & Emily Barritt, ‘The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change’ 




The fact that there are multiple contributors to climate 
change globally does not mean that a single large source 
such as the Anvil Hill Project in the context of NSW should 
be ignored in the environmental assessment process. The 
coal intended to be mined is clearly a potential major single 
contributor to GHG emissions deriving from NSW given the 
large size of the proposed mine. The impact from burning 
the coal will be experienced globally as well as in NSW, but 
in a way that is not currently able to be accurately measured, 
does not suggest that the link in causation of an 
environmental impact is insufficient.147 
 
 
This statement was cited with approval by Justice Preston in Gloucester Resources in 
support of his observation that “many courts around the world have recognised that 
climate change is caused by a myriad of individual sources, each proportionally small 
relative to the global total of GHG emissions, and will be solved by abatement of GHG 
emissions from these myriad individual sources.”148 The epistemic-evidentiary 
foundation for all climate change claims is therefore universal and identical. 
Furthermore, the multi-scalar approach increasingly adopted by courts in climate 
adjudication is largely consistent with the NDC architecture of the Paris Agreement, 
which envisages and encourages cross-level interaction and coordination across 
different tiers of climate change governance. It also serves as further evidence of judges’ 









147 Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258, at [98]. 






This chapter has argued that judicial interventions are a key node in the process of 
transforming IPCC assessments into a shared transnational evidence base for climate 
litigation and adjudication as well as policymaking and regulation on climate change. It 
has shown that through networked interactions and the innovative application of 
scientific knowledge in climate adjudication contexts, national courts are co-producing 
a shared body of transnational case law or jurisprudence on climate change. This is 
largely representative of a model of science-policy-law co-production. Transnational 
judicial networking initiatives like the GJIE and the convergent judicial evaluation, 
interpretation and application of IPCC assessments in domestic courtrooms are 
transformative processes out of which this new body of shared climate change case law 
is emerging. This judicially co-produced body of climate change case law can 
alternatively be thought of as a ‘common law of climate change.’ Moreover, climate 
science constitutes the epistemic core of this emergent body of transnational climate 
change case law. Both climate change jurisprudence and transnational judicial 
conversations have also encouraged the standardisation of evidence-based 
policymaking as best practice in domestic climate change regulation.  
 
Climate adjudication around the world is firmly undergirded by a transnational judicial 
consensus on IPCC assessments as a minimum baseline for climate change regulation 
and policymaking. The transnationalisation of climate change case law or jurisprudence 
has intensified outside the US through the recurrent judicial evaluation, interpretation 
and creative application of climate science, with activist-internationalist courts in 
Europe and Australasia leading such efforts. These courts have shown themselves to be 
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more receptive and willing to adjudicate claims backed by cutting edge climate science 
(IPCC AR5) and new scientific developments such as the IPCC’s global carbon budget 
approach (IPCC SR15). More importantly, the adjudication of local disputes by 
reference to global bodies of climate science reflects a deeper judicial consciousness or 
heightened awareness that courts are more than just domestic institutions; rather they 
have become key players in transnational climate change governance. This chapter has 
shown that climate change jurisprudence is peppered with instances of courts both 
consciously and unconsciously embracing their transnational functions. The science-law 
interface – as embodied by networked interactions between the IPCC, climate scientists 
and judges – involves these actors transcending strict disciplinary boundaries to create 
a new conceptual and transdisciplinary space involving science-policy-law co-
production in which hybridised knowledge work has become normalised. This dynamic 
is generative of a new and co-produced body of transnational climate change case law 





CHAPTER SIX  
 
 
Litigant Networks and the Transnationalisation of Climate Law  
 
 
We are not very good at telling stories about a hundred people doing things or 
considering that the qualities that matter in saving a valley or changing the world are 
mostly not physical courage and violent clashes but the ability to coordinate and 
inspire and connect with lots of other people and create stories about what could be 
and how we get there…Positive social change results mostly from connecting more 
deeply to the people around you than rising above them, from coordinated rather than 







In this PhD project, I argue that climate science is being generated through 
transdisciplinary co-production between the domains of science, policy and law and the 
key actors steering this process include climate scientists, domestic courts and climate 
litigants. The byproduct of these co-productive dynamics is an emergent transnational 
and shared body of legal practice and jurisprudence on climate change, as illustrated in 
Chapter Five and this chapter. The rising environmental and human cost of climate 
change has accelerated the growth of climate litigation in recent years, with the lion’s 
share of lawsuits being filed against governments and corporations by networks of 
private citizens, municipal governments and NGOs which constitute the largest class of 
plaintiffs.2 In this chapter, I specifically argue that a major side-effect of such civil 
society-driven litigation has been the transnationalisation of climate change governance 
 
1 Rebecca Solnit, ‘When the Hero is the Problem’ (2019) < https://lithub.com/rebecca-solnit-when-the-
hero-is-the-
problem/?fbclid=IwAR1TVkwBspKavVUcmPS57bTp7fbWv2WEoqhW1yvzObiegE9RWAZQHebrLb
Q> accessed 25 April 2019.  
2 Out of a sample of 201 climate change lawsuits studied by Markell and Ruhl, NGOs appeared as plaintiffs 
in almost three-quarters of all cases. See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Survey of Climate 
Change Litigation in the United States’ (2010) 40 Environmental Law Review 7, 10647. 
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and the emergence of a new corpus of transnational legal practice and jurisprudence on 
climate change that increasingly resembles what I call ‘a legal commons on climate 
change.’3  Recent civil society and NGO advocacy efforts have precipitated a ‘wave’ of 
climate litigation around the world, with Urgenda v The Netherlands marking its zenith 
and the beginning of a new more promising phase.4 This chapter begins from the premise 
that networked modes of climate litigation, spearheaded by private citizens and the 
NGOs that typically represent them, have become important new drivers of climate 
change regulation and governance. I specifically argue here that alongside the IPCC 
(Chapter Three) and courts (Chapters Four and Five), these litigants are also 
participating in the co-production of a new body of transnational climate change legal 
practice and jurisprudence based on a shared commitment to and affirmation of a 
particular scientific-factual account of climate change.  
 
First, the science being used in most climate change litigation is common and in some 
cases deployed in argumentatively similar ways and, at a minimum, comprises IPCC 
and similar scientific assessments. Litigants are accepting and using the IPCC’s 
technoscientific account of climate change, but are also making their own contributions 
to this account by crafting endangerment narratives and arguments about collective and 
proportional responsibility. These are also increasingly being combined with the 
imperatives of securing climate justice and protecting human rights pursuant to domestic 
 
3 Lord Carnwath has talked more broadly about a ‘common law of the environment.’ Lord Carnwath, 
‘Judges and the Common Laws of the Environment – at Home and Abroad’ (2014) 26 Journal of 
Environmental Law 177, 187. 
4 Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2017) 7 
Transnational Environmental Law 1; Josephine van Zeben, ‘Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care 
for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?’ (2015) 4 Transnational Environmental Law 
2; Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, ‘If At First You Don’t Succeed: Suing 
Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4; John Schwartz, ‘Students, 
Cities and States Take Climate Fight to Court,’ New York Times (10 August 2018) < 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/climate/climate-change-lawsuits-courts.html> accessed 15 August 
2018.   
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law and national constitutions. Second, there is a high degree of overlap and structural 
similarity between these cases in terms of legal argumentation – a trend exemplified by 
NGO-driven public interest climate litigation. The prototypical examples in this regard 
include Urgenda v The Netherlands and Juliana et al v USA, which have inspired 
analogous pro-regulatory climate litigation in jurisdictions around the world.  
 
This chapter examines NGO-led climate change lawsuits against both governments and 
corporations, which highlight how NGO litigants are using IPCC assessments and event 
attribution science to advance pro-regulatory agendas5 and co-produce a shared body of 
transnational climate change case law. The analytical focus is on public interest lawsuits 
filed by NGOs on behalf of citizens against governments and corporations, with rights 
claims and the public trust doctrine at their epicentre,6 as these lawsuits provide among 
the best illustrations of how litigants are engaged in the science-law co-production of 
transnational climate change case law.  
 
Part II considers the ‘framing power’ of NGOs in climate change governance7 and its 
formative role in the transnationalisation of NGO-climate litigant networks. Parts III 
and IV argue that the emergence of a shared transnational body of case law and 
jurisprudence on climate change is borne out by the striking structural similarities 
between climate change lawsuits around the world, particularly recurrent patterns of 
 
5 Pro-regulatory lawsuits are those which seek to hold defendants (e.g. governments and corporations) 
accountable in accordance with a state’s existing environmental and climate change laws and policies 
and/or compel the state’s adoption of new domestic laws and policies pertaining to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in accordance with a state’s international obligations under the UNFCCC 
regime (i.e. the Paris Agreement).  
6 John Schwartz, ‘In a Novel Tactic on Climate Change, Citizens Sue Their Governments,’ New York Times 
(2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/science/climate-change-citizen-lawsuits.html?_r=0> 
accessed 12 May 2016.  
7 Jen Iris Allan & Jennifer Hadden, ‘Exploring the framing power of NGOs in global climate politics’ 
(2017) 26 Environmental Politics 4.  
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legal argumentation based on litigants’ mobilisation of IPCC climate science. Part III 
discusses litigants’ use of IPCC assessments and event attribution science to construct 
endangerment narratives, which constitute a recurrent and unifying thread in climate 
change lawsuits. Part IV considers administrative lawsuits in common law jurisdictions 
which are resulting in the standardisation of climate impact assessments in 
environmental decision-making. These cognate parallel processes represent an indirect 
form of cross-fertilisation. Part V then focuses on the direct cross-fertilisation of 
litigants’ legal claims and argumentation (i.e. reliance upon foreign cases) anchored in 
IPCC climate science, with an emphasis on what I term youth-driven ‘future generation 
lawsuits’ comprising human rights and public trust claims. I argue that the sum of these 
processes is generative of a new and distinctly transnational space within which a shared 
body of climate change case law – one that closely resembles Waldron’s idea of a 
modern ius gentium8 - is emerging and taking shape. Part V presents some concluding 
observations.  
 
II. Transnational NGO-Litigant Networks 
 
The transnationalisation of NGO networks through climate litigation  
Transnational climate litigation is both a cause and a consequence of the 
transnationalisation of NGO networks. The NGO climate movement has gained 
significant momentum since COP-21. It is argued here that climate litigation marks an 
important arena in which NGO networks have made crucial gains with a discernible pro-
regulatory impact. The growth of NGO-driven climate litigation globally in recent years 
has reinforced and catalysed the transnationalisation of climate change law and 
 
8 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 1.  
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jurisprudence. At its core, the rise of NGO networks and civil society is a symptom of 
globalisation, the spread of transnational modes of governance and the growth of 
transboundary environmental problems due to runaway neoliberal and fossil fuel 
capitalism.9 In addition, the global institutional architecture of environmental 
governance (e.g. UNEP, UNFCCC COPs etc.) fosters and encourages transnational 
modes of interaction, dialogue and cooperation among NGOs and other civil society 
actors.10Seen against this backdrop, the filing of lawsuits by NGOs against multinational 
fossil fuel corporations in a range of jurisdictions constitutes a conscious and 
coordinated forum-shopping strategy to hold the latter accountable. For example, Lliuya 
v RWE aptly illustrates this transnational dynamic with a claimant in Peru backed by the 
German ENGO, Germanwatch, suing a German power company in its own jurisdiction 
for climate-related damages. Moreover, this turn to private litigation against 
corporations is consistent with the transnationalisation of climate change governance 
writ large.11 The absence of political will at the nation-state level to regulate the fossil 
fuel industry by, for example, removing subsidies or imposing a carbon tax, has 
compelled NGOs to sue fossil fuel companies in more receptive jurisdictions like 
California,12 Germany13 and the Philippines,14 with a view towards securing adaptation 
assistance for climate change-affected communities and driving remedial legislative and 
regulatory reform.  
 
9 James Rosenau, ‘Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World’ in Daniel Archibugi et al (eds), 
Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford University Press 
1998) 42. 
10 Robert Rohrschneider & Russell J. Dalton, ‘A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation Among 
Environmental Groups’ (2002) 64 The Journal of Politics 2, 514. 
11 G.Ganguly et al., n4, 845-846. 
12 City of Oakland v B.P. et al a No. C 17-06011 WHA, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (25 June 
2018) at 10. 
13 Saul Luciano Lliuya v RWE (2017) 20171130 Case No-2-O-28515. 
14 Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Others v Carbon Majors No CHR-NI-2016-0001 (2015) 
Greenpeace.org < 
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/CC%20HR%20Petition_public%20version.pdf> 




As prominent actors in global governance, NGOs have traditionally been more 
responsive to transboundary environmental problems and are “more likely to engage in 
international activity because they may find it necessary to look beyond their national 
borders for allies who support their principles.”15 Indeed, empirical studies have 
confirmed a high level of interaction between ENGOs across national boundaries in this 
century.16 They have also observed that the processes through which ENGO networks 
are transnationalising typically comprise the international exchange of information, the 
coordination of activities, participation in international conferences and dealing with an 
international agenda.17  
 
Rohrschneider and Dalton observe that when surveyed about their cross-border 
interactions, most ENGOs throughout North America, Europe, Latin America, Asia and 
the Pacific reported that they routinely and actively exchange information and 
coordinate their activities with their counterparts in other countries.18 Among these, 
Northern (i.e. North American, Western European and Australasian) NGOs were more 
likely to be suppliers rather than recipients of technical and financial assistance.19 The 
study also concludes that when ENGOs view an environmental problem as a 
predominantly international issue ‘such as global warming,’ they actively prioritise and 
pursue transnational modes of cooperation to address the problem.20 Transnational 
ENGO activity was also found to be more vigorous in countries that have had a major 
 
15 R.Rohrschneider et al., n10, 516.  
16 Ibid, 519; Marissa A. Pagnani, ‘Environmental NGOs and the Fate of the Traditional Nation-State’ 
(2003) 15 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 4.  
17 R.Rohrschneider et al., n10, 519. 
18 Ibid.   
19 Ibid, 520. 
20 Ibid, 521, 526. 
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hand in creating the international environmental law regime.21 Finally, ENGOs like 
Greenpeace which first achieved prominence domestically22 have tended to be more 
internationally active, which lends some credibility to the view that ‘transnational 
activism is an extension of domestic politics.’23  
 
While empirical observations mainly pertain to ENGOs and their role in global 
environmental governance, I argue that these distinctly transnational modes of NGO 
interaction have accelerated and remain highly visible in the sphere of climate change 
governance. For example, the Climate Action Network (CAN), possibly the largest 
transnational NGO network on climate change, declares that its vast membership of 
1300 NGOs across 120 countries works towards the goal of:  
 
limiting human-induced climate change to ecologically 
sustainable levels…through information exchange and the 
coordinated development of NGO strategy on international, 
regional, and national climate issues…[with] regional 




Transnational NGO networks occupy a position of central importance and influence 
within the global climate change movement and have stepped up their transnational 
activism with the intent of transforming national climate policies in line with IPCC 
 
21 R.Rohrschneider et al., n10, 523. 
22 Greenpeace was founded in 1971 in Vancouver, Canada by environmental activists Irving and Dorothy 
Stowe. It has offices in over 40 countries and an international coordinating office in Amsterdam. Marc 
Montgomery, ‘The Canadian Origins of Greenpeace’ (2015) 
<http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2015/09/16/history-sept-15-1971-the-canadian-origins-of-greenpeace/> 
accessed 2 April 2019; Greenpeace, ‘Our History,’ (2019) < 
https://www.greenpeace.org.uk/about/impact/history/> accessed 2 April 2019.  
23 R.Rohrschneider et al., n10, 526.  
24 Climate Action Network, ‘About CAN’ (2019) < http://climatenetwork.org/about/about-can> accessed 
1 April 2019.  
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climate science and the Paris Agreement. Firstly, the work of the IPCC and marked 
advancements in climate science have furnished ENGOs with a compelling and 
cohesive rationale and impetus for their activities around climate change. Traditional 
NGO lobbying efforts at UNFCCC COPs have typically yielded mixed results, often 
delivering only superficial or symbolic victories. Now armed with cutting edge scientific 
knowledge on climate change, these same ENGO networks continue to consolidate and 
extend themselves into the arena of climate litigation where they have fared better and 
even occasionally prospered.25  
 
Secondly, as a universally accredited basis for national climate action, the Paris 
Agreement has also provided NGOs with a robust foundation for climate change 
advocacy and litigation. As will be documented below and in subsequent sections, recent 
climate change lawsuits signify the emergence of an increasingly shared ethos among 
NGOs on climate action and a common outlook on the benefits of strategically 
deploying litigation as an accountability mechanism. In sum, science and law have 
provided a powerful shared vocabulary for NGOs to articulate climate change claims in 
courts around the world on behalf of the citizens and constituencies they represent. 
Indeed, CAN Europe’s extensive support for a recent public interest climate change 
lawsuit brought by citizens from ten countries against the European Union26 attests to 
 
25 See Stichting Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment), ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396; Saul 
Luciano Lliuya v RWE (2017) <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/lliuya-v-rwe/> 
accessed 21 August 2017. 
26 In The People’s Climate Case, the plaintiffs have challenged the EU’s 2030 emissions reduction 
target, arguing that it should adopt a more ambitious target to protect their fundamental rights. See  
Armando Carvalho and Others v EU (European General Court, T-330/18, complaint filed 24 May 
2018) < https://peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/application-delivered-




the fact that litigation is being consciously promoted by NGOs as a mainstream strategy 
and another form of direct action on climate change.  
 
The ENGOs ClientEarth and Greenpeace have arguably emerged as global leaders in 
this area. Since 2015, Greenpeace has filed a plethora of climate change lawsuits in 
several countries including Canada, Norway, Germany, France, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and the UK.27 In some of these lawsuits, Greenpeace has received strategic 
and advisory support or been joined as a plaintiff by other prominent ENGOs like 
ClientEarth, Oxfam and Friends of the Earth.28 These ENGOs are increasingly 
coordinating their activities and advocacy strategies on climate change around the 
world. For example, in a case filed by Greenpeace Belgium against the Flemish regional 
government for illegal levels of air pollution in violation of an EU Air Quality Directive, 
ClientEarth provided strategic advice in support of Greenpeace’s legal claims.29 
Similarly, ClientEarth again collaborated with Greenpeace Greece to challenge 
environmental permits issued for the continuing operation of two lignite-fired power 
plants, Meliti I and II, emissions from which are expected to have significant adverse 
environmental impacts on Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania.30  
 
 
27 See Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (LSE), ‘Climate Change 
Laws of the World: Litigation’ (2019) < http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-
the-world/> accessed 27 March 2019.  
28 See Greenpeace and Others v UK (Heathrow Airport Expansion Lawsuits) (2019) 
<https://storage.googleapis.com/gpuk-old-wp-site/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/case-against-heathrow-
expansion.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019; Isabella Kaminski, ‘UK court hears climate challenge to 
Heathrow airport expansion,’ Climate Liability News (19 March 2019) 
<https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/03/19/heathrow-expansion-climate-change-third-runway/> 
accessed 1 April 2019.  
29 ClientEarth, ‘ClientEarth Litigation Summary: October-December 2018,’ (2018) < 





Furthermore, Greenpeace and Oxfam have collectively sued both the UK and French 
governments for failing to take adequate action on climate change in violation of both 
EU climate change directives and domestic laws.31 In the French lawsuit filed at the 
Administrative Court in Paris in March 2019, Greenpeace and Oxfam have argued in a 
manner similar to Urgenda that the French government is failing in its duty to reduce 
emissions and limit global temperature rise to 2C below pre-industrial levels.32 They 
have also put forward supporting evidence that documents an increase in French 
emissions.33 In the same month, Greenpeace, Oxfam and Friends of the Earth also filed 
parallel lawsuits against the UK government for its proposed construction of a third 
runway at Heathrow Airport. Greenpeace has challenged the development on the 
grounds of noise pollution, biodiversity loss and public nuisance.34 Oxfam, Friends of 
the Earth and the UK ENGO Plan B Earth have additionally argued that the 
government’s Aviation National Policy Statement (ANPS) which approves the project 
is unlawful as it fails to consider domestic GHG emissions reduction targets under the 
UK Climate Change Act (2008), the Paris Agreement and IPCC reports.35  
 
These lawsuits were filed in quick succession in March 2019 and paralleled the growing 
public momentum and pressure on governments to pursue meaningful climate action, as 
reflected by the youth climate strikes in the same month in over a hundred countries.36 
 
31 Sarah Elzas, ‘French NGOs sue government for climate inaction’ (14 March 2019) 
<http://en.rfi.fr/environment/20190314-french-ngos-sue-government-not-doing-enough-curb-climate-
change> accessed 27 March 2019.  
32 Karen Savage, ‘French government sued for inadequate climate action,’ Climate Liability News (14 
March 2019) <https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/03/14/france-government-sued-climate-
greenpeace-oxfam/> accessed 28 March 2019.  
33 S.Elzas, n31.   
34 Greenpeace & Ors v UK (Heathrow Airport Expansion Lawsuits), n28. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Sandra Laville, Matthew Taylor & Daniel Hurst, ‘It’s our time to rise up: youth climate strikes held in 
100 countries,’ The Guardian (2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/15/its-our-
time-to-rise-up-youth-climate-strikes-held-in-100-countries> accessed 27 March 2019.  
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In addition, the French lawsuit also garnered public support via a petition signed by 
2000 French citizens.37 While it is difficult to conclusively demonstrate a causal 
connection between these developments, it can be plausibly inferred that these lawsuits 
are at least partly motivated by growing public antipathy and moral outrage towards 
governmental procrastination on climate change. Such public disenchantment is 
widespread and beginning to serve as a prime catalyst for newer generations of NGO-
led climate litigation. The post-Urgenda and post-Paris wave of climate litigation since 
2015 is therefore distinctive relative to previous generations because NGOs have 
become the main receptacles through which public outrage towards deficient climate 
governance is expressed and translated into legal action.  
 
NGO networks’ science-based co-production of climate change case law 
Overall, the transnationalisation of NGO networks has been enabled by significant 
advancements in both climate science and climate litigation in recent years. Firstly, as 
the scientific terrain on climate change has shifted considerably since 2014 (as reflected 
in IPCC AR5, the IPCC Special Report (2018) and a new body of attribution science on 
extreme weather events), NGOs have assumed a new function as global ambassadors 
and leading exponents of climate science. Litigation has become their strategic weapon 
of choice to compel governments to adopt sound, science-based climate change policies. 
As one spokesperson for the NGOs in Greenpeace et al v France noted, “acting through 
justice, through a lawsuit is a new means, which is absolutely necessary considering the 
climate emergency we are in.”38 In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that IPCC reports 
represent a synthesis of climate science specifically designed to be policy relevant and 
 
37 Laville et al, n36.  
38 See S.Elzas, n31.  
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intended as an aid for governments when designing and adopting climate change 
policies. I also problematise assumptions about the ‘pure’ nature of climate science and 
subsequently make the case for its concurrent recognition as a body of applied science 
and trans-science. Thus, in keeping with this characterisation, I argue here that, beyond 
its traditional policy demands and uses, NGO-driven climate litigation has become a 
new and discrete source of demand for the production of new climate science. 
Furthermore, NGOs are integrating new IPCC climate science such as SR15 and event 
attribution studies into their legal claims in order to lobby for science-based regulatory 
action. In doing so, they are engaging in the science-law co-production of an incipient 
body of shared transnational climate change case law in the post-Paris era. This dynamic 
is illustrated in further detail below in Parts III and IV. 
 
Secondly, by repeatedly invoking and applying science in litigation around the world, 
NGOs are contributing to the transformation of both climate science and climate law. 
Although conventionally used to describe mainly domestic or intergovernmental 
scientific bodies like the IPCC, the concept of ‘boundary organisation’39 has been 
expanded to include “institutional attempts to govern expertise, stabilise differences and 
assign responsibilities.”40 It therefore has pertinent applications in relation to the range 
of knowledge-based lobbying and advocacy activities carried out by ENGO networks 
and their litigious efforts to hold governments and corporations accountable. Like the 
IPCC, ENGOs are also increasingly functioning as boundary or ‘hybrid management’ 
 
39 David H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction” 
(2001) 26 Science, Technology & Human Values 4, 399.  
40 Karin M. Gustafsson & Rolf Lidskog, ‘Boundary organizations and environmental governance: 




organisations41 in climate change governance because they are also deeply involved in 
processes of knowledge vetting, synthesis and dissemination which have the potential 
to influence and shape public policy. Their strategic deployment of IPCC climate 
science in climate litigation (documented in Parts III and IV below) means that they also 
sit alongside the IPCC and domestic courts as co-producers of an emerging transnational 
climate change case law.  
 
Climate litigation elucidates this dynamic as ENGOs now fluidly operate across the 
worlds of science, law and policy. They are also a kind of boundary or ‘hybrid 
management’ organisation as they are mediating and facilitating interactions between 
the climate science community and courts. In what Miller refers to as ‘cross-domain 
orchestration’ that is symptomatic of hybrid management42 previously discussed in 
Chapter Three, ENGOs are transmitting and translating scientific knowledge into legal 
and policy settings. Their strategic fusion of science and law is generating a distinct 
body of hybridised climate change case law. The key products or ‘boundary objects’43 
emerging out of this synthesis include what I call endangerment narratives, new 
arguments on collective and proportional responsibility based on the market share 
theory, the standardised climate change impact or risk assessment and an entirely new 
 
41 In Chapter Two, I outline how Clark Miller’s notion of ‘hybrid management’ expands and updates 
David Guston’s concept of the boundary organisation. Miller’s more expansive and flexible terminology 
is relied upon here as it more apt for describing the range of knowledge activities being carried out by 
climate scientists and NGOs in climate litigation scenarios. Clark Miller, ‘Hybrid Management: 
Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental Governance in the Climate Regime’ (2001) 
26 Science, Technology & Human Values 4, 492. 
42 Ibid, 492. 
43 As discussed in Chapter Two, Star and Griesemer employ the term boundary objects to refer to 
“relatively stable and reproducible things, people, projects, texts, maps, and ideas that facilitate 
articulation between different actors and social worlds” and satisfy the informational requirements of 
each of them. These boundary objects often flow through allied knowledge networks between scientists 
and non-scientists. Susan Leigh Star & James R. Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and 
Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology’ (1989) 19 




genre of climate litigation which I term the future generation lawsuit. These are 
constitutive components of an incipient shared transnational climate change 
jurisprudence. NGO-driven climate litigation therefore aptly showcases the ways in 
which climate science and law have become mutually constitutive and reinforcing.  
 
The framing power of NGOs  
The role of NGOs in international climate change negotiations is well-documented. 
ENGO efforts at early UNFCCC COPs indicate that the use of expert evidence, 
including climate science, to shape both public and international political discourse on 
climate change is indeed a long-standing and well-established practice among ENGOs 
and global civil society. This ‘framing power’ of NGOs in global climate politics 
partially explains the inclusion of a provision on loss and damage in the Paris 
Agreement.44 I argue that over the past decade NGOs have adopted and fine-tuned a 
strategy of using technoscientific framings of climate change in a novel, and more 
contextualised way than before. This ‘framing power’ lies at the heart of their co-
productive contributions to climate litigation and the development of a new body of 
transnational climate change case law. 
 
While mobilising a technoscientific framing of climate change derailed earlier NGO 
efforts to influence outcomes at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and subsequent COPs 
like Copenhagen, Allan and Hadden contend that NGOs expanded their influence and 
made significant gains in the lead up to COP-21 in Paris because they had shifted the 
discursive terrain on climate change more explicitly towards a ‘justice framing.’45 The 
 
44 J.I.Allan et al., n7, 600; Michael Jacobs, ‘High pressure for low emissions: How civil society created 
the Paris climate agreement’ (2016) 22 Juncture 4, 600.  
45 M.Jacobs, Ibid, 606.  
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proliferation of NGO-driven climate justice framings after COP-15 in Copenhagen 
proved essential for the mobilisation of global public opinion and sympathy in favour 
of climate action. Allan and Hadden argue that the ‘justice framing’ of climate change 
superseded previous technoscientific framings of the problem.  
 
While true for its time, I argue that the binary between ‘justice’ and ‘technoscientific’ 
framings of climate change appears increasingly superficial and dated in contemporary 
climate politics in light of the rapidly changing role and influence of civil society. 
Rather, recent waves of climate litigation strongly indicate that these two seemingly 
disparate and oppositional framings of climate change have become deeply enmeshed, 
with NGOs using both in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner before 
courts, as will be discussed below in Parts III and IV. In addition to lobbying 
governments in international climate negotiations, NGOs also engage in research, 
advocacy and outreach46 and are increasingly resorting to adversarial tactics such as 
litigation to hold governments and corporations accountable for climate change in 
accordance with their commitments under the Paris Agreement. Knowledge production 
and litigation have become important frontline tactics in the long-term NGO strategy 
with respect to climate action in the last decade, as exemplified by landmark climate 
litigation in Urgenda v The Netherlands and Juliana v USA. The sum of these processes 




46 Michelle M. Betsill & Elisabeth Correll, NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations (MIT Press 2008) 2. 
47 M.Jacobs, n44, 322. 
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The contribution of NGO networks to climate change advocacy and litigation have been 
fourfold. Firstly, by resorting to the language of rights, NGOs have cast a spotlight on 
climate change not only as a scientifically-proven phenomenon as per the work of the 
IPCC, but also fundamentally an issue of global inequity and social justice.48 In doing 
so, they have laid the groundwork for explicitly linking ‘so-called social struggles with 
those we call ecological.’49 Their lobbying efforts in the post-Copenhagen era have 
served to ensure that climate change has achieved a stranglehold on the public 
imagination as a problem inextricably bound up with questions of inequality, 
development, poverty, justice and rights.  
 
Secondly, NGOs like Greenpeace and Bill McKibben’s 350.org as well as NGO 
coalitions like the Climate Action Network (CAN) have been instrumental to the work 
of the IPCC as expert advisers and ‘provide the legitimacy of inclusiveness needed for 
the epistemic coalition to have sufficient authority.’50 They do so by bringing together 
climate scientists through the commissioning of expert reports and employing scientific 
methods and arguments to convey their message.51  
 
Thirdly, an important contribution of NGOs to epistemic processes on climate change 
has been to encourage debate on the level of precaution that should be adopted in climate 
change regulation.52 Finally, another important contribution lies in their ability to 
produce narratives about climate change by creatively interweaving and combining 
technoscientific, justice and rights-based arguments and framings and effectively 
 
48 J.Iris Allan et al., n7, 601. 
49 Bruno Latour, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime (Polity Press 2018) 82. 
50 Clair Gough & Simon Shackley, ‘The respectable politics of climate change: the epistemic 
communities and NGOs’ (2001) 2 International Affairs 77, 332. 
51 Ibid, 338. 
52 Ibid, 339. 
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mobilising them before courts. This has manifested in the form of novel arguments about 
collective and proportional responsibility and the framing of climate change as an 
emergency. I accordingly contend that in the post-Paris era, NGO-driven climate 
litigation represents a continuation and logical apotheosis of earlier global lobbying and 
advocacy efforts. These co-productive contributions of NGOs to climate litigation and 
the development of an emergent transnational body of climate change case law are 
documented in detail below in Parts III and IV. 
 
III. Structurally Convergent or Similar Claims 
 
In this section, I employ Waldron’s concept of ius gentium outlined in Chapter Five to 
argue that structurally similar climate change lawsuits around the world and growing 
cross-citational practices therein are constitutive of an emergent transnational case law 
on climate change. Litigants’ claims are generally built on a similar foundation, 
comprising the strategic mobilisation and application of universal climate science (e.g. 
IPCC assessments) and similar or even identical patterns of science-driven legal 
argumentation. Constitutive features of this new transnational climate change case law 
include endangerment narratives, administrative claims involving challenges to 
environmental impact assessments (EIAs), rights-based claims and public trust claims. 
In this section, I specifically map parallel developments in climate change lawsuits 
around the world, which exemplify structural likeness or convergence in legal 






A. Science-based endangerment narratives  
The contemporary realities of climate litigation seriously challenge preconceptions 
about a rigid dichotomy or opposition between technoscientific framings of climate 
change on the one hand and human rights and justice framings. Closer examination of 
climate change lawsuits reveals that all these framings are increasingly synthesised and 
used by claimants in complementary ways. NGOs and individual claimants have given 
technoscientific framings of climate change renewed emphasis through the recurrent 
invocation and use of IPCC assessments and event attribution studies to construct and 
put forward rights-based endangerment narratives before courts.  
 
Recurrent application of IPCC assessments and carbon budget framework  
As discussed in Chapter Five, IPCC assessments, particularly the 2014 Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5), constitute the foundational evidentiary glue of several high-profile, 
public interest climate change lawsuits since 2015 due to their near-universal acceptance 
as an authoritative synthesis of global climate science. Given both its universality and 
its exposition of climate change as a global phenomenon, AR5 is proving to be a highly 
enabling epistemic resource for transnational litigant networks. It allows them to frame 
climate change as a series of transboundary harms and therefore concurrently litigate 
the problem across multiple jurisdictions. This prospect is reinforced by states’ universal 
membership of the Paris Agreement. Indeed, the post-Paris era has been marked by a 
growing wave of climate change lawsuits against both governments and corporations, 
which seek to hold these actors accountable for climate-related harms projected to result 




The year 2015 marked a new phase in transnational climate litigation with the watershed 
NGO lawsuit Urgenda v The Netherlands. The ENGO Urgenda popularised the use of 
IPCC science in climate litigation and encouraged the strategic merging of scientific and 
rights-based framings of climate change to mount a robust legal challenge to 
government inaction. Urgenda asserted that the GHG emissions of the Dutch 
government are contributing to dangerous climate change and are unlawful since they 
constitute a violation of the latter’s duty of care pursuant to Article 6:162 of the Dutch 
Civil Code (DCC) and Articles 2 (the right to life) and 8 (the right to respect for private 
and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).53 To establish 
that the Dutch government owed a duty of care to prevent dangerous climate change and 
reduce its GHG emissions to 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020, “so as to prevent the 
violation of the rights and freedoms of as laid down in Article 2 and 8 ECHR,”54 
Urgenda relied on IPCC assessments to construct a broader narrative of endangerment. 
Urgenda contended that the danger of climate change is apparent as confirmed by the 
IPCC and international community’s consensual conclusion that a 2C rise in global 
temperatures would constitute ‘dangerous’ anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.55 Joining the international consensus, the Netherlands had also previously 
acknowledged that exceeding a 2C threshold would be dangerous.  
 
On the likelihood of that danger manifesting if the 2C threshold is exceeded, Urgenda 
submitted that the IPCC and other scientific institutions like the International Energy 
Agency agree with 95% confidence that the level of the danger would be very great in 
 
53 Stichting Urgenda v. Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment), ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145, Rechtbank Den Haag, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 - 
Summons, 103-104, at [363]-[364].  
54 Ibid, 74, at [233].  
55 Ibid, 104, at [367]; See IPCC, ‘Fifth Assessment Report (AR5): The Physical Science Basis’ (2013) 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/> accessed 15 November 2015.  
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the absence of more ambitious climate abatement policies.56 Urgenda further submitted 
a substantial list of catastrophic climate change impacts documented by the IPCC.57 
Within this submission, it also listed specific climate impacts contributing to a general 
state of endangerment in Europe and the Netherlands such as “glacial melt, longer 
growing seasons and a shift in natural habitats, extreme weather events, and increased 
water stress due to disparities between wet and dry periods.”58  
 
Based on an aggregation of national and regional scientific data and IPCC findings, 
Urgenda argued that there is sufficient scientific evidence to conclude that there is a 
causal relationship between anthropogenic emissions and climate change, including 
atmospheric and oceanic warming.59 Secondly, it stated that the consequences of such 
warming and climate change are overwhelmingly negative and threatening as attested 
by Part I of AR5 on the physical science basis of climate change.60 Finally, Urgenda 
concluded its endangerment narrative by suggesting that, based on current global and 
national policies on climate change, the world is hurtling towards 4C or more of 
warming by 2100 (i.e. an unacceptable level of danger or risk).61 The unabated GHG 
emissions of the Netherlands (one of the highest per capita) are unlawful and 
contributing to dangerous climate change.62 No one country is individually responsible 
for causing climate change, meaning that the ‘but for’ test of causation cannot be 
satisfied.63 However, Urgenda argued that every country including the Netherlands has 
 
56 Urgenda, n53, Summons, 38.  
57 Ibid, 38-39.  
58 Ibid, 3, 39. 
59 Ibid, 42. 
60 Ibid, 43. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid, 100-102.  
63 RHJ Cox, ‘The Liability of European States for Climate Change’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of 
International Law 78, 133. 
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contributed a percentage share to the global stock of GHG emissions and the 
Netherlands is therefore severally or proportionally liable to adopt preventive measures 
to avoid dangerous climate change.64  
 
Urgenda’s strategic fusion of technoscientific and rights-based framings of climate 
change proved successful in the appeal proceedings. The Hague Court of Appeal (COA) 
and Dutch Supreme Court both accepted Urgenda’s contention based on IPCC climate 
science that the Dutch government owed a duty of care pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 of 
the ECHR to “counter the genuine threat of dangerous climate change,”65 which it had 
violated by failing to adopt more ambitious mitigation targets and allowing GHG 
emissions to continue unabated within its territory. With respect to Urgenda’s claims 
pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, the COA held that Urgenda was entitled to bring a 
public interest claim on behalf of Dutch citizens “who fall under the State’s jurisdiction 
[to] invoke Articles 2 and 8 ECHR in court, which have direct effect,” and that 
Urgenda’s “ground of appeal in cross-appeal is therefore well-founded,”66 since 
Urgenda itself had “sufficient interest in this claim.”67  
 
The COA ruled that the Dutch state has a positive obligation “to protect the lives of 
citizens within its jurisdiction under Article 2 ECHR” and under Article 8 ECHR “to 
protect the right to home and private life,”68 which applies to all activities that would 
endanger such rights including industrial activities.69 Taking judicial notice of IPCC 
 
64 Urgenda, n53, Summons, 44. 
65 Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) v Stichting 
Urgenda, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610, The Hague Court of Appeal (COA), at [34]-[38], [45]; 
Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) v Stichting Urgenda, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, at [5.6.2].  
66 Urgenda II, Ibid, at [36].  
67 Ibid, at [38].  




AR5, particularly on the risks of reaching climate tipping points and the catastrophic 
impacts of a temperature rise between 1 to 2°C, the COA opined that, “it follows from 
Articles 2 and 8 ECHR that the state has a duty to protect against this real threat” of 
dangerous climate change.70 
 
Recognising that “climate change affects human rights,”71 the Dutch Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the COA with respect to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR and further 
opined that, in giving substance to these articles, “one must take into account broadly 
supported scientific insights” (emphasis added).72 The court then considered IPCC AR4 
and, in line with this assessment, the vast support that exists in the global scientific, 
policy and legal communities for the necessity of reducing emissions by 25-40% below 
1990 levels by 2020.73 Notably, the court held that the Dutch state’s obligation towards 
its own citizens pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR to counter the threat of dangerous 
climate change is preventive in nature and encompasses both mitigation and adaptation 
measures.74  
 
Urgenda’s argumentative approach, particularly with respect to challenging suboptimal 
emissions reduction targets, has been emulated by claimants in many subsequent climate 
change lawsuits both within and beyond Europe. Notable post-Urgenda lawsuits which 
also use AR5 as an evidentiary foundation include Saul Luciano Lliuya v RWE, In re 
Greenpeace Southeast Asia & Ors, Juliana et al v USA, and Thomson v Minister for 
Climate Change. Directly taking a leaf out of Urgenda’s playbook, the claimant in the 
 
70 Urgenda II, n65, at [44]-[45]. 
71 Urgenda III, n65, at [5.7.9].  
72 Ibid, 5, at [6.1]-[7.3.6].  
73 Ibid, 5.  
74 Ibid, at [5.3.2].  
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2015 New Zealand case of Thomson argued that the Climate Change Response Act 
compels the Minister for Climate Change to prescribe a more ambitious GHG emissions 
reduction target for 2050 directly in line with AR5 and periodically review and revise 
this target following the release of every new IPCC assessment.75  
 
The claimant’s endangerment narrative is also nearly identical to Urgenda’s and relies 
on the same key findings from AR5 on the anthropogenic basis and impacts of 
atmospheric and oceanic warming, ice-melt and sea level rise.76 Like Urgenda, the 
claimant also emphasised New Zealand’s high per capita contribution to climate change 
as a developed country emitter and its responsibility to reduce GHG emissions 
drastically by setting a more ambitious 2050 mitigation target in accordance with AR5 
and its INDCs under the Paris Agreement.77 In Canada, the ENGO ENVironnement 
JEUnesse has adopted the same approach to challenge the Canadian government’s 2050 
mitigation targets in the Quebec Superior Court. The claimant has used the same 
findings from AR5 to frame Canadian endangerment as a public health emergency due 
to increased extreme heatwaves in recent years which have precipitated a spike in 
hospitalisations.78  
 
In Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport, the NGO claimant did not directly 
invoke AR5, but argued in nearly identical terms to the claimants in Urgenda, Thomson 
and ENVironnement JEUnesse that under UK Climate Change Act, the Transport 
 
75 Sarah Thomson v Minister for Climate Change ‘Statement of Claim’ (2015) 
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2015/20151110_2017-NZHC-733_complaint-1.pdf> 7, paras [72]-[77], accessed 22 May 
2018.  
76 Ibid, at [15]-[54].  
77 Thomson, n64, at [71]-[87].  
78  ENVironnement JEUnesse v Attorney General of Canada, ‘Statement of Claim’ (2018) < 
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2018/20181126_500-06_application-2.pdf > at [2.18]-[2.22], accessed 24 May 2018.  
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Secretary was obliged to review and revise the UK’s 2050 mitigation target in line with 
“significant developments in scientific knowledge about climate change.”79 This can 
arguably be read as an implicit reference to AR5 and national equivalents.  
 
 In Lliuya v RWE, another the NGO lawsuit, the claimant’s case also relies substantially 
on AR5 and climate science studies that have concretely documented specific climate 
change impacts such as glacial melt in the Peruvian Andes.80 The IPCC has exhibited 
“a very high degree of confidence” in climate change-induced glacial retreat in the 
Andes.81 Relying on AR5, the claimant alleges that RWE’s emitting activities have 
caused major climate change impacts such as glacial melt likely to result in the flooding 
of the Palcacocha glacial lake, which have placed Lliuya’s home and village at high risk 
from floodwaves.82 Finally, in a series of climate change lawsuits filed by municipal 
governments in California against fossil fuel corporations, claimants have crafted 
endangerment narratives based on a combination of IPCC, national and subnational 
scientific assessments. In similar terms to the claimants in the cases discussed above, 
the claimants in the City of Oakland v BP p.l.c reiterated AR5’s findings on 
anthropogenic warming and highlighted that the ‘melting of the West Antarctic ice 




79 Plan B Earth and Others v Secretary of State for Transport, ‘Statement of Claim’ (2018) < 
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2018/20180806_2019-EWHC-1070-Admin_complaint.pdf> 6, at [11], accessed 22 May 
2018.  
80 IPCC AR5, n53. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Saul Luciano Lliuya v RWE (2017) 20171130 Case No-2-O-28515. 
83 City of Oakland v BP p.l.c, ‘Statement of claim,’ (2017) < http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2017/20170919_docket-CGC-17-
561370_complaint.pdf> at [48]-[51], accessed 23 May 2019.  
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As previously discussed in Chapter Five, in a cluster of recent cases, litigants have 
also applied the IPCC ’s carbon budget framework. In Carvalho v EU84 (The People’s 
Climate Case), the claimants (ten families and the Swedish Saami Youth Association) 
have also heavily relied on AR5 to frame their arguments. The case is a pertinent 
illustration of climate litigants’ creative synthesis of AR5, the SR15 carbon budget 
approach and the Paris Agreement. This has led to the case being described as “a 
laboratory for examining the interface of climate science, law and economics.”85 The 
claimants have argued that the EU regime on mitigation – comprising ETS Directive 
2018/410, the Climate Action Regulation and the LULUCF Regulation (‘the GHG 
Emissions Acts’), which set an overall reduction target of 40% below 1990 levels by 
2030 – leaves a remaining and permissible emissions budget of 60% of emissions at 
1990 levels to 2030 (or 3392 Mt CO2 eq), which is still far too high and is likely to 
adversely impact their livelihoods.86    
 
The claimants argue that this remaining budget exceeds what is required under higher-
ranking law, namely human rights law (The EU Charter Fundamental Rights) and 
international law (The Paris Agreement).87 They have accordingly sought to have the 
existing mitigation provisions of the GHG Emissions Acts nullified or, alternatively, an 
injunction to compel the EU to revise its mitigation provisions in line with higher-
ranking law and thereby adopt more ambitious mitigation targets.88 The claimants rely 
more generally on AR5 to sketch an extensive list of impacts likely to be experienced 
 
84 Carvalho, n26. 
85 Gerd Winter, ‘Armando Carvalho and Others v EU: Invoking Human Rights and the Paris 
Agreement for Better Climate Protection Legislation’ (2020) 9 Transnational Environmental Law 1, 
137.  
86 Carvalho, n26, at [2]-[3].  
87 Ibid, at [3].  
88 Ibid, at [3], [8].  
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as a result of climate change and global temperature rise, including inter alia disrupted 
livelihoods from sea-level rise, coastal flooding, extreme weather events, extreme heat, 
food insecurity, and the loss of marine and coastal ecosystems and biodiversity.89 They 
have also relied on AR5 to document a list of specific climate change impacts likely to 
be experienced by them including, for example, the loss of agricultural livelihoods for 
the Carvalho family due to deforestation and adverse impacts on reindeer herding and 
food security for the Saami claimants.90 Notably, the claimants have derived their 
calculation of the remaining GHG emissions budget for the EU through their application 
of the carbon budget approach prescribed in SR15 and outlined in Chapter Five.91  The 
claimants note that the IPCC’s carbon budget is overly generous and allows for 
excessive emissions92 and argue for a higher level of ambition for EU climate change 
mitigation.  
 
Applying SR15’s carbon budget framework, the claimants have calculated the EU’s 
emissions budgets per capita, as a share of the overall global carbon budget. 93  Using a 
lower-end temporal baseline of 2021, the claimants have estimated that the EU’s 
remaining emissions budget is 7.46 years, which they predict will be consumed before 
2030.94 The claimants have provided a range for when available EU emissions budgets 
may be exhausted: 
 
The 2°C budget is exhausted in 2027 (or 2034 or 2041, 
respectively) if emissions remain constant after 2020, and 
exhausted in 2034 (or 2048 or 2061, respectively) where linear 
emissions reductions are made. The 1.5°C budget is exhausted 
 
89 Carvalho, n26, at [14]-[42].  
90 Ibid, at [46]-[49]; [83]-[86].  
91 Ibid, at [259]-[263], [275]-[284].  
92 Ibid, at [263].  
93 Ibid, at [259]-[271].  
94 Ibid, at [281].  
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in 2024 (or 2023 or 2024, respectively) if emissions remain 
constant after 2020, and exhausted in 2027 (or 2026 or 2028, 
respectively), where linear emissions reductions are made.95 
    
By using the IPCC’s carbon budget framework to generate these projections of the EU’s 
remaining carbon budgets, the claimants have sounded the alarm and raised global 
awareness about the inadequacy of the EU’s mitigation targets and the fact that rapid 
and deep cuts to EU GHG emissions (an 80% reduction as per a 2°C warming scenario96) 
are urgently required. In addition, they have applied the prevention principle to require 
that the EU spend its remaining carbon budget in a linearly regressive manner.97  
 
The claimants in the US case, WildEarth Guardians v Bernhardt et al98, have also 
applied the IPCC carbon budget framework, which is an important pillar of the 
evidentiary basis for their claims. The litigants, which comprise several citizen groups, 
have brought action against a US government agency, the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM), to challenge its approval of 2067 oil and gas leases across the United States.99 
The claimants allege that by failing to consider the “direct, indirect, and cumulative 
impacts of oil and gas leasing on our climate,” and failing to prepare an environmental 
impact statement before approving 23 leasing authorisation, BLM is in breach of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).100 The claimants observe that US federal 
fossil fuel resources contain enough recoverable coal, oil and gas, that if exploited and 
burned, would result in 492 GtCO2, thereby surpassing the entire global carbon budget 
 
95 Carvalho, n26, at [281]- [282].  
96 Ibid, at [286].  
97 G.Winter, n85, 163.  
98 WildEarth Guardians and Physicians for Social Responsibility v Bernhardt et al, No.s 19-cv-
001920-RBJ (D.Colo. 11/08/2019).  
99 Ibid, at [1].  
100 Ibid, at [1], [7], [150].  
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for 1.5°C and nearly eclipsing the 2°C target.101 Federal fossil fuels comprise 91% of 
these potential emissions, with already leased federal fossil fuels accounting for 
approximately 43 GtCO2, which has expended almost all of the US’ remaining carbon 
budget.102  
 
Based on these carbon budget calculations, the claimants argue that any new leasing of 
federal fossil fuel resources is inconsistent with a carbon budget that seeks to avoid 
catastrophic climate change.103 The claimants also argue that if BLM ceased its leasing 
and renewal of existing leases of US oil and gas resources, the US could reduce annual 
CO2 emissions by approximately 100 Mt by 2030.104 The claimants are accordingly 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BLM to prevent new leasing, 
exploitation and combustion of US fossil fuel resources.105  
 
The US claimants’ utilisation of the IPCC carbon budget approach in a manner 
analogous to the European claimants in Carvalho again illustrates that US climate 
litigation is consonant with and not disconnected from transnational climate litigation 
trends, as argued in Chapter Four. Both cases are also a fitting example of the kind of 
science-law co-production that climate litigants now typically engage in. In particular, 
they highlight the way in which the IPCC’s carbon budget framework and the Paris 
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There are also a handful of climate change lawsuits which do not directly rely on IPCC 
assessments such as AR5, but are nonetheless noteworthy for their replication of 
Urgenda’s advocacy strategy and argumentative approach in relation to the use of 
climate science. In these cases, claimants typically employ national analogues or 
substitutes for IPCC assessments. For example, in the United States – a jurisdiction in 
which there is greater resistance to the use of foreign materials in some courts106 – 
claimants have relied on national and subnational climate science assessments. Shortly 
after Urgenda, in September 2016 the ENGO Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) filed 
a federal civil suit in the US against ExxonMobil for water pollution and climate change 
damage in New England.  
 
At first glance, the US may appear sui generis and insular as a jurisdiction. However, 
on closer inspection, the degree of separation between the US and other jurisdictions in 
relation to climate litigation is skin-deep, since like the claimants in the cases discussed 
above, CLF also relied extensively on climate science, namely the Third National 
Assessment (TNA) and the Massachusetts Climate Adaptation Report (MCAR) which 
adopts the IPCC’s findings. CLF mobilised this IPCC-inflected technoscientific framing 
of climate change to argue that ExxonMobil’s operations in New England have 
substantially contributed to climate change-induced sea level rise thereby endangering 
the health and wellbeing of New England residents.107 CLF relied on the MCAR to argue 
that Massachusetts residents are at significant risk from climate impacts that are 
projected to result from ExxonMobil’s unabated GHG emissions. These include further 
sea level rise, coastal flooding, extreme precipitation events which will increase the 
 
106 J.Waldron, n8. 
107 Conservation Law Foundation v ExxonMobil Corp (2016) 1:16-cv-11950 (Complaint) 
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-
documents/2016/20160929_docket-116-cv-11950_complaint-1.pdf> accessed 27 February 2019, 21-22. 
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height of storm surges, shoreline erosion, destruction of vital coastal infrastructure 
including flood defences and ultimately the loss of vast tracts of habitable coastal 
land.108  
 
These cases exemplify how the universally authoritative status of climate science is 
encouraging and enabling litigants to put forward almost identical or analogous 
endangerment narratives in courts around the world. Notwithstanding the contingent 
national circumstances and differences in legal systems, cultures and areas of law, IPCC 
assessments such as AR5 and increasingly SR15’s carbon budget framework, are 
transnational common denominators which have emboldened litigants to lobby for 
convergent interpretations of states’ legal obligations on climate change mitigation (e.g. 
in accordance with the requirement of higher ambition under the Paris Agreement), 
adaptation and human rights protection in the face of adverse climate impacts.  
 
The growth of event attribution science   
Science-law co-production is also visible in relation to attribution science on extreme 
weather events, which is increasingly being used by climate litigants to frame and 
advance endangerment narratives before courts with the aim of satisfying causation 
requirements. There have been many recent signs indicating that the causation limbo in 
climate change cases is gradually being dismantled and causal evidentiary difficulties 
will no longer be insurmountable obstacles for claimants. IPCC AR5, the IPCC 
scientific consensus, and the growing body of climate change research on attribution in 
recent years have arguably shifted the dynamics of proof towards the possibility of 
successfully attributing liability for specific climate change impacts and quantifying the 
 
108 Conservation Law Foundation, n107, 23-29.  
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historical contributions of major carbon producers. Richard Heede’s Carbon Majors 
Study is the best-known example of this new wave of climate change research and is 
notable for its quantification of the cumulative emissions of 90 of the world’s largest 
carbon producers from 1854-2010.109 The study calculates and ascribes a percentage 
figure to each individual emitter or ‘Carbon Major Entity’ (CME) to mark their 
proportionate contribution to global anthropogenic GHG emissions.110 It ultimately 
concludes that the aggregate emissions of CMEs constitute approximately two-thirds 
(63%) of all global anthropogenic GHG emissions. Crucially, the study also concludes 
that the 90 CMEs released more than half of their total contribution of emissions after 
1988, which suggests that the roots of the problem are easier to trace and more recent.111  
 
Many commentators have hailed the Carbon Majors study as “a turning point in the 
debate about apportioning responsibility for climate change” and have praised it as the 
“first study of its kind to [identify] a discrete class of defendants” in climate change 
litigation.112 The Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW) observes that such 
research “removes the previously insurmountable hurdle for grassroots lawyers seeking 
to hold major emitters accountable” and will better enable them to meet the burden of 
causation in legal proceedings.113 Outside the US, there is already an emerging trend in 
private climate litigation that evidences an increased reliance by plaintiffs upon such 
attribution studies. As discussed in Chapter Five, in Lliuya v RWE, a Peruvian farmer 
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filed a damages claim in Germany against RWE in 2015 which was based on a finding 
in the Carbon Majors Study that 0.47% of carbon emissions emitted during the industrial 
era could be traced back to RWE.114 Similarly, in September 2015, the Philippines 
Reconstruction Movement and Greenpeace Southeast Asia filed a petition at the 
Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights on behalf of 13 organisations and 20 
individuals requesting that the Commission exercise its investigative powers to examine 
the role of Carbon Majors in causing climate change and ocean acidification.115 A 
lawyer for Greenpeace’s Global Climate Justice and Liability Project in Toronto 
Canada, Kristin Casper, confirmed that the Carbon Majors study was “one of the 
bedrock pieces of science research that helped form our campaign.”116  
 
It is also becoming increasingly possible to identify specific categories of climate harms 
that are typically being experienced by particular groups and local communities. 
Existing climate science documents sub-regional impacts, such as coastal erosion and 
sea-level rise in many parts of the US, particularly South-Eastern states like 
Louisiana.117 The IPCC has also stated with high confidence that polar regions will be 
some of the worst affected, since rising temperatures are causing rapid sea-ice and 
permafrost melt.118 The Arctic is changing at an alarming rate, with recent scientific data 
indicating record low levels of ice cover and unusually high temperatures.119 NASA 
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climate scientists have labelled this trend “Arctic greening.”120 Both organisations have 
also identified Alaska as being susceptible to this trend and as a high-risk state that is 
already being profoundly affected by climate change. The American legal context attests 
to the credibility of these scientific findings, as coastal communities from Louisiana and 
Alaskan Inuit peoples have already appeared as plaintiffs in high profile climate change 
lawsuits and are likely to be repeat players in future litigation as climate change impacts 
intensify.  
 
The Carbon Majors Study is only a starting point in climate attribution research. Climate 
scientists are already beginning to observe and declare the existence of “human 
fingerprints” on single extreme climatic events such as droughts, heatwaves, and floods 
based on a series of new studies on planetary waves. Renowned climate scientist and 
author of a leading study on planetary waves, Michael Mann, observes that “human 
activity has been suspected of contributing to this pattern of activity before, but now we 
uncover a clear human fingerprint of human activity.”121 NASA attribution studies are 
also in a growth phase and have so far calculated the likelihood of the occurrence of 
extreme climatic events as a result of warming. For example, such studies have shown 
that a heatwave in South Australia in 2009 was made twice as likely and floods in the 
Northern UK in 2015 were made 40% more likely due to anthropogenic climate 
change.122 It is highly likely that future IPCC assessment cycles will be devoted to the 
aggregation, vetting, and synthesis of event attribution science and unearth more 
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detailed data about specific climate change impacts and single extreme climatic events, 
all of which will better enable plaintiffs to satisfy causation requirements and assist 
courts in holding major emitters accountable.  
 
Event attribution science or Probabilistic Event Attribution (PEA) is an emerging branch 
of climate science concerned with assessing and quantifying the extent to which extreme 
weather events can be linked to past anthropogenic GHG emissions, also known as 
‘attributable risk.’123 It has been recognised as a vital repository of evidence and 
information for legal regimes surrounding loss and damage and civil liability (i.e. 
climate tort) litigation.124   
 
Mobilising attribution science: The Market Share Theory 
Further preliminary evidence of the development of shared litigation strategies by NGOs 
in response to the growing body of scientific evidence on climate change can be found 
in their application of the ‘market share theory’125 to overcome the collective nature of 
causal data in climate science. In most recent litigation against large fossil fuel 
companies, the absence of tailored scientific analyses attributing damages to specific 
parties have led plaintiffs to typically apply the market share theory based on Heede’s 
Carbon Majors study. This posits that the costs a company is liable to pay roughly 
corresponds to their proportionate contribution to cumulative global carbon-dioxide 
emissions multiplied by the additional damages incurred from climate change 
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impacts.126 As discussed above, claimants in both Urgenda and Lliuya deployed 
arguments about the Netherlands’ and RWE’s proportionate contribution to and 
responsibility for climate change.  Harrington and Otto observe, “this theory relies on 
several testable assumptions, one of which is the inference that attributable climate 
change impacts increase linearly with cumulative carbon emissions.”127 They also note 
that in the lawsuits filed against Carbon Major corporations, calculations of an 
attributable damage estimate for a fossil fuel company would involve their fractional 
contribution towards cumulative global emissions multiplied by the corresponding 
increase in attributable damages over that same time step, with “the sum of all time steps 
then [yielding an] attributable damage estimate for that company.”128 While current 
attribution science has successfully elucidated the historical emission profiles of Carbon 
Major companies, it is not yet known what trajectories (including non-linear ones) 
emergent climate impacts will follow alongside rising cumulative emissions. Harrington 
and Otto observe that the latter will be crucial for assigning responsibility and meeting 
the challenges of climate change adaptation.129 They also summarise PEA’s immediate 
research priorities which are pertinent to climate litigation in the following terms:  
 
Specific research priorities include understanding to what 
extent different types of climate change impacts can deviate 
from the assumption of a linear response to warming, as well 
as whether the qualitative shape of impact profiles is 
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Mobilising attribution science: Framing climate change as an ‘emergency’ 
An emergent strand of the endangerment narrative is the framing of climate change as 
an ‘emergency’ by litigants based on their strategic reliance upon event attribution 
science. In re Greenpeace Southeast Asia & Ors provides the clearest illustration of this 
strategy, with the NGO petitioners mobilising support for their specific framing of 
climate change as a ‘human rights emergency’ from the some of the world’s leading 
climate scientists at the Philippines Human Rights Commission’s New York and 
London hearings in September and November 2018, respectively. Notably, all three 
climate scientists who provided amicus-style testimony during these hearings – James 
Hansen (New York), Brenda Ekwurzel (New York) and Myles Allen (London) –  have 
served as lead authors of IPCC reports and possess substantial expertise on attribution.  
 
Although PEA is still in its infancy, certain statements submitted by these three eminent 
climate scientists in support of the petitioners’ claims at the Philippines Human Rights 
Commission’s hearings appear to add weight to and provide some clarification on the 
above theories and calculations on climate change attribution. Moreover, these scientists 
used their testimonies to raise awareness about the ramifications of extreme weather 
events like hurricanes for social justice and the human rights of Filipino citizens. In 
doing so, they explicitly tethered a scientific framing of climate change to a justice and 
rights-based narrative of wider societal endangerment. James Hansen spoke at length 
about ocean surface temperature rise, ice melt, sea-level rise and amplifying feedbacks 
as well as extreme weather events like hurricanes (also known as cyclones or typhoons). 
In relation to the latter, he identified significant increases in wind intensity and higher 
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storm surges as consistent with anthropogenic forcing.131 He specifically noted that 
rising ocean temperatures provide greater fuel for increased cyclonic activity, including 
tropical thunderstorms and typhoons and that “super typhoon Haiyan had the strongest 
sustained winds over land ever recorded, reaching 195 mph, well over 300 km per 
hour.”132  
 
Brenda Ekwurzel, the Director of Climate Science at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
opined that certain climate change impacts and extreme weather events have more 
clearly identifiable human fingerprints. Noting that “attribution science has advanced to 
now assess the contribution of human-induced climate change to many types of extreme 
events,” she stressed that the strongest attribution evidence exists in relation to 
hurricanes, extreme rainfall from hurricanes, extreme precipitation and high tide 
flooding from storm surges.133 Ekwurzel identified hurricanes Sandy in New York 
(2012) and Harvey in the US Gulf Coast (2017) as incidents with respect to which 
attribution evidence is robust. Attribution studies have revealed that predominantly 
anthropogenically-induced sea-level rise of 20cm during the 20th century led hurricane 
Sandy to cause flooding in an area approximately 70km2 greater than it would have in 
 
131 James Hansen (4th Inquiry hearing in New York for Greenpeace Southeast Asia et al v Carbon 
Majors), ‘Ongoing Global Climate Change and Consequences,’ (2018) 
<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/38pc0ojxoxat0mx/AABYjL-
9akEWUEuauJcB9Ndia/CHR%20Resource%20Persons%20PowerPoint%20Presentations?dl=0&subfold
er_nav_tracking=1> accessed 8 April 2018.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Brenda Ekwurzel, ‘Statement for the Commission on Human Rights Inquiry Hearing’ (2018) 
<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/38pc0ojxoxat0mx/AAAucu6TnYagXvdKlMIzMFlga/Brenda%20Ekwurz
el?dl=0&preview=Exh+EEEEEEE+Brenda+Ekwurzel+Statement.pdf&subfolder_nav_tracking=1> 
accessed 8 April; Brenda Ekwurzel, ‘Presentation for the Republic of the Philippines Commission on 
Human Rights National Enquiry on Climate Change fourth round of public hearings, New York, USA, 
September 27 2018’ (2018) 
<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/38pc0ojxoxat0mx/AAAucu6TnYagXvdKlMIzMFlga/Brenda%20Ekwurz
el?dl=0&preview=Exh+GGGGGGG+Brenda+Ekwurzel+PowerPoint.pptx&subfolder_nav_tracking=1#
> accessed 8 April 2019.  
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1880.134 With respect to hurricane Harvey, another study has shown that anthropogenic 
climate change “made precipitation about 15% more intense, or equivalently made such 
an event 1.5-5 times more likely.”135 Situating super typhoon Haiyan on a continuum 
with these events, Ekwurzel cited another important attribution study comparing Haiyan 
to a late 19th century typhoon in the Philippines which concluded that the former was 
“more intense, had larger maximum wind coverage, and moved faster” and the 
associated “storm surge was about twice the height of the 1897 event in San Pedro 
Bay.”136  
 
Finally, at the 5th hearing in London, Myles Allen, a professor of Geosystem Science at 
Oxford who has contributed extensively to the development of attribution science as a 
field, discussed his contribution as lead author to the IPCC Special Report (2018) and 
focused on an attribution study by Izuro Takabuyo on super typhoon Haiyan which 
“demonstrates how the size and impact of a storm surge from a typhoon might have 
been exacerbated by anthropogenic climate change.”137 With respect to the IPCC 
Special Report (and on the topic of general attribution of climate change to 
anthropogenic GHG emissions), Allen noted that a key finding was that “human-
induced global warming has now reached 1C relative to the period 1850-1900, which 
may be considered approximately representative of pre-industrial 
 
134 B.Ekwurzel, n133; K.G.Miller et al, ‘A geological perspective on sea-level rise and its impacts along 
the US mid-Atlantic coast’ (2013) 1 Earth’s Future 1, 3–18.  
135 B.Ekwurzel, Ibid; G.J. van Oldenborgh et al , ‘Warm US Februaries becoming much more common’ 
(February 2017) <www.worldweatherattribution.org/analyses/u-s-heat-february-2017> accessed 1 June 
2018.  
136 B.Ekwurzel, Ibid; J. L. A Soria et al, ‘Repeat storm surge disasters of Typhoon Haiyan and its 1897 
predecessor in the Philippines’ (2015) Bulletin of American Meteorological Society.  
137 Myles Allen, ‘National inquiry on the impact of climate change on the human rights of the Filipino 
people: Statement of Resource Person Myles Allen,’ (2018) < 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/gx8x4wu9npetpeq/AADm3Enz8mxpmmDmyeHma3ATa/Myles%20Allen




conditions…[meaning] that all observed warming since 1850 can be considered 
anthropogenic, with 80% of that warming due to carbon-dioxide emissions.”138 With 
respect to event attribution (and in alignment with Ekwurzel’s observations), Allen 
remarked that “based on evidence available from current climate models…the 
probabilities of many potentially damaging extreme weather events including heatwaves 
and short-duration extreme precipitation events, increase predictably with rising global 
temperatures.”139 He subsequently relied upon Takabuyo’s attribution study to show that 
super typhoon Haiyan was indeed intensified by anthropogenic warming. Key 
characteristics of such a warming-intensified hurricane include higher storm surges 
which are a primary consequence of higher wind speeds.140 
 
Notably, all three climate scientists assumed a more hybrid role of the activist-scientist 
or scientist-advocate as they emphasised the imperative of urgently addressing the dire 
human rights and social justice implications of these extreme events resulting from 
unabated anthropogenic climate change. Hansen specifically identified three tiers of 
climate injustice, namely intergenerational inequity or injustice inflicted upon young 
people, injustices perpetrated by the global North towards the global South and injustice 
inflicted by humans upon other species.141 Allen considered adverse implications for 
human health and economic growth in the Philippines142 and Ekwurzel commented on 
the moral culpability of the oil industry for misleading the public despite having prior 
 
138 M.Allen, n137, 3; IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’ (SR15) (2018) < 
https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf> accessed 27 June 2019. 
139 M.Allen, Ibid, 3; Izuro Takabuyo et al, ‘Corrigendum: Climate change effects on the worst-case storm 
surge: a case study of Typhoon Haiyan’ (2015) 10 Environ. Res. Lett. 8.  
140 I.Takabuyo et al, Ibid. 
141 J.Hansen, n131.  
142 M.Allen, n137.  
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knowledge about climate change from internal scientific research conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s.143  
 
By merging attribution science with justice and rights-based discourses in this manner, 
all three scientific (or rather trans-scientific) testimonies were largely complementary 
and harmonious with one another. They were also pivotal to the petitioners’ case since 
they were used to complement and corroborate the personal testimonies provided during 
the hearings by several Filipino citizens in relation to their experiences surrounding 
super typhoon Haiyan. For example, one of the typhoon survivors and community 
witnesses Marielle Bacason, a London-based Filipino nurse, recollected her experience 
of the typhoon and its ramifying social impacts. These comprised forced migration (a 
recognisable adaptation response to such extreme climatic events), being pushed into 
survival mode, experiencing severe trauma as a result of losing her home and family 
members and living in perpetual fear of being attacked and sexually assaulted.144 In a 
telling statement that sheds light on the extent to which climate change may have 
affected the typhoon’s intensity, Bacason noted that “growing up I thought the strongest 
typhoon was signal number 3. In my lifetime, I was able to experience signal number 
5.”145 Furthermore, in their closing statement for the hearings, the NGO coalition 
representing the petitioners was unequivocal about the power of event attribution 
science as an explanatory, enabling and legitimating force for their social justice and 
rights-based claims:  
 
 
143 B.Ekwurzel, n133.  
144 Marielle Trixie J.Bacason, ‘Statement at 5th Inquiry Hearing in London’ (2018) < 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/gx8x4wu9npetpeq/AAA7HM64jGQtWnfOj5VK6PGWa/Community%20
Witnesses%20Statements?dl=0&preview=Exh+NNNNNNN+Statement+of+Marielle+Bacason.pdf&subf
older_nav_tracking=1> accessed 15 April 2019, 3. 
145 Ibid, 6. 
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With event attribution science, we can now detect the human 
fingerprint of climate change on these events. It is becoming 
clearer that what we once called “natural” disasters are 
anything but natural. Why is this important to us? Well better 
science means more communities and individuals like those 
we have heard can better understand and prove the human 
rights harms they experienced and are experiencing in their 
day-to-day lives are connected to climate impacts.146  
 
 
These hearings and trans-scientific testimonies also have wider resonance for 
transnational climate litigation writ large. Not only do they reflect an emerging global 
scientific consensus on event attribution with respect to extreme weather events like 
hurricanes and typhoons. They also foreground the pivotal importance of attribution 
science for legal inquiries on loss, damage and climate responsibility that are typically 
enlivened and pursued by affected parties or victims (most often through NGOs) in 
direct response to such extreme events. Thus, attribution science is concurrently 
developing alongside and has become inextricably intertwined with social justice and 
rights-based NGO advocacy and litigation and forms the epistemic crux of the 
endangerment narratives put forward by climate change victims.  
 
Contrary to scholarly and popular assumptions that COP-21 ushered in a definitive move 
away from scientific framings of climate change towards justice and rights-based 
framings, these climate change cases reveal that scientific framings of climate change 
are alive and well and routinely being used to reinforce the former. Whether they are 
IPCC assessments, national scientific assessments or attribution studies, scientific 
framings of climate change have taken on increased significance and relevance in 
 
146 In re Greenpeace et al, ‘Closing Statement for the Petitioners’ (2018) 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/Closing%20Statement%20(CHR)_footnotes.pd
f> accessed 16 April 2019. 
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climate litigation and very much remain in wide circulation and usage. Far from 
obsolete, they continue to serve as the conceptual and discursive foundation of litigants’ 
case theories and claims before courts around the world and foster the development of 
a cohesive new body of transnational legal practice on climate change.  
 
B. Administrative lawsuits and the standardisation of climate impact assessments 
Administrative lawsuits are understood here as public interest lawsuits filed by citizens 
or NGOs against governments for conduct that may be in violation of legislative 
requirements such as those pertaining to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).147 
Administrative lawsuits in the post-Paris era aptly showcase the range of creative 
argumentation and case theories employed by NGOs and civil society organisations 
through their amalgamation of climate science and environmental law. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, Massachusetts v EPA constitutes one of the earliest examples of 
administrative climate litigation which resulted in ‘expertise forcing,’ obliging 
government agencies like the EPA to consider up-to-date scientific evidence in decision-
making in relation to GHG emissions and climate change. Following Massachusetts, 
administrative climate change lawsuits have proliferated both within and outside the 
United States, with notable examples in other common law countries like the UK, 
Australia and South Africa. A key factor might be that most major climate science 
studies and leading climate scientists steering the work of the IPCC are from the US, 
UK and Australia, which are the major metropolitan sites of knowledge production on 
climate change.  
 
 
147 See Brian J. Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation (Part 2)’ (2011) 2 Climate Change Law Review 
244, 247, 250-251.  
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These administrative lawsuits exemplify a high level of structural convergence and 
overlap across common law jurisdictions in terms of both legal practice and adjudication 
on climate change. These lawsuits have involved challenges to fossil fuel-related 
development projects (e.g. new coalmines, power plants etc.) or national climate change 
policies and mitigation targets. This is most apparent in the UK, Australia and South 
Africa which also possess similar mechanisms for administrative or judicial review 
under their administrative law regimes.148 In these countries, NGOs and civil society 
organisations have filed several claims against central or state governments, seeking 
administrative or judicial review for administrative errors or unlawful conduct in 
relation to climate change. Such claims typically allege: i) misapplication of the law 
(error of law); ii) unreasonable conduct such as the failure to consider relevant factors 
in a decision-making process (error of fact) and; iii) procedural impropriety including 
non-compliance with a statutory procedure such as an EIA.149  
 
With respect to the third category of legal claims – deficient EIAs – litigants have 
repeatedly emphasised the pivotal importance of IPCC assessments and climate science, 
particularly since 2015. Civil society and ENGO claimants have argued that 
governmental consent for proposed fossil fuel development projects ought to be refused 
because GHG emissions from these projects would negatively impact upon measures to 
limit dangerous anthropogenic climate change.150 In the Australian case, Gloucester 
 
148 Australia also possesses a unique system of administrative review known as merits review. Under 
Australian federal law, as well as New South Wales state law, merits review is the process by which 
‘a person or body other than the original decision-maker reconsiders the facts, law and policy aspects 
of the original decision and determines what is the correct and preferable decision.’ This is often 
described as ‘stepping into the shoes’ of the original decision-maker. Merits review can be undertaken 
by a tribunal or judge. Australian Review Council: Australian Government, ‘What is merits review?’ 
(2020) <https://www.meritprotectioncommission.gov.au/information-about-administrative-
review/what-merits-review> accessed 10 February 2020. See also Peter Cane, ‘Merits Review and 
Judicial Review – The AAT as Trojan Horse’ (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 213.  
149 B.J. Preston, n147, 246. 
150 Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning (2019) 234 LGERA 257, at [422].  
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Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning, the civil society group Gloucester Groundswell 
and the NSW Environmental Defender’s Office (EDO) argued that the Rocky Hill 
development application had to consider the significant and deleterious impacts of a new 
coalmine on climate change (including indirect or ‘Scope 3’ emissions) and the town of 
Gloucester.151 Although the outcome of the case did not exclusively hinge on 
determinations about climate change impacts, which were considered alongside the 
social, amenity, economic, and public impacts of the mine, Gloucester Resources 
nonetheless stands out for its extensive use and consideration of climate science. The 
claimants’ case relied extensively on climate science and was built on a combined 
foundation of IPCC assessments, national and local risk assessments and impact studies 
by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and the CSIRO, and expert testimony from 
Earth Scientist Will Steffen. Similarly, in the South African Thabametsi Case, the 
ENGO claimant EarthLife Africa argued that Ministerial authorisation for a new coal-
fired power plant ought to be set aside on the grounds that they failed to conduct a proper 
‘climate change screening’ as part of the EIA for the project.152 Such a screening ought 
to have involved consideration of potential GHG emissions from the proposed project 
and adaptation measures.153  
 
Finally, taking direct inspiration from Urgenda, Plan B Earth, a not-for-profit advocacy 
organisation seeking to realise the objectives of the Paris Agreement, filed a lawsuit 
against the UK Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy alleging 
 
151 Gloucester Resources, n150, at [422]; In New South Wales, ‘Scope 3 emissions’ are those designated 
as indirect GHG emissions that occur in the value chain of a private enterprise and include both upstream 
and downstream emissions. In Gloucester Resources, the court held that both direct and indirect GHG 
emissions should be considered in assessing the impact of the Rocky Hill coalmine on climate change. 
See Gloucester Resources, n150, paras [486]-[513].  
152 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v The Minister for Environmental Affairs (Thabametsi Case) (2017) 




that the latter violated the Climate Change Act (2008) and other UK laws by failing to 
revise the UK’s climate mitigation targets in line with the Paris Agreement and the most 
up-to-date climate science.154Although this case differs from Gloucester and 
Thabametsi, in that it does not challenge a particular fossil fuel development project but 
rather the UK government’s climate change policy as a whole, it is nonetheless an 
administrative lawsuit that challenges governmental failure to consider climate change 
risks and impacts in accordance with the best available climate science. Plan B Earth 
specifically argued that by maintaining its current mitigation targets and failing to take 
into account and properly weigh considerations including climate change risks in 
accordance with current climate science which would compel the adoption of a more 
ambitious mitigation target, the UK government violated its obligations under the Paris 
Agreement155  
 
Notably, claimants in all three cases heavily relied on either AR5, the IPCC Special 
Report (SR15) (2018) on the impacts of global warming of 1.5C above pre-industrial 
levels or a combination thereof. For example, Gloucester Groundswell drew on AR5 
and SR15 to contend specifically that emissions from the coalmine, through the 
exploitation and combustion of coal, would be fundamentally inconsistent with the 
existing global ‘carbon budget’ approach encouraged by the IPCC  and policy goals to 
keep temperature increases to below 1.5C-2C above pre-industrial levels as envisaged 
by the Paris Agreement.156 It would also further contribute to the cumulative growth of 
global GHG emissions.157 Similarly, Plan B Earth’s claims also prompted the UK High 
 
154 Plan B Earth and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2018] 
EWHC 1892.   
155 Ibid, paras [36], [44], [46], [48], [50].  
156 Gloucester Resources, n150, at [422]; IPCC SR15, n118.  
157 Gloucester Resources, Ibid.  
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Court to closely engage with key findings from AR5 and SR15 with respect to global 
mean temperature changes and associated pathways towards net zero emissions.158 
 
In addition to structural similarities in claimants’ argumentation, judicial approaches in 
all three cases are also largely convergent, with presiding courts accepting the centrality 
and veracity of IPCC reports. As discussed in Chapter Five, it is apparent from Justice 
Brian Preston’s reasoning in Gloucester Resources that IPCC and national scientific 
reports carried considerable weight in relation to the court’s assessment of climate 
change impacts of the proposed coalmine. Justice Preston upheld the Minister’s refusal 
of consent for the Rocky Hill project partly on the basis that the proposed coalmine 
would produce more GHG emissions that would contribute to dangerous climate 
change.159 He concluded that “an open cut coalmine in this part of the Gloucester Valley 
would be at the wrong place at the wrong time” because it would increase GHG 
emissions at a time when “a rapid and deep decrease in GHG emissions” is urgently 
required around the world in order to meet generally agreed climate targets.160   
 
In a similar finding, the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria held that the Minister had 
erred in approving the coal-fired power plant project before properly weighing climate 
change considerations when the Environmental Impact Reports clearly revealed that 
GHG emissions from the project would be significant.161 The court therefore held that 
the Minister’s decision-making process was deficient since their authorisation was given 
without reasonable and holistic consideration of the project’s adverse climate impacts. 
In this regard, the court emphasised the importance of anchoring such a process in 
 
158 Gloucester Resources, n150, at [22]-[24]. 
159 Ibid, at [8]. 
160 Ibid, at [697], [699].  
161 Thabametsi Case, n152, at [101].  
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climate science and deemed formal expert reports to be “the best evidentiary means of 
establishing that [climate change] in its multifaceted dimensions was indeed 
considered.”162  
 
Gloucester Resources also evidences direct judicial cross-fertilisation, with Justice 
Preston observing that “many courts have recognised that climate change is caused by 
cumulative emissions from a myriad of individual sources.”163 He specifically relied on 
the findings of the US Supreme Court in Massachusetts and The Hague District Court 
in Urgenda that the US transportation sector’s and Dutch state’s GHG emissions make 
a meaningful rather than negligible contribution to climate change, respectively.164 He 
accordingly concluded that emissions from the Rocky Hill coalmine would also causally 
contribute to climate change in a manner directly contrary to the Paris Agreement’s 
overall goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2050.165  
 
In sum, the consideration of climate change impacts and relevant climate science has 
arguably become a legal duty of administrative decision-makers and a mandatory 
requirement of environmental decision-making (including EIAs) in relation to 
development projects and the adoption of stronger mitigation targets in common law 
countries. EIAs have been extended to include an assessment of the impacts of proposed 
development or activity on the climate in many instances.166 This has led legal scholars 
like Mayer to assert that climate assessment is an emerging norm of customary 
 
162 Thabametsi Case, n152, at [88].  
163 Gloucester Resources, n150, at [516]. 
164 Ibid, at [519]-[522].  
165 Ibid, at [525].  
166 Benoit Mayer, ‘Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation Under Customary International 
Law’ (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 2, 273.  
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international law.167 Mayer observes that the inclusion of GHG emissions for 
consideration as part of national EIA processes has become “sufficiently widespread, 
representative and consistent to constitute a prevailing and, arguably, a ‘general’ 
practice.”168 
 
Indeed, the above cases, which Mayer also identifies as evidence of a growing state 
practice on climate assessment169, exemplify how NGO and civil society litigants are 
engaging in transnational standard-setting by articulating a shared vision of what lawful 
and competent administrative decision-making and governance on climate change ought 
to look like. They are specifically lobbying for the adoption of an evidence-based 
approach to climate change policy-making and periodic revision of national climate 
mitigation targets in line with the Paris Agreement and ‘the current international 
scientific consensus.’170 Taken together, these incremental domestic litigation efforts 
have contributed to the elevation of science-driven climate change impact or risk 
assessments as transnational best practice and a central pillar of an emergent 
transnational jurisprudence on climate change. 
 
IV. Direct Cross-fertilisation: The ‘Future Generation Lawsuit’ 
 
A burgeoning climate youth movement  
Among the most morally-charged debates on climate change are those that relate to 
intergenerational equity. The principle of intergenerational equity (also referred to as an 
ESD principle) is a central pillar of both the international human rights and 
 
167 B.Mayer, n166, 274.  
168 Ibid, 282.  
169 Ibid, 283.  
170 Plan B Earth, n154, at [3].  
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environmental law regimes and posits that every generation holds the Earth in common 
with members of present, past and future generations and has a duty to protect and 
conserve the Earth’s environment and natural resources (including air, water and land) 
for the benefit of future generations.171 Despite being a group with heightened 
vulnerability to climate change, future generations (and their rights and interests) remain 
largely under-represented within the international climate change and human rights 
regimes.172 The Paris Agreement contains only a preambular reference, instructing states 
to consider the rights of future generations when formulating climate policies.173 Thus, 
a major challenge with respect to the protection of future generations under a changing 
climate is how best to balance their rights against those of current generations.174  
 
These familiar debates are very much at the heart of a recent wave of climate change 
lawsuits initiated by youth plaintiffs around the world. It is becoming increasingly 
apparent that civil society advocacy and litigation have become fixtures in climate 
change governance. Climate scientists and NGOs are seeking to give expression to the 
climate-related grievances of future generations by representing them in lawsuits against 
their own governments. Indeed, some of the strongest emergent civil society alliances 
on climate change are those that have been forged between climate scientists and 
 
171 The concept of intergenerational equity has deep roots in many legal traditions around the world. The 
principle was recognised by the international community in the aftermath of WWII and is enshrined in 
the UN Charter as well as several UN declarations, resolutions and treaties. Concern for welfare of future 
generations became a multilateral preoccupation in the lead up to the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration recognised the responsibility of states to protect 
and improve the environment for present and future generations. The 1992 Rio Declaration reiterates this 
principle. See Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Intergenerational equity: a legal framework for global change’ in 
Edith Brown Weiss (ed), Environmental change and international law: New challenges and dimensions 
(United Nations University Press 1992) 3-4. 
172 Bridget Lewis, ‘The Rights of Future Generations within the Post-Paris Climate Change Regime’ 
(2019) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 1, 70.  
173 B.Lewis, Ibid, 72; Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 
2016) 78 UNTS 54113 <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf> accessed 3 
February 2017.   
174 B.Lewis, Ibid, 71-72. 
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younger victims of climate change. Logistical support from transnational NGO 
networks also resulted in youth climate protests being held in over a hundred countries 
on 15 March 2019,175 24 May 2019 and 20 September 2019. 
 
Greta Thunberg, a 16-year-old Swedish youth activist, has become the accidental leader 
and poster child of this incipient transnational youth movement on climate change.176 
Thunberg appeared before UN delegates at COP-24 and the European Parliament to 
make the case for a ‘climate emergency’ and urge governments to pursue science-based 
action and policies as a matter of moral urgency.177 At COP-24, Thunberg also led a 
protest by a group of school students who held up signs stating “only 12 years left” and 
thereby directly invoking the text of the IPCC’s 2018 Special Report, 178 which was 
again emblematic of the strategic synthesis of the language of climate science, justice 
and equity by civil society actors as discussed in part III. The recently founded American 
youth ENGO, the Sunrise Movement,179 is also employing a merged vocabulary of 
climate science and climate justice to lobby the US government to adopt the Green New 
Deal recently tabled by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio Cortez – a proposal for 
sweeping structural-regulatory and socio-economic reform in the United States designed 
 
175 Damian Carrington, ‘Youth climate strikers: “We are going to change the fate of humanity,”’ The 
Guardian (1 March 2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/01/youth-climate-
strikers-we-are-going-to-change-the-fate-of-humanity> accessed 6 March 2019; Adrian Horton, Dream 
McClinton & Lauren Aratani, ‘Adults failed to take climate action. Meet the young activists stepping 
up,’ The Guardian (4 March 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/04/can-they-
save-us-meet-the-climate-kids-fighting-to-fix-the-planet> accessed 6 March 2019.  
176 Kate Aronoff, ‘How Greta Thurnberg’s Lone Strike Against Climate Became a Global Movement,’ 
Rolling Stone (5 March 2019) <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/greta-thunberg-
fridays-for-future-climate-change-800675/> accessed 6 March 2019.  
177 Jennifer Rankin, ‘Forget Brexit and focus on climate change, Greta Thunberg tells EU’ The Guardian 
(16 April 2018) < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/16/greta-thunberg-urges-eu-
leaders-wake-up-climate-change-school-strike-movement> accessed 16 April 2019.  
178 John Sutter & Lawrence Davidson, ‘Teen tells climate negotiators they aren’t mature enough’ CNN 
(16 December 2018) < https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/16/world/greta-thunberg-cop24/index.html> 
accessed 17 April 2019.  
179 Sunrise Movement (2019) <https://www.sunrisemovement.org/> accessed 6 March 2019.  
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to address climate change over the next decade.180 The empowerment of youth and the 
conscious promotion of the welfare of future generations under a changed climate is a 
more recent, albeit effective strategy being used by transnational NGO networks. It is 
argued here that these alliances and collaborations between civil society, youth 
movements and climate scientists across borders have arguably birthed an entirely new 
and distinctive genre of climate litigation which I term the future generation lawsuit.  
 
For the most part, these lawsuits involve new and innovatively framed intergenerational 
equity and human rights claims that rely on the public trust doctrine and constitutionally 
enshrined fundamental rights, respectively. The landmark Juliana et al v USA, 
previously discussed in Chapter Four, constitutes the first prototypical example of a 
future generation lawsuit on climate change. The case has had a profound knock-on 
effect in terms of inspiring similar lawsuits both within the United States and around the 
world. The science-backed and equity-rights-driven argumentation employed by the 
twenty-one youth plaintiffs has been emulated in many subsequent future generation 
lawsuits.  
 
The amplifying effect of Juliana et al v USA 
Juliana et al v USA has engendered a spike in future generation cases both within and 
outside the United States. To briefly recapitulate, the case consists of a federal class 
action climate change lawsuit filed in 2015 at the District Court of Oregon on behalf of 
young US citizens by the environmental NGO Our Children’s Trust, which “advocates 
on behalf of youth and future generations [and] for legally binding, science-based 
 
180 Sunrise Movement, ‘Our Road to Victory on a Green New Deal’ (2018) 
<https://www.sunrisemovement.org/gnd-strategy> accessed 17 April 2019.  
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climate recovery policies.”181 It is notable for being the first case to bring a major 
constitutional claim in the US with respect to climate change. The twenty-one youth 
plaintiffs allege that the US government has violated the common law public trust 
doctrine and their constitutional rights to life, liberty and property by doing little about 
climate change and exacerbating the problem by continuing to subsidise fossil fuel 
exploitation and combustion.182 
 
The plaintiffs’ science-backed claims and argumentation contain three prongs. Firstly, 
they allege that by supporting and subsidising the extraction, combustion and 
consumption of fossil fuels and allowing CO2 to exceed 350ppm, the defendants (the US 
government and other federal agencies) have dangerously interfered with a stable 
climate system for the United States and the plaintiffs and violated their fundamental 
constitutional rights to life, property, dignity of the person and due process.183 
Concurrently framed as personalised endangerment narratives, the plaintiffs’ rights-
based claims reflect several unifying themes. Relying on IPCC assessments and national 
and localised scientific studies from NASA and NOAA,184 the plaintiffs’ lawyer and 
Our Children’s Trust’s Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Julia Olsen 
identified a host of specific climate change impacts commonly experienced by the 
plaintiffs. Impacts arising from a warming trend or temperature increases in recent years 
include a 2015 heatwave in Oregon; warmer summers and an increase in wildfires to 
which Oregon is particularly susceptible as a heavily forested state; increased allergies 
and worsening respiratory problems like asthma which many of the plaintiffs suffer 
 
181 Our Children’s Trust, ‘Mission Statement’ (2017) < https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/mission-
statement/> accessed 23 October 2017. 
182 Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (Our Children’s Trust Case) (2016) 
Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (Complaint) 4, 7. 
183 Ibid, at [279]-[289]. 
184 Ibid, at [68]-[77].  
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from; snow melt, reduced snowfall and loss of income and livelihood for some plaintiffs 
and their families employed during ski seasons which have become shorter; loss of 
income for plaintiffs from farming families due to drought; ocean acidification and 
warmer temperatures negatively affecting food sources of all plaintiffs (e.g. salmon 
stocks and fisheries); altered seasons and precipitation patterns adversely affecting and 
depleting plaintiffs’ water sources; loss of habitable lands and housing from sea level 
rise; and, across the board, a deterioration in the plaintiffs’ quality of life, with climate 
change impacts affecting their enjoyment of nature and outdoor activities in general.185 
Moreover, in the case of several indigenous youth plaintiffs, climate change is 
interfering with their deep cultural and spiritual connections to their lands.186 Three of 
the plaintiffs are also from New York and Louisiana and experienced hardship, trauma 
and losses as a result of climate change-induced hurricanes in those states in recent 
years.187  
 
Secondly, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their rights under the public trust doctrine 
(as beneficiaries as well as present and future generations) which is secured by the ninth 
amendment of the US constitution and several state constitutions.188 They submitted that 
the US government is a public trustee of domestic natural resources including “the air 
(atmosphere), sea, sea shores, water and wildlife.”189 As custodians and public trustees 
of natural resources, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants owe a duty of care towards 
them and future generations and have abrogated that duty in failing to protect their rights 
 
185 Juliana et al v USA, n182, at [16]-[97].  
186 Ibid, at [21]-[23].  
187 Ibid, at [63], [72], [86].  
188 Ibid, 93-94, at [276]; Anne Richardson Oakes, ‘Judicial Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Powerful Tool of Environmental Protection?’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 3, 8; Zachary 
L. Berliner, ‘What About Uncle Sam? Carving a New Place for the Public Trust Doctrine in Federal 
Climate Litigation’ (2018) 21 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change 4, 352. 
189 Juliana et al v USA, n182, at [82].  
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to life, liberty and property.190 The latter’s conduct and omissions (i.e. subsidisation and 
approval of fossil fuel projects such as pipelines and aggregate acts such as the 
extraction, production, transportation, combustion and consumption of fossil fuels) 
amount to dangerous conduct which infringes on the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.191 
While the public trust doctrine has previously been invoked in other environmental 
litigation contexts, Juliana represents the first major US lawsuit to extend and apply the 
doctrine to climate change. It has given the doctrine a new lease on life by “[recasting] 
it in the form of an inherent limitation on sovereign power” and a fiduciary obligation 
which applies to federal and state governments alike and is potentially subject to judicial 
enforcement in contexts where government action remains deficient on climate 
change.192  
 
Thirdly, the Juliana youth plaintiffs have also claimed that the US government’s current 
climate change policies are deficient because they are not based on the best available 
science.193 They accordingly urge that climate change policies going forward will, at a 
minimum, need to be anchored in state-of-the-art climate science.194 Attesting to the 
strong nexus and linkages between contemporary climate science and litigation, Juliana 
also constitutes a pertinent example of a climate change lawsuit that has directly 
influenced the production of new climate science studies specifically tailored for climate 
litigation. The claimants have relied on a scientific study specifically produced for this 
litigation by James Hansen and his team titled ‘Young People’s Burden,’195 discussed in 
 
190 Juliana et al v USA, n182, at [286]. 
191 Ibid, [288]-[289].  
192 A.Richardson Oakes, n188, 6. 
193 Juliana et al, n182, 81-82, at [261]-[262].  
194 Ibid. 
195 James Hansen et al, ‘Young people’s burden: requirement of negative CO2 emissions’ (2017) 8 Earth 
System Dynamics 1.  
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Chapter Three. The connection between this study and Juliana is further evidenced by 
the following remarks of Sophie Kivlehan, Hansen’s granddaughter and one of the youth 
plaintiffs in the case:  
 
I’m excited for Young People’s Burden to provide support 
for Juliana v United States. This paper secures a strong and 
legitimate foundation for which young people can fight for 
our right to life, and a viable future. We need the adults to 
wake up and listen.196 
 
 
This type of close coordination between climate science and law represents another 
instance of hybrid management and science-law co-production. Hansen’s dual role in 
the case as both an expert witness and a plaintiff blurs the boundaries between his 
occupation as a climatologist and his role as a climate activist. Moreover, as a repeat 
player in climate litigation, Hansen has arguably transitioned to the role of the scientist-
advocate (discussed in Chapter Three) which typifies the hybridity that permeates much 
of the knowledge work surrounding climate change (including that of the IPCC) and 
remains subject to ongoing public misunderstandings about the trans-scientific nature 
of climate science.  
 
Juliana has engendered a new wave of public trust litigation that is arguably distinctive 
because it is predominantly driven and articulated by youth plaintiffs and their NGO 
advocates and firmly anchored in a robust scientific foundation. In these crucial aspects, 
it represents a clear departure from previous generations of US climate tort litigation in 
the vein of Kivalina and Comer. Juliana’s outsized impact and resonance in the sphere 
of transnational climate litigation is evidenced by its precipitation of a litany of similar 
 
196 As quoted in James Hansen, ‘Young People’s Burden: Requirement of Negative CO2 Emissions’ (18 
July 2017) < http://csas.ei.columbia.edu/2017/07/18/young-peoples-burden-requirement-of-negative-
co2-emissions/> accessed 22 March 2019.  
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lawsuits in the US. Five future generation lawsuits were filed following Juliana in a 
relatively short time frame between 2017 and 2018 and include Sinnok v Alaska, a North 
Carolina Petition, Clean Air Council v USA, Reynolds v Florida and Aji P. v State of 
Washington.197 What is strikingly similar in all these cases is that they have been brought 
forward mainly by youth plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ who have adopted identical or 
analogous argumentation to the Juliana plaintiffs with respect to violations of their 
constitutional rights and the public trust doctrine. For example, in Aji P, Sinnok and 
Reynolds the youth plaintiffs have claimed that their state governments in Washington, 
Alaska and Florida, respectively, contributed to climate change by supporting a fossil 
fuel-based energy and transportation system which has resulted in harm to the states’ 
natural resources and the plaintiffs.198 They argue that as public trustees of the natural 
resources in their territory, their state governments have a fiduciary duty to protect 
public trust resources. They have accordingly sought injunctive relief to compel their 
governments to abolish existing environmental legislation inadequate for dealing with 
GHG emissions and instead adopt more ambitious climate-friendly policies and 
programs, including the preparation of state GHG emission inventories.199 Aji P also 
involves a repeat player, with one of the youth plaintiffs concurrently appearing as a 
plaintiff in Juliana.  
 
In a further indication of cross-pollination and the transnational stakes and dimensions 
of this Juliana line of cases, ENGOs like Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, Friends of the 
Earth and the Sunrise Movement have all appeared as amicus curiae and provided 
 
197 Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, ‘U.S. Climate Change Litigation: Public Trust Claims’ (2019) 
<http://climatecasechart.com/case-category/public-trust-claims/> accessed 22 March 2019.  
198 Aji P v State of Washington (2018) 18-2-04448-1 SEA Wash. Sup. Ct.; Sinnok et al v State of Alaska 
(2017) Case No. 3AN-17-; Reynolds et al v State of Florida 37 2018 CA 000819 Fla.Cir.Ct.  
199 Aji P, Ibid.  
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supporting statements for the youth plaintiffs in several cases. These NGO amicus briefs 
map the genesis and development of the public trust doctrine in US environmental law 
and jurisprudence and make a strong case for its extension and application to climate 
change in the interest of protecting future generations.200 These amicus briefs are also 
trans-scientific in nature as they draw extensively upon climate science data in order to 
detail specific climate impacts that have or are likely to materialise in each state. For 
example, the amicus brief in Aji P documents Washington state’s high susceptibility to 
ocean acidification, its devastating impact on fisheries and the enormous threat climate 
change poses to the state’s estuarine topography, salmon runs and indigenous modes of 
subsistence.201  
 
At the time of writing, this upward trend of future generation public trust climate 
litigation shows no sign of waning. This strand of climate litigation is also emergent in 
the Global South, with a cluster of lawsuits filed in recent years. Inspired by Juliana, 
youth plaintiffs in India, Pakistan and Colombia have alleged violations by their 
respective governments of the public trust doctrine, their constitutional right to life and 
their governments’ mitigation obligations under the 2015 Paris Agreement.202 Critically, 
the NGO claimant behind Juliana, Our Children’s Trust, has provided direct strategic 
assistance to the plaintiffs in all of these cases,203 which attests to the growing 
 
200 Juliana et al v USA (2019) No.18-36082 9th Cir. Ct. (Sunrise Movement Amicus Curiae Brief), n, 2-3.  
201 Aji P (Sierra Club et al Amicus Curiae Brief), n198, 10-14.  
202 Pandey v Union of India, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law: Columbia Law School, ‘Climate 
Case Chart’ (2018) < http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2017/20170325_Original-Application-No.-___-of-
2017_petition-1.pdf> accessed 23 April 2019; Rabab Ali v Federation of Pakistan, Our Children’s Trust, 
‘Global Legal Actions: Pakistan’ (2019) < https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/pakistan> accessed 8 July 
2018; Future Generation v Ministry of the Environment & Others, Sabin Center for Climate Change 
Law: Columbia Law School, ‘Climate Case Chart’ (2018) <http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-
case/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others/> accessed 23 April 2019.  
203 Our Children’s Trust, ‘Global Legal Actions’ (2018) < https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/india> 
accessed 8 July 2019.  
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transnationalism and active collaboration within civil society that permeates post-Paris 
climate litigation. These cases are also built on an evidentiary foundation that combines 
national scientific assessments and more localised climate impact studies. The 9-year-
old applicant in the Indian case Pandey v Union of India has relied on similar 
argumentation to the plaintiffs in Juliana with respect to claims invoking the public trust 
doctrine and the principle of intergenerational equity. Furthermore, in reliance upon 
Leghari v Pakistan, the applicant has also requested the National Green Tribunal to 
direct the Indian government to “take science-based action to reduce and minimize the 
adverse impacts of climate change in the country.”204 The applicant’s case is heavily 
modelled on Juliana upon which she relies to argue in identical terms that under the 
Indian constitution, the public trust doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty on the Indian 
government to protect the environment and natural resources in its territory from the 
adverse effects of climate change.205 The plaintiff also emphatically relies on the parts 
of Judge Ann Aiken’s judgment in Juliana which note that the US government’s public 
trust obligations constitute an inherent aspect of sovereignty and embody aspects of 
intergenerational equity which require it to protect the rights of future generations to a 
balanced and healthy environment.206  
 
In a nearly identical lawsuit in Pakistan, Rabab v Federation of Pakistan, a 7-year-old 
girl Rabab Ali filed a constitutional petition in 2016 against the Pakistani government 
and regional government of Sindh alleging that their continued exploitation and 
combustion of coal is resulting in violations of the public trust doctrine and the rights of 
younger generations to life, liberty, property, human dignity, information and equal 
 
204 Pandey, n202, 2.  
205 Ibid, 45. 
206 Ibid, 46.  
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protection of the law.207 The plaintiff has further alleged that Pakistan’s coal exploitation 
and combustion, as well as new coal development projects, violate the latter’s 
obligations under the Paris Agreement, particularly its INDC “to promote and support 
low-Carbon, Climate resilient development.”208 As with Juliana, the youth plaintiff has 
also relied on Hansen’s study Young People’s Burden which forms a core evidentiary 
component of this case.209 In the Colombian case Future Generation v Ministry of the 
Environment & Others, the twenty-five youth plaintiffs, supported by the NGO 
Dejusticia, specifically alleged in their tutela (i.e. legal petition) that deforestation in the 
Amazon and rising temperatures from climate change threatened their rights to a healthy 
environment, life, health, food and water.210  
 
In all these cases, the plaintiffs have stressed that future generations stand to suffer the 
most from climate change impacts and regulatory inaction by their governments. Future 
Generation also exemplifies the high level of transnational cross-fertilisation that 
characterises these lawsuits as James Hansen reprised his role as an amicus curiae in 
this case. In his amicus brief for Future Generation, Hansen reiterated the key findings 
of his study Young Peoples’ Burden, which was also used in Juliana, to assert that the 
protection of the plaintiffs as future generations is contingent on the Colombian 
government pursuing climate action in line with its INDCs under the Paris Agreement 
and geared towards the goal of negative emissions via improved agricultural and forestry 
practices including reforestation programs.211   
 
207 Rabab Ali, n202, 1. 
208 Ibid, 25, at [32].  
209 Ibid, 15. Hansen’s study has been included with the petition in Annexure B.  
210 Future Generation, n202; Dejusticia, ‘In historic ruling, Colombian court protects youth suing 
national government for failing to curb deforestation’ (2018) < https://www.dejusticia.org/en/en-fallo-
historico-corte-suprema-concede-tutela-de-cambio-climatico-y-generaciones-futuras/> accessed 15 
August 2018.  






Recent iterations of climate litigation, particularly in the post-Paris era, reflect new 
forms of remedial collectivism around climate change. This chapter has shown that a 
relatively new constellation of civil society actors or litigants – climate scientists, NGOs 
and climate change victims including future generations – and their epistemic 
interactions and exchanges represent the foundational core of this new wave of climate 
litigation.  Indeed, it has been argued that NGO-driven climate litigation exhibits many 
signs of becoming a transformative tool for regulatory change with respect to our current 
climate crisis. Foremost among them is the strategic fusion of technoscientific and rights 
and justice-based framings of climate change by transnational civil society networks. 
Their hybrid-epistemic interactions not only result in the production and mobilisation of 
‘scientific facts’ about climate change, as embodied by IPCC assessments and event 
attribution studies, but entail a double move. Transnational climate litigation is also 
serving to validate these trans-scientific accounts of climate change by reference to 
broader societal values including the protection of fundamental rights and the realisation 
of intergenerational equity and climate justice.  
 
These dynamics are visible across many jurisdictions and are simultaneously 
transforming both climate science, as attested by increased demands to generate event 
attribution science specifically for litigation, and law, as evidenced by the 
reconfiguration and ‘greening’ of domestic administrative and environmental law 
regimes to become better attuned to climate risk. They also appear to vindicate Solnit’s 
claim that “our largest problems won’t be solved by heroes. They’ll be solved, if they 
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are, by movements, coalitions, civil society. The climate movement has been first of all 
a mass effort…”212 Climate change endangerment narratives, novel arguments on 
collective and proportional responsibility based on the market share theory, the 
standardised climate change impact assessment and the future generation lawsuit 
(predicated on constitutionalised fundamental rights and the public trust doctrine) are 
all hard-won fruits and knowledge hybrids that derive from this new epistemic synthesis 
and constitute the seminal building blocks of an emergent transnational common law of 
climate change.  
  
 









We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children. 
Native American Proverb 
 
As governments around the world continue to exhibit inertia on climate change and 
under-deliver on the goals of the Paris Agreement, civil society has stepped up its fight 
against regulatory stasis by turning to the courts. Against the backdrop of our escalating 
climate crisis and the fight to avert disastrous global warming of 2C above pre-
industrial levels, the IPCC and the global judiciary are increasingly looked upon as more 
promising sites of regulatory change with the potential to deliver some remedial relief 
and climate justice. Law and science have furnished civil society actors with powerful 
vocabularies and tools for addressing climate change and driving regulatory change on 
the issue. In my PhD project, I have focused on the relationship between climate science 
and climate litigation and sought to provide one of the first comprehensive analytical 
accounts of how these spheres of climate change governance are intersecting, shaping 
one another and co-evolving.  
 
My principal aim has been to develop a detailed STS-inflected account of how the 
climate science community (IPCC), domestic courts and climate litigants are interacting 
with one another, how climate science is being used in climate litigation and 
adjudication and how the transdisciplinary interactions between these actors are 
reshaping transnational climate change governance. To that end, I have sought to 
demonstrate that the production and synthesis of climate science by the IPCC, its 
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certification and transformation by domestic courts, and its recurrent mobilisation by 
climate litigants around the world is contributing to a new and emergent transnational 
body of climate change case law, which is epistemologically hybrid and 
transdisciplinary in character. The key thematic nodes of my PhD thesis are as follows.   
 
I. The Co-constructive Relationship Between Climate Science and Climate 
Law 
 
My PhD project constitutes a response to the dearth of rigorous legal scholarship on the 
relationship between climate science and climate law1 and what I find to be the frequent 
mischaracterisation of climate science and its role in climate change governance by 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) accounts on the topic. It accordingly contributes 
to both STS scholarship and the literature on climate litigation by offering a 
comprehensive STS-constructivist analysis of climate change knowledge production by 
the IPCC and the application and mobilisation of climate science in climate litigation 
and adjudication. My PhD project brings together the literature on climate litigation and 
the STS-constructivist literature on knowledge production in regulatory scientific 
institutions in a novel manner. In this regard, it also makes a theoretical contribution by 
illustrating both the strengths of STS-constructivist frameworks for analysing complex 
scientific and legal processes and their weaknesses in terms of their critical tendency 
and potential for deconstructionism.  
 
 
1 Joana Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, ‘Climate change litigation: A review of research on courts and litigants 
in climate governance’ (2019) 10 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 3, 11. One notable 
exception is the paper by Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, ‘Extreme weather event attribution science 
and climate change litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?’ (2018) 36 Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law 3.  
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Relying on the work of pioneers in the field such as Bruno Latour and Sheila Jasanoff, 
and the latter’s critical texts examining the relationship between science and law, I have 
suggested that STS and constructivist sociological scholarship offer valuable analytical 
frameworks for understanding the interrelationship between science, policy, and law in 
contemporary society. I have drawn upon STS-constructivist analyses of regulatory 
science and the knowledge practices of boundary organisations (i.e. regulatory scientific 
institutions like the IPCC).2 More specifically, my project is predicated on the STS-
constructivist idea of science as a socially constructed and dynamic knowledge system.3 
I have argued that the IPCC’s knowledge production on climate change has always been 
a political project rather than a purely scientific one, as indicated by its disclaimer that 
it is a producer of “policy relevant [knowledge].”4 I have accordingly shown that climate 
science, and the IPCC’s framing of it, fits within the STS models of science for action5 
and trans-science, which is oriented towards addressing questions that transcend pure 
science and cannot exclusively be answered by it.6  
  
In light of the practical exigencies and complexities of climate change regulation, my 
PhD project develops an alternative conceptualisation of the interrelationship between 
science, politics, and law than those advocated by existing STS-constructivist accounts. 
This can only occur when we pay close attention to the knowledge work of regulatory 
institutions and the institutional processes through which the knowledge base on climate 
 
2 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘A New Climate for Society’ (2010) 27 Theory, Culture & Society 233; Oren S. Perez, 
‘The Hybrid Legal-Scientific Dynamic of Transnational Scientific Organisations’ (2015) 26 The 
European Journal of International Law 2.  
3 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Is science socially constructed? – And can it still inform public policy?’ (1996) 2 
Science and Engineering 1, 263. 
4 IPCC, ‘Statement on IPCC Principles and Procedures’ (2016) < http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press/ipcc-
statement-principles-procedures-02-2010.pdf > accessed 8 March 2016.  
5 David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political 
Economy (Princeton University Press 2016) 82. 
6 Alvin M. Weinberg, “Science and Trans-Science” (1972) 10 Minerva 2, 209. 
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change is being produced. As noted by David Kennedy, a major shortcoming of the 
actor/structure/system framework in social scientific work is the tendency to overlook 
the knowledge work of experts and “to treat expertise as a marginal part of the story.”7 
He further contends that such analytic engagement might fruitfully yield a better 
understanding of the “way expert knowledge operates to constitute actors and shape 
structures while serving as a tool for people pursuing projects to allocate and capture 
gains.”8  
 
I have taken up this call to study ‘science in action’ by drilling down into the IPCC’s 
knowledge work. My research uncovers the sophisticated manner in which the IPCC 
and its Working Groups synthesise most of the world’s climate science through complex 
and iterative review cycles involving a range of experts from different backgrounds. I 
problematise critical STS and sociological perspectives on the IPCC’s natural scientific 
bias and monopolism and my investigations in this regard have yielded two important 
discoveries. First, the IPCC’s knowledge work is far more heterogeneous, dynamic and 
inclusive of non-scientific and localised knowledge inputs and perspectives than 
generally assumed by STS scholars and other critics of the IPCC. This is best 
exemplified by active ongoing collaborations in the Arctic between Earth Scientists, 
anthropologists and indigenous peoples. Moreover, the IPCC assessment cycle strikes a 
healthy and well-functioning balance between instances of both boundary work (i.e. 
performed by Working Group I) and more hybrid and interdisciplinary knowledge work 
(i.e. performed by Working Groups II and III).  
 
 




Second, both popular and scholarly accounts perpetuate fictions and misconceptions 
about the essential or ‘pure’ nature of climate science. I have shown that climate science 
is distinctive both for its mode of production and its evolution as a practical body of 
knowledge specifically designed for policymaking, regulation and, increasingly, legal 
process. I have accordingly argued that climate science is best conceived of as applied 
science and trans-science. I have also demonstrated that the changing and multi-faceted 
role of the climate scientist as an advocate, activist, expert witness and repeat player in 
climate litigation, can also be better understood in terms of and is fundamentally 
consistent with this more nuanced bipartite framing of climate science. In sum, my PhD 
project offers up this more textured account of climate science which sheds light on the 
deep formative links and interconnections between the science and law of climate 
change. This development has largely eluded scholarly attention and analysis to date.  
 
II. IPCC Assessments, Climate Adjudication and the Recasting of 
Evidentiary Boundaries 
 
My PhD project also contributes to transnational environmental law scholarship by 
providing new insights into the treatment and role of science in climate adjudication and 
litigation. It advances our understanding of the impact of a growing and increasingly 
consolidated body of climate science on adjudicative processes of fact-finding as well 
as evidence gathering and evaluation. In common law societies, there is a tension 
between law and science that arises as a consequence of the adversarial character of law 
coming into contact with scientific norms and consensus, as litigation generally 
promotes contestation rather than ‘truth’ seeking. Traditional legal-adjudicative 
evidentiary and fact-finding procedures do not always align with modes of scientific 
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inquiry. Within the sciences, there are certain theories that are so firmly entrenched that 
they have attained the status of scientific law or consensus and a sense of permanence.9 
As an established body of knowledge and high consensus field, climate science fits this 
mould.  
 
In contrast, evidence gathered in the aftermath of environmental crises are often inchoate 
forms of science requiring input from multiple researchers to challenge underlying 
hypotheses and supporting data.10 Furthermore, evidentiary processes within adversarial 
models of litigation and adjudication (i.e. civil or criminal procedure) compel the parties 
to engage in the piecemeal dissection and mobilisation of scientific testimonies to 
support or contest discrete findings of law and fact.11 The scientific process by contrast 
remains committed to a larger project of fine-tuning and improving scientific knowledge 
that transcends any particular litigation scenario. Moreover, the consolidation of a 
scientific consensus on the anthropogenic causes of climate change by the IPCC 
potentially obviates the utility of adversarial modes of evidence gathering and fact-
finding in court, at least with respect to general causation enquiries. This is consistent 
with Fisher et al.’s observation of climate change as legally disruptive because it 
compels a reconceptualisation of the causation issue, with linear causation requirements 
being ill-suited to the climate change context due the diffuse and transboundary nature 
of GHG emissions.12 These deficiencies within adversarial litigation and adjudication 
 
9 Keum J. Park, ‘Judicial Utilization of Scientific Evidence in Complex Environmental Torts: Redefining 
Litigation Driven Research’ (2011) 7 Fordham Environmental Law Review 2, 505.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
12 See Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford & Emily Barritt, ‘The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate 
Change’ (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 2.  
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systems have also prompted calls for tort law reform within the United States to better 
accommodate climate change claims.13  
 
Through a fine-grained examination of climate change lawsuits around the world, I have 
shown that the evidentiary dynamics of climate litigation, and the role of science therein, 
are indeed of a different order. This is specifically due to the distinctive universal 
character and currency of IPCC assessment reports. I have proposed that the judicial 
uptake, evaluation and application of IPCC assessments is resulting in courts around the 
world adjusting or transforming evidentiary standards and legal doctrines to facilitate 
the adjudication of climate change questions. Occasionally, this has involved the judicial 
relaxation or expansion of evidentiary boundaries to allow for the inclusion of generalist 
climate science. This has led some courts to reject arguments about a state’s negligible 
contribution to global climate change and make findings of proportional responsibility 
as illustrated by the Urgenda decisions. This marks a significant departure from how the 
limited scope of evidencing generally works in civil and criminal legal procedure where 
individuated and divergent scientific testimonies are relied upon.  
 
In this regard, I have shown that evidentiary enquiries in climate adjudication and 
litigation are always automatically tethered to a universal body of science due to the 
inherently multi-scalar (i.e. concurrently global and localised) nature of climate change 
and its impacts. Climate adjudication, particularly in the post-Paris era, is marked by a 
high level of science-law hybridity, whereby the IPCC is ascribed a pivotal fact-finding 
role in most climate change lawsuits around the world. IPCC assessments have become 
an enabling adjudicative tool, with courts in both the United States and around the world 
 
13 See Douglas A. Kysar, ‘What can climate change do about tort law?’ (2001) 41 Environmental Law 1.  
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routinely integrating scientific statements on climate change into their jurisprudence. 
Through recurrent application, courts have also transformed IPCC assessments into a 
usable body of shared knowledge for litigation and a mandatory framework to guide 
more climate-responsive administrative decision-making and policymaking. In sum, 
courts around the world are explicitly privileging the IPCC’s technoscientific account 
of climate change and have firmly cemented the status of IPCC assessments as a baseline 
for sound climate change governance. Moreover, the climate crisis and the subsequent 
judicial elevation of IPCC climate science are also formatively consequential for and 
transformative of law, as they are contributing to a transnational process of legal 
(re)ordering.  
 
III. Towards a Shared Body of Transnational Climate Change Case Law: A 
New Project of Socio-legal (Re)ordering 
 
Finally, My PhD project contributes to the literature on transnational environmental law 
by offering a new conceptualisation of post-Paris climate change governance extending 
beyond the standard range of legislative and executive responses and initiatives. It 
accordingly puts forward an analytical account of the ways in which transdisciplinary 
interactions between climate science and law are reshaping transnational climate change 
governance. This represents a new project of normative restructuring and socio-legal 
(re)ordering in response to climate change. I have proposed and demonstrated that the 
intersection of climate science and law is constitutive of two interlocking, 




Firstly, climate science is changing the law and legal practice on climate change in 
several important ways that merit close attention. Domestic courts and judges are at the 
heart of this shift and are increasingly embracing their role as transnational institutions 
and key actors in climate change governance. Networked judicial interactions outside 
the courtroom have sometimes resulted in the production of soft law frameworks on 
climate change. Moreover, through adjudication, judges are relying upon IPCC 
assessments and other climate science to flexibly and creatively interpret and adapt 
existing legal principles and doctrines to address climate change questions 
Scientifically-attuned climate adjudication is also serving to encourage more climate-
responsive and evidence-based administrative decision-making.  
 
This process is also being reinforced and consolidated by NGO-driven climate litigation. 
An energised civil society has seized on the momentum of the Paris Agreement and 
recent high-profile pro-regulatory climate litigation in Urgenda v The Netherlands and 
Juliana et al v USA14 to launch a series of parallel efforts in jurisdictions around the 
world that directly emulate these cases. NGO litigants, several of whom are repeat 
players in these cases, are attempting to replicate the Urgenda-Juliana model by 
strategically running similar or even identical arguments and claims, many of which are 
anchored in IPCC assessments and event attribution science. These NGO-driven efforts, 
which involve the replication of legal arguments and the filing of analogous claims 
grounded in universal climate science, are symptomatic of a high level of consciously 
 
14 I refer here to Juliana’s success on narrower terms as the first instance decision of the District 
Court of Oregon. At the time of writing, the case is still pending a final resolution and a successful 
outcome overall is by no means a foregone conclusion. See Judge Ann Aiken’s judgement in Kelsey 
Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al (Our Children’s Trust Case) (2016) 
Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC. Also discussed in Chapter Four.  
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engineered strategic convergence in global legal practice on climate change in the post-
Paris era.  
 
Secondly, legal processes like litigation and adjudication are, in turn, informing and 
influencing the production of some new scientific studies on climate change. This is 
partially a response to earlier instances of failed tort litigation in the United States where 
claimants failed to prove causation. I have argued here that climate science is a 
specialised body of knowledge specifically intended for policy design, regulation and 
litigation. Certain event attribution studies, like The Carbon Majors study, constitute  
salient examples of trans-science, as they are being produced specifically to facilitate 
post-Paris climate litigation and adjudication and enable the resolution of (previously 
insurmountable) causation enquiries.  
 
In addition to engaging in a diagnostic exercise of identifying an emergent and shared 
body of transnational case law on climate change, my PhD project has also provided a 
preliminary articulation of its content. The foundational tenets or core by-products of 
this science-law synthesis include endangerment narratives which are concurrently 
undergirded by the vocabularies of IPCC science and human rights, market share 
approaches to responsibility, the global standardisation of climate change impact 
assessments through science-attuned adjudication, and the future generation lawsuit 
typified by youth claimants’ revival of and reliance upon the public trust doctrine. I have 
shown that these transnational strategies, ideas and trends in legal practice on climate 
change are distinctive and hybridised precisely because they are the product of science-
law interactions and exchanges. In sum, climate science and law are locked in a dynamic 
process of mutual reinforcement and co-construction. My PhD thesis constitutes a first 
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attempt to map this development which is not yet well recognised or understood in the 
literature on climate litigation and transnational environmental law. More broadly, what 
does this development mean for law as a field, discipline or praxis? I have suggested 
that climate change is inherently transformative and reordering of something about the 
law's ideas of itself, both as praxis and in the ways in which it sees the world. It is 
changing the law’s internal ideas about what constitutes equity and justice in the face of 
global ecological collapse.  
 
IV. Limitations & Future Research Prospects 
 
A major focus of my PhD work has been on the role of courts in climate change 
governance. This discussion has been delimited in terms of my specific examination of 
the links between climate science and law and, consequently, the relationship of courts 
to other institutional actors such as the IPCC and ENGOs. However, another interesting 
line of enquiry not pursued here is how the reconfiguration of judicial power in response 
to climate change is impacting upon existing political arrangements in constitutional 
democracies. A possible unintended consequence of science-law interactions with 
respect to climate change may be the expansion of judicial authority at the expense of 
legislative and executive authority. In other words, are courts assuming policymaking 
functions in this area and undermining the separation of powers? My PhD work has not 
examined the implications of the transnational growth of judicial power for democratic 
governance – an extensive topic that merits separate treatment. Thus far, such scholarly 
explorations on climate adjudication and the separation of powers are chiefly expressed 
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as commentary on the Urgenda case.15 Further critical reflection and research is needed 
to develop a deeper and more textured understanding of the evolving relationship 
between the judiciary, other regulatory actors and global administrative regimes and 
networks on climate change governance.  
 
By largely concentrating on the world of legal practice and adjudication, my PhD project 
has also not explored in detail the domestic enforcement of climate change norms, which 
is dependent on specific national contexts and “legally, scientifically and institutionally 
complex.”16 Existing scholarly contributions in this regard include Scotford et al.’s 
analysis of national climate change laws across Commonwealth countries, including 
legal measures designed to “implement climate change policy, including climate change 
legislation and regulatory instruments such as emissions trading schemes and energy 
efficiency measures,”17 for the purpose of identifying the least as well as most effective 
and well-functioning governance approaches geared towards delivering on the goals of 
the Paris Agreement. Further context-sensitive research in this vein could help to map 
the translation, uptake and implementation of emergent judicially-enacted soft law 
frameworks on climate change in domestic regulatory settings.  
 
My PhD project has also briefly touched upon the issue of climate denialism to highlight 
the potential pitfalls of STS constructivist methodologies, which have been repeatedly 
misappropriated by climate deniers to attack the mainstream IPCC account of climate 
change. The nexus between climate denial and anti-regulatory litigation, particularly 
 
15 See Josephine van Zeben, ‘Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: 
Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?’ (2015) 4 Transnational Environmental Law 2.  
16 Elizabeth Fisher & Eloise Scotford, ‘Climate Change Adjudication: The Need to Foster Legal 
Capacity: an editorial comment’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 1. 
17 Eloise Scotford, Stephen Minas & Andrew Macintosh, ‘Climate Change and National Laws Across 
Commonwealth Countries’ (2017) 43 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 3-4.  
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against prominent members of the global climate science community, is a related topic 
that merits separate treatment and investigation. Oreskes and Conway’s work, 
Merchants of Doubt, offers a pertinent springboard for further scholarly exploration of 
counternarratives to climate science and their role in recently intensified efforts by the 
fossil fuel industry and its allies to thwart progressive climate change regulation by 
peddling doubt about climate science18  and pursuing vexatious litigation against climate 
scientists. The Climate Science Legal Defense Fund (CSLDF), an American advocacy 
group defending the interests of climate scientists, reported a sharp increase in frivolous 
lawsuits against climate scientists in 2017, particularly since the election of Donald 
Trump.19 Thus, climate litigation is also of scholarly interest as a mechanism that is 
being (mis)used by well-resourced climate deniers (fossil fuel corporations, politicians, 
conservative think-tanks, front groups etc.) to undermine climate science and obstruct 
climate change regulation. As this type of anti-regulatory litigation remains largely 
concentrated in the United States, it does not directly contribute towards my thesis on 
the transnationalisation of climate law and legal practice and was therefore excluded.  
 
My PhD project has also run up against certain methodological limitations. Once 
published, the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report20  is likely to provide further and deeper 
insights into the links and interconnections between climate science and legal processes 
such as adjudication and litigation, particularly on event attribution science. 
Furthermore, my PhD project has predominantly engaged in doctrinal-textual analysis 
 
18 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the 
Truth on Issues From Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (Bloomsbury 2010).  
19 Climate Science Legal Defense Fund, ‘CSLDF in the Guardian: Climate Scientists are Under Attack 
from Frivolous Lawsuits’ (2016) < https://climatesciencedefensefund.org/2016/07/07/csldf-in-the-
guardian/> accessed 28 June 2017.  
20 The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report is expected to be rolled out from April to October 2021 (one per 
Working Group) and the Synthesis Report in June 2022. See IPCC, ‘Sixth Assessment Report’ (2019) 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/> accessed 13 August 2019.  
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of primary materials such as case law and legislation and relied on secondary materials 
like articles, books and media publications as complementary interpretive aids. 
Alternatively, other equally valid and fruitful ways of seeing and understanding the 
research questions raised by my PhD work are offered by sociological, socio-legal and 
anthropological frameworks.  
 
For example, there is considerable merit in conducting ethnographic research on 
governance activities that are occurring in the shadow of climate litigation and 
adjudication, particularly with respect to the networking initiatives and capacity 
building efforts of courts and climate litigants. Institutional ethnographic studies would 
further enrich our understanding of judicial and ENGO networks and serve to demystify 
their internal cultures and politics and unpack the range and complexity of their 
epistemological and governance activities. Of the three actors examined in my PhD 
work, only the IPCC has been the subject of close study by STS scholars.21 My PhD 
project has crafted an STS-style account of domestic courts and ENGOs in the context 
of climate change governance. This could be usefully complemented and bolstered by 
further ethnographic study. In this regard, sociological and anthropological perspectives 
on law, justice, legal practice and courts22 abound and may serve as instructive templates 
for carrying out such research.  
 
21 See Clark Miller, ‘Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental 
Governance in the Climate Regime’ (2001) 26 Science, Technology, & Human Values 4; Shadur 
Agrawala, ‘Structural and process history of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (1998) 39 
Climatic Change 1; Mark Vardy, Michael Oppenheimer, Navroz K. Dubash, Jessica O’Reilly & Dale 
Jamieson, ‘The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2017) 42 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources 1.  
22 For example, see Sally Engle Merry, ‘New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law’ 
(2006) 31 Law & Social Enquiry 4; Susan S. Silbey, Law and Science, Volume I: Epistemological, 
Evidentiary, and Relational Engagements (Routledge 2008); Susan S. Silbey, ‘Legal cultures and 
cultures of legality,’ in John R. Hall et al (eds), Handbook of Cultural Sociology (Routledge 2010), 
Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (University of Michigan Press 2000); Carol J. Greenhouse, 
‘Judgment and the Justice: An Ethnographic Reading of the Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings’ (2010) 8 





V. Final Reflections 
 
 
Few of us remain untouched by climate change. At the time of writing, we have emerged 
from unprecedented European heatwaves and the hottest July on record, which scientists 
are attributing to climate change.23 Monsoonal flooding and human displacement have 
repeatedly devastated my birth country of India while my home country of Australia 
experienced unprecedented bushfires in January 2020 – problems that are expected to 
worsen with each passing year. Confronted with such sobering realities, legal 
professionals and scientists of all stripes are often in the vanguard when dealing with 
the fallout from climatic events that now routinely claim both human and non-human 
victims. The sense of urgency with which climate scientists, NGO advocates, lawyers 
and judges are tackling climate change is hardly surprising and, for many, a welcome 
reprieve in the face of tepid and disingenuous responses from political elites. In an 
otherwise bleak global political landscape marked by the dual threats of rising right-
wing populism and climate catastrophe, these new kinds of transnational networks and 
alliances provide some grounds for cautious optimism. The growing activism on display 
within these networks and communities is here to stay, and the potential for fruitful 
collaborations and the development of more creative knowledge-based regulatory 
responses, modes of governance and societal reordering remains within our reach.  
 
23 Damian Carrington, ‘Climate change made European heatwave at least five times likelier,’ The 
Guardian (2 July 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/02/climate-change-european-
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